



מכון ון ליר בירושלים

THE VAN LEER JERUSALEM INSTITUTE

معهد فان لير في القدس

The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Policy Paper

Draft for public debate

Uri Sagie and Gilead Sher

This Policy Paper outlines a plan for reshaping the daily reality and guaranteeing the vital interests of the State of Israel. The plan calls for a proactive separation in two stages, which will enable a resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians in the future.

The document presents the principles of the plan and a detailed map. Their adoption by the Israeli leadership with broad public support will require a well-organized, sustained effort.

Av 5762
July 2002

The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute initiated the research presented here as part of its efforts to enrich, deepen and enhance the public debate on central issues on the national agenda in Israel. This document is a draft for comment, critique and public discussion. It does not reflect a political position adopted by the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, its directors or employees.

Executive Summary

The historic conflict between Jews and Arabs is situated at a decisive crossroads. Just as half a century ago the Zionist movement grasped the initiative to guarantee the existence of a homeland for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel, today a similar approach should be taken. In addition to the larger moral and political quandaries that accompany day-to-day life for most segments of the Israeli public, now they – and their leadership – must also grapple with strategic threats to the State of Israel, the loss of a sense of personal security, the entrenching of severe rifts within Israeli society, an economic crisis and breaches in the edifice of the rule of law. Having failed in its far-reaching attempt to bring about an end to the conflict through a historic compromise, Israel must take the initiative to ensure the most fundamental interest of the State of Israel – its existence as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state.

Israel currently faces three principal alternatives: continuing the status quo, pursuing an agreement with the current Palestinian leadership, or reoccupying the territories and establishing military rule over them. This paper holds that none of these options can guarantee the vital interests of the State of Israel in the long term. Therefore, it is proposed that a fourth option be adopted: “proactive separation” that will enable a return to negotiations in the future.

The current Palestinian leadership lacks the ability to lead its people to a stable agreement that will put an end to the conflict. In such circumstances, the authors of this Paper are convinced that a unilateral redeployment, in stages, along a temporary boundary, backed by a national consensus and international support, can shape the reality here in a manner that will guarantee the continued existence of a Jewish, Zionist, democratic state, and will create a favorable diplomatic, economic and social momentum in Israel and in the entire region.

The proposed plan is grounded in a temporary boundary indicated on the attached map. In the **first phase** – the “transition phase” – Israel will bear responsibility for security in the Palestinian areas, the erection of a physical barrier along the boundary

will be completed, planning for the transition of Israeli towns and villages to permanent communities according to broad national policy planning will be concluded, and the role of the international community in reconstructing Palestinian institutions of government will be defined. In the **second phase**, the resettlement effort will be completed, infrastructures will be separated, and an effective border regime between Israel and the Palestinian areas will be established. With international coordination and Israeli consent, an international military-civilian force with a defined mandate may deploy in the Palestinian areas. In Jerusalem, informal arrangements will be set in place that will lead to a weakening of the ties between Jewish Jerusalem and the city's Arab population, and alternatives for municipal services to the Arab residents shall be created.

This Position Paper is distinctive in that it bases the separation between Israel and the Palestinians on long-term interests and on the national security of the State of Israel, and in that it was developed over a long, painstaking process involving dozens of experts from the academy, the civil service and the private sector. These experts addressed and examined each of the issues and proposals raised by our team. The Paper integrates the ideas, analysis and research that the experts presented to the team, as well as their observations during two closed symposia at which the principles of the proposed plan were discussed. It should be emphasized, however, that the contents of this Paper represent only the unanimous view of the team directors, and the majority view of team members.

The team thankfully acknowledges the contributions of all those who participated in the preparation of the Paper. We invite the institutions of the State of Israel – and the general public – to examine the proposed policy guidelines, to critique them, and, subject to any modifications that might be made, to adopt them.

