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3 To be a *Voyvoda* in Diyarbakır: Socio-Political Change in an 18th-Century Ottoman Province

Mustafa Ağa, the son of Abdülvehhab Ağa and grandson of Hacı Hüseyin, served as the *voyvoda* of Diyarbakır for several years before he died in the city of Amid (Diyarbakır). This was the most senior position he ever held. On 6 June 1741, probably not long after his death, three women appeared at court to apply to the office of the Diyarbakır registrar (*kassam*) for the registration and devolution of Mustafa Ağa's patrimony. As a result, his considerable property: cash, real estate, belongings and debts, were registered, calculated and evaluated at the sum of 118,969 *kuruş*. From his probate inventories we know the extent of his holdings and his involvement in the commercial life of the city and beyond: he owned five houses, five shops, a dye house, and a bakery, all in the city of Amid, as well as other property beyond the city walls. All of these, including the money, were divided among three legal heirs: his sister Emine Hatun, who received the lion's share of the inheritance, Zeynep Hatun, his mother, and his only wife, Hamide Hatun. The last two had to settle for less than Emine's share.¹ Although this is a puzzling distribution of the patrimony, there are other, still more surprising elements in this story.

It turns out that Mustafa Ağa had the equivalent of 45,253 *esadi kuruş* (Dutch Löwentalers) in cash and personal belongings in the *Bedestan-ı Atık* and invested with his broker (*sarraf*) in Istanbul. This money that was confiscated after his death in 1741,² suggesting that Mustafa Ağa was not merely rich: he was a *kul*, one of Istanbul's—slaves of the Porte, whose possessions were considered part of the sultan's assets, and whose money and material goods were appropriated by the state treasury upon their death.³ This raises the question of why his Diyarbakır goods were not confiscated like those in Istanbul. In part, this chapter will provide an explanation for

1 Diyarbakır Şerhiye Sicilleri, 315: 71–76 (hereafter DŞS)

2 Başbakanlık Arşivi, Bâb-ı Defter-i Baş Muhasebe Muhallfat 12532 (hereafter D.BŞM.MHF 12532); Ariel C. Salzman, *Measures of Empire: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Régime, 1695–1807* (Columbia University, 1995), 278.

3 Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, "kapı kulu" in *Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü*, (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1951), I: 173–5; Metin Kunt, *The sultan's servants: the transformation of Ottoman provincial government 1550–1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 6–7, 41–5, 97; Karl K. Barbir, "One Marker of Ottomanism: Confiscation of Ottoman Officials' Estates," in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman world: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz*, eds. Baki Tezcan and Karl K Barbir (Madison, Wisconsin: Center for Turkish Studies at the University of Wisconsin & The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 135–146; Eduard J. Erickson and Mesut Uyar, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk*. (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009), 17–20, 28–9, 91–6, 108–110, 120–8.

this discrepancy. But further to that, this incongruity will provide the starting point for some of the interesting insights driven out of the *voyvoda's* narrative. This essay will discuss three main questions concerning the social arena and its dynamics in the Ottoman provinces. Primarily, what were the roles and the social meaning of the *voyvoda* and the *voyvodalık* in the eighteenth century?

The story of Mustafa Ağa, the *voyvoda* of Diyarbakır reveals much about the practical meaning of being a *voyvoda* and enriches our knowledge on this subject, mainly obtained from the eminent work of Ariel Salzmänn. The political and social status of the *voyvoda* vis-à-vis the *vali* is also addressed here. The *voyvoda* was a rising power in the Ottoman administration at that time, hence a potential for struggle between himself and the *vali* was obviously unavoidable. Yet the *voyvoda's* position enabled him the advantage of a relatively safe mode to increase his fortune and political power, while others were genuinely in danger of losing their career, their property, or even their lives. This could not have happened without the help of mediators in Istanbul—either the *sarraf*, who played a fundamental role once the tax-farm and the life-term tax-farm were introduced, or from other family and household members holding central positions in the Empire. Hence, the second question this chapter wishes to examine is the relations between the center of the empire and the provinces.

Scholars have long rejected the so called disconnection of the provinces from the center of the Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when powerful locals were taking over the administration of the *vilayets*. Ehud Toledano describes this social change as the “Ottomanization-Localization” process: in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Toledano suggests, the *askeri* (the military and bureaucratic elites) established themselves in the provinces, while at the same time notable provincial families became integrated into the urban Ottoman elite. The career of Mustafa Ağa sketches clearly both stages of this process and contributes to our understanding of how precisely this was done. Additionally, the rift in his extended family between Istanbul and Diyarbakır shows the availability of these two options—Ottomanization and localization—while the advantage to families who could function at both levels is lucidly demonstrated.

The nature of the relations among elite members of society is the third matter to be discussed, with specific focus on bonds of patronage. How individuals created and perpetuated interactions of patronage in the daily life is a fascinating question that will help elaborate on the pragmatic nature of these relations. Gifts, loans, and debts were all used to create a feeling of indebtedness, a strong ground for patronage relations. Hence, accordingly in the following paragraphs, the story of Musatafa Ağa, a *voyvoda* from Diyarbakır, will serve as a case study.

