The Gender Index

Gender Inequality in Israel

2015

Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher

with

Hanna Herzog

Naomi Chazan

WIPS • שווה

Advancement of Women
In the Public Sphere

מכון ון ליר בירושלים

THE VAN LEER JERUSALEM INSTITUTE

معهد فان لير في القدس

The Gender Index

Gender Inequality in Israel 2015

Principal Researcher: Dr. Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher

Research Team: Yulia Basin, Oleg Glybchenco

Steering Committee: Prof. Hanna Herzog, Prof. Naomi Chazan, Hadass Ben Eliyahu, Ronna Brayer-Garb

Academic Committee: Prof. Michal Shamir, Prof. Moshe Justman, Prof. Orit Kedar

WIPS • שווה

Advancement of Women In the Public Sphere

מכון ון ליר בירושלים

THE VAN LEER JERUSALEM INSTITUTE

معهد فان لير في القدس

The Gender Index
Gender Inequality in Israel
2015

English Translation: Janine Woolfson

Linguistic Editor, Foreword and Introduction: Deborah R. Schwartz

The development and publication of the Gender Index was made possible by generous donations from the following foundations:

Graphic Design: Rami & Jacky Studio Ltd

Typesetting: Nadav Shtechman Polischuk

Printed by: Printiv

The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS) was established at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in 2009 with the support of the Dafna Fund. WIPS is committed to gender mainstreaming as an overall strategy for promoting the democratic and civil status of women in diverse social groups. This approach aims to transform the issue of gender inequality into a general social worldview that relates to both women and men and to all social structures. The WIPS center aims to make gender equality an inseparable part of the thought and action of legislators and decision makers in various areas.

WIPS conducts research, promotes strategic thinking, and initiates projects and programs in areas relevant to implementing gender mainstreaming and gender equality in Israel. The founders of WIPS seek to make it a framework that brings together women's organizations, feminist activists, researchers, legislators, and decision makers, so that their dialogue and sharing of ideas will serve as a source of knowledge, guidance, and experience for anyone interested in promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in Israel. The center also promotes strategies to coordinate the efforts and impact of social action designed to promote the status of women and gender equality by connecting grassroots women's organizations, policy makers, legislators, and those acting for broad social change.

Acknowledgements

The 2015 Gender Index is the third in the series published by **The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS)**. The construction, development, and periodic publication of such an index are akin to long-distance running, in the sense that success is contingent upon continuity. The first Gender Index was launched at an international conference attended by scholars and policy makers from both Israel and abroad, an economist from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and researchers from the world's largest women's database, The WomanStats Project. The present Index not only continues monitoring the domains examined in previous years but expands to include new domains as well.

We would like to thank all who participated in this important endeavor. First and foremost we thank the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (VLJI), which hosts **WIPS**; Prof. Gabriel Motzkin, director of the VLJI; Prof. Moshe Justman, director of the Israeli Civil Society Division; and the VLJI's administrative staff and academic faculty, for their initial and sustained support. Were it not for their faith in the importance of the Index and their continuing moral and financial support, we could not have done this work. We extend our thanks and appreciation to Dr. Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher, principal researcher and developer of the Index, and the dedicated research team that worked with her: Yulia Basin and Oleg Glybchenco. Heartfelt thanks go out to the members of the Academic Committee who have been involved with this project since its inception—Prof. Michal Shamir, Prof. Moshe Justman, and Prof. Orit Kedar. Their insightful comments and useful suggestions contributed a great deal to the development of the new domains added to this year's Index. Many thanks also to Dr. Amit Kaplan, the reader-evaluator, whose in-depth perusal of the Index helped with sharp and accurate presentation of the findings and was augmented with important suggestions for continued development of the Index. We also thank representatives of the Central Bureau of Statistics, especially Yafit Alfandari; representatives of government ministries; and other bodies who participated in the conceptualization of new directions for developing the Index and new ways to gather gender-specific data. Our heartfelt thanks go to the women's organizations that cooperated and assisted in conceptualization from the inception of the Index. Again, the influence and success of the endeavor are contingent on continued efforts to develop the Index as a monitoring tool and a signpost for policy change.

Heartfelt thanks to Ronit Zimmer, who toiled over seeking funding opportunities and writing grant requests, and to Sandra Fein who submitted the many requests. We deeply thank the foundations who put their faith in us and helped us pursue this endeavor: The Dafna Fund, UN Women and the European Union, The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, The Hadassah Foundation, The Miriam Fund, Jewish Women's Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, Jewish Women's Foundation of the Greater Palm Beaches, and the Women's Amutot Program of the Greater Miami Jewish Federation.

The VLJI Publications Department stepped up, as it always does, and helped us avoid potholes along the road and abide by time constraints—among others, the intention of presenting the Index at the Knesset's Committee for the Advancement of Women and Gender Equality on the set date. We thank all who had a hand in the work, first and foremost Dr. Tal Kohavi, chief editor and director of the VLJI Publications Department, for her commitment to this project and her help, encouragement, and wise advice. Many thanks to Janine Woolfson for her careful translation of the report and to Deborah R. Schwarts for her thorough editing and good advice. Many thanks also to Yona Ratzon for the production of the report.

We thank our families and friends for their support and encouragement.

Hanna Herzog, Naomi Chazan, Ronna Brayer-Garb, Hadass Ben Eliyahu

Table of Contents

The 2015 Gender Index: Principal Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

The Gender Index developed by **The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS)** at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute is a powerful tool for monitoring and measuring the changing status of women and men in Israel over time. This report is the third annual publication of the Gender Index and it covers the years 2004 to 2013 – a full decade. The Index is developed on the basis of two guiding principles: the continuous expansion of the domains and indicators that comprise the Index and the examination of gender inequality not only in terms of the binary division between women and men but also in terms of the intersectionality of gender and other social categories, such as the periphery and Arab society in Israel. The Index is distinguished from other measurement tools by the breadth and depth of the perspective it offers. The data it yields render it a compass for decision makers and governmental and public agencies in Israel, and a vital tool for both women's organizations and wider civil society in determining agendas and plans of action directed at closing all social gaps.

The declared objective of **WIPS** is to integrate the concept of gender equality into social thought and action with a view to redefining the problem as one that affects Israeli society in general, rather than one that pertains only to women. As such the Gender Index grows out of a commitment to gender mainstreaming as a comprehensive strategy for promoting social and civil equality in a democratic society. The focus is not on the status of women per se but on the changes that take place in the status of women in comparison to that of men over time. Gender is not a synonym for women; it is a term that refers to all the social constructs based on the binary distinction between women and men, social definitions of the roles of women and men, and social expectations that direct men and women toward different functions in the economic, political, civil and cultural realms. The purpose of the gendered perspective is to demonstrate how social constructs based on the aforementioned binary distinctions give rise to inequality between women and men and expose the mechanisms that create unequal power relations between the genders. This perspective enables us to challenge the existing social order and reformulate it in a manner that gives credence to the realities, needs and life experiences of women from a variety of backgrounds and groups.

The 2015 Gender Index: New Features

The 2015 Gender Index has several new features:

a. **A comparison of the "Magnitude of Inequality" between various domains:** This new measure makes it possible to compare domains and rank them according to the degree of gender inequality they manifest. It also allows for examination of the severity of inequality in each domain over time, as well as any changes that occur. It can be used to identify the mechanisms that give rise to inequality in each area and guide prioritization in decision-making processes.

b. **An eleventh domain, "Time"** was added to the existing ten domains (Education, Labor Market, Gendered Segregation of Professions, Poverty, Power, Family Status, Violence against Women, Health, Arab Society, and the Periphery). The Time domain examines the distribution of time in the daily lives of women and men in the public and private realms and presents new loci that call for measurement of the gaps between women and men. At this stage the areas examined are leisure time (vacations and volunteerism) and "invisible" labor—housework and family care that is neither compensated nor factored into the calculation of contributions to the domestic and national economies. This domain emerged from the life experience of women, but it sheds light on the lives of men as well, bringing to the social agenda issues that have been neglected, particularly the perpetuation and ramifications of the gendered distribution of labor. The near absolute dearth of continuous data in this area, both in Israel and worldwide, indicates the degree to which indexes of social inequality are biased toward the life experiences of women and men in the public realm, while the **domestic realm is ignored.** The **WIPS** Gender Index seeks to address these biases and thus call the attention of decision makers and policy makers to invisible realms that create social inequality, thereby promoting public discourse in this regard.

c. **Three new indicators were added:** The Labor Market domain now has an indicator that examines benefits that men and women receive from their employers. These benefits are a form of worker compensation and have an effect on wages and are therefore significant in their gendered distribution. The Education domain now has an indicator that measures the degree of gender segregation in various academic fields. Given the degree of gender equality achieved in the educational realm over time, it is now important to ascertain which fields attract which gender in order to better understand the connection between education and the labor market. The Violence Against Women domain now has an indicator of the sense of personal safety while walking on the street. This indicator also reflects the life experience of women and the issues they identify as having impact on their daily lives.

Our goal is to continue expanding the areas of measurement and increasing the number of indicators in each domain, in order to augment the sensitivity of the Gender Index. The difficulty in achieving this goal is threefold: first, a prohibitive lack of data for many of the issues we propose; second, our approach requires a segmentation of data that challenges existing segmentations and requires the recalculation of existing data; and third, even when various measurements conducted by bodies responsible for data collection and analysis do take gender issues into consideration, the data collection is neither continuous nor systematic. Given this lack of sufficient data, we decided to highlight, in each new edition of the Gender Index, phenomena that call for examination and to seek out methodological solutions to the problem of how to present them. In 2015 the **spotlight** is on the following: representation of women and men in senior academic faculty positions; the differences between women and men in life satisfaction and their sense of loneliness; and the differences between Jewish and Arab women in a variety of areas.

Principal Findings

Like last year's Index, the 2015 Index does **not show a uniform trend** of gender inequality in all areas. Two trends can, however, be identified in the decade in question: from 2004 to 2007 gender inequality increased, and from 2010 to 2013 the overall incidence of gender inequality showed signs of decreasing. In the second case, with the exception of the Education and Gendered Segregation of Professions domains, which showed increased inequality, all other domains remained stable or improved during this time. The decrease that occurred in recent years was particularly evident in three domains: Arab Society, Poverty and Power. However, this decrease derived in part from a **general deterioration** in employment conditions for both men and women and not from an improvement in women's situation. It should also be noted that despite the improvement, the **magnitude of inequality across all domains remains high** (59%), particularly in the Power, Labor Market and Gendered Segregation of Professions domains. These findings indicate the enormity of the ongoing challenge we face with regard to promoting equality between women and men in Israel.

One of the main causes of the stability of the gender gap and the moderate, if equivocal, trend toward decreased inequality is the depth of the gap in the **Labor Market** domain. The gap is both deep and stable in all the indicators in this domain: labor market participation, pay, contract workers, part-time employment and the depth of segregation by profession. Likewise, the gender gap in the **Power** domain is the deepest and most stable across the years, though the political representation (women in government) indicator showed a decrease in gender inequality. This decrease, however, was caused by the smaller government in which there were fewer male ministers rather than by increased representation of women. The only domain in which gender inequality actually decreased during the measurement period was **Education**: not only are there no gaps between women and men in years of study, but genderization within education has shrunk over the years—that is, women are acquiring education in more fields with a view to more successful integration into the labor market. This means that **women are acquiring human capital in order to integrate into the public realm, but they are not managing to translate this into either achievements in the labor market or narrowing the gaps in political and economic power.** They are encountering structural and cultural obstacles that restrict their ability to do so.

An in-depth examination of these data—decreased inequality in the Education domain versus stasis in the Power and Labor Market domains—yields two principal insights. First, although women are investing time and effort in acquiring the tools for integration into the labor market, gendered segregation in fields of study in higher education is still deep, and this is one of the main causes of gender inequality in this domain. The second, non-contingent, insight is that we need to seek an explanation for the gender gap in the deeply gendered structure of the labor market. This structure is in large part a function of the gendered division of tasks and responsibilities with regard to home and family care. It negatively impacts women's ability to achieve positions of political and economic power. Hence, the blame should not be placed on women alone but on society as a whole. The only strategy that can bring about policy changes that will effectively reduce gender inequality is one of gender mainstreaming, which brings gendered considerations into every aspect of life.

The gender-mainstreaming perspective involves not only tracking the changes in gender gaps in a variety of domains but also inquiring as to the underlying processes that are manifest in these gaps. In most of the domains measured, improvements in women's situation over time were usually accompanied by a similar improvement in men's—the "floor" rises while the "ceiling" soars—thus leaving the gender gap fairly static. In contrast, a narrowing of the gender gap usually indicates a general deterioration—that is, a reality in which both men and women have fewer opportunities. In other words, a gendered perspective enables us to see that decreased gender gaps do not necessarily attest to improvement in the social situation, and sometimes even reflect deterioration in the social and economic conditions. The Gender Index therefore contributes to understanding broad processes taking place in the economy and in society in Israel and assessing their impact on gender gaps in diverse fields of life. Two of the main conclusions of the 2015 Gender Index are presented below, along with relevant findings:

a. Decreased gaps are prominent at the intersection of social position and gender:

- The gap between women and men was smaller in the periphery than in the center of Israel (though women in the former are still disadvantaged). This, however, does not reflect an improvement in women's situation but rather a narrowed set of opportunities in the periphery that affects both women and men.
- The spotlight on the comparison between Jewish and Arab societies shows that in the Arab sector inequality between men and women in the Labor Market domain, in the indicators of monthly and hourly wages, is lower than in the general population. This, however, is more a function of the limited opportunities for Arab men in the labor market than of progress toward gender equality.

b. Narrowed gaps may well indicate deterioration in conditions for both men and women:

- The ratio between the average monthly wages of women and men decreased to 0.68 (from 0.66 in 2010 and 2012). However, this decrease derived from a drop in the average wages of men and not from a significant rise in women's wages.
- The gap between the number of women and men employed part-time narrowed in recent years, and this indicator was a major contributor to the decrease in gender inequality in the Labor Market domain. But the narrowing resulted mainly from a rise in the number of men employed part-time (which is still half the number of women thus employed). This trend demonstrated deterioration in employment opportunities and conditions for both women and men rather than improvement in the situation of women workers.
- The gap between the rates of men and women employed as contract workers closed: the 2015 Index shows that the rate of males employed as contract workers thus equaled the rate of women. However, this is mainly an indication of the deteriorating labor conditions of male workers and of worsening conditions in the unstable labor market, since this form of employment means less job security and fewer social benefits.

- The gap between women and men with regard to employee benefits for full-time employees is a new indicator, appearing in the 2015 Index for the first time. It too decreased, but here again not because of improved conditions for women but rather a decrease in benefits given to men.
- In the years 2009-2013, the gap between women and men receiving income support narrowed. But this finding too stemmed from decreased allocation of such support to both women and men. This reduced the inequality index in the Poverty domain, but not the rate of poverty.

Policy Recommendations

The Gender Index calls attention to many aspects of gender inequality and facilitates bringing a gender-sensitive perspective on social issues to the public agenda. Its findings help identify areas that call for intervention and policy planning. The Index can therefore serve as a guide for the action plan authorized by the government in December 2014, the objective of which is to promote gender equality in all aspects of life and to integrate gendered thinking in government initiatives, including the processes of planning and policymaking.[1] In this context the Index stresses that women (like men) are not a homogeneous social group, and therefore **the gender mainstreaming strategy for promoting equality must take into account the distinct needs and interests of women from a variety of population groups and social positions**. Moreover, the ramifications of action plans, legislation, policies and allocation of resources must be examined in terms of the distinct needs of women from diverse social groups in order to ensure that justice and equality will not be the sole preserve of women from a particular social class.

Gender mainstreaming as a strategy for promoting gender equality is an innovative approach that requires new skills and knowledge bases. To this end there is a need for **tailored training to target audiences**: decision makers at all levels, advisers on the status of women and gender equality, and more. This issue was acknowledged by the aforementioned government decision, and its implementation by the National Authority for the Advancement of Women will create the necessary professional infrastructure to achieve gender mainstreaming in processes of planning, resource allocation and policy making on all levels.

Owing to the ongoing lack of gender-sensitive data, there is a need for **legislation that will ensure gendered data collection** in a systematic and continuous fashion. Such a database would provide both the foundation and the momentum for the promotion of gender equality in various domains. Thus, for example, as is evident in the Time domain, there is a need for **a survey of time-use** that will enable the exposure of gendered aspects of time usage and the apprehension of their patterns, including the "invisible labor" issue. To achieve such a database, gender mainstreaming is called for in the organizations that collect and publish data, such as the Central Bureau of Statistics and the National Insurance Institute, as well as other government, public and private institutions.

1 Government decision no. 2331. See www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2014/Pages/des2331.aspx.

The Time domain exposes only a fraction of the time-use patterns of women and men that have many repercussions in both the public and private spheres. A gendered view of time usage calls for a reconceptualization and recalculation of **national accounts** in a way that also reflects the activities and economic contributions of women. Today women make a double "contribution" to the economy, both in that they earn less (which profits employers, including the state, which is a large employer) and in the "invisible labor" they do, mainly in the private sphere, work that is neither acknowledged nor compensated.

As noted, the Gender Index domain that evidenced the deepest inequality was that of Power. To remedy this situation there is a need for **affirmative action**, even if for a limited period of time, in appointed positions, as well as guaranteed representation of women from diverse social groups in elected positions. Failure to take such steps, which is evident among other things in the continuous funding of political parties that exclude women or the failure to ensure that women are represented in national and local government positions, has thus far directly contributed to the perpetuation of the gendered structure of the public sphere. The principle of equal representation must also be applied in the labor market, as has been achieved in the European Union. Among other things, it is important to define quotas for the representation of women in corporate executive positions in order to increase said representation within a relatively short period of time.

Hanna Herzog, Naomi Chazan, Ronna Brayer-Garb, Hadass Ben Eliyahu

Introduction

This is the third publication of the Gender Index, a systematic monitoring of gender inequality in Israel developed by The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere (WIPS) at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (VLJI). The Index is designed to serve as a tool for examining levels of gender inequality in Israel over time. It presents differences between women and men in a variety of domains and provides an overall assessment of gender inequality in Israel today on the basis of a composite of these domains.

The Gender Index is the first of its kind in that it examines gender inequality within the state, while other such indexes compare between countries. It can therefore serve as a policy compass for decision makers and government and public officials in the State of Israel, as well as guide civil organizations, among them women's organizations, in the formulation of policy that fosters gender equality. The Gender Index's contribution, in comparison with other indexes in Israel and elsewhere, lies in its systematic examination of data in a variety of spheres over several years and in its provision of a composite "score." This structure facilitates examination of various developments in each area and component while providing an overall depiction of the state of gender inequality in Israel—a whole that exceeds the sum of its parts. Moreover, this index takes into account aspects of gender inequality that are not included in other indexes—for example, the Arab society domain—because it was developed on the basis of an in-depth understanding of the Israeli context. The index of Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), for example, examines only the rate of women in parliament, the rate of women in decision-making economic positions, and income discrepancies between women and men. Similarly, the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) focuses on only three areas: health and fertility, empowerment, and the labor market. These well-known indexes do not address, for example, aspects of gender inequality among disadvantaged populations.[2]

The Gender Index is issued annually. Each year the domains are updated, and new domains and indicators that illuminate aspects of women's life not addressed in other indexes are added. The objective of the Index is to provide a tool for long-term monitoring of the situation while simultaneously stimulating the creation of new data sets that are currently either not collected at all or are not broken down by gender. In this way it will help expose the gender blindness in many areas and highlight the severity of both the genderization of society and of gender inequality. Without such an analysis, these realities are overlooked. Furthermore, the Index can serve as a model for the development of similar indexes in other countries and thus become a new tool for intercountry comparison—which today is only available for a limited number of indicators.

New Features Included in the 2015 Index

The 2015 Gender Index examines gender inequality in eleven discrete domains comprising fifty-six indicators, at ten points in time from 2004 to 2013.[3] (The 2014 Gender Index had ten domains comprising fifty indicators.) This Index has the following new features and additions:

2 For more on international gender indexes, see Appendix I.

3 Data usually become available after two years; hence, the 2015 Gender Index reports on data from 2013.

- The new domain, time, reflects gender inequality with respect to leisure, volunteerism and unpaid work within the home. This is a significant addition because the magnitude and depth of gender inequality cannot be apprehended without consideration of the manner in which unpaid labor—whether in the private or public realms—is distributed and executed.[4] There is no systematic monitoring of such labor on the national scale. In the absence of such data, it is even more important to include indirect indicators in the assessment of gender inequality in the domain of time.
- Another addition is a measurement of the depth of gender inequality in each of the domains examined in the Index. In this context "depth" is the magnitude and severity of the inequality, which can be compared among the domains and thus facilitate prioritizing treatment.
- A new indicator was added to the labor market domain: employee benefits for salaried employees (women vs. men).
- A new indicator was added to the education domain: gendered segregation by field of study in universities.
- A new indicator was added to the violence against women domain: women and men's sense of personal safety in the public realm.

These additions extend the purview of the Gender Index and shed light on previously unexamined factors.[5] Moreover, for the first time the data provide a comprehensive overview of a full decade. As noted, improvement of the Index involved, among other things, the development of new data sets that would shed light on gender inequality in previously unexamined areas in order to attain a richer, more complex and beneficial depiction of the reality of women's lives in Israel, across all levels of society. At the same time, the updating of data each year will make it possible to monitor changes in gender inequality in Israel over time.

Using the Index to Examine Gender Inequality

The idea for the development of the Gender Index is rooted in several theoretical approaches, among them human development, women's empowerment, gender equality and gender mainstreaming (GM). The first gender index, the GDI, was developed by the United Nations in 1995. The GDI viewed gender inequality as an issue related to general human development and not just to women, and it aimed to contribute to policy discussion on the subject of gender inequality and meet the need for analysis and policy formulation. Other indexes were developed with the explicit goal of women's empowerment.[6]

In contrast to both of the aforementioned approaches, **WIPS**'s Gender Index approaches gender inequality as a problem related to social structure. Its point of origin is the strategy of gender mainstreaming, according to which it is vitally important to highlight the mechanisms

4 This has been demonstrated by many studies: see, for example, Daniels (1987); Garey and Hansen (2011); Bianchi et al. (2012).

5 All indicators were subjected to statistical screening so that they could be grouped in a single index. For a detailed explanation of the methodology used in developing the Gender Index, see Appendix II.

6 For more on indexes in other countries, see Appendix I.

that create gender inequality. One such powerful mechanism is the distinction between the public and domestic/private spheres. This distinction is accompanied by a hierarchical perception of the standing and importance of the two spheres: the public sphere, mainly economics and politics, is perceived as the core of society and considered "masculine," while the domestic/private sphere is considered the domain of women. The absence of equitable division of labor between women and men in the two spheres, along with the differential valuation of paid labor versus caregiving, gives rise to gender inequality. Thus, for example, women who work in the labor market, even those who hold senior positions (elected officials or other leadership roles), are often perceived as mothers—or as also mothers, or as future mothers—and therefore as having secondary status in the labor and "power" markets. The Gender Index must therefore address manifestations of inequality that are functions of gendered perceptions and structures.

The perception reflected in the Index, as opposed to other gender indexes, is broad rather than specific. Many gender indexes suffer from oversimplification of the inequality they measure. Certain indicators, such as life expectancy and education, are presented as evidence that women have significant advantages over men, but they fail to reflect women's overall quality of life—the resources at their disposal, their degree of economic independence, their medical situation and their limitations in old age.

The uneven distribution of work (paid and unpaid) and its repercussions on access to economic resources and the risk of sinking into poverty must be adequately emphasized by any index describing gender inequality. A gender index must focus on gender distribution in employment and unemployment rates, types of employment, available income and economic compensation. To reflect all of these, the index must also examine time spent caring for family, division of responsibilities within the family, and leisure time and activities. Time spent on caregiving, work and leisure are extremely important indicators for the index, and the new time domain included in the 2015 Gender Index will facilitate its consideration. An extremely important area examined in the present Index—one that rarely features in other indexes, partly because of a dearth of reliable, available data—violence against women. Inequality is prominent in this area—at home, in the workplace and in society. Another area covered by this Index is disadvantaged women, such as Arab women, women in the periphery and poor women—in recognition of the fact that women do not constitute a homogeneous social group and that differences between women that affect their life circumstances must be taken into account. The aim is to avoid an index that reflects only women of high socioeconomic status.

The Gender Index constitutes a comprehensive overview of perceptions of gender inequality in society. Its development involved dialogue with women's organizations, policy makers, data providers such as the Central Bureau of Statistics, the National Insurance Institute, the Ministry of Public Security, the Knesset's Research and Information Center, and the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women. We also maintain contact with the OECD, which has helped us begin considering ways of quantitatively measuring the gender gap and finding suitable methods of data collection that will reflect inequality with a view to decreasing it. Contact with these agencies, some of which are directly involved in shaping and promoting policy, is an important factor in rendering this Gender Index an influential tool both in Israel and beyond.