Table of Contents

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| I. Introduction | 7 |
| II. The Zionist Vision and National Interests | 9 |
| III. Data and Basic Assumptions | 11 |
| ζ Ethno-demographic Trends | 11 |
| ζ Security Background and “Separation Plans” | 12 |
| ζ Economic Background | 13 |
| ζ Policy Alternatives | 14 |
| ζ “The Green Line” | 16 |
| ζ The Permanent Status | 17 |
| IV. The Proposed Israeli Policy | 19 |
| ζ The Five Principles | 19 |
| ζ The Deployment Map | 20 |
| ζ Implementation in Phases | 22 |
| ζ Emphases and Other Points | 24 |
| ζ Jerusalem | 26 |
| ζ Foreign Relations between Israel and the International Community | 28 |
| ζ International Force | 29 |
| ζ National Minorities in Israel | 30 |
| V. Major Implications of the Proposed Policy | 30 |
| VI. Conclusion | 33 |
| <i>Appendices</i> | |
| ζ Appendix 1 – The Proposed Deployment Line | 37 |
| ζ Appendix 2 – Demographic Data | 39 |
| ζ Appendix 3 – Demographic Map – State of Israel | 43 |
| ζ Appendix 4 – Demographic Map – Jerusalem | 45 |
| Region | |
| ζ Appendix 5 | 47 |
| 5.1 Team Members | 47 |
| 5.2 Experts who Appeared before the Team | 48 |
| 5.3 Symposia Participants | 49 |

* This document was drafted by Moty Cristal.

I. Introduction

In September 2000 Israel's reality changed drastically – from a political process that aimed to bring Israel and the entire Middle East to the brink of a new era, to a swift deterioration into violent conflict. Since then, Israel's citizens have had to live amidst a complex array of external and internal struggles. The long-term strategic threat, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and grassroots Arab and Muslim hostility, and the efforts of hostile states and organizations to obtain weapons of mass destruction create an external challenge to the State of Israel, the response to which requires allotment of significant national resources. The profound crisis into which the Israeli economy has sunk,¹ the deepening of the rifts in Israeli society and the cracks that have appeared in the rule of law – in the norms guiding the individual and the public – pose a precipitous internal challenge, which also demands significant allotment of national resources.

Draft

The weight of this twin challenge is compounded when set in the context of the longstanding moral and 'political' quandaries facing Israeli society, which are themselves an amalgam, among others, of: the occupation and control of another people over more than thirty years; the ideological polarization that has occurred since the peace process began, which rose to a peak with the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; the waves of immigration and the heterogeneous mosaic of cultures that comprise Israeli society; the system of government and the lack of a constitution. These and other forces have prevented Israeli society from forming some structure of agreed values and norms of conduct.

In view of the impasse currently confronting Israel's society and leadership, the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute decided to prepare this Position Paper. It is the product of intensive work by a professional team headed by General (Res.) Uri Sagie and Gilead Sher, Adv., with the participation of the Head of the Institute, Dr. Shimshon Zelniker. The Position Paper outlines a framework for a diplomatic plan. The preparation of the Paper involved the participation of several dozen experts in the various fields relevant to the problems at hand. These experts represent a broad spectrum of views,

¹ We thank Dr. Dan Ben-David for the economic data.

but all shared the commitment to protect the long-term interest of Israel's continued existence as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state.

The Paper proposes a phased, controlled and balanced policy framework, which will move Israeli society towards accomplishing the aims crucial to its national security, and will assist in establishing a society in which equality is more fully realized. The condition for realizing these goals is fixing stable borders. Even if such borders are not final, they point the State of Israel in the desired direction: a state with a solid Jewish majority and Jewish-humanitarian values, a state that respects the Arab national minority living within it; a state that lives in security, maintaining good relations with its neighbors and not interfering in the affairs of the Palestinian state, when it is established.

Draft

Over the past decade, Israel sought to reach an agreement that would put an end to the conflict with the Palestinians through a historic compromise between the national aspirations of the two peoples, and a political arrangement that would ensure Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state, within clear, sovereign, recognized boundaries. **This remains the strategic goal of the State of Israel.** However, after the Palestinians rejected the outstretched hand of peace and compromise, Israel must take a different path to achieve that goal, and embark on another diplomatic initiative that will guarantee its national security.

In a 36-month process, involving two 18-month phases with checks and balances – Israel can reduce the friction between the two populations, enable both nations to live in security and comfort, and disengage from the majority of the Palestinian population. Such disengagement is a step on the path to permanent status. The larger aim remains to reach agreement with the Palestinians regarding borders and permanent status, when a responsible Palestinian leadership is stably in place.

Currently, construction has begun on a fence that divides Judea and Samaria from the State of Israel. During the preparation of this Paper, the President of the United

States, Mr. George Bush, set forth the foundations of his government's policy regarding the conflict. The policy framed in his speech is congruent with the position of the Government of Israel, which views the present period as a "static phase" that will continue until the formation of a Palestinian leadership that is untainted by terror or official corruption. This Paper presents a "road map" for operational implementation of the policy guidelines enunciated by President Bush in his speech on June 24, 2000, without waiting for changes in the Palestinian leadership.