3.1 The *Voyvoda* and *Voyvodalık*

The title of *voyvoda* and *voyvodalık* (the office of the *voyvoda*) were used with differing meanings throughout the years of Ottoman rule for various responsibilities and authorities, and differed from one place to another. Etymology derives *voyvoda* from the Slavic root *vojn*, signifying a high-ranking military commander in mediaeval Serbia or governor of a military district on the eve of the Ottoman conquest. In early Ottoman sources, however, the term appears to relate to Christian lords, and during the sixteenth century this title was used variously to designate a sub-commander, civil governors of the Black Sea and Balkan regions, as well as the governor of Athens, as Stathi shows. The title accrued further meanings soon after. *Voyvodas* were agents (sometimes called *naip*) attached to the *timar* and *zeamet* system, in charge of revenues from the imperial and other domains, including *has* fiefs granted to *vezirs*, provincial governors and other dignitaries.⁴

With the expansion of the tax-farm system (*mukataa*) in the seventeenth century, and especially towards the end of the century when the Ottoman administration started leasing tax-farms for life-long tenure (*mâlikâne mukataa*—sometimes even transferred to the descendants), the position of *voyvoda* entailed responsibility for supervising and managing the bulk of these contracts, and was itself a tax-farm contract. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, for example, such a contract for the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbakır was sold for 15,000 *kuruş*. *Voyvodas* accumulated fortunes, and extended their power by getting a share of the profits of the *ilitzâm* or *mâlikâne* contract they were in charge of. Others, we learn, received a salary from the central government. A *voyvoda* could earn 22,500 *kuruş* per year. By selling regional contracts, the state managed to raise money from provincial investors as well as from those in Istanbul, and the revenues were used more and more to finance the expenses of the governors in the provinces.⁵

This is how, during the eighteenth century, the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbakır, like its equivalents, the *muhasşılık* of Aleppo or the *defterdarlık* of Damascus, became responsible for most of the fiscal affairs in the urban administration and absorbed many of its functions, such as taxation of dye works, weighing the wheat, affixing the black tax stamp on clothes, as well as collecting household taxes, extraordinary taxes

⁴ Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, “*Voyvoda*” in *Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü* (Istanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1954), III: 598; Fili Adanir, “Woywoda,” in *EI2* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), XI :215; Maria Pedani, “Sultans and voivodas in the 16th century : gifts and insignia,” *Journal Of International Social Research* 1 (2007): 194–5; Ariel Salzman, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Boston: Brill, 2004), 128; Katerina Stathi, “An (in)famous governor: The *voyvoda* of Athens Hadji Ali Haseki” in *RCAC Mini-Symposium: Provincial Officials in the Ottoman Empire during the Mid-18th and 19th centuries: formation, functions, identities* (Istanbul, 2009), 1–10.

⁵ Ariel C. Salzman, *Measures of Empire: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Régime, 1695–1807*, (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1995); Salzman, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 156.

(*avariz*) and poll taxes (*cizye*), while retaining the former tasks relating to the agrarian economy and its taxes.⁶ Though Evliya Çelebi's *siyahatnamesi* of Diyarbakır from the seventeenth century reports the existence of a *defterdar*, in the following century this office no longer existed. Instead the *voyvoda* achieved extreme importance in the administration of the *vilayet*: Ottoman decrees from the center to Diyarbakır were mainly addressed to the *vali*, the *voyvoda*, and the *kadi*, heads of the highest levels of the bureaucracy of the *vilayet*.⁷ Thus, the *voyvoda* was a kind of broker or mediator between the center and the provinces.

In war-time or during internal conflicts the *voyvoda*'s responsibility was even greater. In 1777 the *voyvoda* of Diyarbakır recruited 2,000 militiamen (*sekban*) to defend the *vilayet* of Musul, a military force similar in size to that recruited by the governor of this province himself.⁸ The *voyvoda* was thus at times second only to the authority of the governor, which was a potential for either collaboration or struggle.⁹ In the late 1800s and at the beginning of the 1900s the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbakır was often granted to local figures, many of them from the prominent *şeyhzade* family of Diyarbakır.¹⁰

Mustafa Ağa, originally from Diyarbakır, was born to a well-established Muslim family. In the eighteenth century, however, this did not contradict his being a *kul*: since the 1600s Muslims were also recruited to the corps; moreover, free-born Muslims could buy pay-certificates (*esāme*) that entitled them to a rank and a place on the rolls of privileged salary receivers. In 1740 this practice was legalized by Sultan Mahmud I.¹¹ How Mustafa Ağa of Diyarbakır won his title is not entirely clear yet we know that it was a direct result of the fact that his father and uncle were genuine *kul* in Istanbul. Whether he purchased his title of Ağa or was in fact recruited to be a soldier in the "Inside" or "Outside" services of the sultan's household is not known but also does not make a real difference.¹²

Mustafa Ağa's establishment in the *voyvodalık*, however, took place long after his father Abdülvehhab Ağa and his uncle Mehmet Emin Ağa became part of the

6 Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 129.