The Structure of the Gender Index

The Gender Index comprises eleven interrelated domains that together provide a comprehensive overview of the gaps between women and men. As a group, these domains facilitate comparison and consequently formulation of policy for closing the gaps in each. Furthermore, and just as important, we hope that the act of measurement itself and the publication of the data will expose inequality in less predictable areas. The present Gender Index features six new indicators: gendered segregation in fields of study has been added to the education domain; employee benefits to the labor market domain; the sense of safety in the public realm was added to violence against women; and the new time domain contains three new indicators.

The following section, **Monitoring of Inequality in Israel**, describes the structure of the Index, elaborating on the domains and the indicators that comprise them. Then, in the **Summary of Results of the Gender Index** section, the comprehensive (aggregate) results are presented, showing the changes in inequality in 2013 in comparison with 2012 and preceding years and the development of inequality between the years 2004 and 2013. The next section, **Gender Index Results for the Eleven Domains**, describes the results for each of the domains individually. The **education domain** presents discrepancies between men and women acquiring higher education—those with 13–15 years of study and those with 16 or more years of study. It also presents gendered segregation in higher education in Israel. The **labor market domain** outlines gaps between women and men in labor market participation levels, income, part-time employment rates, and more. The **gendered segregation of professions domain** outlines the rate of women in certain professions that are characterized by relatively high employment segregation (that is, a relatively high concentration of men or women in relation to the population distribution and in relation to other professions); this section also presents the gender segregation by occupation indicator, which we constructed according to the Duncan Index of gender segregation in professions and employment sectors. [7]

The **poverty domain** traces the prevalence of poverty among women as opposed to men, and the gap between the number of women and the number of men receiving income support stipends. The **power domain** features indicators that reflect social influence and power in the political and economic realms. Among these are the rates of women members of parliament, mayors, CEOs and women in senior civil service positions. The **family status domain** describes the differences in (first) marriage age between men and women, the enormous discrepancy in the rate of single family households headed by women versus those headed by men, and the rate of teen pregnancies. The **time domain** describes distribution of time between men and women with respect to leisure and responsibility for home and family care. It also measures differences between men and women in time spent vacationing both in Israel and abroad, in time spent volunteering, and the rates of women employed part-time or not at all because of domestic responsibilities. The **violence against women domain** describes the number of new sex offense files opened by the rape crisis centers, the number of domestic violence complaints made, the number of clients at welfare ministry centers, and more. For the first time, the sense

7 For an explanation of the Duncan Index, please see: Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification," American Journal of Sociology 60 (March, 1955): 493–503.

of personal safety in the public realm is included. The **health domain** presents the gaps between women and men in life expectancy, mortality rates and self-assessment of health status. In the **Arab society domain**, some indicators pertain to the situation of Arab women in the labor market in contrast to that of Arab men, while some indicators pertain to family status and education. The **periphery domain** presents the gaps between women and men in the center of the country in comparison with the periphery, by labor market participation level and by average monthly income.[8]

As noted previously, each of the eleven domains consists of several indicators, and the overall trends are examined for the years 2004–2013. Figures for each indicator are presented in all domains, both in numeric terms and in terms of the relation between women and men. Explanatory notes accompany the figures. The conclusion to each domain features a chart that presents the development of inequality in that domain over the period of measurement.

Following presentation of the domains and their individual results, the specific 2013 results are presented in the section titled **Results of the 2015 Gender Index by Domain**. This section provides a more detailed elaboration of the measurement results in each domain for the last year of measurement and examines changes that occurred at this time in comparison with preceding years.

The Gender Index report has two appendices: **Appendix I** describes gender indexes used elsewhere in the world, after which it lists the gender indexes developed in Israel. **Appendix II** provides a detailed description of the methodology employed in the development of the Gender Index.[9]

The Gender Index expresses gender gaps in Israel in quantitative terms. It breaks the phenomenon down into clear categories for the consideration and comparison of inequality between women and men in Israeli society. In doing so it facilitates the redefinition of these problems and the formulation of policies directed at addressing them. Moreover, the Index makes it possible to compare policies employed in the different domains examined. It is our aspiration that the Gender Index will be used to lend momentum to the discourse regarding gender inequality in Israel, to encourage the implementation of reforms in existing policies, and to formulate proposals for the improvement of gender equity. In addition we hope to call attention to manifestations of inequality that go unnoted but that need to be considered in the context of the struggle for gender equality.

Methodology

The data comprising the domains of the Gender Index come from different content areas in a variety of disciplines. Seemingly, they cannot be used collectively for the presentation of an overall situation at any given time. However, the logic that guides the Index gives it the ability to indicate a general trend that is more comprehensive than the data displayed in each area separately. The grouping of data and their expression as a single numeric value make it

8 Our definition of the periphery as the north and south regions of the country is based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' regional sectors.

9 See the Gender Index online at www.genderindex.vanleer.org.il.

possible to examine the changes that have taken place in the gender inequality situation over the years in many areas simultaneously.

Development of the Gender Index involved creating the simplest possible platform for estimation, into which more indicators and domains could be added to reflect more and more quantitative manifestations of gender inequality—separately and comprehensively. To select indicators with the capacity to express gender inequality, we held extensive talks with members of the steering committee and with feminist organizations. We compiled a list of the dozens of social manifestations of gender inequality and sought indicators that had internal validity and lent themselves to the quantitative expression of said manifestations. The indicators are variables that are monitored consistently each year, in the same manner and by the same executors.

The next step was matching the manifestations of gender inequality with the existing indicators. We found dozens of indicators, calculated the correlations among them and then used factor analysis to determine their relevance to gender inequality. At the end of this screening process we were left with fifty-six indicators that are not overly correlated with one another but that correlate to the first predictive factor established by the factor analysis. The first year for which we have data for all indicators that met the criteria is 2004, and therefore this is the first year of measurement.

The selected indicators were converted into the ratio between the rate of men and the rate of women. The resulting ratio reflects the level of gender inequality, so that a higher ratio indicates greater inequality. Indicators that were not expressed as ratios were standardized, and some are presented as a proportion of the population. All the indicators in each of the Index's domains were measured and their averages calculated independently, thus creating an infrastructure for monitoring gender inequality in each individual domain. In each domain we squared the score, totaled, and divided by eleven to obtain the overall Gender Index value for the given year. This formula—that is, the squaring of the average value of each domain—is based on the OECD's Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI).[10]

This year we added an additional measure—**magnitude of inequality**, by means of which the severity of inequality in different domains can be ranked and compared. Only indicators that express the inequality in proportional terms are included in this measure—that is, indicators with values that express differences in equivalent and defined terms and have an absolute zero that indicates absence of inequality (e.g., salary or political representation). This property makes it possible to compare the degree of inequality in one indicator with that in another, and also to compare different time periods within an indicator. The number of indicators meeting this prerequisite is 39. On the basis of these indicators, divided into domains, we calculated the general magnitude of inequality by means of averaging.

The Gender Index is computed according to the following formula:

Index = 1/11*(education)^2 + 1/11*(labor market)^2 + 1/11*(gendered segregation of professions)^2 + 1/11*(poverty)^2 + 1/11*(power)^2 + 1/11*(family status)^2 + 1/11*(time)^2 + 1/11*(violence)^2 + 1/11*(health)^2 + 1/11*(Arab society)^2 + 1/11*(periphery)^2

10 See Appendix I for more on the SIGI Index.

This formula minimizes the degree to which one domain compensates for inequality in another domain. It assumes that disadvantage caused by inequality does not increase in a linear fashion, and it augments the mobility of the Index in comparison with the mobility of its constituent domains. The comprehensive Gender Index score for each year is obtained in this manner. The significance of this number does not lie in its numeric value but in its relative value in comparison with other years.[11]

The Database

The Gender Index is based on data obtained from several official sources, chief among them the Central Bureau of Statistics. Because the Index monitors changes in gender inequality, it is imperative to use stable data sets gathered in the same manner each year. We also used data from the National Insurance Institute—the poverty and social gaps report, the average wage and income report, by locale, and other economic variables—and the Knesset Research and Information Center, which obtains its data from the police, the courts administration, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel. Another source of data pertaining to segregation in the labor market is the Civil Service Commission's Department for the Advancement and Integration of Women.

The Central Bureau of Statistics obtains its data by issuing and processing surveys of the labor force, income and society. In 2012 the labor force and income surveys underwent a comprehensive change following Israel becoming a member of the OECD. Experts from that organization recommended these changes in order to improve the comparability of data pertaining to Israel with data from other member countries. The changes affect, among other things, the sample size, inclusion of temporary and permanent military personnel, and increased frequency of measurement—monthly rather than quarterly—face-to-face rather than telephone interviews, and an increased number of locales. These changes affect the comparison of 2012 with previous years in the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, Arab society and poverty domains.[12] It should be noted that some of the 2013 data have yet to be released by the CBS, and as a result extrapolations were performed for some indicators (these are identified in footnotes).

Monitoring Gender Inequality in Israel

Table 1 (below) depicts the structure of the 2015 Gender Index. The Index is based on calculation of gender inequality in Israel in eleven domains: education, labor market, gendered segregation of professions, poverty, power, family status, time, violence against women, health, Arab society and the periphery. Each domain reflects an aggregation of several indicators from a group of fifty-six in total.

11 See the Appendices for a detailed description of the methodology.

12 See footnote 16 for more information.

Table 1

The Gender Index 2015: Domains and Indicators

1. Education	2. Labor Market	3. Gendered Segregation of Professions	4. Poverty	5. Power	6. Family Status	7. Time	8. Violence Against Women	9. Health	10. Arab Society	11. Periphery
1. 13–15 years of education	1. Workforce participation	1. Engineers and architects	1. Incidence of poverty	1. Members of parliament	1. Teen pregnancies (ages 15–19)	1. Vacations in Israel	1. Calls to rape crisis centers	1. Life expectancy	1. Labor market participation	1. Labor market participation
2. 16+ years of education	2. Part-time employment	2. Doctors, pharmacists, and veterinarians	2. Income support recipients	2. Government ministers	2. Women heading single-parent families	2. Vacations abroad	2. Status of new sex offense files	2. Mortality rate	2. Part-time employment	2. Gross monthly salary
3. Segregation in higher education	3. Gross monthly salary	3. Judges and lawyers		3. Heads of local municipalities	3. Age at marriage	3. Volunteerism	3. Women in treatment at Welfare Ministry centers	3. Subjective evaluation of good health	3. Gross monthly salary	
	4. Gross hourly wage	4. Women in teaching professions		4. CEOs		4. Part-time work because of domestic obligations	4. Domestic violence files opened		4. Gross hourly wage	
	5. Median wage	5. Nannies and caregivers		5. Senior managers		5. Unemployed because of domestic obligations	5. Files closed for lack of evidence		5. 13–15 years of education	
	6. Contract workers	6. Women in hi-tech		6. Other managers			6. Sense of personal safety in public spaces		6. 16+ years of education	
	7. Recipients of employee benefits	7. Segregation by occupation		7. Top three ranks of the civil service					7. Domestic violence complaints	
		8. Segregation by industry		8. Senior contracts in the civil service					8. Teen pregnancies (ages 15–19)	
									9. Age at marriage	

* Green = New indicators; Orange = Indicators that were moved to a new domain

Summary of the Gender Index Results

Figure 1 (below) depicts the rate of change of the level of gender inequality in Israel from 2004 to 2013. **Ascending functions are indicative of increased gender inequality. Therefore, a composite ascending curve also indicates increased gender inequality in comparison with the previous year, and a descending curve indicates decreased inequality and hence a positive trend**. For indicators that do not reflect the ratio between women and men—for example, the number of complaints filed due to domestic violence—the higher the number relative to the size of the population, the higher the inequality and the Index's score.

The figure depicts the development of the Gender Index in Israel over the measurement period. Each point on the graph represents a weighted average of all the indicators and domains used to examine gender inequality in each year in relation to the base year—2004. Two main periods of changing trends stand out: the first is from 2004 to 2007—a rise in gender inequality (with the exception of 2006) is evident; the second is 2008-2013, in which we see a decreasing trend in gender inequality (with the exception of 2010). It is hence impossible to assert the existence of an unequivocal trend over the measurement period, either in terms of increased or decreased gender inequality.

Figure 1

Results of the Gender Index 2004–2013



Figure 2 (below) describes the rates of change in the Index in each year compared with the preceding year. It depicts an increase of 5.2% in gender inequality in the years 2004-2007, which can be attributed to increasing inequality in the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, poverty, power, time, violence against women and periphery domains. The years 2008-2009 showed an improvement: inequality retreated from its peak in 2007 by 3.9%. In 2010 inequality rose once again, by 3.2%, owing to deterioration in seven domains, but especially the

labor market and violence against women. In 2011 inequality decreased by 5.5% as a result of improvements in the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, violence against women, and Arab society domains. In 2012 gender inequality decreased by another 1.5% and approached the values recorded in 2004, the beginning of the measurement period. An additional decrease in inequality of 4.4% occurred in 2013, due to reduced inequality in the following domains: poverty, family status, time, and particularly power, with all indicators in this domain showing improvement. In 2013 the following domains were stable or showed slight improvement: labor market, health, Arab society and the periphery. By contrast, slight increases in inequality were evident in the domains of education, gendered segregation of professions and violence against women.

Figure 2

Results of the Gender Index 2004–2013: Rates of Change for Each Year in Comparison With the Previous Year



Summary of Results: Measurement of the Magnitude of Inequality

Measurement of the magnitude of inequality between women and men in Israel is a new feature in this year's Gender Index. This measurement lends expression to the extent of gender inequality in each domain and overall. The base year for the Gender Index has been determined as 2004, for purposes of comparing results in each and every domain and for the index as a whole, in order to assess whether inequality increased or decreased in relation to the previous year. However, this methodology does not enable us to attribute properties of magnitude or size to gender inequality nor to determine in which domain the gender inequality is largest or smallest. Consequently, we developed an additional measure to estimate and compare the magnitude of gender inequality, one that encompasses thirty-nine of the fifty-six indicators included in the Index. As noted above,

the indicators included in this measure were those in which the degree of inequality is a ratio—that is, an indicator with values reflecting equal differences in the given variable, fixed units, and an absolute zero which indicates an absence of inequality.[13] For example, the gap between the average gross monthly income of women and men is 31.9%. By contrast, the gap between the hourly wages of women and men is 14.4%. Hence, inequality in monthly income is over twice as large as that in hourly income. Thus, it is now possible to compare the magnitude or size of inequality for 70% of the indicators included in the Index, to identify the most problematic areas, and to rank indicators according to the severity of inequality.

The magnitude of inequality aligns itself with those indicators that use standard quantitative measurement. In other words, this means indicators with values that can be expressed in numeric terms for both men and women and therefore offer a relatively conservative measurement of gender inequality in the sense that it pertains to issues that are conventionally recognized in professional discourse and by policy makers as reflective of gender disparities in society. Focus on these indicators neglects the less traditional and more innovative indicators, which are employed less in most indexes. This is particularly evident with regard to domestic violence and violence against women, as well as the areas of fertility and health. The magnitude of inequality is hence a more conventional and less challenging tool in terms of the issues it measures. However, it does pose a challenge to the professional discourse in terms of methodology, since most of the existing indexes do not feature this kind of measurement in multiple domains. Table 2 (below) presents the indicators included in the calculation of the magnitude of gender inequality (39 in total) and Figure 3a depicts it in all the indicators examined.

Figure 3a

Magnitude of Inequality in All the Indicators Examined (39 in Total)



13 The domains included in the calculation of the magnitude of gender inequality are: education, labor market, poverty, power, time and the periphery. Only selected indicators from the following domains were included in the calculation: gendered segregation of professions, family status, violence against women, health and Arab society.

Table 2

Indicators Included in Calculation of the Magnitude of Gender Inequality

1. Education	2. Labor Market	3. Gendered Segregation of Professions	4. Poverty	5. Power	6. Family Status	7. Time	8. Violence Against Women	9. Health	10. Arab Society	11. Periphery
1. 13–15 years of education 2. 16+ years of education 3. Segregation in higher education	1. Workforce participation 2. Part-time employment 3. Gross monthly salary 4. Gross hourly wage 5. Median wage 6. Contract workers 7. Income support recipients	1. Segregation by occupation 2, Segregation by industry	1. Incidence of poverty 2. Income support recipients	1. Members of parliament 2. Government ministers 3. Heads of local municipalities 4. CEOs 5. Senior managers 6. Other managers 7. Top three ranks of the civil service 8. Senior contracts in the civil service	1. Women heading single-parent families 2. Age at marriage	1. Vacations in Israel 2. Vacations abroad 3. Volunteerism 4. Part-time work because of domestic obligations 5. Unemployed because of domestic obligations	1. Sense of personal safety in public spaces	1. Subjective evaluation of good health	1. Labor market participation 2. Part-time employment 3. Gross monthly salary 4. 13–15 years of education 5. 16+ years of education 6. Age at marriage	1. Labor market participation 2. Gross monthly salary

As the table demonstrates, in 2004, the base year, the magnitude of inequality was 66%. The severest magnitude of inequality was in 2007 (70%), followed by a gradual decrease until 2011, when the magnitude of inequality once again reached 66%. In 2012 it decreased to 57% and rose slightly in 2013 to 59%. The decrease in magnitude of inequality in recent years can largely be attributed to changes in three domains: Arab society, poverty and power (especially political power). In Arab society, which has the highest degree of gender inequality, a progressive narrowing of the gaps (which are far wider than in the rest of Israeli society) is in evidence. Gender gaps also decreased in the poverty domain as a result of deterioration in the circumstances of the middle and lower income percentiles of the population. The reduction in gender gaps in the political power domain derives from the rise in the number of women elected to the Knesset in the 2013 elections. In summary, it can be said that gender inequality in Israel has decreased slightly over the past two years, but this is not the sharp or unequivocal drop we would like to see, especially since it was partly caused by a general deterioration in the employment situation (which affects society in general) and was not necessarily from an improvement in women's circumstances. Figure 3b depicts the magnitude of gender inequality (i.e., the distance from full equality) in eight domains.[14]

Figure 3b

Magnitude of Gender Inequality in Eight Domains



14 The three domains omitted from the figure are family status, violence against women and health. In the first domain, the single-parent head of family indicator renders the depth of inequality extreme and precludes comparison with other domains. The second domain, by definition, does not involve comparison with violence against men and hence measures the direction but not the depth of inequality. The third domain is not included because it comprises a single indicator.

As the figure demonstrates, gender inequality in education is low, never exceeding 7%. By contrast, it is 30% in the labor market domain, 50% in gendered segregation of professions, and highest of all in the power domain: 60%. These results are similar to the results of the European EIGE index.[15] It follows, especially in light of the results in the power domain, that there is a need for explicitly pro-women's advancement policies in institutions and organizations. Such an initiative was launched in Europe with the goal of seeing women hold 30% of executive positions within a five-year time span. Table 3 depicts the direction of change in the degree of inequality from year to year, from 2004 to 2013.

Table 3

Results of the Gender Index 2004–2013: Fluctuations in Gender Inequality in Each Domain from One Year to the Next (+ indicates deterioration; – indicates improvement)

Domain / Year	Education	Labor Market	Gendered Segregation Of Professions	Poverty	Power	Family Status	Time	Violence Against Women	Health	Arab Society	Periphery
2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2005	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+
2006	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
2007	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+
2008	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-
2009	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-
2010	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+
2011	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+
2012	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-
2013	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	0	-	-

The above table demonstrates that in 2005 the status of women deteriorated in most domains: gendered segregation of professions, poverty, power, time, violence against women, health and the periphery. The overall result was an increase of 3.3% in inequality between women and men in comparison with 2004.

In 2006 there was an increase in inequality in the domains of the labor market, poverty and time, and a significant 5.3% rise in the domain of violence against women. In contrast to the increase in these domains, there was improvement in education, gendered segregation of professions, power, family status, Arab society and the periphery. After adjustment, the overall Gender Index dropped by 0.9%.

In 2007 there was an increase in gender inequality in most of the domains. The situation deteriorated in the domains of labor market, poverty, power, family status, time, violence against women, health and the periphery. Improvements in the domains of education, the

15 The EIGE index examines inequality in several domains for each country in the European Union. It measures economic decision making by the number of women corporate directors. See pp.137–138, http://eige.europa.eu/apps/gei/content/Gender-Equality-Index-Report.pdf. For more on the EIGE, see Appendix I.

labor market and Arab society were too small to reverse the overall trend, and the Gender Index as a whole rose by 2.8% for this year.

In 2008, there were improvements: inequality in the labor market domain decreased by 0.9%, in the gendered segregation of professions domain by 2.2%, in the family status domain by 3.3%, in the time domain by 4.1%, in the violence against women domain by 3.3%, and in the periphery domain by 1.4%. As a result there was an improvement of 2.3% in the index overall.

In 2009 there was further improvement, and most domains demonstrated a decrease in inequality. The overall index improved by 1.6%. However, this trend was reversed in 2010 as a result of increased inequality in several domains: a 1.6% rise in the labor market, 1.7% in gendered segregation of professions, 1.4% in poverty, 8.2% in power, and 6.3% in violence against women. This was a peak year for violence against women. Though improvements occurred in education, family status, time and Arab society, they did not result in an improved overall result. A deterioration of 3.2% was recorded for 2010.

In 2011, the gender inequality situation improved: the overall index decreased by 5.5% in comparison with the preceding year, mainly because of a noticeable improvement in the power domain, but also because of an improvement in the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, and violence against women domains.

In 2012, there was yet another improvement in gender inequality. While there were increases in five of the domains that make up the Index—3.1% in power, 1.5% in poverty, 3.6% in time, 3.4% in violence against women, and 0.7% in the periphery - other domains showed decreases in inequality: 2.4% in education, 3.8% in gendered segregation of professions, 8.7% in family status, and 6.7% in Arab society. Health remained static. Overall, in 2012 there was a 1.5% decrease in gender inequality.[16]

The downward trend in gender inequality persisted in 2013. Improvements were evident in the following domains: poverty, power, family status and time. Slight improvements also occurred in the labor market, Arab society and the periphery. Conversely, there was increased inequality in education, gendered segregation of professions and violence against women. Health remained static. Overall, in 2013 there was a decrease of 4.4% in gender inequality in Israel.

16 As mentioned above, the changes in measurement methods used by the Central Bureau of Statistics in its labor force and income surveys have made it difficult to compare data between 2011 and 2012. Therefore, we examined the results of the Index in indicators affected by the change by means of extrapolations based on previous trends. The results of this examination are as follows: there was a very slight reduction of 0.3% in inequality in the labor market (as opposed to an increase of 2.6% according to the official data). The most influential indicators in this domain in 2012 were the rate of women who work part-time because they are housewives and the rate of women unemployed because they are housewives. In the gendered segregation of professions domain, all the indicators are based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' labor force survey and are hence affected by the change in measurement strategy. There was an increase of 3.2% in gender inequality in the domain (and not a decrease of 3.8% as indicated by the official data). The same phenomenon is evident in the Arab society domain: the official figures indicate a decrease in inequality—mainly because of the decreased ratio of women to men in part-time employment—but the extrapolation of the domain shows an increase of inequality in 2012. In the final analysis it appears that the indicators from the Central Bureau of Statistics labor force survey influenced the entire Index: according to the Index, there was a decrease of 2% in overall gender inequality in 2012, but the utilization of extrapolations that traced previous trends in the data showed a slight increase of 0.3% in inequality.

Discussion

The Gender Index is an attempt to quantify the gaps between women and men in public activity, the labor market, areas of vulnerability (violence against women), and in intersections of disadvantages (for example, Arab society and the periphery). Aggregation of the multiple results that constitute gender inequality and its ramifications into a single value that can be tracked over time is a significant challenge of unparalleled importance, and the results of the Index affirm this. In many senses public sentiment holds that feminism has already achieved most of its goals, but the comprehensive data indicate that this is not the case. The gaps are deeply embedded in the structure of the labor market, in the various spheres of power and among disadvantaged population groups. Moreover, violence against women has not decreased, and women are still more prone to poverty than men. An increase in the rate of educated women (in 2013, 48.3% of women had 13 or more years of education while 45.4% of men had 13 or more years of education) attests to women's aspiration toward full participation in the public sphere, since education is mainly "human capital" and an entrance ticket to relatively sought-after leadership positions in the labor market.