This document advocates the adoption of a phased, controlled and integrated process which views separation as a springboard for defining the content of Israel's national mission, and for raising the flag of Israel's social needs, at the same time that it defines borders and creates a stable, secure reality. Promoting the ideas presented herein will bring hope, development and national prosperity.

Draft

II. The Zionist Vision and the National Interests

"The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.

". . . This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.

"The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for an Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants, irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy

Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

...

“We appeal – in the very midst of the onslaught lauched against us now for months – to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.”

Excerpts from the Declaration of Independence

Today, too, it is necessary to ensure the existence of a Jewish and democratic State of Israel. Four founding principles have been accepted by the vast majority of the Zionist movement since its founding until the present day:

- ז Concentrating a majority of the Jewish People in its homeland, the Land of Israel.²
- ז Preserving a Jewish state with an absolute Jewish majority in the Land of Israel.
- ז Reviving Hebrew culture (language, literature, history, plastic arts) as the spiritual foundation of the Jewish State in the Land of Israel.
- ז Aspiring to make the Jewish people a nation like all other nations, living freely in its own State and maintaining a high-quality life of abundance, progress and culture.

Draft

² According to demographic indexes and forecasts, which take account of the current state of affairs, without changes in the world such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, one-half of the Jewish people will be concentrated in the State of Israel within 30 years. This is not because of Jewish immigration (*aliyah*), which will decline over the next three decades, but due to a gradual decrease in the growth of the Jewish population in the world generally and in the Diaspora (della Pergola, 2000, Appendix 2).

III. Data and Basic Assumptions

Ethno-Demographic Trends

Demographic data – Mandatory Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael)

The demographic trends in the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River indicate that, absent a massive immigration of Jews, the Jewish population³ at the end of the present decade will be only 51% of those living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. After another decade (2020), the Jewish population will become a minority (47%), and by the middle of the present century (2050) the Jews will be only 37% of the population between the Jordan River and the sea. In contrast, if a clear political boundary is established between Israel and the Palestinian areas, based on the Green Line, the Jewish population in 2010 will be a majority of 79% in the State of Israel, although this majority will gradually decrease to 74% in 2050.

Within the area of the State of Israel

Currently, 5.01 million Jews live within the boundaries of the State of Israel, as well as 1.11 million Arabs,⁴ who comprise roughly 19% of the State's population, according to the following breakdown:

- ¿ 200,000 in Arab communities along the Green Line;
- ¿ 200,000 Arab residents in the Jerusalem region who have Israeli I.D. cards (non-citizen permanent residents);
- ¿ 200,000 Bedouins, 50,000 of whom reside in the Galilee, the remainder in the Negev;
- ¿ 150,000 in Arab-Muslim communities in the Galilee;
- ¿ 150,000 Christians;
- ¿ 150,000 Palestinians, Egyptians and Jordanians residing illegally in Israel, mainly in Arab communities along the Green Line;

³ Including a considerable proportion of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who are not Jews, but are included in this population group. (*Id.*)

⁴ See the attached demographic map (Appendix 3).

ז 60,000 Arab residents of mixed cities (Haifa, Acre, Upper Nazareth, Ramla, Lod).

In addition, 100,000 Druze and Circassians reside in Israel.

The authors of this document are aware of the national and social developments among Israeli Arabs over the years. We do not ignore social processes influencing the ability of the State of Israel, even within the Green Line, to secure its existence as a Jewish and democratic state for future generations.

Security Background and “Separation Plans”

Draft

Israel, as a law-abiding state committed to human rights, does not succeed completely in preventing the infiltration of terror and hostile criminal activity into its sovereign territory. In the Palestinian areas there exists a widespread terror infrastructure and operational capability. The prevailing view, shared by the authors of this document, is that the ability and motivation to commit terror acts will continue as long as no political settlement is found. On the other hand, Israel’s military power serves as a deterrent that prevents, for the time being, the outbreak of a regional war, but it cannot be fully used in the conflict with the Palestinians.