7 See, for example, Diyarbekir Ahkâm Defterleri I: 1, 4, 8, 12.

8 Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 142; Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretleri İskân teşebbüsü, 1691–1696* (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1963), 18.

9 In the case of Athens he was actually the governor. See Stathi, "An (in) famous governor", 4.

10 İbrahim Yılmazçelik, XIX. yüzyılın ilk yarısında Diyarbakır: (1790–1840): fizik, idarı, ve sosyo-ekonomik yapı, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), 216.

11 Virginia H. Aksan, "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768–1774 Russo-Ottoman War," *War in History* 5/1 (1998): 26–7; Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman warfare: 1500–1700* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1999), 46–8; Aksan, *Ottoman wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged*, (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2007), 48–52; Eduard J. Erickson and Mesut Uyar, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk*, (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009), 91.

12 Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 155.

kapıkulları in Istanbul. Although the *mukataa* contract cannot be found, archival documents from the treasury of Diyarbakır (Diyarbakır *hazinesi*) point roughly to the time when they bid and won the *mâlikâne mukataa* of the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbakır: in 1731 his uncle, Mehmet Emin Ağa, is mentioned in relation to this investment, and six years later, in 1737, his sons, together with Mustafa Ağa, are all identified as shareholders of the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbakır, represented by a *vekil*, İsmail Ağa.¹³ This demonstrates that the *voyvodalık* tax-farm contract could be divided among several shareholders who had purchased the right to tax whatever farms were under the administrative and fiscal authority of the *voyvodalık*. Since the shareholders did not necessarily reside in the area in which their investments were placed, they needed a representative to handle their interests and to forward them their profits, a representative who would be a *voyvoda* in practice.¹⁴

And indeed, Mehmet Emin Ağa, Mustafa Ağa's uncle, lived not in Diyarbakır but in Istanbul, where he was well integrated into the political scene. He reached the office of *ağa-ı silhadar* (commander of the sword bearers) in the *altı bölük* (second regiment of cavalry troops) of the Porte,¹⁵ and was later appointed to be the *sipahiler ağası*—commander of the first regiment of the cavalry troops of the Porte.¹⁶ His son, Emin Ağazade Hüseyin Ağa, also reached several high positions at the Porte, and in time was appointed *sipahiler ağası*, like his father.¹⁷

At some point Abdülvehhab Ağa, Mustafa Ağa's father, returned to Diyarbakır and established his own household there. This may have been extant in 1710, when he was mentioned as the *voyvoda* of the Diyarbakır customs (*gümrük*). In 1735 he was appointed to be *voyvoda* in practice, though not for long, because he probably died two years later.¹⁸ In Diyarbakır he was considered to be a man of wealth: his real estate was evaluated at over 6,000 *kuruş*, and we know he was married twice, either at the same time, or perhaps remarried after the death of the first wife or after a divorce.¹⁹

13 Başbakanlık Arşivi, Bâb-1 Defter-i Baş Muhasebe Diyarbakır hazinesi (hereafter D.BŞM.DBH) 24: 33; D. BŞM.DBH 27: 20, 39, 54.

14 Ariel Salzmänn, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* 21 (1993): 401–5; Ariel Salzmänn, "Privatization and "public" office: the *Voyvodalık* of Diyarbakır in the Eighteenth Century," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 16/2 (1992): 203–205.

15 Ariel Salzmänn, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 107; Salzmänn, *Measures of Empire*, 275.

16 D.BŞM.MHF 12532.

17 Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî: Osmanlı ünlüleri*. (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), Salzmänn, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 275; as for his son see Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, I: 90, III: 694–5.

18 D.BŞM.DBG (Diyarbakır Gümrüğü) 2: 91. Between 1713–1717 documents are missing and therefore we can not say whether or not he was still the *voyvoda*. D. BŞM.DBH 26: 79–90.

19 For the correlation between wealth and polygamous marriage see Margaret L Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo 1770–1840* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 122–126, 177.

Mustafa Ağa himself already resided in Diyarbakır in 1715 when he purchased and renovated a *kasr* (palace) in the Balıklı neighborhood, probably for his own use. Three years later he bid for the office of *kitaplık*. In 1738, probably after his father's death, Mustafa Ağa became the actual *voyvoda* of Diyarbakır, as well as being a shareholder in the *mukataa* of the *voyvodlık*. Although the position of *voyvodlık* was *mâlikâne*, that is, granted for life, Mustafa Ağa's death did not end his uncle's hold and that of his sons over the desirable tax-farm contract: after Mustafa Ağa's death another agent replaced him as their representative in Diyarbakır—Halil Ağa.²⁰

As for his conjugal family, we learn that he was married to Hamide Hatun, daughter of Abdullatif Ağa, and had no children entitled to his inheritance. Therefore, unlike his father, polygamous marriage or remarrying was not his experience. In this case, Mustafa Ağa's agnates were entitled to inherit. His father was dead, but his uncle Mehment Emin Ağa was still alive. That said, he did not receive any share of the inheritance, at least at first sight. Even more surprising, of Mustafa Ağa's three inheritors, Emine Hatun, his sister, inherited the largest part.