Another addition to the current Index was a comparative analysis of women's investments in human capital and the returns these investments yield. It is often claimed that inequality in the labor market is persistent despite equality in education, because women acquire education in fields that are less lucrative, such as liberal arts, social sciences and paramedical professions. Men, on the other hand, go into the sciences, engineering and computers. To examine this claim, the degree of gendered segregation between women and men in higher education must be compared with the degree of segregation in the labor market. Were it to transpire that gender distribution by field of study is less prevalent than by profession, the conclusion would be that the labor market mitigates the gender inequality in higher education. On the other hand, were it to transpire that higher education is more equitably divided than the labor market, we might conclude that women with higher education encounter another chasm of discrimination that is rooted in the distribution of professions. We examined this hypothesis by calculating a Duncan Index for the higher education system and for the labor market. This index is sensitive to the number of fields/faculties included: the greater the number of professions or study areas, the higher the results. Hence, to make it possible to compare the degree of gendered segregation between men and women in fields of study in comparison with gendered segregation in the labor market, an equal number of indicators were examined for each.[17]

As the figure below illustrates, segregation in the labor market is more severe than in higher education for every year examined. This indicates that women encounter obstacles in attempting to enter certain professions, despite their education. Moreover, the gendered

17 Calculation of the gendered segregation of professions includes about a hundred different types of employment (a two-digit level of specificity according to the CBS), while only eleven fields of study are included in higher education. This discrepancy precludes comparison of the two categories, since the higher the level of specificity, the higher the resolution and the resulting calculated segregation. When the level of specificity is similar, neither category should demonstrate higher segregation due to a higher level of specificity. Therefore, to make it possible to compare fields of study with professions, we calculated gendered segregation in the labor market by main professional categories (academic, free and technical, managerial, clerks, agents, sales and service people, agricultural professionals, construction and engineering professionals, and nonprofessional workers) and thus achieved a one-digit level of specificity.

character of the labor market and its prevailing hierarchy of "masculine" and "feminine" professions are not beneficial to women and compromise their employment potential and ability to earn a living. This issue is of course closely tied to the division between women and men in terms of home and family responsibilities. An in-depth discussion of these issues necessitates examining the prevailing cultural paradigms with regard to women's role in the home and the mechanisms that perpetuate these paradigms.

It might be argued, therefore, that there are two dimensions of inequality in the public sphere: the first being inequality in education that results from the gendered segregation of study areas, which is subsequently reinforced by the labor market, which is structured in such a way as to distance women from certain professions and pushes them toward others in which they are the majority. The second dimension is inequality at the highest levels of decision making and resource allocation, both in the labor market and the political realm. These dimensions both derive from the gendered segregation of labor in the private sphere.

Gendered Segregation of Professions and in Higher Education in Israel*



* The figure is not numbered because it is not included in the calculation of the overall Index.

Summary

An overview of all the data combined indicates that gender gaps in the labor market and in politics remain alive and well, and there is no clear evidence of a convergent trajectory. The conclusion that must be drawn is that women's educational achievements are not being translated into achievements that reduce gaps between women and men in the labor market and power domains. The explanation for this difficulty lies in the deeply gendered structure of

society: one foundation of gender inequality is the gendered distribution of responsibility for care of home and family, and the tension between the pursuit of work and career and domestic responsibilities it creates. The feminist revolution liberated women from the domestic sphere to some extent, enabling them to participate in certain areas considered to be within the masculine realm, such as the labor market and politics, but it failed to introduce men into the areas considered feminine (Hochschild 1997).

Ultimately, when women entered the workforce in large numbers, a deep transformation in their employment requirements took place but without a parallel change in the private sphere that would facilitate more equitable cooperation between women and men in caring for home and children. In this respect a new demand on women transpired, one that had not previously been their lot and had never been the lot of men: the expectation that they would find a balance between work and family. Women were liberated so that they could join the workforce, but this was not accompanied by liberation from the work they do in the home, because their entry into the workforce was not accompanied by the entry of men into the home. This one-sided revolution made women increasingly involved in spheres regarded as masculine (not necessarily as equals to men) while remaining responsible for the domestic sphere (England 2010). Thus, women were saddled with their new out-of-the-home responsibilities in addition to their work at home, which Hochschild dubs the "second shift" (Hochschild and Machung 1989). Though this situation did involve a redefinition of femininity, it did not weaken the traditional gender divisions and categories. For this reason the "feminist revolution" amounted to a stagnated or "stalled revolution."

The tension that arose as a result of this stalled revolution is also described in the research of Claudia Goldin (1997). Goldin traces the patterns of balancing work with family among women in the US in the course of the twentieth century. She identifies five patterns of handling this tension, each prominent during a specific period. The first pattern is "career or family"—that is, choosing between pursuing a career and having a family (this was common among women born in the late nineteenth century). The second pattern is "job then family." Women who employed this pattern went to work after college and then left the labor market to raise a family, a step that was detrimental to their potential for career development (this was common among women born in the first two decades of the twentieth century). The third pattern is "family then job." Women who subscribed to this approach first established their families and then went to work in noncareer positions because their late arrival in the workforce reduced their range of possibilities for career development (this pattern was common among women born in the 1930s and 1940s). The fourth pattern is "career then family"—a genuine attempt to choose a career path, which caused women to delay having a family until their late forties or early fifties (this was common among women born in the 1940s and 1950s in the US). The fifth pattern is "career and family"—a frustrating attempt to combine working and establishing a family simultaneously (common among women born in the 1960s and 1970s). Goldin notes that American women were successful in implementing the first three patterns (career or family, job then family, family then job) but that the latter two—most recent—patterns (career then family, career and family) were a virtually unattainable aspiration that caused women much frustration.

These trends were described following statistical monitoring of a large number of women in the US, and they constitute a sort of large-scale social experiment in which different women

in different periods tried all possible constellations of combining career and family. Goldin completed her study in the late 1990s. She maintains that women at the end of the second millennium were troubled and frustrated even though many doors that had previously been closed to them had been opened. Hochschild and Goldin, using their respective research methods, present a similar portrait of the difficulties faced by women trying to negotiate career and family. Among other things, these difficulties delay the closing of the gender gap.

The results of the Gender Index support the finding that gender gaps have stagnated or remained static, largely owing to gender inequality in the labor market. Despite the slight, insignificant trend toward improvement, inequality between men and women is still apparent. All indicators in the labor market domain point to the magnitude of this gap: gaps in pay, labor market participation, rates of contract and part-time workers, and gendered segregation of professions. Today, when 80% of jobs are in the service sector and do not involve physical strength, the question of why the gap remains so stable begs to be asked.

As noted above, the lack of change is rooted to a large extent in the gendered structure of the labor market and in the "second shift" that women undertake with home and family—for which we have no consistent annual data. On the home front women's work is uncompensated, while their participation in the labor market is perceived as secondary to that of men, and therefore their wages are lower. The Index shows this to be true for all years of the measurement period. More women than men work part-time (twice as many, on average),[18] more women than men are contract workers, and women are not equally compensated for their work (women's average monthly pay is 32% lower than that of men)—not even in terms of gross wage per hour (women earn 14% less than men per hour). The rate of women who do not work outside the home at all goes up with each year of measurement (from 24% in 2004 to 34% in 2013), and this points to the gendered perceptions so deeply entrenched in society, according to which men are free to go out and work, while women are obliged to care for home and children. Women's partial participation in the labor market perpetuates both their inferiority therein and the gaps in earnings between men and women. Moreover, as a result of women's looser connection to the labor market, their pension suffers (it should be recalled that women live an average of 3.6 years longer than men), and they are not eligible for the same benefits as men. The prevalence of poverty is also higher among women than among men (there are 1.9% more poor women than men, after benefits and taxes) and women are therefore more reliant on income support stipends (15.2% more women than men receive such stipends).

18 On the impact of part-time employment on the status of women, see Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2000).

The Gender Index Results in Each of the Eleven Domains

DOMAIN 1: Education

We elected to begin with the education domain because education is perceived, in Israel and worldwide, as a mobility factor in the labor market. For example, after a worldwide investigation, the World Bank determined that women's education is the most important factor in increasing a country's GDP (King and Hill, 1993). In the local context, the question is whether education contributes to equality between women and men in the labor market. We attempt to address this question in two manners: first, by examining the education levels of women and men, and second, by comparing the extent of segregation in higher education with the extent of segregation in the labor market.

The number of educated people in the population is increasing steadily—both in number and proportion. The rate of educated women has risen faster than the rate of educated men, and as a result we might have anticipated a rise in gender equality - mainly because education is considered a major factor in promoting equality in the workplace. However, the situation is complex, and the rise in education actually reduces the relative advantage of obtaining it. Likewise, in terms of gender equality, women usually go into prestigious fields just as those fields begin to lose ground in compensation and prestige. Therefore, obtaining the educational prerequisites for these fields does not afford them the same status as men who had worked in them before they began to decline.

In this domain, there are three indicators of inequality:

1. Ratio of women to men among those with 13-15 years of education
2. Ratio of women to men among those with 16 or more years of education
3. Gendered segregation in fields of study in higher education

1. Ratio of women to men among those with 13-15 years of education

Figure 4a shows that since 1999 the number of women with 13-15 years of education has been higher than that of men: 23.9% of women versus 20.7% of men. In 2013, 45.4% of men in Israel had 13 or more years of education, as compared to 48.3% of women. Figure 4b expresses the ratio of women to men with 13-15 years of education, showing that this tends to favor women slightly. In 2013, the ratio was 1.14.

Figure 4a

Rate of Those with 13-15 and 16 or More Years of Education, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 4b

Ratio of Women to Men Among Those with 13-15 Years of Education



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

2. Ratio of women to men among those with 16 or more years of education

Figure 4a above presents the rates of women and men in Israel who have 16 or more years of education. The figure shows that from 2004 to 2006 the rate of men with 16 or more years of education was higher than that of women, and gender inequality in education grew. However, as evident from figure 5 below which shows the ratio of women to men among those with 16 or more years of education, since 2007 the ratio has remained close to 1—that is, the numbers of men and women with 16 or more years of education were close to equal. Between 2010 and 2011 women even overtook men in rate of education, and inequality in this domain declined slightly. In 2013 there were slightly more men than women with 16 or more years of education. It should be noted that the Central Bureau of Statistics does not differentiate between study at academic institutions of higher learning and yeshiva (religious) studies, and it is therefore unclear what percentage of yeshiva learners are included in the total number that make up the indicator.

Figure 5

Ratio of Women to Men Among Those with 16 or More Years of Education



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

3. Gendered segregation in fields of study in higher education

This indicator is a new addition to the Gender Index. It examines gendered segregation in the areas of study in higher education in Israel from 2004-2013 (only research universities were studied: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Technion, Tel Aviv University, Bar Ilan University, Ben- Gurion University of the Negev, Haifa University and the Weizmann Institute). The indicator was formulated according to the Duncan Index. Figure 6 shows that the rate of gendered segregation in academic fields of study in Israel is 26.6%. This means that more than one quarter of students pursuing advanced degrees at Israeli universities would have to change fields in order for gender equality to prevail in all fields of higher education.

Figure 6

Gendered Segregation in Higher Education



Source: Council for Higher Education. Data processed by the authors

Spotlight: Rates of women in various fields of study at universities

It is impossible to discuss equality between women and men without addressing gendered segregation in education, for the trajectory of career acquisition, training and education is highly gendered. Despite changes that have occurred over the years and the entrance of women into fields previously foreign to them, it is still imperative to encourage women to select a more varied spectrum of professions, one that includes professions dominated by men, in order to provide them with better and more plentiful opportunities than they currently have. The figures appearing below depict the rate of women in university-taught fields. They are not included individually in the calculation of the Index because the indicator presented above is a composite of them all.

As the next figure shows, women are a majority in the humanities (which comprises many fields and subjects): some 65% of the 27,446 humanities students at universities in 2013 were women. This is a slight decrease (about 2% over a decade), given that women accounted for 68% of humanities students in 2004. In the social sciences, 66% of 27,472 students in 2013 were women – a percentage that has held steady over the years. Women were an absolute majority in education and teacher training—80%. Here too, we see a slight decrease over time, since in 2004 the percentage was 82%. In business and management sciences women were less than half (46%) of the students, a figure that remained steady over the past decade.

Rates of Women University Students in Humanities, Social Sciences, Education, Business Administration and Management



Source: Council for Higher Education. Data processed by the authors

The next figure shows the rate of women students in medicine and law. In the past, most of the students in these fields were men, but this has been reversed and women are now the majority. In medicine, the rate of women students increased from 53% in 2004 to 55% in 2013; in law, the rate of women students increased from 52% in 2004 to 54% in 2013. Women are the majority (82%) in paramedical professions.

Rates of Women University Students in Law, Medicine and Paramedical Professions



Source: Council for Higher Education data processed by the authors

In the fields of mathematics, statistics and computer science, all of which are related to hi-tech industries, women are noticeably in the minority at a mere 30%. There is a slight decrease in representation of women over the years, with the baseline in 2004 being 32%. The picture is similar in the physical sciences: representation of women is now lower than it was, having deteriorated gradually from 39% in 2004 to 37% in 2013. In engineering and architecture, women's representation increased slightly over the years, yet remained below 30% in 2013—i.e., less than a third of students in this field are women. Over the past decade there has been a decrease of 7% in the rate of women studying agriculture and today they number half the students in this field. In biology, the rate of women is almost two-thirds, and this has been steady over the past decade.

Rates of Women Studying Physics, Biology, Engineering and Architecture, Agriculture, Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science at Universities



Source: Council for Higher Education data processed by the authors

Spotlight: Women in Senior Academic Faculty Positions

As the figure below shows, the rate of women in senior faculty positions rose from 25% to 28% over the period 2002-2011. In other words, less than a third of senior faculty members are women. The rate of women full professors, the highest academic ranking, was 15% in 2002 and 21% in 2011—meaning that only a fifth of Israeli full professors were women. The data demonstrate the absence of proportional representations of women in the upper echelons of academia (in spite of the significant increase over the course of the decade). Despite the fact that the majority of undergraduate and graduate students are women, the senior faculty level, with its influence and power, does not reflect their presence.

Rate of Women in Senior Academic Faculty Positions



Source: Council for Higher Education data processed by the authors

The next figure shows the numbers of women versus men in senior academic positions. The figure demonstrates the large numerical gap between women and men: more than 3,200 men versus some 1,200 women in senior academic faculty positions.

Number of Women versus Men in Senior Academic Faculty Positions



Source: Council for Higher Education data

Summary: Gender Inequality in Education

Figure 7a shows that there was a slight improvement in the education domain in most years of measurement as a result of an increased rate of educated women relative to the rate of educated men. This finding shows that, contrary to what we might expect, education is not a sufficient tool to close gender gaps in the labor market. As will be demonstrated in the labor market domain, the gaps in this area are not shrinking. The examination of gendered segregation of higher education in Israel shows that although women have entered professions previously considered male territories (such as medicine and law), there is still gendered tracking of women toward the humanities, social sciences and paramedical professions, while men are directed toward mathematics, computer science, engineering and architecture. In 2013 there was a slight increase (0.3%) in gender inequality in this domain.

Figure 7b shows the magnitude of inequality in the education domain—i.e., the distance to a state of equality. This measurement has shrunk a little over the years, and was 4% in 2013. In fact, education is the most equal of the domains in terms of the magnitude of inequality.

Figure 7a

Gender Inequality in the Education Domain, 2004–2013



Figure 7b

Magnitude of Inequality in the Education Domain, 2004-2013



DOMAIN 2: The Labor Market

The labor market has a direct, tangible and decisive influence on gender inequality, determining the gendered division of labor between the public and private spheres. There are 1.5 million working women in Israel, amounting to 47% of the labor market, while men make up 53%. Approximately one third of working women (some 535,200), hold part-time jobs; the number of men with part-time jobs is less than half that (approximately 243,900). Women's level of participation in the labor market has risen over the years and reached 58.2% (of working-age women) in comparison with 69.4% for men. However, part of this increase can be attributed to growing numbers of women in part-time employment. The discrepancy between women's and men's monthly salaries is hence greater than the discrepancy between their hourly wages. Nevertheless, the gap between the hourly wages of women and men has endured and even increased slightly. Inequality in the labor market domain is measured and presented according to several indicators:

1. The ratio of women to men in labor market participation rates
2. The ratio of women to men in part-time employment
3. The ratio of women to men in gross monthly salary
4. The ratio of women to men in gross hourly wage
5. The ratio of women to men in median wage
6. The ratio of women to men among contract workers
7. The ratio of women to men in recipients of employee benefits

1. The ratio of women to men in labor market participation rates

Women's level of participation in the labor market in Israel has been lower than that of men since it was first measured. Over the years, however, there has been some convergence, and the gaps in participation levels have narrowed. Figure 8a shows that between the years 2004 and 2011, men's participation rate fluctuated between 60.6% and 62.3%, while women's participation rate fluctuated between 49.6% and 52.6%.[19] In 2012 participation levels in the workforce were measured for the entire population, including military personnel, and thus men's rate of participation went up to 69.3% and women's went up to 58.1%.[20] In 2013 men's participation rate rose to 69.4% and women's to 58.2%, a negligible change compared with 2012.

19 Some of the indicators include data from years prior to 2004, and these are presented here in the name of comprehensiveness. However, the base year for calculation of the Index is 2004 because this is the first year for which we have complete data for all indicators.

20 The increase in labor market participation can be attributed to the change in the Central Bureau of Statistics' surveys. As noted previously, from 2012 the data pertain to the entire workforce (including conscripted and permanent military personnel). Likewise, from 2012 the data are based on monthly rather than quarterly surveys, as had been the prior case. Since the Index expresses the ratio between women and men, it should be assumed that the value of the Index itself is not affected by the change in measurement methods.

Figure 8a

Labor Market Participation Rates, by Gender (Age 15 and Up)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Rising participation levels of both women and men are evident in almost every year of measurement.[21] One of the reasons for it is the change in welfare policy made in 2003, when National Insurance stipends were cut, among them income support stipends. This unexpected reduction in the income of disadvantaged households resulted in drawing into the labor market all those who were able to work, both men and women. This supposition is supported by the fact that men's participation level had been on the decline until the early 2000s. Another reason for the change is that in recent decades the average cost of living went up, but the average wage did not. Buying power was hence weakened, and this compelled many more Israelis to go out to work (Trajtenberg Report 2011).

Figure 8b depicts the ratio between women's and men's participation rates in the civilian labor force (with the exception of 2012-2013, when the entire workforce is referred to). It is apparent that in recent years the gap between the participation rates of men and women in the labor force has narrowed somewhat—that is, the participation rate of women increased faster than that of men. Nevertheless, this narrowing did not close the gap between men and women in labor market participation rates, because of the manner in which women were integrated into the labor force, as demonstrated by other indicators (part-time work, contract workers and so on). In other words, the ratio between the genders in labor market participation rates

21 As noted, the sharpest increase was in 2012, following changes made in the Central Bureau of Statistics' labor force survey, one of them being inclusion of both conscripted and permanent members of the military service in the total workforce.

in Israel has been perpetuated, remaining constantly in favor of men. In the years 2011–2012 there was even deterioration in comparison with 2009–2010 because women's participation rate dropped while men's rose, thus increasing the inequality between them slightly.

Figure 8b

Ratio between the Labor Market Participation Rates of Women and Men



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

As per the figure, in 2004–2010 this indicator contributed to reducing gender inequality in labor market participation rates. This trend was reversed in 2011 and 2012, with an increase in the gap between the participation rates of women and men leading this indicator to increase inequality in the labor market domain. There was no real change in 2013 in comparison with the previous year, and the ratio of women to men remained the same. However, it can be observed that in the last few years the decrease in the gap between women and men in labor market participation has stopped.

International Comparison of Labor Market Participation Rates: In 2014 women's labor market participation rate in the US was 67% and men's 78% (a ratio of 0.86); in Britain women's participation rate was 70% and men's 82% (a ratio of 0.85); in Sweden women's participation rate was 78% and men's 82% (a ratio of 0.94); in Spain women's participation rate was 68% and men's 81% (a ratio of 0.85) (Source: Global Gender Gap Index). In comparison with these countries, the gap between labor market participation rates of men and women in Israel is the largest (0.84).

2. The ratio of women to men in part-time employment

Part-time employment brings to the fore the gaps in the employment patterns of women and men. It reflects women's partial interaction with the labor market, one that is usually not career oriented. Figure 9a shows the number of part-time employees in Israel. It shows that the number of women among part-time workers is higher than that of men in all years. This reflects the gendered division of labor, which still places most of the responsibility for childcare and housework on women. Moreover, part-time employment is characteristic of women in all age groups and the rate of women in part-time employment is higher than that of men throughout the employable years of life.

Figure 9a

Part-Time Workers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

This figure presents the absolute number of part-time workers and demonstrates that there has been an increase in the number of both women and men employed part-time. Figure 9b presents the rate of part-time workers in the population. The figures show that in 2004 and 2006 the rate of men working part-time in the civilian labor force decreased while that of women increased. In other words, these years saw an increase in inequality in the labor market. In 2007 the number of men working part-time rose, while the number of women remained at the level of the preceding year—that is, this year saw a slight improvement, and inequality decreased. From 2008 to 2010 the rate of men working part-time continued to rise, while the number of women working part time actually decreased slightly before rising again. In these

years also this indicator contributed to a slight decrease in labor market inequality. In 2011 there was a change: the number of men working part-time and their ratio in the civil work force rose sharply in comparison with the preceding years, while the rate of women working part-time dropped. In 2013, the number of men working part-time dropped a little while the number of women working part-time rose.

Figure 9c presents the ratio between men and women among part-time workers. The graph shows that in 2011–2012 there was a change of trend and the gap narrowed, though it remained significant. The result was that despite the sharp increase in the number of men employed part-time, women still outnumbered them 2:1. In 2013 however, the gap expanded again: the rate of men working part-time dropped to 18.2% while the rate of women working part-time rose to 35.2% of the civil labor force (535,500 women versus 243,900 men, as evident in figure 9a).

Figure 9b

Rate of Part-Time Workers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 9c

Ratio between Women and Men among Part-Time Workers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

3. The ratio of women to men in gross monthly salary

Between 2004 and 2012 the gap between women and men in average monthly salary remained almost static—women earned 63% to 66% of men's monthly salary. Figure 10a presents average monthly income by gender. It shows that in 2013 women earned an average gross monthly salary of NIS 7,280, while men earned NIS 10,683. The gap between the monthly income of women and men is larger than the gap between the hourly income of women and men because it factors in the extent of the position (as noted, more women than men work part-time because of women's responsibility for home and childcare).

Figure 10a

Average Monthly Salary, by Gender (in New Israeli Shekels—NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 10b presents the ratio between the average monthly salaries earned by women and men. The chart shows that overall the average monthly salary has increased from year to year, but the gap between women and men has remained intact, and women consistently earn less than men. Interestingly, during the 2009 economic crisis, there was a decrease in inequality in this indicator: the average monthly salary of women went up while that of men went down, reducing inequality. This appears, however, to have been an isolated incident. In 2010–2012 the discrepancy between women's and men's wages remained steady at 0.66. In 2013 the ratio fell to 0.68%, largely because of a decrease in the average salary of men (of approximately NIS 300), not because of a significant improvement in the average salary of women (a mere NIS 35).

Figure 10b

Ratio between Women and Men in Average Monthly Salary



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

4. The ratio of women to men in gross hourly wage

Figure 11a shows the average hourly wages of women and men, both of which have gone up over the years. However, as is evident from Figure 11b, the gap between them persists. In 2005–2007 the gap was relatively stable, but in 2008 deterioration in the hourly wage of women caused it to grow wider: women earned only 82% of men's hourly wage. In 2009 there was a slight improvement, and women's hourly wage went up to 84.5% that of men. However, in 2010 it once again deteriorated, dropping to 83% of the hourly wage of men. In 2011 the gap remained steady, with men earning an average hourly wage of NIS 53, while women earned NIS 44—namely, 83% of men's wage. In 2012-2013 there was an improvement: in 2013 men earned an average hourly wage of NIS 55.4, and women earned NIS 47.4—that is, 86% of men's wage.[22]

22 The wage figures for 2012 cannot be compared with those for previous years, because of changes in the measurement methods used in the Central Bureau of Statistics' income and expenses surveys.

Figure 11a

Average Gross Hourly Wage, by Gender (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Comparing hourly wages of women and men reduces the effects of the scope of the position and hence the monthly earning discrepancy. The gap in gross monthly income can be partially attributed to the fact that more women than men are employed in part-time positions, but the difference in hourly wages is not necessarily affected by the scope of those positions. Figure 11b, depicting the gap between the hourly wages of women and men, shows that this gap is 15% to 17% for all the years in which hourly wage was measured, reflecting the difference in wages between the positions held by women in comparison with the positions held by men. One reason is that women work less, on average, and therefore have less experience; another reason is that women work in fields that pay less. Still, some of the gap derives from discrimination in the labor market. In the years 2010–2011, this indicator increased inequality in the labor market, but in 2012-2013—as a result of decreased discrepancy in hourly wage between the genders—this indicator led to a decrease in inequality in the labor market.

