Chances, Counterfactuals and Credences

history   |   philosophy   |   sociology   |   science
יום שני 14/12/15, 18:00 עד 20:00
מיקום האירוע: 
Tel Aviv University: Gilman Building, Hall 449

Within the framework of the Bar-Hillel Colloquium for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science 2015-2016

In this talk Prof. Bradley will investigate the relationship between subjective probability (degrees of belief) and objective uncertainty (chances), with a focus on Skyrms' thesis that the subjective probability of a counterfactual is the expected conditional chance of truth of its antecedent, given the truth of its antecedent. The main aim will be to clarify what relationships between facts, counter-facts and chances must hold if Skyrms' thesis is true. To that end he will suggest how we can conceive of these various objects of belief in a manner that is relatively neutral with regard to their metaphysical and epistemological status, provide some of formal underpinnings for such a conception, and draw out is implications for decision theory.