Islamic law left little freedom of choice to the individual over transfer of property, but the rigidity of Islamic inheritance laws was apparently more theoretical than real.²¹ In practice this meant that degree of closeness was more relevant than hierarchy of gender. Families used several strategies in order to maintain wealth or to transfer wealth from one generation to another, decisions that could have major consequences for their success in the future. Since inheritance laws did not specify a time for dividing the patrimony, families and individuals could indefinitely postpone the devolution of property without violating the law.²²

In fact, inheritance strategies and household patterns were closely related. The devolution of Abdülvehhab Ağa's patrimony did not occur until the death of his son Mustafa.²³ We do not know exactly how long after his father's death Mustafa Ağa died and how the patrimony was divided, but the household did not fall apart and family members were still economically dependent on one another. Apparently it was Mustafa Ağa who held the corporate property after his father's death, and became the head of the household in Diyarbakır. By keeping the property and the rest of the communal estates undivided, the family kept a larger pool of readily available resources to support their economic and political agendas, and maintained their large household and high social status.²⁴

²⁰ Ali Emiri, *Tezkere-i Şu'ara-yı Amid*, (İstanbul: Matbua-yı Amidi, 1910–11(1328)); Salzmänn, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 155; D.ŞM.DBH 28: 26, 49, 75–78.

²¹ Haim Gerber, *Islamic law and culture, 1600–1840* (Leiden Boston : Brill, 1999), 64–5, 85, 95, 106, 131–2; Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count*, 155–6; Wael B. Hallaq, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 139.

²² Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count*, 159.

²³ Mustafa Ağa's part of His father's patrimony was calculated as part of the total sum. DŞS 315: 76.

²⁴ Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count*, 156.

But obviously things changed after Mustafa Ağa passed away. It appears that there was no male in the family who could sustain the household and maintain its earlier fortune and status. Therefore, protection and help in times of need or economic dependency were no longer something to count on. Tensions over the inheritance or other issues arose, so that a claim was submitted to the court to split the patrimony among the remaining family members. Corporate possessions and debts were divided by avoiding joint ownership and by buying out shares in the property: Emine Hatun, Mustafa's sister, bought the wife's and the mother's shares in a garden and a well²⁵. Conflicts over the patrimony were such that legal interference by the court and subsequently by the central authorities (a supreme decree) was needed in order to resolve the problems raised by their communal ownership. Finally, the enormous sum of 105,000 *куруş* was deducted from the cash patrimony of Mustafa Ağa and sent as a reconciliation fee to Mehmet Emin Ağa, Mustafa's uncle, by Hasan Ağa, one of his representatives, so that in the final count Mehmet Emin Ağa did receive the bigger part of this patrimony after all.²⁶ The economic wealth that sustained this family and its household for so many years was dispersed, and Mustafa Ağa's household came apart. Mehmet Emin Ağa's household in Istanbul, on the other hand, survived for many years to come, with his sons as successors.

The devolution of the patrimony however, was fairly simple: since it was so large and the number of heirs relatively small, each of the three women received a substantial share. Properties were handed to them in full, with no need to sell or divide, as were the debts allocated to each one, according to the amount they received. This means that the transfer of property probably did not take very long, as it did in other cases where a sale of property was needed.

Interestingly, according to the *tereke* (probate inventory), the house of the *voyvoda* remained undivided for the continuous use of his heirs. Yet, if it was not part of the patrimony to calculate and divide, why was it then registered? It seems that other individuals, who were away, were also concerned with this patrimony and wished to track down every asset they knew about. The Diyarbakırlı poet *Hami-i Amidi* reports that Abdülvehhabzade Mustafa Ağa had purchased a *kasr* in Balıklı neighborhood of Diyarbakır in 1727, and renovated it. Therefore, he was probably the one who endowed this property as a family *vaqf*, though its *vaqfiyye* (endowment deed) cannot be found. It appears that he was deeply concerned for the future of his family or other household members, in the absence of other men in the family in Diyarbakır. Perhaps he feared potential confiscation or wished to secure a property whose ownership was contested. In any case, he used this legal tool to remove part

²⁵ DŞS 315:77.