Figure 11b

Ratio between Men and Women in Gross Hourly Wage



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

5. The ratio of women to men in median wage

The median wage is the wage that half the workers in the economy earn equivalent to or less than. Because there is no maximum ceiling for monthly salary, though there is a minimum threshold of 0, most wage distributions in the world are characterized by a median wage that is lower than the average. In other words, very high salaries pull the average upward, but they have no impact on the median wage.

Figure 12a presents the median wages of women and men. The figure shows that, over the years, the discrepancy between the median wage of men and women persists: whereas the median wage of women is in the fourth percentile, the median wage of men is in the sixth percentile. In 2013 men's median wage was NIS 7,657, while women's median wage was just NIS 5,615.[23]

Figure 12b shows the ratio between the median wages of women and men. The figure shows that the ratio between the median wages of women and men rose from 0.67 in 2004 to a peak of 0.73 in 2013. The gap between the median wages of women and men is lower than the gap between the average monthly salary (women's average monthly salary being 68% that of men). This is because the average is influenced by the upper end of the salary distribution curve, which is very high and moving further away from the median as the gaps in income continue to widen. Thus, a small group of employees that earns very high wages pulls the average upward.

23 The median wage data also come from the Central Bureau of Statistics' survey of income and expenses, which underwent changes in 2012. As a result of these changes, there is a fairly sharp hike in the median wage for both women and men in this year.

Figure 12a

Median Wage, by Gender (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 12b

Ratio between the Median Wages of Women and Men



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

6. The ratio of women to men among contract workers, of all employed persons

Figure 13a reflects the rate of women working for employment agencies, among the overall population of contract workers (which in 2013 was 54,500). The figure shows that the rate of women among all contract workers in Israel dropped to 50% in 2013. In previous years the rate of women contract workers was higher. For the first time, equal rates of women and men are employed under the problematic conditions and detrimental agreements that characterize jobs offered by employment agencies.

Figure 13a

Rate of Women among All Contract Workers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The figure shows that from 2005 to 2007 the rate of women among contract workers climbed gradually, increasing inequality and gaps in the labor market. In 2008 there was an improvement, and the rate of women among all contract workers decreased in comparison with previous years, though it remained higher than the rate of men. In 2009-2010 the rate of women among contract workers jumped again, and in 2011 it dropped sharply to the level it had been in 2008—the year of improvement. In 2011, 50.3% of contract workers were women, and 49.7% were men. In 2012 this situation remained stable. In 2013, however, the rates evened out, with 50% of contract workers being men and 50% women.

Nevertheless, the rate of women contract workers is still slightly higher than that of men (1.5% and 1.3% respectively). Figure 13b reflects the ratio between women and men contract workers. The figure shows that in 2004 there were 1.4 times more women than men among contract workers, while in 2013 this number had dropped to 1.15.

Figure 13b

Ratio between Women and Men among Contract Workers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

7. The ratio of women to men in recipients of employee benefits

Employee benefits are an extension of worker compensation, one seldom taken into account in analyses of gender gaps in the labor market. To address this, we have added an indicator to this year's Gender Index that takes the following benefits into account: life insurance contribution, paid (in full) sick leave, pension fund participation, professional insurance or pension plan, education fund participation, profit dividends or stock options, vehicle allowance and fully paid vacation leave. These benefits vary according to extent of employment, seniority and experience, among other things, and therefore there is a big difference in this respect between full-time and part-time employees. Had we examined employee benefits without correcting for this difference, we would have been reiterating the inequality already implicit in this category. Our analysis therefore pertains to full-time employees only (by contrast, gender gaps in employee benefits among those employed part-time affirm that women who are more often employed thus on a permanent basis, indeed receive their benefits in this context, while men are often only temporarily or episodically employed part-time).

Figure 14 demonstrates gaps between women and men in full-time employee benefits in all years of measurement. The most significant disparity is in vehicle allowance, with men receiving higher amounts at all points in time. Thus for example, in 2013, 23% of men employed full-time received vehicle allowance, in comparison with only 6% of their women peers. Another benefit that is given more to men than women is profit dividend or stock options: in 2013, 13% of men received this benefit and only 7% of women.

The gendered disparity in receipt of employee benefits is evident both for full-time and part-time employees. The figure following Figure 14 depicts the rate of employee benefit recipients by gender for the entire workforce (this indicator is not part of the Index because, as explained above, the part-time/full-time variable is too highly correlated with the employee benefit variable). The figure demonstrates a standing gender gap among recipients of employee benefits: in 2013, 46% of employed men received benefits, compared with 42% of women. In the past two years this gap has narrowed somewhat due to a decrease in benefits given to men.

Figure 14

Ratio of Women to Men in Full-Time Employees Who Receive Benefits



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Ratio of Women to Men in All Employees Who Receive Benefits*



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

* The figure is not numbered because this indicator is not included in calculation of the Index.

Spotlight: Rate of Women with Driver's License

Over the years, there have been more men than women licensed to drive in Israel, though this gap is slowly closing. In 2012, 57% of drivers were men, and 43% were women. For methodological reasons this indicator cannot be included in this index (lack of internal validity). Nevertheless, it offers a different perspective on the degree of independence possessed by women, their access to the labor market, and their ability to utilize opportunities to realize their potential.

Ratio of Licensed Drivers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Labor Market Domain

Gender inequality in the labor market domain remained static from 2004 to 2005, rose by 1.5% in 2006, and then dropped by 1.4% in 2007-2008. In 2010 it rose again, by 1.6%, deriving mainly from a widening of the gap between the number of women and men among contract workers (in this year women accounted for 56% of contract workers). This increase was also the result of widening discrepancies in hourly wages between women and men in 2010: women earned an average of 83.7% of men's average hourly wage.

In 2011 there was a decrease in gender inequality and a slight improvement in the labor market domain owing to slight improvements in the number of women employed part-time and a decrease in the rate of women among contract workers. In 2012 gender inequality decreased again, but rose slightly in 2013. As is evident from Figure 15a, gender inequality in the labor market domain was slightly lower in 2013 than it was in 2004, the base year of measurement.

Figure 15b depicts the magnitude of gender inequality in this domain, demonstrating that the distance to full equality in the labor market has decreased slightly over the years: from about 34% in 2004 to about 29% in 2013.

Figure 15a

Gender Inequality in the Labor Market Domain, 2004-2013



Figure 15b

Magnitude of Gender Inequality in the Labor Market Domain, 2004-2013



DOMAIN 3: Gendered Segregation of Professions

Gendered segregation of professions in the labor market is a reflection of inequality between men and women, and it also creates differences in income and opportunities for advancement. There are very few professions with equal numbers of women and men. In fact the labor market is largely characterized by occupational segregation: there are professions mostly populated by men, in which the average working conditions are better, and professions populated by women, with inferior working conditions and, accordingly, lower prestige.

The European Gender Equality Index measures occupational segregation by examining the rate of women in fields in which they are overrepresented—such as education, health and social work—and that are not well paid. Similarly, this Index has selected as indicators professions that are characterized by relatively high occupational segregation—that is, a relatively high concentration of men or women in relation to the population and in relation to other professions.[24] Likewise, professions that have high or low pay relative to other professions were selected because pay is an indication of high or low professional prestige. The Finance Ministry's "Work Rating" website was utilized to examine the average salary in the selected professions and the demand for these professions.[25] The indicators that comprise the domain are as follows:

1. Engineers and architects
2. Doctors, pharmacists and veterinarians
3. Judges and lawyers
4. Women in teaching professions
5. Nannies and caregivers
6. Women in hi-tech
7. Segregation by occupation
8. Segregation by industry

1. Engineers and architects

Architecture and engineering are respected, prestigious professions, and practitioners usually enjoy high socioeconomic status. This category includes architects (including town planners), civil engineers, cartographers, electrical and electronics engineers, mechanical engineers, chemical engineers, food engineers and biotechnologists, computer engineers, industrial and management engineers, and metallurgists and metallurgical engineers. Figure 16a presents the number of women versus the number of men who practice these professions, showing a tremendous discrepancy. In 2013 there were 81,500 men who were engineers and architects, versus just 25,000 women. As is evident from Figure 16b, the rate of women among engineers and architects rose from 19% in 2004 to 24% as of 2013. Despite this improvement over time, women still amount to less than one quarter of professionals in these fields.

24 The categorization of professions and occupations is determined according to the Central Bureau of Statistics' definitions.

25 See http://ovdim.gov.il/Report.aspx.

Figure 16a

Number of Architects and Engineers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 16b

Rate of Women among All Architects and Engineers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

2. Doctors, pharmacists and veterinarians

Medical professions, like engineering professions, have high status and prestige. This indicator includes doctors, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians and academics in medical fields. Interestingly, in recent years women are the majority in these professions—from 55% in 2004 to 58% in 2013. Figure 17a presents the number of women versus the number of men working in these professions and 17b shows the rate of women among those employed in these fields.

The figures show that the number of women in medical professions has risen over the years, reaching a peak of 58% in 2013. This decreased inequality in the gendered segregation of professions domain. However, it should be stated that a full understanding of trends in this field would require examination of the internal gender division according to different professions within medicine, an analysis that the data currently available do not facilitate.

Figure 17a

Number of Doctors, Pharmacists and Veterinarians, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 17b

Rate of Women among All Doctors, Pharmacists and Veterinarians



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

3. Judges and lawyers

This is also a prestigious field with above-average working conditions. This indicator includes judges, lawyers and other legal professionals. The average salary in these professions is above average (over NIS 10,000 per month). As Figure 18a shows, over the years, the gap between men and women in these professions has persisted (the ratio between women and men is 0.75 on average). In 2013 the gap widened: the rate of men in legal professions rose while the rate of women dropped. Figure 18b reflects the rate of women among all legal professionals, showing that it was 45% in 2013.

Figure 18a

Number of Judges and Lawyers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 18b

Rate of Women among All Legal Professionals



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

4. Women in teaching professions

In Israel teaching professionals earn less and have lower status than other degree holders and teaching professionals in other countries. Many of them earn less than the average wage, and sometimes near the minimum wage. This indicator includes elementary-, middle- and high-school teachers; preschool teachers; and guidance counselors. Figure 19a shows that in 2013 there were 220,000 women in teaching professions, versus just 65,000 men—that is, 3.5 times more women. Figure 19b reflects the rate of women among all teaching professionals and shows that this profession has a clear majority of women: some 77% of teaching professionals are women. This situation has remained fairly constant over the years.

Figure 19a

Number of Teaching Professionals, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 19b

Rate of Women among All Teaching Professionals



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

5. Nannies and caregivers

This profession is very poorly paid (approximately NIS 4,000 per month) and is not respected or accorded social prestige. This indicator includes nannies and caregivers in both institutional and domestic settings. The gap between women and men in this field is large. While there has been an increase in the number of women providing caregiving services, the number of men doing so has barely grown. Figure 20a describes the number of women versus the number of men who are caregivers, showing that in 2013 there were some 168,000 women in this profession, versus just 12,800 men—that is, an average of 13 times more women. Figure 20b shows that women, at 93%, overwhelmingly dominate this profession and that the number of men in it is negligible.

Figure 20a

Number of Nannies and Caregivers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 20b

Rate of Women among All Caregivers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

6. Women in hi-tech

The hi-tech industry is considered the spearhead of the Israeli economy. Hi-tech employment is prestigious, the average wage is high, and the working conditions are among the best in the country. This indicator is hence extremely important in the context of gender inequality. Figure 21a reflects the number of women versus the number of men employed in the hi-tech sector, showing a constant rise in employment in this field (with the exception of 2009, when it decreased slightly). However, Figure 21b reflects the rate of women among those employed in hi-tech, showing that it held steady at 34% to 35% from 2002 to 2011. In 2011 there was a slight decrease in the number of women in hi-tech in comparison with 2010—when the rate dropped to 34.1%—while in 2012 it went back up to 36%, indicating a slight improvement. In 2013 the rate of women employed in hi-tech dropped by 1%, increasing inequality in this domain of the Gender Index. Women thus make up only about a third of all hi-tech employees. It would be interesting to examine the status of women versus that of men in this industry more closely.

Figure 21a

Number of Hi-Tech Employees, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 21b

Rate of Women among All Hi-Tech Employees



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

7. Gendered segregation of professions in Israel

Gendered segregation of professions in the labor market is reflected in disproportionately high concentrations of women in certain professions, usually those with inferior working conditions. Segregation is the mechanism that perpetuates and exacerbates gaps between men and women with regard to income and opportunities for advancement. There are very few professions with similar or identical rates of men and women, and the labor market as a whole exhibits segregation by professions. Ordinarily, professions dominated by men feature better working conditions, while those dominated by women feature inferior conditions and low status. We sought to examine changes in gendered segregation of professions in the Israeli labor market, to which end we constructed an indicator that would track development over the years. The indicator was constructed using all the professions tagged by the Central Bureau of Statistics (overall, fewer than one hundred occupations, based on CBS's two-digit classification system) and grouping them according to the number of women and men practicing them and calculated according to the Duncan Index.[26]

$$I = \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left|M_i - F_i\right|$$

$$M_i \equiv \frac{m_i}{m} \text{ and } F_i \equiv \frac{f_i}{f}$$

26 The Duncan Index is the preeminent index of segregation. Its advantages are that it is not dependent on the composition of the population, it is a commonly used measurement and hence facilitates comparison among various studies, and it is easy to comprehend (see Massey and Denton 1988).

In the above formulas mi is the number of men in a certain profession (i), and m is the number of men in the labor market. Therefore, Mi is the rate of men in profession i, of all men in the labor market. In the same vein fi is the number of women in a certain profession (i), and f is the number of women in the labor market. Therefore, Fi is the rate of women in profession i, among all women in the labor market.

We used the Duncan formula to calculate the level of segregation in the Israeli labor market over the years as follows: the number of women and the number of men in each profession, divided by the total number of women and the total number of men in the labor market. Next we subtracted the percentage of men and the percentage of women in the same profession from each profession, as an absolute value, and last we combined them all and divided by two.

In the Duncan Index the results fluctuate between 0 (no segregation) and 1 (complete segregation). The results therefore show the degree to which there is gendered segregation of occupations and professions in Israel and what percentage of employees would have to switch jobs in order to level the situation and achieve full equality. The next figure describes occupational segregation in Israel by occupation, according to the Duncan Index (for the sake of convenience, the findings are presented in percentages, from 0%-100%).

Figure 22

Gendered Segregation by Occupation



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

The figure shows that over the measurement period there was a very slight improvement in occupational segregation in Israel. In 2004 segregation measured 53.7%—that is, 53.7% of people, men and women alike, would have to change jobs in order for there to be equality in the labor market. In 2011 this figure decreased slightly to 51.5%. Still, the population in question would amount to over half of the workforce. In 2012 there was a relatively significant improvement as a result of a change in the Central Bureau of Statistics' survey methodology.

In 2012 the Duncan Index of occupational segregation in Israel measured 47.62%, and in 2013 segregation rose to 49%.

8. Gendered segregation by employment sector

This indicator was also formulated in accordance with the Duncan Index. The grouping is per all the different employment sectors in Central Bureau of Statistics records. Among these are agriculture, industry, electricity, water and so on. The next figure describes the Duncan Index calculation of occupational segregation according to employment sectors. The figure shows that segregation by occupation decreased by only 2% between 2004 and 2013, reaching 56% in 2013.

Figure 23

Occupational Segregation by Employment Sector



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain

Figures 24a and 24b indicate a consistent trend of improvement in the area of gendered segregation of professions in Israel between 2004 and 2012 (albeit one attributable in part to a change in the CBS's methodology). However, in 2013 this trend stalled. In other words, the distribution of men and women across professions and occupations is becoming increasingly equitable but at a relatively slow pace. The findings did not indicate the presence of policy directed at reducing professional segregation in Israel, and many fields are still characterized by a significant majority of men or women. In professions in which most workers are women, the average wage is lower than the general wage. In professions in which most workers are men, however, the wages are higher than the average wage. Figure 24b depicts the depth of inequality in the Gendered Segregation domain, indicating that the distance to equality has indeed shrunk slightly—from 56% in 2004 to 53% in 2013—though it is still considerable.

Figure 24a

Gender Inequality in the Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain, 2004–2013



Figure 24b

The Magnitude of Inequality in Gendered Segregation of Professions*



* Measurement is based on two of the Domain's indicators: segregation by occupation and segregation by employment sector.

DOMAIN 4: Poverty

Poverty is a domain that carries a lot of weight in terms of gender inequality because it is a situation where disadvantages converge and are exacerbated. Moreover, the poverty rate is controlled—albeit partially—by the welfare system and can be regulated for various population groups (Stier and Lewin 2000). Gender inequality in the area of poverty is measured by the incidence of poverty among women compared to the incidence of poverty among men, using data from the National Insurance Institute. Furthermore, we took into account the number of people who, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, received income support stipends. Inequality in the poverty domain is measured using two indicators:

1. Incidence of poverty among women versus men, after transfer payments and taxes
2. Ratio of women to men among income support recipients

1. Incidence of poverty by gender, after transfer payments and taxes

Figures 25a and 25b present the incidence of poverty among women and men after transfer payments and taxes, and the ratios between them. The figures show that poverty is consistently more prevalent among women than among men, although not by much. It should be stressed that reference is being made to the incidence of poverty after the intervention of the welfare system—that is, said intervention does not close the gender gap, and this is cause for consideration. In 2002–2005 and in 2008, the ratio in incidence of poverty between men and women increased, and gender inequality in these years grew. In 2011 the ratio appeared to decrease—that is, gender inequality in the poverty domain was reduced, but it grew again in 2012. Although in 2012 the rate of poor men and women dropped, the gender gap once again widened because the decrease in incidence of poverty among men was more acute. In 2013 there was another decrease: the rate of poor women was 18.4%, and the rate of poor men was 16.5%.

Figure 25a

Incidence of Poverty after Transfer Payments and Taxes, by Gender



Source: National Insurance Institute data processed by the authors

Figure 25b

Ratio of Women to Men in Incidence of Poverty



Source: National Insurance Institute data processed by the authors

2. Ratio of women to men among income support recipients

Figure 26a expresses the number of women versus the number of men receiving income support. The figure shows a steady gap between men and women because, among other things, women are poorer than men. Thus, as the ratio between women and men receiving income support went up, gender inequality in the poverty domain rose. Figure 26b expresses the ratio of women to men among recipients of income support. The figure shows that the gap has been narrowing since the early 2000s, a function of a directed social policy that made the conditions for eligibility for income support, as well as the conditions for being categorized as "cannot be placed [in the workforce]," stricter.[27] From 2009 to 2013 the ratio dropped a little because both genders received less income support, and thus inequality in the poverty domain was reduced.

Figure 26a

Number of Recipients of Income Support, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

27 National Insurance Institute conditions can be found on their website: www.btl.gov.il/benefits/income_support/Pages/default.aspx.

Figure 26b

Ratio of Women to Men among Recipients of Income Support



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Poverty Domain

Women are consistently poorer than men; the incidence of poverty among women is higher and more of them are eligible for income support. Figure 27a shows that there have been no real changes in this gap over the years examined—the gap between the number of poor women and the number of poor men remained stable throughout the period of measurement. This domain is directly influenced by the welfare system, and the results therefore show that policy directed at poverty relief is guilty of gender blindness. As is evident from Figure 27b, the incidence of poverty in 2012 seems to have reverted to its 2004 level, and then dropped slightly in 2013. Over the years of measurement, the distance from complete equality fluctuated between 21% and 13% (in the last year of measurement). The narrowing of the gender disparity in the incidence of poverty is attributable to the fact that family incomes below the median all dropped as a result of the recession and the expanding economic gaps. When the pie is smaller, so are the differences between women and men, but the overall situation cannot be considered an improvement.

Figure 27a

Gender Inequality in the Poverty Domain, 2004–2013



Figure 27b

Magnitude of Inequality in the Poverty Domain



DOMAIN 5: Power

The power domain expresses the power of women in the public sphere, in political and economic leadership in Israel. The domain focuses on the representation of women in decision-making positions, out of a general consensus that gender balance in power relations in such positions is crucial to increasing equality between women and men. Gender equality in the power domain is important because it ensures that women and men have an equal voice, and thus they have an equal opportunity to shape economic, social and political agendas. Moreover, one of the ways to change gendered perceptions is to promote role models, and a woman in a position of economic or political power is thus meaningful on the symbolic level as well. The lack of gender equality in this domain derives from the dearth of participation by women in all aspects of national decision making.

The power domain consists of eight indicators that examine women's representation in positions of political power—government, parliament and local authorities—and economic power—CEOs and senior executives in the private and public sectors. Much like the European Gender Equality Index, we divided the indicators into two groups: political and economic.[28]

The first subdomain, political power, consists of three indicators:

1. Ratio of women to men among members of parliament: annual highs
2. Ratio of women to men among government ministers: annual highs
3. Ratio of women to men among heads of local authorities and regional councils

The second subdomain, economic power, consists of five indicators:

4. Rate of women CEOs
5. Rate of women senior managers
6. Rate of women in other managerial positions
7. Rate of women in the top three ranks of the civil service
8. Rate of women in the civil service who are employed under senior contracts

1. Ratio of women to men among members of parliament

Figure 28a presents the number of women in parliament; Figure 28b presents the ratio between women and men members of parliament. The figures show a clear upward trend: in the 1990s there were just over 10 female members of parliament and today there are 30. From 2004 to 2006 the rate of women in parliament went up and inequality decreased slightly, though in 2006 there were just 22 women among the 120 members of parliament (18.33%)—that is, a very small improvement indeed. In 2007 the number of women members of parliament dropped to 17, and gender inequality in the power domain increased. From 2008 to 2012 the number of women members of parliament rose to 24 (20%), and the ratio between women and men members of parliament was 0.25. In 2013, following elections for the nineteenth Knesset, the number of women members of parliament reached a record 27. This, however, is still low relative to the rate of women in the population.36 Of course, equality would entail 60 women members of parliament, and the gap remains immense (after the 2015 elections the number of female members of parliament went up to 29 and then to 30).

28 On the European gender index, see Appendix I.

Figure 28a

Number of Women in Parliament and Government



Source: Knesset data processed by the authors

Figure 28b

Ratio of Women to Men among Members of Parliament



Source: Knesset data processed by the authors

Ratio of Women to Men in Parliament: An International Comparison
In 2014 this ratio was 0.22 in the United States, 0.29 in Britain, 0.82 in Sweden, and 0.66 in Spain (Source: Global Gender Gap Index). Israel, at 0.29, is ranked 58th in the world in ratio of women to men in parliament (only 22.5% of the members of the 19th Knesset were women) (Source: IPU-Inter-Parliamentary Union).[29]

2. Ratio of women to men among government ministers

Figure 29a shows that the record number of ministers in the government rose from 12 to 28 in a single year, and the number of women ministers fluctuates between 2 and 4 each year. This indicator hence demonstrates gender inequality in the power domain in most years of the Index. Figure 29b depicts a general trend of declining ratios of female to male ministers. This decline derives from changes in the number of men rather than women in ministerial positions. In 2011 there was a slight improvement in the ratio between women and men ministers relative to the preceding year, but the rate of women ministers remained very low (approximately 10%). In 2012 there was yet another decrease because the government consisted of one less minister. In 2013 the overall number of ministers dropped and thus narrowed the gap between the numbers of men and women ministers, so the rate of women ministers rose to 21%.

Figure 29a

Numbers of Women to Men among Government Ministers



Source: Knesset data processed by the authors

29 See www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.

Figure 29a

Ratio of Women to Men among Government Ministers



Source: Knesset data processed by the authors

Ratio of Women to Men among Government Ministers: An International Comparison: In 2014 this ratio was 0.47 in the United States, 0.19 in Britain, 1.30 in Sweden (that is, more women than men) and 0.44 in Spain (Source: Global Gender Gap Index). With the exception of Britain, Israel has the lowest representation of women in government of all these countries (0.21).

3. Ratio of women to men among heads of local authorities and regional councils

There are some 256 local and regional councils in Israel. Women's representation as heads of these is negligible, ranging from 4 to 8 women per year. The mayor or head of council has a great deal of influence on the lives of the public and a lot of autonomy relative to other administrative positions. Therefore, the lack of women in these positions in Israel is highly significant. In 2012 there were 6 women mayors/council heads: Miriam Feinberg, Yael German, Tali Ploskov, Flora Shushan, Sigal Moran and Matti Tzarfati Harcabi—amounting to just 2% of the people in these positions. In 2013 the number remained the same although it was an election year. Figure 30a presents the number of mayors/council heads by gender, and Figure 30b presents the ratio between them. The figure illustrates the immensity of the gap.

With respect to council members, the gap is also dramatic. The rate of women elected to councils in 2008 was 11%: 232 women as opposed to 1,756 men. In the 2013 local elections, the rate went up to 13%: 344 women as opposed to 2,128 men. This is a very small improvement over a five-year period. Unfortunately there are no data that track the number of council members each year, so we were unable to include the set in the Index itself. The picture, however, is clear.

Figure 30a

Number of Heads of Local Authorities and Regional Councils, by Gender



Source: Data processed by the authors

Figure 30b

Ratio of Women to Men among Heads of Local Authorities and Regional Councils



Source: Data processed by the authors

4.Rate of Women CEOs

The labor market affects millions of employees—their daily routine, quality of life and standard of living—and it is steered and directed by CEOs. The position of CEO comes with power in decision making and policy making, and it is hence important to examine women's representation in this role. This indicator measures the numbers of women and men CEOs over the years. The data at our disposal include general managers of government and local services, nonprofit organizations and national institutions, and in the business sector, in private and government companies (as per the Central Bureau of Statistics' definition). Figure 31a shows a consistent gap between the numbers of women and men in these roles. In 2013 there were 37,944 men CEOs, versus only 6,631 women CEOs. The ratio between women and men therefore ranges from 0.13 to 0.19. Figure 31b shows that in 2013 only 15% of CEOs were women. This is very low, illustrating that the number of women reporting to men as their superiors is much higher than the reverse. It may be that women find it harder to envisage themselves at the apex of the pyramid because there are few role models attesting to this potential, which is why this gap has persisted over the years with very little improvement.

Figure 31a

Number of CEOs, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 31b

Rate of Women among All CEOs



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

5. Rate of women senior managers

This indicator depicts the number of senior managers, by gender, in each year. The data, grouped according to the Central Bureau of Statistics' definitions, include managers from all branches of manufacturing, financial services and taxation, human resources and labor, advertising and marketing, suppliers, computer services, security, community and medical services, and research and development. As is evident from figure 32a, women are outnumbered by men in these roles, though the gap has narrowed somewhat over the years. Figure 32b shows that in 2013 women accounted for 39% of all senior managers.

Figure 32a

Number of Senior Managers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 32b

Rate of Women Among All Senior Managers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

6. Rate of women in other managerial positions at the local level

This indicator, which also matches the Central Bureau of Statistics' definitions, includes secretaries of local municipalities and other general managers: in architecture and hunting, forestry and fishing, manufacture and construction, wholesale commerce, restaurants and hotels, transportation, storage and communication, business services, personal care, cleaning, and similar fields. As is evident from Figure 33a, in 2004 there were 8,500 women in these positions versus 24,395 men—a ratio of 0.37. In 2005 things deteriorated, and the ratio dropped to 0.31. From then until 2011 the situation improved from year to year, with the number of women in these positions increasing. In 2013 there were 17,883 women versus 34,689 men in these positions. Figure 33b shows that in 2013 women accounted for 35% of local officials and other managers.

Figure 33a

Number of Local Administrators and Other Managers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 33b

Rate of Women among All Local Administrators and Other Managers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

7. Rate of women in the top three ranks of the civil service

The Civil Service Commission is responsible for implementing government policy in administration and human resources. The representation of women in the top three ranks of the civil service[30] is therefore reflective of the political visibility and representation of women at the senior levels of decision making and policy formulation. Figure 34 shows that in 2004 women accounted for 41% of the top three ranks of the civil service. Since then there has been an improvement, and in 2013 this went up to 47% (the percentage of men in these positions dropped from 59% to 53%). This is an example of the influence of policy directed at closing gender gaps, since the civil service has a system in place for monitoring the inclusion of women, which resulted in a consistent improvement in the number of women in senior positions.

30 The reference is to the upper tiers populated in each rank and to the level of the position, not to the salary.

Figure 34

Rate of Women Versus Men in the Top Three Ranks of the Civil Service



Source: Civil Service Commission data processed by the authors

8. Rate of women in the civil service who are employed under senior contracts

This indicator expresses the number of women in senior positions in the civil service who are employed under senior contracts. As Figure 35 shows, women accounted for 26% of such employees in 2004, but the rate went up to 36% in 2013 (the percentage of men in these positions dropped from 74% to 64%).

Figure 35

Rate of Women Versus Men among All Those Employed under Senior Contracts in the Civil Service



Source: Civil Service Commission data processed by the authors

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Power Domain

Figure 36a shows that gender inequality in the power domain increased up to 2010: in 2005 women were very poorly represented in senior positions in relation to men; in 2006 there was a small improvement, but in 2007-2010 inequality once again increased, owing to deterioration in most indicators. In 2011 there was improvement in all the indicators—first and foremost, a woman minister was added (Orit Noked replaced Shalom Simhon), and two women were elected mayors/heads of council (Tali Ploskov as mayor of Arad and Matti Tzarfati Harcabi as head of the Yoav regional council)—leading to a reduction in inequality in the power domain for this year. As is apparent, each appointment of a woman has wide numerical consequences in the domain of political power, making it quite volatile. (This is particularly noticeable with regard to the number of women ministers in government. This indicator is based on the total number of ministers in government, which is limited to a few dozen at best.) In 2013 the number of female members of parliament rose, as did the rate of women CEOs and senior managers, and inequality in the power domain for this year of measurement hence dropped. Nevertheless, the number of women in senior national and local positions is still relatively low in proportion to their representation in the population.

Figure 36b shows that inequality in the power domain is deeper than any of the other domains in the index. This is no surprise, since government, management and decision making have always been the purview of men. Moreover, studies have shown that women usually enter fields and professions considered prestigious and the realm of men after men have moved on to more lucrative pursuits. Men are not keen to give up their power in society and inequality in

this domain hence remains especially high. The EIGE index shows that in the European Union this is also the domain with the deepest inequality.[31]

Figure 36a

Gender Inequality in the Power Domain, 2004–2013



Figure 36b

Magnitude of Gender Inequality in the Power Domain



31 See: http://eige.europa.eu/apps/gei/content/Gender-Equality-Index-Report.pdf p.137.

These findings reinforce the importance of measuring the gender gap and monitoring its development from a multi-disciplinary perspective, as this Index endeavors to do. The new methodology we have formulated, which enables us to present a hierarchy of areas afflicted by gender inequality according to its severity, calls attention to the severity of the problem in the domain of power, both political and economic.

Women and Men Israel Prize Laureates

The Israel Prize is a prestigious award presented by the State of Israel in a wide variety of fields. The prize carries great symbolic significance as a mark of state recognition for important contributions in research and other areas of endeavor. Methodologically, this could not be included as an indicator, because of the low incidence, but it is evident that over the years, the prize has been awarded to more men than women. In 2010, for example, the laureates included thirteen men and one woman. In 2013 the prize was awarded to 7 men and 2 women.

Israel Prize Laureates, By Gender



Source: Data processed by the authors

DOMAIN 6: Family Status

This domain examines several aspects of family life that have far-reaching influence on women's independence and scope of choice. The possibilities for combining work and family are a key component in understanding the lives of women in a capitalist economy. As long as women bear the burden of caring for home and family there can be no equality between women and men. In Israel, women bear more of the domestic burden than men do. Moreover, the Israeli labor market, in which men earn more than women, supports and perpetuates this situation by making it more logical for men to work since they earn more. The indicators that comprise the domain are as follows:[32]

1. Rate of teen pregnancies (ages 15-19)
2. Ratio of women to men heading single-parent families
3. Average age at (first) marriage

1. Rate of teen pregnancies (ages 15-19)

Societies characterized by high rates of teen pregnancies are usually ones in which there is little gender equality and women's rights are diminished. This is why the United Nations monitors this variable, which amounts to a red flag apropos women's rights and freedom of choice. This indicator measures the specific fertility rate—that is, the number of babies born in a given year to mothers in a certain age group, divided by the number of women in that age group in the year in question (per 1,000 women). Figure 37 depicts a decrease in the fertility rates of girls aged 15-19, which results in a reduction in gender inequality in the family status domain.

32 Indicators of fertility are employed in various gender indexes worldwide. For example, the Gender-related Development Index and the Gender Inequality Index .(See Appendix I for more on these indexes.)

Figure 37

Rate of Pregnancies of Teenage Girls Aged 15–19 (per 1,000 Teenage Girls)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

2. Ratio of women to men heading single-parent families

This indicator examines the number of women who head single-parent families that include children up to age 24 in comparison with the number of men who do so. Figure 38a shows that the number of single-parent families headed by women is increasing over the years, reaching some 148,000 families in 2012 in comparison with only 18,000 families headed by men. In 2013 there was a slight decrease in the number of families headed by single men, and a contrasting increase of 10,000 in the number of families headed by single women. Inequality in this domain hence increased. Figure 38b shows that the ratio between the two types of families stands at an average of 8 single-parent families headed by women to one headed by men.

Figure 38a

Heads of Single-Parent Families, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 38b

Ratio of Women to Men Heading Single-Parent Families



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Single-Parent Family Heads, by Gender: An International Comparison

In 2012 there were 8,869,000 single-parent families headed by women and 2,415,000 headed by men in the United States—a ratio of 3.67. In Britain there were 2,575,000 such families headed by women and 400,000 by men—a ratio of 6.43. In Sweden there were 222,838 single-parent families headed by women and 69,825 headed by men—a ratio of 3.2 (Source: UNECE).

3. Average age at (first) marriage

Worldwide, most marriages are between older men and younger women. This difference in age is 2-3 years in western societies and higher in traditional societies (highest of all in Africa). This indicator tracks the average ages at which men and women first marry. In 2013 the average marriage age of men was 27.8 and of women 24.2, younger than in 2012. Figure 39a shows that men are about 3.5 years older throughout the measurement period—that is, they marry later than women (it should be noted that the gap remains in evidence even when the median marriage age is considered). Figure 39b shows that the ratio between women's and men's age of marriage was 0.89 in 2013. Given that men marry later, they are able to focus on professional and economic establishment before they have a family. By contrast, the fact that women marry younger may be detrimental to their professional advancement.

Figure 39a

Average Age at (First) Marriage, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 39b

Ratio between Women's and Men's Average Age at (First) Marriage



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The Average Marriage Age: An International Comparison

In 2012 the average age at (first) marriage in the United States was 26.6 for women and 28.6 for men—a difference of two years. In Sweden the average age at (first) marriage was 33.4 for women and 35.9 for men—a difference of 2.5 years. In Spain the average age at (first) marriage was 31.7 for women and 33.8 for men—a difference of 2.1 years (Source: UNECE). In Israel the average age at (first) marriage was 26 for women and 29.2 for men. The difference, 3.2 years, was high in comparison with other countries.

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Family Status Domain

Figure 40a shows a decrease in gender inequality in the family status domain over the years. Improvement is evident in most of the indicators: the teen pregnancy rate declined sharply, as did the gap between marriage age of women and men. Likewise, in 2012 there was a certain decrease in the gap between the number of single-parent families headed by women and those headed by men. In 2013 there was another slight decrease in inequality in this domain, primarily because of the decline in the teen pregnancy rate.

Figure 40b shows deep inequality between women and men in the family status domain. This derives primarily from the large discrepancy between the numbers of families headed by single women and single men (in 2013 there were 153,700 families headed by single women and 18,300 headed by single men). This gap is illustrative of the burden that women bear as a result of family status.

Figure 40a

Gender Inequality in the Family Status Domain, 2004–2013



Figure 40b

Family Status Domain Values*



* Measurement does not include the indicator of teen fertility rate.

DOMAIN 7: Time

The time domain appears for the first time in this edition of the Gender Index. Its purpose is to complement the Index's analysis of gender gaps in the labor market, type of employment and segregation of professions, addressing the distribution of time outside of work. There is a clear-cut gendered distinction in how time is spent both in the private and public spheres: men spend more time than women in the public sphere while the opposite is true for women, who devote a great deal of time to caring for home and family. Studies in various countries have shown that women's work in the home has decreased in proportion with their increased participation in the labor market, but is still largely their purview (Walby, 1990). The narrowing of the gap between men and women with regard to involvement in the home is primarily attributable to the decreased involvement of women and not to the increased involvement of men (Crompton, 2007).[33]

However, gendered division of time is not entirely derived from the dichotomy between paid work and care of home and family. It is also related to participation in social, personal and civil activities. For this reason the time domain is one of the most crucial in deciphering gender inequality and developing policies to address it. Unfortunately, the data at our disposal in this regard are sparse and partial. Unlike other countries, Israel does not conduct periodic surveys of time usage, which would have provided information regarding time utilization habits of men and women and the central activities in their lives.[34] As a result the time domain as presented in this report covers only a small number of the areas and topics that pertain to the gendered aspects of time utilization.

The time domain is divided into two sub-domains: leisure and caregiving. The first includes the amount of time spent on leisure activities—i.e., those that are neither paid work nor unpaid (caregiving) work. These activities include both public and personal development endeavors. This sub-domain examines the ability to participate in recreational, political or educational activities, and participation in cultural, religious or other organizations. With respect to leisure time, it appears that men have more leisure time than women (OECD 2009) and tend to enjoy it more. The quality of women's leisure hours is more likely to be compromised by interruptions from work or the need to balance them with work and caregiving, or by housework that cannot be delayed (Bittman and Wajcman 2000). The indicators comprising this sub-domain are gaps between women and men in vacationing locally or abroad, and in volunteering.

The second sub-domain examines time spent on caregiving—housework, childcare, or care for other family members—by measuring the statistical discrepancy between the commitment of women and men to such activities. This is measured by means of the rate of women who self-report as not working (full-time or part-time) outside the home because of their commitment to caring for home and family. Focusing on the home naturally reduces labor market participation and hence also the potential for financial independence. Time spent on caregiving limits time spent on other activities and is therefore a good indicator of inequality between women and men.

---

33 In Israel we do not have long-term data regarding the division of homecare responsibilities between men and women. According to the 2009 figures, laundry falls on 75% of women but only 5% of men, food preparation falls on 68% of women versus 4.5% of men, and cleaning is done by 57% of women versus 4% of men.

34 This type of survey is conducted annually in the United States: American Time Use Survey, www.bls.gov/tus/charts/household.htm.

The leisure indicators are:

1. Ratio of women to men among those who take vacations in Israel
2. Ratio of women to men among those who take vacations abroad
3. Ratio of women to men among those who volunteer

The caregiving indicators are:

4. Rate of women who self-report as employed part-time because of commitments in the home, among all women employed part-time
5. Rate of women who self-report as unemployed because of commitments in the home, among all unemployed women

1. Ratio of women to men among those who take vacations in Israel

Vacations are an established and significant activity, and gender gaps with respect to vacations are indicative of extensive gaps in the grey areas of leisure time and financial resources. As is evident in figure 41a, men take more vacations in Israel in each of the years measured: more than 50% of men in each year compared to 47%-50% of the women. Figure 41b shows that the ratio between women and men who take local vacations was 0.94 in 2013.

Figure 41a

Vacationing in Israel, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 41b

Ratio of Women to Men Among Local Vacationers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

2. Ratio of women to men among those who take vacations abroad

In most of the years examined, more men than women took international vacations. Figure 42a shows that the ratio between women and men who vacation abroad was 0.95 in 2013.

Figure 42a

Vacationing Abroad, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 42b

Ratio of Women to Men Among Vacationers Abroad



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

3. Ratio of women to men among volunteers

This indicator shows a consistent gap in favor of men: according to figure 43a, in 2013 22% of men reported being involved in volunteer work compared with 18% of women. This might be a result of women having less free time and more responsibilities at home (childcare, housework, etc.). It might also be because volunteerism is sometimes integrated in the workplace—i.e., men volunteer on their employer's time. Figure 43b shows that the ratio of women to men among those who volunteer was 0.83 in 2013.

Figure 43a

Volunteers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 43b

Ratio of Women to Men Among Volunteers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

4. Rate of women who self-report as employed part-time because of commitments in the home, among all women employed part-time

This indicator reflects the gendered distribution of labor between the public and private spheres and the ratio between the time devoted to home and family and time devoted to paid work. Since Israel does not conduct periodic time allocation surveys of women and men, our means for establishing time allocated to home and family care at the macro level is by tracking the rate of women who self-report as being employed part-time because of home and family commitments. Figure 44 shows that from 2003-2007 there was a rise in the number of women who self reported thus, among all part-time employed women. In 2008 the rate dropped slightly, but has risen steadily since, reaching about 19% of women working part-time in 2011 (about 80,000). By contrast, only 9% (1,400) of men employed part-time reported that this was due to home and family care responsibilities. According to this indicator, about a fifth of women working part-time, do so because of commitments in the home and to family. In 2011, as noted, the number of women working part-time for this reason increased and deepened inequality, but in 2012-2013 the number decreased, with the opposite effect. In 2013, 16.6% (77,200) of women working part-time attributed this to commitments in the home.

Figure 44

Rate of Women Who Self-Report as Employed Part-Time because of Commitments to Home and Family Care, Among All Women Employed Part-time



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

This phenomenon reflects the gendered perceptions regarding division of labor in the family, according to which women must care for home and family while men support the family financially (Stier 2005). In these circumstances, women are forced to restrict their ties with the labor market. The rate of women working part-time is higher than the rate of men working part-time and this perpetuates their inferiority in the labor market and the wage discrepancies between the genders.

5. Rate of women who self-report as unemployed because of commitments to home and family care, among all unemployed women

This indicator reflects the total disconnection of women from the paid labor market. It addresses the incidence of women who self-report as unemployed because of commitments to home and family. It should be noted that the indicator only portrays women who have not been in the labor market for the 12 months prior to measurement and not the total number of homemakers in the population. Figure 45 expresses the rate of women who self-report as unemployed because of commitments to home and family in each year.

Figure 45

Rate of Women Who Self-Report as Unemployed because of Commitments to Home and Family Care, Among All Unemployed Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

The figure shows that from 2004-2007 the rate of women who self-report as unemployed because of home and family care responsibilities rose from 24% to 33% of all unemployed women. This increase exacerbated gender inequality in the time domain in these years. In 2008 the rate began to drop, reaching 25% in 2011 and resulting in somewhat of an improvement in inequality in this domain. However, compared with the result of men who self-report as unemployed because of commitments to home and family care (2.7%), the rate of women who do so is very high. As noted, this gap is indicative of a gendered and inequitable distribution of labor that places most of the burden of home and family care on women. In 2012 the rate of women who self-report as unemployed because of commitments to home and family care rose to 34.1%, the highest since the beginning of measurement,[35] and remained at 34% in 2013.

35 These figures are based on human resource surveys that, as has been noted, underwent changes in 2012. Comparison with previous years should hence be made with caution.

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Time Domain

Figure 46a depicts fluctuations in gender inequality in the time domain: in 2004-2007 gender inequality increased, while in 2008-2010 it decreased. In 2011-2012 it rose again, and decreased in 2013 as a result of a decrease in the gap between men and women who volunteer and in the number of women who work part-time as a result of home and family care responsibilities. Figure 46b shows that the distance to gender equality fluctuates between 15% and 19% over the years of measurement. It should be noted that no real change has occurred in the magnitude of inequality in this domain, which was 15% in both 2004 and 2013.

Figure 46a

Gender Inequality in the Time Domain, 2004-2013

Figure 46b

Magnitude of Gender Inequality in the Time Domain



The authors call on the Central Bureau of Statistics to include detailed time utilization surveys in the data they gather annually and to emphasize the issue of gendered division of time according to additional variables as a central focus in their data gathering and analysis. We believe that this information has the potential to shed light on deep social structures and their economic and social repercussions.

DOMAIN 8: Violence against Women

The Central Bureau of Statistics does not monitor violence against women on a regular basis. Therefore, most of the data sets in this domain come from other sources: The Knesset Research and Information Center reports and Association of Rape Crisis Centers reports. Change in the number of complaints and victims is only significant when compared with change in population size; therefore, for each year in which we estimated the domain, we took the total number of women in the population into account. The indicators in this domain are as follows:

1. Number of calls to rape crisis centers
2. The status of new sex offense files opened: the number of files transferred to the police prosecutor or state attorney's office
3. Number of women in treatment at welfare ministry domestic violence centers
4. Number of domestic violence files opened
5. Rate of domestic violence files closed for lack of evidence
6. Rate of women who feel safe in public spaces

1. Number of calls to rape crisis centers

An examination of the number of calls made to rape crisis centers in relation to the natural growth of the population shows that in the late 1990s these calls increased in volume, particularly from women,[36] as is reflected in Figure 47. One of the reasons for this increase was the growing number of rape crisis organizations and the increasing public awareness of their ability to help women who suffer sexual violence or feel threatened. In the early 2000s there was a certain decrease in the volume of new calls made to crisis centers. In 2010, after a decreasing trend from 2005 to 2009, there was a reversal, and the number of women calling the crisis centers rose—as did the level of inequality in the violence against women domain. In 2011 as well the number of calls went up, but the number of women in the population also rose, and the ratio between the number of new calls and the number of women remained stable. In 2012 the number of new calls dropped slightly, while the population grew, which led to a decrease in inequality in this domain. In 2013, by contrast, a rise in the number of new calls led to increased inequality in this domain.

36 The data come from the Association of Rape Crisis Centers' reports and Internet site (www.1202.org.il). The data are not categorized by gender, but most calls received by the centers are made by women.

Figure 47

Number of New Calls to Rape Crisis Centers



Source: Association of Rape Crisis Centers data processed by the authors

2. The status of new sex offense files opened following complaints made by women: the number of files transferred to the police prosecutor or state attorney's office

Figure 48 traces the number of sex offense cases transferred to the police prosecutor or the state attorney. The figure shows that from 2005 to 2007 the number of such cases opened by women rose from 698 to 955, which increased gender inequality in the violence domain. In 2010 the number of cases rose again; in 2011 there was a slight decrease to 921 cases, bringing a slight reduction in inequality in the violence domain; and in 2012-2013 the number of cases rose to 1,021, increasing inequality in this domain.

Figure 48

Number of Files Related to Sex Offense Complaints, Filed by Women, That Were Transferred to the Police Prosecutor or State Attorney



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

3. Number of women in treatment at welfare ministry domestic violence centers

Figure 49 shows that throughout the period of measurement there was a steady increase in the number of women treated at the welfare ministry's domestic violence centers, with the exception of 2012 and 2013, in which there were slight decreases in the number. To some extent this phenomenon can be attributed to the increase in the number of centers, but even more so to the rising incidence of domestic violence, usually against women.[37] Nevertheless, it should be noted that part of the increase may be attributed to increased reporting and not to an increase in the incidence of violence. This interpretation reflects an improvement in the situation, with the rise in reporting of cases testifying to increasing awareness of domestic violence, which is an important component of controlling it.

37 An increase in domestic violence is also evident from the results of the following indicator—the year-to-year increase in the number of complaints made to the police.

Figure 49

Number of Women in Treatment at Welfare Ministry Domestic Violence Centers



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors

4. Number of domestic violence files opened following complaints by women

Figure 50 shows that the number of domestic violence cases women filed with the police ranges from 14,500 to 16,500 per annum. In 2004-2006 there was a decrease in comparison with the preceding years. In 2006-2010 this number rose in absolute terms, as well as relative to the natural population growth, which resulted in increased inequality in the violence domain. In 2013 the number of cases went down relative to the natural population growth, and therefore this indicator contributed to decreasing inequality in this domain.

Figure 50

Number of Domestic Violence Files Opened



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors

5. Rate of domestic violence files closed owing to insufficient evidence

Closing of a domestic violence case means no further investigation and no criminal prosecution. Of course, this is not indicative of innocence but rather a lack of sufficient evidence to warrant an indictment. Lack of evidence is a particularly acute problem with regard to domestic violence—especially with regard to rape and sexual assault—because the violence is usually perpetrated in the private sphere with no witnesses. Figure 51 shows that from 2008 to 2010 the rate of domestic violence cases closed because of lack of evidence rose, and this increased inequality in this domain. By contrast, in 2013, fewer cases were closed owing to insufficient evidence than in 2012, and gender inequality in the domain decreased.

Figure 51

Rate of Domestic Violence Files Closed Owing to Insufficient Evidence



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

6. Sense of security in public spaces

One expression of the different experiences women and men have in the public sphere is their sense of security on the streets. This is an issue that has direct impact on quality of life. As is evident from figure 52a, women felt more threatened in public than men did, in every year examined. In 2013 approximately 84% of men in Israel felt safe walking in the streets, in comparison with only 61% of women (something of a deterioration from 2012). As figure 52b shows, the ratio of women to men in those feeling safe walking in public was 0.82 in 2013.

Figure 52a

Those Who Feel Safe in Public Places, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 52b

Ratio of Women to Men Who Feel Safe in Public Places



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In terms of policy at the municipal or local level, there are accessible means for controlling this phenomenon and improving women's sense of safety in the public sphere. These include streetlights, municipal policing, cameras, and offering self-defense workshops to women and integrating them into physical education curricula at schools.