²⁶ "mütevefa-ı merhumun emval ve eşyası mukbili veresa-ı mezburundan bedel-i musalaha için bi firman-ı aliul hac Mehmed Emin Ağa ittibaından hacı Hasan ağa'ya teslim" in: DŞS 315: 78. For other examples about Conflicts over the patrimony see: Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count*, 168.

of the patrimony from the effects of the law, and to regulate the transmission of usufruct rights from one generation to another, so that his wife, mother and sister would be able to continue dwelling there after his death.²⁷

Unfortunately the house itself did not survive to tell the tale, but the unique *tereke* of Mustafa Ağa provides an unparalleled opportunity to learn about the physical structure of a *voyvoda*'s residence. This inventory, which differs from most known inventories, lists thousands of items that are sorted according to the house's sections. According to this evidence, Mustafa Ağa's house was a fairly big structure: a two-storey building, with nine rooms, three semi-open ones (*eyvan*), one with an inner pool or a fountain and, probably in addition, a pavilion and a harem—a unique house in size as well as shape. Since the *voyvoda* had only one wife and no children, it is interesting to speculate on who else could have lived there and what uses this massive space fulfilled.

The house was obviously intended for a large social unit. Besides members of his extended family, like his mother, sister, perhaps his father's second wife and his cousin Hasan Ağa, who lived in Diyarbakır,²⁸ other people such as servants (*uşaklar*), companions (*çukadarlar*) and slaves (*köle*) would also have resided in the house. In addition, it was also a professional and public sphere, a place for hosting guests and a base from which to carry out and control all of Mustafa Ağa's business activities.²⁹ The existence of a harem supports this assumption: it fulfilled a need for a protected sphere inside the house, away from strangers and from males who visited on a daily basis.

Yet the harem was more than a way of fulfilling a functional need. The harem emulated the life style of the sultan, and should therefore be seen as a status symbol. In the wider imperial context, this type of residence was found in urban centers, where they were called *konak* (mansion) or *saray* (palace), and were used to house high level functionaries and individuals with high social status. The *voyvoda*'s house in Diyarbakır should be examined with this context in mind and specifically against the background of existing local *konaks*, nowadays mistakenly generalized as “Diyarbakır Evleri,” in the sense of traditional old houses of Diyarbakır. The *voyvoda*'s house was a *konak* in some of its architectural characteristics and similar in this sense to other prominent *konaks* of Diyarbakır. Therefore, when the *voyvoda* purchased and rebuilt the house he was also trying to mark his social status and to distinguish himself from those who could not afford a similar residence. As Thorsten Veblen sug-

²⁷ “Balıklı mahalesinde mütevafa-i merhum sakın olduğu bahçeli oda ve harem taksim olunmayıp veresa beynlerinde mevkuf kalmıştır”, DŞS 315: 77.

²⁸ He signed many of the *berats* given from the Diyarbakır *hazinesi* at that time period; see, for example, D. BŞM.DBH 27:64, 65,69, 82 (1738) or D. BŞM.DBH; 28: 1, 5, 37 (1739).

²⁹ Coffee room, guest room and *eyvans*, together with tents, flags and weapons among the usual items testify to the house's multifunctional character.

gests, social affiliation defined taste and taste in turn defined social status.³⁰ Within the Diyarbakır provincial context, Mustafa Ağa's house and belongings outshone and out-valued those of most others in the city, as is also reflected in the court records. The *voyvoda* of Diyarbakır was therefore a prominent figure, an elite member of the city and perhaps even of the *vilayet*.

However, social boundaries were marked not only by the house's external appearance. Other means were used as well. One of them was access to mobility and transportation, and the ability to participate in the military sphere. As proof of his connectedness, Mustafa Ağa had a considerable private stable: besides two young foals (*tay*) and eleven mules (*katır*), he also had eighteen riding horses (*at*) and one pack horse (*bargir*).³¹ Riding horses could serve in the battlefield³² or could have practical uses as saving valuable time and effort in the collection of taxes, getting to distant areas and reaching close destinations promptly in emergencies, unlike most others in the vicinity. Pack horses, on the other hand, were used domestically to operate mills or pull carriages, and could be used to supply gunpowder or pull artillery.³³ Horses were thus lucrative in daily life and were considered to be a significant possession. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, in central Anatolia Kayseri, horses were more valuable than average houses.³⁴ Even among the military class of Edirne in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only 25 % show evidence in their patrimonies of horses or mules. Therefore, in addition to having a very important functional role—whether used for fast transportation or as beasts of burden at home or in the battlefield, horses were also a symbol that identified their owner as having high social and economic status.³⁵

Moreover, horses and other beasts of burden were significant presents from one ruler to another or between dignitaries, as a manner of creating diplomatic relations as shown in other historical examples.³⁶ This was also true in the case of the *voyvoda*.

³⁰ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007), 78–110.

³¹ DŞS 315: 75.

³² Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2007), 70.

³³ Ibid.; Suraiya Faroqhi and Randi Deguilhem, *Crafts and craftsmen of the Middle East: fashioning the individual in the Muslim Mediterranean* (London; New York: IB Tauris, 2005), 154–7; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Camels, wagons, and the Ottoman state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14 (1982): 523–539; Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman warfare: 1500–1700*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1999), 21, 36, 75, 161, 232.