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Violence against Women Domain

Figure 53 shows that between 2004 and 2006 gender inequality increased in almost all the indicators. From 2007 to 2009 there was something of a reduction in violence, mainly because of a decrease in the number of new calls made to rape crisis centers. The year 2010 saw a rise in inequality in the violence domain because of deterioration in all indicators comprising the domain. In 2011, by contrast, the violence domain decreased, reflecting a significant improvement relative to 2010, and the same was true of 2012. In 2013 there was a very slight rise of 0.4% in the violence domain—due to an increase in the number of new calls to rape crisis centers (8,637 compared with 7,700 calls in 2012) and a decrease in the number of women who feel safe walking the streets (61% versus 63%).

Figure 53

Gender Inequality in the Violence against Women Domain, 2004–2013



DOMAIN 9: Health

This domain is in the early stages of development. At present it includes only three indicators that attest to the health situation of women in comparison with that of men. Our intention is to expand the domain in the future to include health services—among them preventive medicine and health-promoting behavior. We used the Central Bureau of Statistics' social survey to construct the domain. This survey examines subjective perceptions of health and the life expectancy variable that is part of all comparative gender indexes. The indicators in this domain are as follows:

1. Ratio between women's and men's life expectancy
2. Ratio between women's and men's mortality rate
3. Ratio of women to men aged 20 and up who assessed their health as good or very good

1. Ratio between women's and men's life expectancy

Figure 54a presents the life expectancy of women in comparison with that of men; figure 54b shows the ratio between the two. It is apparent from the figures that throughout the measurement period, life expectancy of women was 3–4 years more than that of men. In raw numbers the difference went down from 4.4 years in 2004 (in favor of women) to 3.6 years in 2013. This change is almost negligible, and the relationship between life expectancy of women and men is hence stable. In 2013 the average life expectancy of women was 83.9 years, and that of men was 80.3. This indicator has almost no effect on gender inequality in the health domain, given its fairly stable ratio.

Figure 54a

Life Expectancy, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 54b

Ratio between Women's and Men's Life Expectancy



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Life Expectancy: An International Comparison

In 2014 the life expectancy of women in the United States was 81 and that of men 77; in Britain it was 83 for women and 79 for men; in Sweden it was 84 for women and 80 for men; in Spain it was 86 for women and 80 for men (Source: World Bank). Life expectancy of both men and women in Israel is similar to the above examples.

2. Ratio between women's and men's mortality rate

Figure 55a presents the mortality rate by gender (per 100,000 people) and Figure 55b expresses the ratio between the mortality rates of women and men. The figures show that in all years of measurement the ratio between the life expectancy of women and men remained almost constant: 514 women per 100,000 people died in 2013, and 507 men per 100,000 died in this year. This indicator did not affect gender inequality in the health domain.

Figure 55a

Mortality Rate, by Gender (per 100,000 People)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 55b

Ratio between Women's and Men's Mortality Rate



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

3. Ratio of women to men aged 20 and up who assessed their health as good or very good

This indicator presents subjective evaluations of personal health. Figure 56a shows the number of women and men aged 20 and up who assessed their health as good or very good. Figure 56b presents the ratio between them. The figures show that there is a consistent gap between women and men in this regard: a higher percentage of men than women tended to perceive their health as good or very good. The gap is particularly evident among those who reported their health as very good—the rate of women who reported their health as very good is lower than the rate of men who did so. In 2013, 82% of men reported being in good health, compared with 78% of women—a ratio of 0.95.

Figure 56a

Those Who Assess Their Health as Good or Very Good, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 56b

Ratio of Women to Men Who Assess Their Health as Good or Very Good



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Health Domain

Figure 57 demonstrates that over the course of the measurement period there was no significant change in the gender gap in the health domain. Inequality thus remained stable. At present the health domain does not take structural differences in health budgets or differences between social groups into account. Instead, it presents results that, in our opinion, should be expanded upon in future editions of the Gender Index.

Figure 57a

Gender Inequality in the Health Domain, 2004–2013



Spotlight: Contentedness of Women and Men

It appears that throughout the measurement period, the rate of contented men is higher than that of women. The figure below shows that up to 2010 contentedness was on the rise for both men and women (with the exception of 2009, in which men's contentedness decreased), while in 2010 contentedness declined for both genders. The steepest decline occurred for women in 2011-2012. In 2013 there was something of a convergence between women and men. These data are not included in calculation of the Gender Index.

Contentedness, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Spotlight: Loneliness of Women and Men

Women consistently report loneliness in higher numbers than men do. Upon examination of the relation between this feeling and family status, it transpired that women in all family situations—married, single, divorced, widowed or separated—all report loneliness more than men in parallel situations. These data are not included in calculation of the Gender Index.

Loneliness, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

DOMAIN 10: Arab Society

Inequality between Jews and Arabs exists in all aspects of Israeli life, and gender inequality within Arab society—as reflected in the data presented in this index—is large relative to gender inequality in the general population. Arab society also has unique socioeconomic characteristics, particularly with regard to the labor force, that are indicative of extremely large gaps between Arab men and Arab women.

Inequality between Jews and Arabs, and between Jewish women and Arab women, has been documented extensively in other studies. Our intent here is to present the prevailing situation within Arab society, namely the gaps between Arab men and Arab women. To this end we developed a distinct domain within the Gender Index for the Arab population. It should be noted that data for all domains of the Index pertain to the populations in general, including Arab men and women. However, to examine inequality between men and women within Arab society, it was necessary to focus on Arab society separately.

The indicators of inequality between Arab men and Arab women in Israel are:

1. Ratio of women to men in rate of workforce participation
2. Ratio of women to men in rate of part-time workers
3. Ratio between women's and men's gross monthly salary
4. Ratio between women's and men's gross hourly wage
5. Ratio of women to men with 13-15 years of education
6. Ratio of women to men with 16 or more years of education
7. Rate of Arab women among women filing domestic violence complaints
8. Pregnancy rate among Arab teens, ages 15-19
9. Average age at (first) marriage

Ratio of Arab women to Arab men in rate of workforce participation

As is evident from Figure 58a, the rate of participation of Arab women in the labor force is much lower than that of Arab men. Figure 58b expresses the ratio of Arab women to Arab men in labor market participation, which is on average 0.34. The rate of participation of Arab men in the labor force was approximately 60% throughout the measurement period, while the rate of participation of Arab women rose throughout the period—with the exception of 2011—from 17.3% in 2003 to 22.5% in 2010. The year 2011 saw a change: Arab women's rate of participation in the labor force in relation to that of Arab men dropped to 21.9% (the rate of participation for Arab men was 59.6%), and inequality in Arab society worsened. In 2012 rates of labor market participation of both Arab men and Arab women rose: the former to 66.1% and the latter to 27.1%.[38] In 2013, however, the rate of Arab men's labor market participation dropped to 64.9% and that of Arab women to 26.3%. This constituted a halt to the general trend of improvement in evidence over the previous years.

38 As aforementioned, the change must be attributed to the change in Central Bureau of Statistics' measurement methods. The data refer to the overall labor force (including conscripted and permanent members of the military) and are based on monthly rather than quarterly surveys.

Figure 58a

Labor Market Participation Rates of Arabs in Israel, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 58b

Ratio of Arab Women to Arab Men in Rate of Labor Market Participation



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

2. Ratio of Arab women to Arab men in rate of part-time workers

Figure 59a expresses the rate of Arab women employed part-time, among working Arab women, in comparison with the rate of Arab men employed part-time, among working Arab men. The figure shows that not only is Arab women's rate of participation in the labor market low, but many working Arab women are employed part-time. From 2004 to 2009 the rate of employed Arab women working part-time climbed from 42% to 47%. In 2010-2011 this number dropped to 33.7%, but the situation deteriorated in 2012, with the rate of working Arab women employed part-time rising to 37.3%. The rate of working Arab men employed part-time also rose, from 11.2% in 2011 to 18.8% in 2012.[39] In 2013 the rate of Arab men employed part-time dropped to 16.7% while that of Arab women employed part-time rose to 38.2%. The result was an increased gap between women and men in this indicator. Figure 59b expresses the ratio of working Arab women employed part-time to working Arab men employed part-time, showing that the gap between the genders was significantly reduced between 2009 and 2012. However, this narrowing is the result of a sharp increase in the number of Arab men working part-time and not of an improvement in the situation of Arab women. Thus, in 2004 there were three times as many Arab women working part-time as there were Arab men, and four times as many in 2008, decreasing to twice as many in 2012.

Figure 59a

Rate of Arab Part-Time Workers, by Gender



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

39 It is likely that this change also results from the change in Central Bureau of Statistics surveys in 2012—the sample was widened and now includes many more types of workers. Nevertheless, the change was not in evidence for the whole population, and we therefore presume that it reflects a change in the situation itself and not just in the survey structure.

Figure 59b

Ratio of Women to Men Among Arab Part-Time Workers



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

This indicator therefore decreased inequality in the Arab society domain in recent years, until 2012. As noted, however, this is not an indication of a reduction in the rate at which Arab women were employed part-time but rather the very high rate at which Arab men were thus employed. This phenomenon attests yet again to the trend we described in reference to general labor market participation—namely, a worsening of employment conditions and diminished opportunities for all workers in Israel, especially Arabs. In 2013 the ratio between men and women working part-time rose to 2.2 and this indicator once again caused a rise in gender inequality in this domain.

3. Ratio between Arab women's and Arab men's monthly salary

Figure 60a describes the average gross monthly income of Arab women and Arab men in Israel. Figure 60b expresses the ratio between the monthly income of Arab women and the monthly income of Arab men, and demonstrates that this ranges from 0.72 to 0.80. That is, Arab women consistently earn a lower monthly salary than Arab men, but the gap is smaller than that between the monthly income of men and women in the general population. One of the reasons for this is the high rate of Arab women employed part-time, as we saw above. Another is the lower pay of Arab men in comparison with the general population of men. In 2013 Arab men earned an average monthly salary of NIS 6,453, while Arab women earned just NIS 5,210. In the same year, the gap between women and men widened, and this indicator hence increased gender inequality in Arab society.

Figure 60a

Average Monthly Salary in Arab Society in Israel, by Gender (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Figure 60b

Ratio of Arab Women's to Arab Men's Average Monthly Salary



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

4. Ratio between Arab women's and Arab men's hourly wage

Figure 61a depicts the gross hourly wage of Arab women and Arab men in Israel. Figure 61b describes the ratio between them. The figures show that Arab women's hourly wage is slightly **higher** than Arab men's hourly wage—contrary to the case in the general population, in which men earn 15% to 17% more per hour. This discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that the few Arab women involved in the labor market are more educated, while Arab men active in the labor market have a variety of educational backgrounds. In 2010 Arab women's advantage in hourly wage was eroded somewhat and inequality rose; in 2011 inequality decreased. In 2012-2013 Arab women earned an average of NIS 35 / hour while Arab men earned NIS 33.

Figure 61a

Average Hourly Wage in Arab Society in Israel, by Gender (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 61b

Ratio of Arab Women's to Arab Men's Average Hourly Wage



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

5. Ratio of Arab women to Arab men with 13-15 years of education

Figure 62 depicts the ratio of educated Arab women to educated Arab men in Israel. The figure shows that from 2004 to 2006 the number of Arab women with 13-15 years of education rose, surpassing the number of Arab men with 13-15 years of education and thus narrowing inequality. From 2008 to 2011 the trend reversed. The reason is that the rate of Arab men with 13-15 years of education increased, while the rate of women remained stable. In 2012 there was another reversal and the gap between women and men increased. This trend continued into 2013, the last year of measurement, with 11.1% of men having 13-15 years of education and 13.3% of women. In most of the years examined, there were more women than men with 13-15 years of education. In 2013 this led to a reduction in gender inequality in Arab society.

6. Ratio of Arab women to Arab men with 16 or more years of education

Figure 62 also shows that the ratio between Arab women and Arab men with 16 or more years of education is approaching 1, after gradual convergence throughout the period of measurement. From 2004 to 2010 there was a continual improvement in the rate of educated Arab women, but in 2011 there was a rise in the number of Arab men with 16 or more years of education, which led to an increase in gender inequality in Arab society. By contrast, in 2012 the rate of Arab women with 16 or more years of education was the highest it has been since the beginning of the measurement period—slightly surpassing the rate of men. This trend

continued in 2013: the rate of Arab men with 16 or more years of education was 11.6% and that of women 12.6%. There is hence gender inequality in evidence in this indicator.

It might therefore be said that women in Arab society are more educated than men, except that, just as in Jewish society and contrary to popular opinion, education does not spare Arabs from structural and cultural obstacles and is therefore not an effective enough tool for increasing gender equality in the labor market (see the education domain above).

Figure 62

Ratio of Educated Arab Women to Educated Arab Men



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

7. Rate of Arab women among all women filing domestic violence complaints

Figure 63 presents the rate of Arab women among all women who have filed domestic violence complaints. The figure shows that the rate of Arab women among complainants ranges from 11% to 16% and is low relative to their proportion in the population of women in Israel (20%). From 2009 to 2013 the rate of Arab women complainants rose, and in 2013 it was 16.5%—a record in relation to preceding years. The relatively low rate of complaints by Arab women might well indicate under-reporting rather than a low incidence of violence. The supplementary data, pertaining to the number of domestic complaint files opened with the police, are lacking.

Figure 63

Rate of Arab Women Among Women Filing Domestic Violence Complaints



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

8. Rate of teen pregnancies (ages 15-19) in Arab society

The fertility rate is measured as the number of babies born in a particular year to mothers from a certain age group, divided by the number of women in the same age group in the year in question (per 1,000 women). This indicator is used in multiple indexes around the world. Fertility rates for young age groups are considered indicative of the degree of independence women possess in the society being measured: the higher the rate, the lower their independence. The burden of raising children usually falls on the shoulders of women, and this damages the chances of economic success for both young girls and their children. Figure 64 presents the fertility rates among Arab girls in Israel. The figure shows that this rate is decreasing from year to year, leading to a decrease in gender inequality in the Arab society domain.

Figure 64

Rate of Teen Pregnancies (Ages 15–19) in Arab Society (per 1,000 Girls)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

9. Average age at (first) marriage[40]

Marriage age is also considered indicative of women's degree of independence: in liberal societies with more gender equality, the gap between leaving the parental home and establishing an independent family unit is widening. At the same time, the gap between the age at which men and women marry is shrinking. Figure 65a shows the average age at which Arab Muslim men and women marry. Although the figure shows that the age of marriage for both genders is gradually going up from year to year, there is a stable gap of about 5 years between the two. In 2013 the average age at which men were married the first time was 28.1, while the average age for Muslim women was 22.3. Figure 65b shows that the ratio between the age of marriage of men and that of women in Arab Muslim society is approximately 0.8.

40 For this indicator we only have data pertaining to Muslim women (85% of Arab women in Israel), not to Arab women in general.

Figure 65a

Average Age of Marriage in Arab Muslim Society



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Figure 65b

Ratio between Average Age of Marriage of Arab Muslim Men and Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Arab Society Domain

As is evident from Figures 66a and 66b, the years 2004-2011 were static in terms of the equality of Arab women. The range of changes is small, albeit showing signs of slight improvement. In 2012 there was a decrease in gender inequality in Arab society: the gap in labor force participation and part-time employment shrank; the gap in monthly income rose, but the gap in hourly income shrank; the gaps in education levels (13-15 years and 16 or more years) shrank; the rate of Arab women filing domestic violence complaints with the police rose; teen pregnancies went down, and the average childbearing age rose. In 2013 there was an increase in inequality in four indicators in this domain, a decrease in three indicators and the remaining two did not change. These changes cancelled each other out and once again, gender inequality in Arab society remained static in 2013, with no real progress made.

These results are testimony to a generally encouraging trend, though Arab women in Israel are still far from equal. It is interesting to note that the trajectory of the Arab society domain differs from that of the general Index: in 2008-2009 there was a rise in inequality in Arab society, while the overall Index showed a decrease. On the other hand, from 2007 to 2010 Arab society showed a decrease in inequality, whereas in the Index as a whole, inequality rose. Thus, the developmental directions of inequality in the Arab society domain differ from those in Israel in general.

We already know that the gender gap in Arab society in Israel is larger than the gender gap in Jewish society. Arab women's labor market participation rate is very low, one third of Arab men's participation rate, and their part-time employment rate is three times that of men. Nevertheless, given the low status of Arab men in the Israeli labor market, the indicators of average monthly salary and average hourly wage are lower in Arab society than in the overall population. Although there has been an improvement over the years in the number of Arab women in the labor market, their main occupation is still care of home and children. These findings may reflect the alienation and isolation of Arab society, and they suggest that it is an enclave in all respects pertaining to the measurement of gaps between men and women. In 2012 there was a more significant decrease in gender inequality in Arab society, largely because of increasing education levels among Arab women and a large increase in the rate of Arab men employed part-time—as well as the change in Central Bureau of Statistics' methodology. In 2013 there were, as mentioned, no significant changes in comparison with the preceding year.

As Figure 66b shows, the distance to full equality in Arab society in Israel has shrunk somewhat over the years, but is still large, at 43%. Fluctuations in the magnitude of inequality confirm that there is no uniform trend toward reducing inequality in Arab society. Two main periods can be identified: one of deterioration in 2004-2006 and one of improvement in 2008-2012. In 2013, the situation worsened once again. In general terms, Arab society's point of origin features enormous gaps between women and men and the rate of improvement is higher as a result. Gender inequality, however, is still rampant, as Figure 3b above shows. That figure demonstrates the magnitude of inequality in eight of the eleven dimensions of the Gender Index. Moreover, it depicts an anomaly in the labor market domain: relatively speaking, very few Arab women are active in the labor market, but those who are, are a highly select group that often earns more per hour than Arab men (who participate in the labor market to a high degree, almost equaling the rate in the general population). These two phenomena—the baseline of deep inequality and the labor market factor—create the impression of a relatively sharp drop in gender inequality in Arab society.

Figure 66a

Gender Inequality in the Arab Society Domain, 2004–2013



Figure 66b

Magnitude of Inequality in Arab Society*



* Measurement involved six of the domain's indicators.

Spotlight: Gaps between Arab Women and Jewish Women

The comparison between the situation of Arab women and that of Arab men reflects gender gaps in Arab society in Israel. But Arab women are multiply disadvantaged as both a gender minority and an ethnic minority. It is therefore important to consider the gaps between Arab and Jewish women. While it is methodologically unfeasible to include the ethnic gaps in an index monitoring changes in gender gaps, given the importance of the issue we nevertheless present a comparison between women in Arab society and women in Jewish society, using the same indicators that are used to describe the gender gaps between Arab men and Arab women.

In 2013 Arab women's labor market participation rate was 26.3% of the civil labor force, as opposed to 64.7% for Jewish women. The gap has been stable over the years and does not show signs of improvement. In other words, the increasing rate of Arab women in the labor force is matched by the increasing rate of Jewish women in the labor force.

Rate of Labor Market Participation of Jewish and Arab Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2013, 38.2% of Arab women in the general labor force were employed part-time, while 35.5% of Jewish women were employed part-time. The rate of Arab women employed part-time has decreased over the years, and in recent years the gap between them and Jewish women has closed almost completely.

Rate of Part-Time Workers in the General Workforce, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2013 the average monthly wage of Arab women was NIS 5,210 per month, as opposed to NIS 7,555 for Jewish women. This gap has widened over the years.

Average Monthly Salary, Arab Women versus Jewish Women (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2012 the average hourly wage of Arab women was NIS 37.5, as opposed to NIS 49.5 for Jewish women. As the figure shows, the gap between Arab and Jewish women has widened over the years.

Average Hourly Wage, Arab Women versus Jewish Women (in NIS)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2013 the rate of Arab women with 13-15 years of education was 13.3%, while among Jewish women it was 25.6%. The rate of Arab women with 16 or more years of education was 12.6%, while among Jewish women it was 27.4%.

Rate of Education, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In 2013 the teen pregnancy rate for Arab girls was 24.4 (per 1,000), versus 5.9 among Jewish girls. The first figure shows a clear downward trend in the pregnancy rate of Arab girls. The second figure shows a very interesting trend in the general fertility rate: While Arab women are, on average, having fewer children, the average number of children born to Jewish women has been on the rise since 2005. Arab women still have more children than Jewish women, but barely.

Rate of Teen Pregnancies (Ages 15-19), Arab Girls versus Jewish Girls



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

Overall Fertility Rate, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In all years, Arab women have children at a younger age than do Jewish women. In 2013 Arab women had their first child at an average age of 24, while the average age was 28.3 for Jewish women.

Average Age at Birth of First Child, Arab Women versus Jewish Women



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics data processed by the authors

In conclusion, the gaps between Arab women and Jewish women remain stable with regard to labor market participation and education. In the areas of birth and fertility, the gaps appear to be closing, as they are in the area of part-time employment. On the other hand, the discrepancy in wages between Arab and Jewish women is growing, both in average monthly salary and average hourly wage.

DOMAIN 11: The Periphery

A broad perspective on gender gaps that extends beyond the mainstream, to the geographical and social peripheries, is extremely important. Therefore, we compared the situations of men and women in peripheral locales. Our definition of the periphery is based on that of the Central Bureau of Statistics with regard to participation in the labor market and income gaps between women and men in the center versus the periphery. According to these definitions the southern and northern regions of the State of Israel are considered the periphery. At present this domain includes two indicators, both pertaining to the labor market. Operational constraints made it unfeasible to add new indicators to this domain in the present report, but it is our intention to address the shortage of information and expand the domain in the future. The indicators are as follows:

1. Rate of workforce participation by women and men, periphery versus center
2. Wage gaps between women and men, periphery versus center

1.Rate of workforce participation in the periphery, women versus men

Figure 67 depicts the ratio between women and men in labor market participation in the center and periphery (from 2004 to 2011 in the civilian labor force and in 2012 in the overall labor force). The figure shows moderate changes in the indicator during the period in question. Between 2005 and 2007 inequality in the periphery (northern and southern regions, as per Central Bureau of Statistics definitions) rose because the labor force participation ratio between women and men in the periphery decreased from 0.75 to 0.73. From 2008 to 2011 there was a moderate improvement: women's participation levels in the labor market rose more than those of men, and the ratio climbed to a peak of 0.77. In 2012 this ratio dropped to 0.75 and in 2013 went back up a little to 0.76. As such there was a slight reduction in gender inequality in this domain. In the central region labor force participation levels—of both women and men—are higher than in the periphery, but the gaps between center and periphery are greater for women than they are for men. In other words, in terms of employment living in the periphery has a greater impact on women than it does on men.

Figure 67

Workforce Participation, Periphery versus Center, by Gender



Source: Knesset Research and Information Center data processed by the authors

2. Gaps between women's and men's average monthly salary, periphery versus center

In 2004 women in the periphery earned 64% of what men earned (according to this calculation the average monthly salary is the total annual earnings divided by 12). Until 2008 there was a gradual improvement, peaking in this year at 68% of the salaries of men. However, from 2009 to 2010 the gap widened, and women earned only 65% of the wages of men, a gap that persisted in 2011. In 2012 there was an improvement and women earned 67% of what men earned. This remained stable in 2013. Figure 68 depicts gaps between the monthly salary of men and women in the center and periphery. It is evident from the figure that the gap between the average monthly salary of men and women in the center is slightly larger than it is in the periphery: the average salary of women in the periphery from 2004 to 2012 was on average 66% of the monthly salary of men during those years, while the average salary of women in the center was 61% of the average salary of men. This is because men in the periphery earn on average less than men in the center. Still, the periphery is not kind to men either: it features more low-income and low-status jobs, and therefore the wage differences between men and women in the periphery are smaller than in the center.

Figure 68

Gaps between the Average Monthly Salaries of Women and Men, Periphery versus Center



Source: National Insurance Institute data processed by the authors (2013 values are based on extrapolation)

Summary: Gender Inequality in the Periphery Domain

The periphery domain examines the discrepancies in the labor market between men and women in the southern and northern regions in comparison with those between the center and periphery. Figure 69a shows that in the years examined there were no significant changes in the inequality situation in the periphery, though inequality in this domain did decrease slightly in 2012-2013. Figure 69b shows that the magnitude of the gap and distance from inequality in the periphery prevail, in the region of 30%.

Figure 69a

Gender Inequality in the Periphery Domain, 2004–2013



Figure 69b

Magnitude of Inequality in the Periphery



Gender Index Results for 2015 by Domain

Education Domain: This domain showed a slight increase in gender inequality in 2013 relative to 2012. In 2013, much like in 2012, 24% of women and 21% of men had 13 or more years of education. The proportion of women (in the total population of women) with 16 or more years of education rose to 24.6% (as opposed to 24.7% of men in the total population of men). Conversely, segregation in higher education rose slightly and the ratio of women to men with 13–15 years of education decreased. The overall result was an increase of 0.3% in gender inequality in the education domain.