³⁴ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and daily life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: IB Tauris & Co Ltd, 2005), 149.

³⁵ Ibid.; Ömer L. Barkan, "Edirne Askeri Kassamına Ait Tereke Defterleri (1545–1659)," *Belgeler* 3 (1966): 1–479; Yuzo Nagata, *Materials on the Bosnian notables* (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1979), 32, 38–9, 48–51, 59, 77.

³⁶ Mustafa Alver, "Türkiye'de İngiliz Atı Yetiştiriciliği ve Haralar," in *Türk Kültüründe At ve Çağdaş*

Mustafa Ağa received roughly eighteen beasts of burden as gifts. Most were given to him “off the record,” for his own use, without the formal procedure of transferring the property legally, as in the case of Abdullah (çeteci) Paşa, the governor of Diyarbakır, who gave the *voyvoda* one horse. Some were approved as *hibbe* (the legal term for a gift) during his lifetime, like the two riding horses given to him by Vezir Memiş Paşa. In another case he presented horses as a gift to the *vezirs*. After Mustafa Ağa died, there was no further use for such an extended stable, and it was disbanded. The horses and other animals were sold or given away as gifts, contributing to the slow dispersal of the household.³⁷

Yet, as Marcel Mauss’s pioneering work shows, gifts should be seen not as one-sided, spontaneous outbursts of generosity but instead as part of a reciprocal system of exchange of goods, in which the act of giving was regulated, obligatory and self-interested, and created a personal bond.³⁸ In some cases it was a euphemism for patronage: patrons gave material benefits and thus disguised their power to give (and to revoke) as freely given gifts. Clients in return provided loyal services disguised as voluntary assistance. The reciprocity was obligatory, and benefits and services had to be rendered more than once in the long run.³⁹

Though it is hard to trace the precise paths of reciprocity in the case of the *voyvoda* and others, it would seem that giving and receiving highly prized livestock, such as riding horses, was motivated by more than just a wish to create a personal bond, and was part of the production of patronage relations. If we take into consideration that such relations are bonds of reciprocity between unequal participants, as Ehud Toledano suggests,⁴⁰ then the nature of these relations becomes apparent: although Mustafa Ağa was a prominent political and social figure in Diyarbakır, he was still lower in rank than Memiş (Mehmed) Paşa or Abdullah Paşa (çeteci), both *valis* of the *vilayet* with the rank of *vezir*. Hence their act of giving cannot be seen as merely a spontaneous act, but as payment for services rendered and in anticipation of more services in return, creating a commitment from Mustafa Ağa that he would undoubt-

Atçılık, ed. Emine Gürsoy-Naskali (İstanbul: Resim Matbaacılık A.Ş., 1995); Nadir Özbek, “Imperial Gifts and Sultanic Legitimation during the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909,” in *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts* (2003): 203–222; Donna Landry, “Steal of a Turk,” *Prose Studies* 29 (2007): 116, 128; Maria Pedani, “Sultans and voivodas in the 16th century: gifts and insignia,” *Journal Of International Social Research* 1 (2007): 193; Anthony Cutler, “Significant Gifts: Patterns of Exchange in Late Antique, Byzantine, and Early Islamic Diplomacy,” *Journal of Medieval & Early Modern Studies* 38 (2008): 79–101.

³⁷ DŞS 315: 73.

³⁸ Marcel Mauss, *The gift: Forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies* (Cohen & West, 1954).

³⁹ Sharon Kettering, “Gift-giving and patronage in early modern France,” *French History* 2 (1988): 131–151.

⁴⁰ Ehud R. Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University press, 2007), 109.

edly be called upon to discharge in a time of need. It is interesting to notice, though, that this rule of action was also activated after he died. Not all of his animals were sold for the sake of the inheritance. His heirs handed some of them to other individuals and by that perhaps wished to continue under their protection.

However, Mustafa Ağa by virtue of his office had extensive connections with a variety of people. His social network included a wide range of individuals and groups, which assisted in promoting his goals and agendas in Diyarbakır and beyond. He was economically well established and active in the commercial life of the city and *vilayet*.⁴¹ Although he was not a professional moneylender, he had access to vast amounts of capital,⁴² and he used his financial resources to participate in money-lending, a normative option at the time for financing social and economic activities.⁴³ The picture of these credit relations—loans he was granted as well as debts he owed to other people—illustrates very clearly the regularity of this phenomenon and supports other studies that have found more than once a dissonance between the law and the daily practice: though theoretically the *sharia* forbids the practice of lending money with interest, they have found that the historical reality in the Ottoman cities and provinces proved quite the opposite. Lending money with interest was a legitimate, wide spread phenomenon that surprisingly or not involved Muslims as well as Jews and Christians, and encircled all elements of society even members of the Ulema, as Roland Jennings showed in the 1970s regarding Kayseri in central Anatolia.⁴⁴ Even in the case of Bursa where Haim Gerber has found that loans were bigger and involved sometimes professional money lenders, others were also considerably involved in credit relations.

Among Mustafa Ağa's debtors were high level functionaries, like the *vali* of Diyarbakır, the *vali* of Kerkuk, *beys* of the surrounding *sancaks*, other *voyvodas*, many local or central *kul* officers, and even central functionaries like the *kulağası* and *çavuş emini*. Though our source does not articulate specifically on the issue of interest, financial motives of enlarging one's fortune must have been dominant as motives for

41 The 1,500 *kurus* he lent the people of Zaho and the 400 *kurus* debt of the guild of *esnaf-ı kelekçiyan* are examples that support this understanding.

42 A huge sum of 67,425.5 *kurus* was granted as title deeds and loans (*temasuk, alacaklar*) to 43 different individuals at the time of his death.

43 Ömer L. Barkan, Edirne Askeri Kassamına Ait *Tereke* Defterleri (1545–1659), *Belgeler* 3 (1966): 1–479.

44 Neş'et Çağatay, "Riba and Interest Concept and Banking in the Ottoman Empire," *Studia Islamica* 32 (1970): 53–68; Roland C. Jennings, "Loans and Credit in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient/Journal de l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Orient* 16 (1973): 168–216; Haim Gerber, "Jews and Money-Lending in the Ottoman Empire," *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 72 (1981): 100–118; Haim Gerber, *Economy and society in an Ottoman city : Bursa, 1600–1700*. (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1988), 127–147; Murat Çizakça, "A waqf in history and its implications for modern Islamic economics," *Islamic Economic Studies* 6 (1998): 58–68.

his activity. But still almost 20 % of the money loaned was defined as lost debts. This certainly does not seem to suit the notion of reciprocity or of economic rationality and the assumption that he was a shrewd and successful man of affairs. If indeed so, what could his motives for such behavior have been?

Interestingly, Jacques Godbout suggests that in frameworks such as family or society, the feeling of indebtedness is central to the working of the network, unlike in the state or the market based on human equality or equivalent value exchange. When the network functions well, this debt is positive, creating trust and the will to be loyal, rather than distress or alienation.⁴⁵ This description fits pre-modern societies, where terms of individualism, freedom and the liquidation of any obligation are out of the question, more than it does modern societies. In Ottoman Diyarbakır of the eighteenth century acquaintance, belonging and obligation were part of the fabric of society. Mustafa Ağa and his debtors were part of a social network of mutual obligations. Purely financial motives such as enlarging a fortune or motives of reciprocity and the expectation to receive favors in return probably did exist, but Mustafa's financial resources were not marred by unpaid debt but rather enhanced by it, in several ways: the money loaned was a means of circulating money and encouraging commercial activity; it created social loyalty and personal trust; and it established a network through which he constructed an identity of a powerful *voyvoda*, benevolent though not necessarily charitable.

3.2 Conclusion

The personal history of Mustafa Ağa, the *voyvoda* from Diyarbakır, reveals some of the changes and new practices that appeared in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. A *kul* from Diyarbakır, residing in Istanbul, returned to his home town and established his power and household through the post of *voyvoda* purchased by the family. In this he illustrates the socio-political change that Ehud Toledano posits concerning the formation of Ottoman elites.⁴⁶ The process of localization and Ottomanization is demonstrated as a two-stage process in the person of Mustafa Ağa the *voyvoda*. He was first Ottomanized, that is, he established himself in the center as a *kul* through

⁴⁵ Jacques Godbout, "Homo Donator versus Homo Oeconomicus," *Morality and the Meaning of Life: Gifts and Interests* 9 (2000): 23–46.

⁴⁶ Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman Local Elites (1700–1900): A Framework for Research," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Idea: A History from Within: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani*, eds. Ilan Pappé & Moshe Ma'oz (London: New-York, Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 145–162. See also: Jane Hathaway, *The politics of households in Ottoman Egypt: the rise of the Qazdaglis* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540–1834* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1997).

his attachment to his uncle's household, and then reinserted into the province of Diyarbakır as one of the local elites, through his post as *voyvoda*.

In some of the Ottoman provinces in the eighteenth century, the establishment of a hegemonic household occurred through the post of *vali*.⁴⁷ In Diyarbakır, none of the individuals appointed to this lofty position managed to take over the governorship and to establish their power. Rather, *valis* in eighteenth-century Diyarbakır came and went, carrying out their duties in the *vilayet* for short terms.⁴⁸ Perhaps, since governorship was still in the hands of the central government in Diyarbakır, the powerful position to be in was that of *voyvoda* and *voyvodahk*. *Voyvodas* enjoyed full access to financial resources and were freer to manage their own affairs.⁴⁹

Still, Mustafa Ağa was part of a wider network or households whose center was located in Istanbul, that of Mehmet Emin Ağa, his uncle. Together with his uncle and cousins Mustafa Ağa invested money in buying the *mâlikâne mukataa* of the *voyvodhk* of Diyarbakır, a place they knew the ins and outs of, and which they found potentially profitable. Their acquaintance with the place as well as their personal connections probably led them to invest in their hometown. Since Mehmet Emin Ağa did not reside in Diyarbakır, his brother and later his nephew became their representatives and actual *voyvodas*, besides being shareholders in the *mukataa*. The two households were thus connected by the twin ties of family and professional-financial partnership. This served both sides' interests: the Istanbul household could help when an opportunity came along, such as an important *mukataa* contract for sale, or key posts opening up; while having a loyal representative residing on site could certainly raise its profit potential.