Labor Market Domain: Inequality decreased slightly in this domain in comparison with 2012. This was the result of narrowing gaps in four of its seven indicators: the gap between women and men in civil labor force participation rates shrank; the ratio of men to women in monthly income rose (from 0.66 to 0.68); the ratio in gross hourly wage rose (from 0.85 to 0.86); and the gap in the median wage widened from a ratio of 0.71 to 0.73. The remaining three indicators showed increased gaps: the rate of women working part-time rose, the ratio between men and women working part-time reaching 1.93; the number of women contract workers also rose slightly; and the gap between women and men in recipients of employee benefits widened. Overall, this domain showed a 0.3% decrease in gender inequality relative to 2012.

Gendered Segregation of Professions Domain: Gender inequality increased in four of the eight indicators in this domain in 2013 (based on extrapolations). The rate of women lawyers dropped from 47% to 44%; the rate of women hi-tech workers dropped from 37% to 36%; segregation by occupation rose from 48% to 49%; and segregation by industry rose from 55.9% to 56.2%. The remaining indicators saw slight improvements. Overall, gender inequality increased by 1.3% in the gendered segregation of professions domain.

Poverty Domain: In 2013 inequality in this domain was lower than in 2012. The incidence of poverty among men decreased from 17.3% to 16.5% and among women from 19.7% to 19.3%—slightly narrowing the gap between the genders. Gender equality also decreased among income support recipients: in 2012 there were 56,619 women receiving income support versus 47,884 men, while in 2013 the number of women dropped to 55,538 and the number of men rose to 48,208. Overall, there was a decrease of 2.3% in inequality in the poverty domain.

Power Domain: There was a decrease in gender inequality in this domain in 2013 relative to 2012, thanks to improvements in almost all the indicators. The domain is divided into two subdomains: political and economic power. Under political power we examined three indicators: women members of parliament, women government ministers, and women mayors/heads of local or regional councils. Following the 2013 elections the number of women members of parliament rose to 30 (though a further increase of 30 would be needed to attain full equality); the number of ministers in government was 3, making the ratio of women to men 0.21; and the rate of women mayors/heads of councils was just 2%, as it had been in 2012. With regard to economic power, women's representation in the top three ranks of the civil service held steady, but more women were hired under senior contracts (36% as opposed to 34% in 2012). The indicators of CEOs, senior managers and women in other managerial positions also saw increased rates of women in these positions. Overall, the result was a decrease in inequality in the power domain by 18.7% in comparison with 2012.

Family Status Domain: This domain saw a slight improvement in comparison with the previous year. Teen pregnancy rates (ages 15–19) continued to drop, though the gap between the number

of single-parent families headed by women versus men widened: in 2013 there were 8 times as many single parent families headed by women than by men. Overall, the family status domain shows a decrease of 0.8% in gender inequality.

Time Domain: Gender inequality in this domain decreased in comparison with the previous year. The ratio of women to men among volunteers rose from 0.72 in 2012 to 0.84 in 2013. The rates of women unemployed or employed part-time as a result of commitments in the home also decreased. Overall, gender inequality in the time domain decreased by 3.2% in 2013.

Violence Against Women Domain: There was a very slight deterioration in this domain in 2013. Three indicators saw improvement: the number of domestic violence complaints made to the police decreased; the rate of cases closed due to lack of evidence decreased; and the number of women being treated at welfare ministry centers for domestic violence went down slightly in relation to the preceding year, from 7,335 to 7,286. By contrast, other indicators saw a rise in inequality: the number of sex offense cases transferred to the police prosecutor or state attorney increased; the number of women who feel safe walking in public places decreased from 63% to 60%; and the number of new calls to rape crisis centers rose by some 800. Overall, this domain showed a slight deterioration of 0.4% in gender inequality.

Health Domain: The health domain showed no changes in 2013. The ratio between the genders in life expectancy remained fairly stable at 1.04 in favor of women. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the gap in life expectancy between women and men dropped over the years, from 4.4 years in 2004 to 3.6 years in 2013. The gap between women and men in subjective assessment of health also decreased over the years, measuring 0.95 in 2013.

Arab Society Domain: There were no significant changes in gender inequality in this domain relative to the preceding year.[41] Six of the nine indicators that constitute the domain saw an increase in inequality, while three saw a decrease: gaps between Arab men and women in labor market participation rates widened slightly following a decrease from 27.1% to 26.3% in women's participation; the rate of Arab women working part time rose from 37.7% in 2012 to 38.2% in 2013. The rate of educated women in Arab society also rose (25.9% of Arab women have 13 or more years of education, while 22.7% of Arab men have 13 or more years of education); the rate of teen pregnancies dropped from 27.6 to 24.4; the gaps between the average monthly wage of Arab women and Arab men narrowed. The age of marriage ratio also rose slightly, as did the rate of Arab women filing domestic violence complaints. The overall result for this domain was a decrease of 0.1% in inequality in comparison with 2012.

The Periphery Domain: A slight improvement in gender inequality is evident in this domain. The gap between the labor market participation rates of women and men in the periphery narrowed to a ratio of 0.76, while gaps in wages (extrapolated) also shrank. These two indicators combined demonstrate an improvement of 0.4% in inequality in this domain.

To conclude, a comprehensive analysis that compounds all the domains and indicators of the Index shows that gender inequality decreased by 4.4% in 2013 in comparison with 2012. Gender inequality actually increased in three domains—education, gendered segregation of professions and violence against women—but the other domains remained steady or showed improvement. Gender inequality is still severe in terms of depth (59%) especially in the power, labor market and gendered segregations domains (though not in education).

41 As mentioned, all the other domains and the Index in its entirety pertain to the overall population of Israel.

Appendices

Appendix I: International Gender Indexes

In part, the public and professional validation of indexes rests on their similarity to indexes used in other countries and international organizations. Similar indexes facilitate comparison between Israel and other countries and provide a fuller picture of the situation in the relevant field. Below is an elaboration of the preeminent indexes used in the world (it should be noted that we did not find a gender index that monitors developments in inequality between men and women).

- **The Gender-related Development Index (GDI)**

  Source: United Nations, 1995. This index is a gender-focused expansion of the organization's Human Development Index (HDI). Its components are life expectancy, illiteracy, education and income. The GDI reflects the situation of women in three domains: health and fertility, empowerment, and labor market. It monitors the impact of its results on the HDI—in other words, it examines the impact of gender inequality on general human development. The GDI is constructed in such a manner as to follow the influence of national achievements on the overall development of each country examined by the HDI. A value of 0 denotes full equality between the genders and 1 indicates full inequality. The operationalization of women's health is expressed by two variables: the rate of mortality in childbirth and the birthrate among young girls. The empowerment domain is also measured via two variables: the rate of women in parliament and the rate of women with higher education. The operationalization of the degree of equality between the genders in the labor market is expressed by women's labor market participation levels.[42]

- **The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)**

  Source: United Nations, 1995. The purpose of this index is to measure inequality between men and women all over the world with respect to their active participation in political and economic life- and decision-making processes in their countries. The GEM's components are the rate of women in parliament, the rate of women in key economic positions, and income gaps. Its operationalization is based on three indicators: the rate of women in parliament, the rate of women in economic decision-making positions (administrative, managerial, professional and technical) and gaps in income between women and men. The GEM is grounded in the concept of agency—that is, what women are capable of executing—and less on their feelings or self-perception.[43]

  Both the GDI and the GEM were published in 1995, placing the discussion of gender inequality firmly at center stage. The interest they generated among academics and policy makers raised the need for more systematic gathering of data. However, criticism was leveled at both indexes. It was claimed that they did not measure gender inequality itself, that they were overdetermined, open to interpretation and did not survey all the

42 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/undp%E2%80%99s-revisions-gender-related-development-index.

43 Ibid.

relevant information, and that they did not constitute a means of measuring gender gaps that facilitated international comparisons. One critique claimed: "More importantly, the indicators are not easily interpreted and, in fact, are often misinterpreted, which undermined their usefulness" (Klasen 2007).

- **The Gender Inequality Index (GII)**

  Source: United Nations, 2010. This index was developed after its two UN predecessors were subjected to fierce criticism. Its components are health (fertility and maternal mortality), empowerment (rate of women in parliament and education) and rate of women in the labor market.[44]

- **The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI)**

  Source: OECD, 2009. This is a special index that examines social structure. The OECD maintains the Gender, Institutions and Development Database, which consists of over sixty indicators of equality between the genders and information on 162 countries. The database was established in 2006 to assist researchers and decision makers in understanding the obstacles that were obstructing the social and economic development of women. The database is constructed on the basis of several key variables that measure gender equality in the traditional manner in terms of education (illiteracy rates, years of study, and so on), health (for example, birthrate and fertility), economic situation, and political situation (rate of women in parliament). The social institutions in the OECD database are perceived as long-term codes for behavior, norms, traditions, and formal laws and informal rules that may contribute to gender inequality in all aspects of life. In addition to these traditional domains, the database consists of indicators of social institutions as reflected in social practices and legal norms that create inequality between women and men. The five institutional domains of the index are family codes, civil liberty, physical fairness, preference for male children and property rights. The family code deals with institutions that affect women's capacity for decision making in the home; civil liberty deals with the opportunity to participate in society; physical fairness comprises indicators of violence against women; preference for male children deals with the subject of abortion or mistreatment of women; and the last, property rights, examines women's access to ownership of certain kinds of assets. Twelve indicators were selected to represent these five domains, each one belonging to one of four categories. To make it possible to rank as many countries as possible, the guiding principle behind the design of the index was availability of information; indeed, the index covers a wide range of countries (102). However, it was designed primarily to examine problems associated with countries in the developing world and does not include countries that are members of the OECD.[45]

- **The Global Gender Gap Index**

  Source: The World Economic Forum in collaboration with Harvard University and the University of California, Berkeley, 2006. The index's components are labor market participation (including wage gaps and rate of managers and senior employees

44 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/.

45 See http://genderindex.org. For more on the development of the index, see Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler (2009).

in economic positions), education, health and survival, and political empowerment (women in parliament, length of terms served).[46]

- **The Gender Equity Index (GEI)**

  Source: Social Watch, 2004. Its components are labor market participation, education (illiteracy) and empowerment (senior positions) (Social Watch 2005).

- **The African Gender Status Index**

  Source: Economic Commission for Africa, 2004. Its components are social power (education, health), economic power (income, access to resources) and political power (senior positions in parliament, public sector, civil society institutions).[47]

- **The Women's Social Rights Index**

  Source: The CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 2007. This index adds the human rights perspective. It examines whether women's rights are entrenched in the legal systems of countries all over the world and whether governments enforce laws in this regard. The index includes one indicator from each country, which receives a value of one in four.[48]

- **The Global Gender Index**

  Source: *Times Higher Education*, 2013. The index maps the percentages of women in academe throughout the world.[49]

- **The Gender Equality Index**

  Source: The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), 2013. This is a new index that examines gender inequality in 27 European Union countries over three years. The index's domains are labor (labor market participation, segregation), money (means, economic situation), knowledge (access to education, segregation), time (caregiving and social activities), power (political, economic and social), and health (situation and access). (The domain of violence was not developed in this index.) Each country is ranked on a scale and compared to the overall European Union average.[50]

Indexes Developed in Israel

- **Women's Economic Power Index**

  Source: Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center, 2013. This is a comparative index that examines women's economic power as opposed to that of men in comparison with the OECD countries. The index consists of ten main variables, including labor (labor market participation rate, ratio of working hours, rate of unemployed women), pay (wage gaps between the genders), education/human capital (percentage of university

46 See Lopez-Claros and Zahidi (2005). ww3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf.

47 See Economic Commission for Africa 2004, www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/agdi_book_final.pdf.

48 See www.humanrightsdata.com.

49 See www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/the-global-gender-index/2003517.article.

50 See http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/gender-equality-index-main-findings.

graduates), power (percentage of managers and rate of parliament members) and business entrepreneurship (percentage of business owners). The results of the index show that women in Israel have less economic power than women in OECD countries, especially with regard to power and entrepreneurship. In education, by contrast, Israeli women have full power and even over-representation. These findings align with the findings of our Gender Index.[51]

- **The Equal Value Index**

  Source: The Israel Women's Network, 2011. This index focuses on wage gaps between women and men. Its components are women in the labor market (participation rate, rate of women employees, rate of women contract workers, rate of business owners, rate of managers, rate of part- and full-time workers), discrimination against women in the workplace (glass ceiling and mud floor—that is, discrimination from above and below—and sexual harassment), women and career (women's entrepreneurship), Arab women in the labor market, and equal opportunities.[52]

- **The Gender Representation Index**

  Source: D&B Israel, 2011. This index analyzes data from 361 leading public companies in the Israeli economy. The companies included were selected according to criteria that included being public companies on Dun's 100 list, in central sectors, and employing more than 100 people. Among the prominent industrial and financial companies included were Bank HaPoalim, Bank Leumi, Fox, and Analyst. The index examines the rate of women in management positions in these companies (board chairs, board members, CEOs or partners or presidents, and managers). The percentage of women serving in each of the positions was examined. The results for 2011 show that women are the minority in almost all positions: only 19% of management, 4% of CEOs and 4% of board chairs.[53]

51 See tinyurl.com/p6jdgjc.

52 See www.iwn.org.il.

53 See www.dundb.co.il/pdf/kendb.pdf.

Appendix II: Construction of the Gender Index: Methodology

An index is a quantitative estimation of a social phenomenon, based on multiple indicators that pertain to the phenomenon the index seeks to represent and measure. For example, the consumer price index (CPI) is a comprehensive measure of changing prices in various economic sectors and a means of monitoring those changes. An index operationalizes a concept by monitoring measurable manifestations that purportedly reflect its essence, presenting cumulative values of the variables measured for each indicator. An index of nominal variables (for example, variables that are list items, with no significance to their order) is basically a typology. While an index usually focuses on one domain, a typology ordinarily examines the intersection between two or more domains. A scale is yet another type of quantification that can be applied to social phenomena. Unlike an index, it usually includes only one domain.

Gender equality can be defined thus: a situation in which there is no difference between women and men in social, economic and demographic indexes. Today, significant disparities between women and men exist in every variable examined. While examination of each initial indicator is essential, it is also very important to aggregate the indicators into a single gender index that depicts the overall state of inequality between women and men in society. Below is a discussion of the Consumer Price Index as a case study.

The Consumer Price Index (A Case Study)

The Consumer Price Index expresses, in a single number, a variety of fluctuations in price that affect a broad range of products and commodities. The conceptual problem with this index is that it does not facilitate clear apprehension of the cumulative changes in prices overall. The simple average of all consumer spending throughout the market, as reflected in the Consumer Price Index, reflects changes in consumer behavior in the designated period, as well as changes in prices. On the other hand, the changes in consumer behavior can be isolated by fixing the quantities of goods and calculating the average prices of these goods, weighted according to the volume of consumption. However, the assignation of weights is random in terms of time, and the question arises as to which year's consumption of each commodity should be measured—since afterward, that year should then remain unchanged to facilitate comparison (that is, that year should become the base year). In fact, all consumer price indexes in the world are based on a fixed basket—that is, a predefined group of products. The basket usually reflects the proportional consumption of products and services in a given period. A fixed basket index can therefore be defined as the ratio between the cost of the basket's contents in one period of time and the cost of the same basket's contents in the base year. Prices are usually compared with those in the base year, when the number of products in the basket was determined.

The methodological rationale behind the CPI can be of use to us in the development of the Gender Index. Gender inequality can be defined as the ratio between inequality manifested in a fixed group of socioeconomic indicators in a given time period and inequality manifested in the same group of indicators in the base period. In keeping with this definition the index can

be expressed in the following formula, which depicts an aggregation of changes occurring in the indicators of gender inequality:

(1) $E_t/0^{(c)} = (\Sigma E_t/0 * W)/\Sigma W$

E represents inequality in a particular socioeconomic indicator; t represents the period in which it was measured in comparison with the base period (0) in which there was a particular basket of indicators (c). W is the weight assigned to each indicator included in the Index. Σ expresses the sum of the values of all the indicators of gender equality defined by the Index.

E_0 is the inequality manifested in the indicator in question during the base period. E_t is the inequality manifested in the indicator in question during the period being examined.

(2) $E_t/0^{(c)} = E_t\ E_0$

This equation expresses gender equality as represented by the social indicator, relative to the equality represented by the same social indicator in the baseline period.

(3) $W = (E_0\ Q_c)$[54]

This equation expresses the values of the weights given to each indicator for the purposes of calculating equality, relative to equality in the same indicator in the base year. W is the weight of the indicator in the overall Index based on inequality in this indicator in the baseline period, times its value (Q) during the baseline period (C). As noted above, Σ expresses the sum of the values of all the social indicators included in the group of equality indicators included in the Index. The construct "equality" replaces the construct "cost" used in the Consumer Index.

Methodological Problems in Construction of the Index

When constructing a gender index, it is necessary to determine which indicators are to be included and what weight to assign each one. In the case of the CPI, these issues are resolved using data gathered by periodic surveys conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Such data pertain to the distribution of consumer spending and are presented for a representative sample. In this case the weights express the rate of expenditure on a product from a given basket of goods consumed in the predetermined base period, according to the survey from which the sample is taken. By contrast, the Gender Index has no analogous database that can be used to determine which indicators are to be used and how to assign each of them weights.

54 The significance of the abbreviation Qc rests on the methodological sources of the Gender Inequality Index, which is based on the Consumer Price Index. In the present Index, the "cost" is inequality. The Index is calculated using a formula equivalent to formula (1) above, according to which the index is the cost of products in period t weighted according to consumption in period C, compared with their cost in the base period O. Each cost is multiplied by the consumption rate to make it possible to predict price increases after adjusting for changes in consumption patterns of the various commodities. In order to change the makeup of the basket and disconnect it from the base year, the CPI's products are weighted in such a way that they equal the cost of each product in period C, multiplied by the relative price of this product, which compares its price in the base year O with its price in period C for the period in which the basket was determined.

Edward Harvey, John Blakely and Lorne Tepperman (1990) propose constructing an index thus: selection and validation of a group of indicators of equality from the array of existing equality indexes, followed by assignation of equal weights for each of the indexes selected. They argue that this approach has the advantage of being based on existing data, making the resulting index easy to compute and inexpensive. It has the disadvantage of having no theoretical or empirical basis for allocating equal weights to all of the indicators. The authors therefore propose a method that makes it possible to measure the weights for each source of inequality at a certain point in time so as to give the weights an empirical basis. The stages they propose for computing the Gender Index are as follows:

- Data selection and preparation
- Data validation
- Data synthesis
- Index calculation

Data Selection and Preparation

This process is analogous to the CPI process of identifying a fixed basket of commodities for a relevant target population. Here we must identify socioeconomic indicators that correlate with the construct of gender inequality. In much the same way that the prices of commodities that are not consumer goods are excluded from the CPI, gender gaps in socioeconomic indicators that do not correlate with the construct of gender equality will be excluded from the Gender Index. The process of data selection and preparation consists of three main steps:

- Face validation: The indicator must be assessed to ensure that it represents what it is intended to represent. The process involves examination of all potential indicators to determine which of them pertain to gender equality. This is achieved by answering this question: Does this indicator actually reflect changes in gender equality as we perceive it?
- Repolarization: This process ensures that all the indicators operate in the same direction so that any growth in equality will be expressed as a growth in the indicator, the ratio or the rate. For example, the ratio between women's salaries and men's salaries increases when equality prevails. On the other hand, the ratio between the number of women working part-time and the number of men working part-time decreases as equality increases, and the polarity of the indicator must be reversed to reflect this increase.
- Converting into proportions: This involves converting all indicators into units of rates or percentages (if they are not already so) with a score of between 0 and 1 (or 100%). Calculating the average of indicators expressed in such units is statistically more stable than calculating the average of indicators that express different units.

Data Validation

Validation of the data ensures that indexes of gender equality that we expect to be correlated with one another are indeed correlated, their face validity notwithstanding. The validation method is factor analysis. This procedure requires a given and consecutive series, preferably

annual (data collected every year since the base year). The purpose of factor analysis is to express several variables via a limited number of factors and depict the units of examination in a concise and convenient manner.

The factors are new variables calculated as linear combinations (weighted averages) of the standardized original variables (in other words, each variable has an average of 0 and a variance of 1). Variables require standardization, since different variables are measured in different units: a variable value can be a number, a quotient or a percentage. It can be measured in New Israeli Shekels or years of schooling. Since our index is an inequality index, all variables are presented in the form of a ratio between the rates of men and women in a given period, thus overcoming the problem of different units. In factor analysis, in order to map the differences in the status of women over time, units are arranged in a series: the first factor is the linear combination that explains most of the variance, and hence discriminates the most between the years. The second factor explains the second largest variance out of the variance that cannot be explained by the first factor, and so on.

In constructing the Index we will use a large group of variables that are by definition highly correlated since they all represent the same social phenomenon. Through factor analysis we can construct a new variable consisting of a series of existing variables. As described above, these factors constitute an orthogonal system of axes within the multidimensional array of variables (because each factor is a linear combination of the original variables and the factors are orthogonal). This kind of analysis is called principal component analysis. The factor analysis also produces the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Index of Sampling Adequacy that helps sift through the data. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index has a dual purpose: it can be used to determine whether the variables belong to the same content area, and it can be used to examine a single variable's contribution to the group in which it has been classified. This index's values range from 0 to 1, and therefore results of 0.5 and up indicate that the indicator indeed belongs to the same content area.

Another important concept is factor loading. Factor loadings are coefficients between the variables and the factor. The size of the factor loading measures the relative importance of each variable, by year. A low factor loading on a variable by all factors can be sifted out of the analysis. There are several options in factor analysis, including rotating axes (factors) to increase the association of each variable with one single factor, where possible, and decrease its association with the other factors. This can lead to each factor significantly expressing a different group of original variables that belong to a certain sphere, such as variables that define education level or standard of living. Therefore we must remember that any interpretation of the meanings of factors is but one of many that could have been obtained by rotating the factors.

Factor analysis will generate the first factor, which in this case can be interpreted as the "gender equality factor." We can expect a very high correlation between the component indexes and the first factor; therefore any factor that loads less than 0.71 on this factor will be rejected and excluded. The criterion of 0.71 was selected based on the rationale that at least half of the indicator's variance is explained by the first factor, "the gender equality factor" (namely, variance = loading squared = [0.707] ^2= 0.5). All of the indicators that meet this criterion will be included in the Gender Index. The factor produced will be measured in terms of rate of explained variance and its polarity.

Data Synthesis

At this stage the annual values of the indicators must be standardized. Each value is recalculated relative to its average and the Standard Deviation (SD) of the series. Standardization is the best way to calculate indicators that are originally in different units—such as currency, number of people, or number of hours—and therefore have different distributions and characteristics. Standardization also compares the weights, which are indicative of the relative importance of each indicator in the overall Index. The results of the standardization enable us to compare indicators using the same units. Thus, for example, we could say that between 2000 and 2005, equality improved by an SD of 1 in terms of relative income, while the relative unemployment rate improved by only half an SD—that is, half as much as the income indicator.

An alternative procedure is to use the weight of each indicator in standard scores to influence their relative importance in the overall index. Some, however, claim that in the absence of any logical theory or empirical data that support giving weights to each indicator, they should be evenly weighted (Harvey, Blakely, and Tepperman 1990, 306).

Calculation of the Index

This is the final stage in the calculation of the Gender Index. As we saw from the aforementioned formula, this is when we calculate the weighted average of gender inequality as manifested in the social indicators, relative to the equality situation in the base year. The average in the base year is determined to be 100, and index values are determined accordingly. That is, the standard scores for the base year are transformed to make them equal 100. The standard scores for all the other years are transformed so that their values are less than 100 when equality in an indicator decreases relative to the base year and above 100 when equality increases relative to the base year.

To demonstrate such a transformation: If the standard score of one indicator in the base year is -1.0 (or 1 standard deviation below the indicator's average), we will decide that that value, z = -1.0, equals 100. If the standard score for the following year is -0.25 (or ¼ of a standard deviation below the average), the transformed value will equal the sum of 100 plus the product of the standard deviation and the gap (in terms of standard deviation) between the base year and the following year. Suppose an indicator's standard deviation equals 20. The gap in terms of standard deviation between the base year and the following year is 0.75 (or the gap between -1.0 and -0.25). Therefore, the indicator's value for the next year is 115 (100 + 0.75[20]).

The last stage involves calculating the index using the aforementioned equation for doing so. To illustrate this calculation by way of an example: Suppose we have six indicators in the Gender Index. In the base year each one of them equals 100 and their values for the following year are 110, 115, 120, 105, 100, and 110, respectively. Moreover, all six indicators have equal weights that get the value of 1. Following the equation, the calculation of the index would be as follows:

$$E_t/0(c) = \frac{(110/100) + (115/100) + (120/100) + (105/100) + (100/100) + (110/100)}{1+1+1+1+1+1} = 1.10$$

The accepted practice is to multiply the index by 100 and express it relative to its value in the base year, which would make the result, in this case, 110. The index moved 10 points toward equality between the two periods—from 100 to 110.