However, the autonomous nature of the *voyvoda*'s household can be seen as well: some money and goods of Mustafa Ağa were found in the possession of a *sarraf* in Istanbul. In the eighteenth century, capital kept with *sarrafs*, who served as financial agents, money lenders and bankers, was essential for all transactions made between the center and provinces.⁵⁰ They supported the *mâlikâne*-holders by providing credit and making payments to the central treasury; financed the sub-contractors (*mültezim*) by paying the *mâlikâne*-holder the annual installment in advance; and pro-

47 Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman Local Elites", 145–162.

48 For their attempts to create some stability and perhaps a hegemonic rule in the 17th century see: Tsameret Levy-Daphny, "A Forgotten Ottoman Vilayet: Diyarbakır and Its *Vali*-Households in the Seventeenth Century" in *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Diyarbakır- II. Uluslararası Diyarbakır Sempozyumu (2006)*, eds. Bahaeddin Yediylıdız and Kerstin Tomenendal (Diyarbakır: DiyarbakırValiliği, 2008). As for the 18th century see: Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire*, 260–2; Abdulvehap Yıldız, "135/313 Nolu Şeriye Siciline Göre (1722–1798) Yıllarında Amid (Sancağında Sosyal ve Ekonomik Durum)," Yüksek Lisans Tezi (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 1994).

49 Canay Şahin, "The Rise and Fall of an Ayan Family in Eighteenth Century Anatolia: The Caniklizades (1737–1808)" (Ph.D Thesis, Bilkent University, 2003).

50 Şahin, "The Rise and Fall of an Ayan Family", 95–8.

vided money (*caize*) to the treasury on behalf of an office-holder in order to secure an office or to be assigned one, especially one that could become a source of wealth. In short, alongside their traditional roles as moneylenders and moneychangers, *sarrafs* served as intermediaries and provided crucial bridging loans to the Ottoman elite. The fact that Mustafa Ağa had money sent to the *sarraf* suggest that he wished to secure his post or have access to other posts in order to allow him access to further sources of revenue. As several scholars have shown, the rise of local power and localization did not lead to a rupture with the center, and Mustafa Ağa's case provides further proof of this. Control over resources was still in the hands of the central government, though the new policy was an attempt to attract both state and non-state elites to undertake public responsibilities. Therefore, state functions were performed by the "private sector" that received incentives through a system of institutionalized rewards. One of them was the *voyvoda* and the *voyvodalık*, which absorbed much of the resources of the provincial budget, like the *defterdar* of Damascus, or the *muhasıllık* of Aleppo. The *voyvoda* was thus part of a new administration that established checks and balances over the power of the *vali*, and cemented the new dynamic relations between the center and provinces.⁵¹

Unlike the *valis* of Diyarbakır, who were frequently replaced, the *voyvoda* could not be changed so easily; the position and its holder were well established in office and in the province. Through the mechanism of the *Mâlikâne*, *Voyvodas* like Mustafa Ağa, received autonomy, power and esteem in Diyarbakır, and were evidently less supervised by the central government. As noted, after Mustafa Ağa died, his heirs were able to take over his patrimony in Diyarbakır before any measures of confiscation were taken, although they failed to secure the possessions he had in Istanbul. This shows a significant difference between *voyvodas* in the provincial administration and the men who served as a *valis*. In terms of financial abilities, political strength and influence, pashas and *vezirs* enjoyed better access to central decision making and therefore had more options and power in their political game. But while they lived and died under the watchful eye of the central administration, and were subjected to a continuous examination of their loyalty,⁵² which was designed to curb their social and political power, men in the second administrative tier who were located in the provinces, like Mustafa Ağa, enjoyed greater autonomy and, more importantly, maintained it to the benefit of their relatives. Perhaps by character Mustafa Ağa was more suited to the stable and settled life of a relatively minor grandee, without the danger of losing one's money or, worse, one's head. For him, then, the question whether to be a locally established *voyvoda* or a high flying *vali* could have been one of personal preference and not necessarily a result of failing to

51 Salzmann, "Privatization and "Public" Office", 203–205.

52 Barbir, "One Marker of Ottomanism", 135–146; Dror Zeevi and Ilkim Buke, "Banishment, Confiscation, and the Instability of the Elite Household" in this volume.

climb higher in the political hierarchy. In this path, he had more control over how he would spend his life, how he would die, and what would happen to his family—and his possessions—after his death.