Calculating the Gender Index

As indicated above, to calculate the Index we need a data series that goes back a few years, preferably an extended one. Indicators usually present two typical problems: some have the necessary number of values but do not have face validity—that is, they do not measure gender equality; other indicators have face validity but do not have enough continuity of measurement or enough values to provide a statistical basis for evaluating missing values.

The Algorithm for Calculating the Gender Index

1. Selection of a series of indicators that have face validity: checking that the indicator assesses what it is intended to measure (face validation). This involves examining all potential indicators to determine which of them is pertinent to the assessment of gender equality. We set out to determine whether each indicator expressed changes in gender equality. This was a two-stage process consisting of descriptive analysis and preliminary screening.

   Descriptive analysis: Analysis of the initial list of variables, including statistical indexes for analyzing the distribution of each one independently according to distribution parameters, distribution symmetry and extreme values. We also calculated coefficients between pairs of variables. The purpose of these measures was to reduce the number of variables and avoid including overly influential variables or highly correlated variables. When the Pearson coefficient between two variables is higher than 0.8, the possibility of excluding one of them from the Index should be considered. The rule was that variables representing different social phenomena would be included despite being highly correlated, while variables representing the same phenomenon should preferably have symmetrical distribution, high variance (differences between instances), and low correlations between them.

   Preliminary screening: Preliminary screening of suitable indicators was accomplished on the basis of

   a. the indicator's relevance to gender issues in Israeli society;
   b. reliable data for every point of time, to ensure consistency of the Index;
   c. consistency with other studies. It was important to include as many variables used in other studies on gender equality as possible so as to facilitate comparison with other studies and contribute to the discussion of the subject. At this stage we recommend consultation with relevant agents in the field of gender in order to achieve as broad a consensus as possible for the Index.

2. Repolarization of the indicators so that they all express decreasing gender equality: this process ensures that all measures operate in the same direction—that is, increase along with gender equality. For example, the ratio between the salaries of men and women

rises when equality is attained. Conversely, the ratio between the part-time employment rate of men and women decreases when equality is achieved, and the direction of this indicator must hence be reversed.

3. Examining the construct validity of the indicators by means of factor analysis: factor analysis is used to predict the gender equality factor that will emerge from the statistical process used to determine what links the variables that have been selected and examines the correlation of each indicator with that factor.
4. Rejecting data sets with an explained variance of less than 0.71 according to the first predictive factor: factor analysis will lead to the factorization of a first factor, which in this case can also be interpreted as the "gender equality factor."We can expect a very high correlation between the component indexes and the first factor; therefore, any factor that loads less than 0.71 on that factor will be rejected and eliminated from the Index. The criterion of 0.71 was selected based on the rationale that at least half of the variance of the indicator (namely, variance = loading squared = $(0.71)^2 = 0.5$) is explained by the first factor, "the gender equality factor." All the indicators that were not rejected in this process will be included in the Gender Index.
5. Standardizing of data as described above.
6. Assigning indicators to domains and calculating the averages in each domain: at this stage we divide the data sets into topics and use factor analysis to reexamine which sets fit together and do not negate each other. The areas in which we examined gender inequality are naturally those that appear in international gender indexes: the labor market, health, political representation, and so on. Our objective was to challenge the standard list of areas in which gender inequality is measured and identify new ones that are derived from feminist principles. We therefore added the examination of women of different social statuses, violence against women, and women in Arab society in Israel.
7. Weighting by area or on a theoretical empirical basis: at this stage the Index's formula is consolidated and the proper weights are given to each domain. Considerations in determining the various weights might be theoretical (that is, based on a theory regarding which areas influence gender inequality and to what extent) or empirical (based on research data such as a survey of which aspects of inequality bother women more than others). At this stage of the research, we cannot establish weights, and therefore the assumption is that each area has the same impact on the general Index. Accordingly, the formula for calculating the index by its domains is as follows:

   The Gender Index = 1/11*(education)^2 + 1/11*(labor market)^2 + 1/11*(gendered segregation of professions)^2 + 1/11*(poverty)^2 + 1/11*(power)^2 + 1/11*(family status)^2 + 1/11*(time)^2 + 1/11*(violence against women)^2 + 1/11*(health)^2 + 1/11*(Arab society)^2 + 1/11*(periphery)^2

8. Calculating the index average for all the years of measurement.
9. Setting the average for the base year at 100. The base year is randomly determined and serves mainly as a point of origin for comparison.
10. Calculating the current year's Index in comparison with that of the base year. (The base year can be changed and the Index recalculated. The interyear values will bemaintained.)

Israel Gender Index Model



Selection of Variables to be Included in the Gender Index

The variables included in the Index must be consecutive series going back several years so their relevance to factors that explain gender inequality can be examined. They must also have potential for continued measurement because our intention is to update the Index every year. Stable data series are mostly found in CBS publications and to a lesser extent in NII publications.

Given that the agencies that have been collecting data in Israel over the years are not committed to gender equality, much of the data collected is not gender disaggregated. Moreover, the categories determined and the subjects researched by those agencies are biased toward the men's sphere and its topical dictates.

There is rarely adequate data regarding women's status and experiences, including violence against women, the distribution of resources within the nuclear family, state allocation of resources by gender, compound disaggregation by ethnicity and gender, and more. These technical but critical constraints limit the indicators that can be included in the Index. The preliminary screening of the relevant variables was performed according to the considerations described above.

Indicators That Were Considered but Not Included in the Present Index

As noted, not all the indicators that were considered were ultimately included in this Index. A list of the excluded indicators and the reasons for their exclusion follows. Some of them may be included in future iterations of the Index.

- Murder of women by their partners: according to the standard analysis—rate per 1000 women. Fluctuation is negligible in this indicator.
- Arrest of men for domestic violence offenses: data are available only for the years 2008–2013.
- Arrest of men for sex offenses: data are available only for the years 2008–2013.
- Prison sentences for men convicted of domestic violence offenses: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Rate of repeated incarceration of prisoners convicted of domestic violence offenses: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Prison sentences for prisoners convicted of sex offenses: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Rate of repeated incarceration of sex offenders: data are available only for the years 2007–2013.
- Rate of participation of men and women aged 15 and up in the civilian labor force in Israel, Ashkenazim versus Mizrahim: does not belong to any existing domain in the index; future indexes will examine ethnic gaps.
- Ratio between the number of Arab women and Arab men who are members of parliament: the number of women Arab MKs is too low.
- Rates of women and men who report diabetes: data were collected only for 2003, 2004 and 2009.
- Rates of women and men who report a disability or a severe disability: data were collected only for 2003, 2004 and 2009.
- Rates of women and men who report physical activity: data were collected only for 2003, 2004 and 2009.
- Rates of women and men with a high BMI: data were collected only for 2003 and 2004.
- Number of domestic violence investigators in the Israeli police by religion and gender: figures were published only for 2010.
- Rate of Jewish versus Arab girls in preschool and public and city day care centers: no gender disaggregated data.
- Division of domestic responsibilities between married people aged 20 and up: data exist only for 2009.
- Overall fertility rate of women in Israel.
- Fertility rate of Arab women in Israel.
- Average age of mother at first birth—overall population.
- Average age of mother at first birth—Arab society.[55]

55 The last four indicators were eliminated because of disagreement over whether they are directly pertinent to gender inequality.

The Indicator Selection Process: Partial Results of Factor Analysis

The statistical procedure of factor analysis allows us to select indicators by determining which of them are associated with the same hypothesized factor. Like many statistical procedures, however, factor analysis requires numerous observations—between 100 and 300 (Field 2005). Another variable that must be taken into account is the number of indicators: the ratio between the number of variables in each indicator and the number of indicators should be at least 1:2. In other words, to examine a list of fifty indicators of gender inequality, each indicator should include at least one hundred observations. Since we are working with years, this is not feasible, and we therefore had to conduct the factor analysis in stages, dividing the indicators into groups (some of the simulations we ran are presented below). Because of these constraints, most gender indexes include strong indicators that have reliable data from consecutive multiannual measurements, but these are not an exhaustive representation of the phenomenon of gender inequality. Since our goal was to present a broader picture of gender inequality, we had to compromise the sample size of each indicator and thereby limit the robustness of the results of the factor analysis used to select indicators.

Before performing the factor analysis, we examined the correlation between each pair of indicators: when no correlation between them was found, we concluded that factor analysis would not provide us with any additional information, because they appeared unrelated to the hypothesized variable of the factor analysis. Conversely, if we found high or full correlation between two indicators, it would be impossible to isolate each of their contributions to the hypothesized factor, which would indicate that the analysis was invalid. Therefore, examining correlations between pairs of indicators was another tool used to select indicators. Another preliminary stage before factor analysis, which also contributed to indicator selection, was an examination of whether their distributions were normal, or at least not overtly contrary to a normal distribution. Sharp ups or downs might have impaired the factor analysis.

Several indicators were thus filtered out—for example, in the areas of education and poverty. All the education indicators are correlated with each other. We selected two—people with 13–15 years of education and people with 16 or more years of education—and the indicators of undergraduate degrees and at least 13 years of education were dropped. Poverty after transfer payments and poverty before transfer payments are highly correlated; we retained the former because it is related to the involvement of the welfare system. Because of the limitations of the analysis—a result of the limited number of observations for each indicator—we performed factor analysis of each indicator within its domain and examined the correlations of each indicator with other similar indicators and with all indicators. This constituted another stage of indicator selection. Table II-a below shows the results of the factor analysis of the variables.

Table II-a

Factor Analysis of All Indicators in the Index

	Component							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
educ_13_15_100	.496	.694						
educ_17_100	.766	-.574						
educ_segragation_100			-.669		-.430			
w_participation100	.885							
w_parttime100	.636	.468		-.441				
w_salary100	.900							
w_wage100		.633					.449	
w_median_salary	.855	-.435						
w_temp100		.447				.665		
w_hatavot	-.705		-.540					
seg_engineer_architect100	.740			.404				
seg_doctors100	.679			-.681				
seg_judge_lawyer100		.810						
seg_teaching100	.758			.448				
seg_carry100				.684	.587			
seg_hitec100h	.784				-.468			
segragation_proffesions	.822	.484						
segragation_disciplines	.769	.441						
pov_after100		-.696					.453	.407
pov_benef100	.599	.557	.459					
pol_parl100	.841							
pol_minister100	-.784	.409						
pol_muni100			-.515	-.521				
pol_general_manegar100	.805				.514			
pol_senior_manegar100	.699	-.627						
pol_other_manager100	.793							
pol_highest_position100	.975							
pol_senior_contract100	.898							
family_fertility_15_19	.960							
family_single_parent_family	.515	.518		.450				
family_age_marry	.918							
time_vocation_israel	.510			.552				-.479
time_vocation_abroad			.831	.404				
time_volunteer		-.841						-.440
time_housewife_part	-.796	.438						
time_housewife_unempl			.629	-.446				
v_sex_abuse_complaints100	.859							
v_sex_abuse_cases100	-.662		.555					
v_violence_abuse_victims100	-.876							
v_violence_cases100	.833		-.461					
v_violence_cases_closed100		.443		-.634				
v_feel_safe_street100			.722					
h_expectancy100	-.827							
h_mortality100	-.669		.572					
h_feeling100	.869							
a_participation100	.977							
a_parttime100		.665		-.442		-.459		
a_salary100	.688			-.563				
a_wage100			-.593		-.552			
a_educ1315_100	-.533		-.715					
a_educ16_100	.910							
a_complaints100	-.923							
a_fertility15_19	.971							
a_age_marry		.411		-.466	.498			
p_participation100	.645		.745					
p_salary100				.653	.475			

Table II-b

Explained Variance

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	26.152	46.701	46.701	26.152	46.701	46.701
2	7.682	13.717	60.418	7.682	13.717	60.418
3	6.797	12.137	72.555	6.797	12.137	72.555
4	5.950	10.625	83.180	5.950	10.625	83.180
5	3.512	6.272	89.452	3.512	6.272	89.452
6	2.173	3.880	93.332	2.173	3.880	93.332
7	2.155	3.848	97.179	2.155	3.848	97.179
8	1.580	2.821	100.000	1.580	2.821	100.000

As Table II-b shows, 47% of the variance of all indicators over the 2004–2013 period is explained by the first factor, 14% by the second factor, and 12% by the third factor. Table II-c below presents several samples of factor analysis on various domains of the Index.

Table II-c

Samples of Domain Factor Analyses

Labor Market Domain Indicators

Component Matrix*

	Component		
	1	2	3
w_participation100	.889		
w_parttime100	.711	.549	
w_salary100	.979		
w_wage100	.549	.536	-.544
w_median_salary	.839		
w_temp100		.609	.770
w_hatavot	-.797		

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

* 3 components extracted.

Health Domain Indicators

Component Matrix*

	Component
	1
h_expectancy100	.970
h_mortality100	.944
h_feeling100	-.933

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

* 1 component extracted.

violence against women Indicators

Component Matrix*

	Component		
	1	2	3
v_sex_abuse_complaints100	-.666	.632	
v_sex_abuse_cases100	.911		
v_violence_abuse_victims100	.886		
v_violence_cases100	-.927		
v_violence_cases_closed100	.507		.856
v_feel_safe_street100	.519	.812	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

* 3 components extracted.

Family Status Domain Indicators

Component Matrix*

	Component
	1
family_fertility_15_19	.957
family_single_parent_family	.702
family_age_marry	.942

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

* 1 component extracted.

Table II-d

Working Model of Magnitude of Gender Inequality (39 proportional indicators)

	Component							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
w_participation	.876							
w_parttime		.936						
w_salary	.778	.404						
w_hour							.820	
w_median_salary	.936							
w_koachadam						.926		
w_hatavot	-.888							
segragation_proffesions	.417	.632	.462					
segragation_disciplines	.404	.473	.500		.499			
p_participation	.615			.555				
p_salary								.901
a_participation	.680	.561						
a_parttime		.906						
a_salary	.741							-.575
a_educ1315	.550			.589	.401			
a_educ16	.840							.415
a_age_marry		.709			-.600			
pov_after		-.676	-.585					
pov_benef		.662						
educ_13_15			.744					
educ_17	.906							
educ_segragation				-.830				
pol_parlament	.764		.431					
pol_minister	-.883							
pol_muni					-.879			
pol_general_manegar	.735	.471						
pol_senior_manegar	.900							
pol_other_manager	.738				.466			
pol_highest_position	.840	.430						
pol_senior_contract	.643	.684						
family_single_parent_family			.914					
family_age_marry	.760	.480						
time_israel_vocation			.953					
time_abroad_vocation			.513		.587			
time_voluntary		-.437				-.551	-.560	
time_housewife_part	-.893							
time_housewife_unempl				.894				
health_feel	.861							
violence_street				.597		.588		

* The explained variance of the magnitude of inequality is 45%

Sources of Data

Central Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Abstracts

Table 3.13: "Fertility Rates, by Age and Religion" (online)

Table 3.14: "Fertility Rates, Average Age of Mother and Sex Ratio at Birth, by Selected Characteristics of the Mother" (online)

Table 3.24: "Life Expectancy by Sex, Religion and Population Group" (online)

Table 3.31: "Deaths and Mortality Rates, by Cause, Sex and Age" (online)

Table 3.6: "Median, Mean and Weighted Mean Marriage Age, by Previous Marital Status and Religion" (online)

Table 5.12: "Lone Parent Families with Children Aged up to 24, by Parent's Characteristics, Type of Household and Size of Household" (online)

Table 6.18: "Persons Aged 20 and Over, by Self-Assessed Health and by Selected Characteristics" (online)

Table 7.2: "Persons Aged 20 and Over, by Contentedness, Sex, Age and Population Group" (online)

Table 7.22: "Recipients of Benefits for Income Maintenance, by Sex and Family Composition" (online)

Table 7.5: "Persons Aged 20 and Over, by Volunteer Activity and Selected Traits Group" (online)

Table 8.72: "Population Aged 15 and Over, by Population Group, Years of Schooling, Age and Sex" (online)

Table 12.1: "Population Aged 15 and Over and Population Aged 25–54 (Prime Working- Age Group), by Civilian Labour Force Characteristics, Population Group and Sex" (online)

Table 12.21: "Employed Persons Usually Working Part-Time, by Reason for Part-Time Work, Population Group and Sex" (online)

Table 12.26: "Unemployed Persons, by Reason for Stopping Work, Employment Previous to Seeking Work and Date of Stopping Last Work" (online)

Table 12.32: "Employees in the High-Tech Sector, by Se," (online)

Table 12.4: "Population Aged 15 and Over, by Labour Force Characteristics, District and Sub-District of Residence, Localities Numbering 100,000+ Residents and Sex" (online)

Table 12.47:"Gross Money Income from Wages and Salaries of Employees, by Years of Schooling and Sex" (online)

Central Bureau of Statistics: Wages Surveys

Table 0.42: "Gross Income per Employee, by Population Group, Continent of Birth, Period of Immigration and Sex" (online)

Table 0.44: "Deciles of Employees, by Gross Monthly Income, Sex, Number of Years of Schooling and Occupation" (online)

Table 2.12: "Employed Persons and Employees, by Industry (Two Digits), Population Group and Sex" (online)

Table 2.17: "Employed Persons and Employees, By Occupation (Main Group—Two Digits), Population Group and Sex" (online)

Central Bureau of Statistics: Employment Surveys

Table 1.24: "Percent in Civilian Labour Force and Unemployed Persons, by District and Sub-District of Residence, Population Group and Sex" (online)

Table 2.50: "Annual Civilian Labour Force (Not Including Permanent Samples)—Total and Recipients of Wages from Employment Agencies, by Weekly Civilian Labour Force Characteristics and Sex—Total Number of Recipients of Wages From Employment Agencies" (online)

National Insurance Institute

Poverty and Social Gaps, Table 7: "Incidence of Poverty among Persons by Gender (Percentages), 1999–2013" [in Hebrew] (online)

Average Wage and Income by Locality and by Various Economic Variables, Table 7: "Average Monthly and Annual Salaries of Employees (NIS) by Gender and by District and Sub-District, 2010–2012"[in Hebrew] (online)

Council for Higher Education

Human Resource Reports by Budgetary Units of the Universities, VATAT: Planning and Policy Division (unpublished)

Knesset Research and Information Center

Almagor-Lotan, Orly. 2010. *Women's Employment in the Periphery* [in Hebrew]. The Knesset Research and Information Center. (online)

Bogesky, Yuval. 2013. *Violence against Women: Data Summary for 2013* [in Hebrew]. (online)

Israel Civil Service Commission

Shahal-Rosenfeld, Talila. 2013. Department for the Advancement and Integration of Women, Annual Report for 2013 [in Hebrew]. (online)

Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel

Parenting in the Aftermath of Trauma: Dealing with Sexual Violence in Israel 2013 [in Hebrew]. (online)

Sources for Indicators Not Included in the Index

Central Bureau of Statistics: 2009 Health Survey

Table 11.1: "Persons Reporting Diabetes, by Age, Sex and Socio-Demographic Characteristics" (online)

Table 18.1: "Persons with Functional Limitations (in at Least One Daily Activity), by Age and Socio- Demographic Characteristics" (online)

Table 25.1: "Persons Who Engage in Physical Activity at Least 3 Times a Week, by Age, Sex and Socio-Demographic Characteristics" (online)

Table 28: "Body Mass Index (BMI) of 30 or More (Based on Self-Reported Weight and Height)" (online)

Table 43: "Married Persons Aged 20 and Up, by Role in the Home and Selected Characteristics" [in Hebrew] (online)

Other Sources

World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.MA.In/countries

United Nations Commission for Europe (UNECE), Statistical Database, http://tinyurl.com/unece-stat-30ge

World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2014* (online)

Bibliography

Bianchi, Suzanne M., Liana C. Sayer, Melissa A. Milkie, and John P. Robinson, 2012. "Housework: Who Did, Does or Will Do It, and How Much Does It Matter?" *Social Forces* 91 (1): 55-63.

Bittman, Michael, and Judy Wajcman, 2000, "The Rush Hour: The Character of Leisure Time and Gender Equity," *Social Forces* 79 (1): 165-189.

Branisa, Boris, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler. 2009. "Background Paper: The Construction of the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI)," University of Goettingen, Department of Economics. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/19/42295804.pdf/

Crompton, Rosemary, 2007. *Employment and the Family: The Reconfiguration of Work and Family Life in Contemporary Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daniels, Arlene K., 1987. "Invisible Work," *Social Problems* 34 (5): 403-415.

Economic Commission for Africa, 2004. *The African Gender and Development Index*. Addis Ababa: ECA.

England, Paula. 2010. "The Gender Revolution: Uneven and Stalled," *Gender and Society* 24 (2): 149–166.

Field, Andy P., 2005. *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*, 2nd ed. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Garey, Anita I., and Karen V. Hansen, 2011. *At the Heart of Work and Family: Engaging the Ideas of Arlie Hochschild*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Goldin, Claudia. 1997. "Career and Family: College Women Look to the Past." In *Gender and Family Issues in the Workplace*, ed. Francine D. Blau and Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 20–58. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvey, Edward B., John H. Blakely, and Lorne Tepperman. 1990. "Toward an Index of Gender Equality," *Social Indicators Research* 22: 299–317.

Hochschild, Arlie. 1997. *The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work*. New York: Owl Books.

Hochschild, Arlie, and Anne Machung. 1989. *The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home*. New York: Viking Penguin.

King, E. and Bellew, R. (1993) "Educating Women: Lessons from Experience", in king and Hill (eds.) *Women's Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits and Policies*, Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press.

Klasen, Stephan, 2007. "UNDP's Gender-Related Measures: Some Conceptual Problems and Possible Solutions," *Journal of Human Development* 7 (2): 243–274.

Lopez-Claros, Augusto, and Saadia Zahidi. 2005. *Women's Empowerment: Measuring the Global Gender Gap*. Davos: World Economic Forum.

Massey, D., and N. Denton. 1988. "The Dimensions of Residential Segregation." *Social Forces* 67 (2): 373–393.

OECD, 2009. "Special Focus: Measuring Leisure in OECD Countries." In *Society at a Glance 2009*, Geneva: OECD.

Social Watch. 2005. *Roars and Whispers, Gender and Poverty: Promises versus Action*. Montevideo: Social Watch.

Stier, Haya. 2005. "The Inter-Relationship between Work for Pay and Family Work", *Israeli Sociology* 7(1): 143–160. [Hebrew]

Stier, Haya, and Alisa Lewin. 2000. *Poor Women in Israel* [in Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: The Israel Women's Network.

Stier, Haya, and Noah Lewin-Epstein. 2000. "Women's Part-Time Employment and Gender Inequality in the Family," *Journal of Family Issues* 21 (3): 390–410.

Trajtenberg Report. 2011."The Cost of Living"[in Hebrew]. Shituf Hatzibur—The Committee for Social and Economic Change. http://hidavrut.gov.il/content/4170

Walby, Sylvia, 1990. *Theorizing Patriarchy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

The Gender Index, an innovative tool developed by WIPS – **The Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere**, serves to evaluate gender inequality in Israel across a spectrum of fields over time. The 2015 Gender Index is based on the calculation of gender inequality in Israel in eleven key domains: education, the labor market, gendered segregation of professions, poverty, power, family status, time, violence against women, health, and gender inequality in the periphery and in Arab society in Israel.

The 2015 Gender Index contains several new elements: For the first time, the Index provides an estimate of the depth of gender inequality and enables a comparison between the different domains to identify the areas in which gender inequality is most severe. The 2015 Index also contains a new dimension—time, which presents the differences in how men and women divide their time. Several new indicators have been added, including employers' differential benefits given to men and women employees, gendered segregation in fields of study in universities, and women's and men's sense of security in the public sphere.

The Gender Index's contribution lies in its systematic examination of data in a variety of spheres over more than a decade, to provide an overall depiction of the state of gender inequality in Israel. Unlike other gender indexes, the Gender Index takes into account aspects of gender inequality that address issues of diversity and deep social structures of inequality—for example, Arab society, gendered segregation in the workforce, and violence against women. Furthermore, as a monitor of the status of women in Israel, it is a powerful tool for evaluating Israeli state policies and initiatives directed at increasing gender equality and promoting social justice.

רחוב ז'בוטינסקי 43, ירושלים 9104001, ת"ד 4070, טל' 02-5605222; פקס 02-5619293

43 Jabotinsky St., Jerusalem 9104001, P.O.B. 4070, Tel. 972-2-5605222, Fax. 972-2-5619293

شارع جابوتنسكي ٤٣، القدس ٩١٠٤٠، ص. ب. ٤٠٧٠، تلفون: ٠٢-٥٦٠٥٢٢٢، فاكس: ٠٢-٥٦١٩٢٩٣

vanleer@vanleer.org.il • www.vanleer.org.il

מכון ון ליר בירושלים

THE VAN LEER JERUSALEM INSTITUTE

معهد فان لير في القدس