The terror of suicide bombers and the political dead-end have led to an increase in public support for the idea of unilateral disengagement.⁵ “Separation” has become a catch-phrase, though few people know the differences in the nature and underlying conceptions of the various “separation plans” that have been put forward. The current state of affairs, particularly the political situation and the Prime Minister’s explicitly declared position that no settlements will be evacuated at the present time, have led to the development of the concept of “security disengagement.”⁶ The core of this

⁵ Public sentiment indicates that 24% of the public are unwilling to evacuate even a single settlement for the purpose of such separation, 28% agreed to evacuate isolated, distant settlements to this end, 14% were willing to evacuate most of the settlements, and 32% are willing to evacuate all settlements. A distinct majority of the Jewish public in Israel is thus willing to evacuate settlements in the context of unilateral separation (Tel Aviv University, Tami Steinmetz Center, *Peace Index*, February 2002 (hereinafter “*Peace Index*”).

⁶ This conception was voiced by President Moshe Katsav (“A temporary security separation should be created until the Intifada ends... and the imposition of a military government in the areas controlled by the IDF should be considered.” *Ma’ariv*, May 2, 2001), as well as in the diplomatic plan of the Chair of the Labor Party, Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer.

conception consists of the erection of a physical barrier with technical devices, without any change in the location of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Completing such a system is supposed to help prevent passage of terrorists into Israel “proper”. However, any “security separation” unaccompanied by diplomatic initiatives cannot achieve full security, as it does not take into account the roots of the conflict and the resulting Palestinian motivations. “Security separation” alone might concentrate Palestinian terror on the settlers, creating a *de facto* gap between the level of security that will be provided to inhabitants of Israel and to Israelis in the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

The “security separation” in and of itself is insufficient, and should be regarded as a first stage in disengaging the populations along a political deployment line, based on recognition of the present reality alongside a willingness for a comprehensive solution that will be achieved in the future by negotiations.

Economic Background⁷

Israel’s economic situation and the security-political situation are intertwined. The economic growth forecast for 2003 stands at 1%, and in retrospect indicates more than anything else the State of Israel’s inability to realize its inherent growth potential. In real terms, the losses caused to date by the violent conflict with the Palestinians (\$8 billion) is still less than the cost of the Yom Kippur War, although projections indicate that it will soon outstrip the latter.

Unemployment levels are rising and may reach 11% or more by the end of the year, even climbing to 12% in 2003. Most of the unemployed have meager education – women, Arabs and residents of outlying, non-urban areas. The violent conflict has led to uncertainty and a decrease in economic activity. Households respond by extra caution in expenses, thus leading to a decline in GNP but a rise in savings. The level of government spending has not declined in the necessary proportion to the massive decline in national income caused by the decline in economic activity. As a result, the

⁷ This section is based on a lecture given by Prof. Zvi Eckstein at Tel Aviv University in June 2002.

Draft

government deficit is increasing. Public sector debt is growing, leading to an increase in Israel's risk as compared with other states, which may bring about a decline in Israel's credit rating and continued reluctance of investors to invest in the country; we have already witnessed significant movement of capital abroad. This may evolve into a vicious circle.

The path out of the economic crisis depends on external factors such as the security situation and the global economy, but also on decisive and courageous economic leadership. Allotment of resources for implementing the policy ideas presented herein – erecting the physical barrier, building while moving the communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to within Israel and to settlement blocs, and adjusting infrastructures to reflect the disengagement – can create momentum for economic growth and encouragement of investment, along with redirection of resources towards development towns and residents in outlying communities. Such economic momentum aims to establish new socio-economic priorities, and to repair past distortions in those priorities.

Draft

Policy Alternatives

The State of Israel currently faces four alternatives: first, preserving the current status quo; second, reaching an agreement with a Palestinian partner (whether it is called a temporary, interim, transitional or permanent agreement), which is conditional on having a partner on the Palestinian side; third, reoccupying the Palestinian territories and instituting military government over the Palestinian population; and fourth, a unilateral policy initiative which also allows for resumption of diplomatic negotiations, as explained in detail below.⁸

With respect to the first alternative, there are those who argue that the diplomatic status quo will not last for long, as the developments in the Palestinian leadership and the deep involvement of Egyptian and American security services will lead over the coming months to changes in the Palestinian leadership and to the formation of an international “caretaker” arrangement that can ensure the maintenance of interim

⁸ The authors are convinced that forced international intervention cannot create a state of affairs that guarantees the crucial interests of the State of Israel.

arrangements with the State of Israel. Even so, this alternative has marked disadvantages. The status quo is in essence a passive waiting for the Palestinian leadership to change, during a continuous trend toward military escalation. Repeated seizure of Palestinian towns by the IDF already exacts a heavy moral, economic and security toll from Israel. Moreover, the hoped-for changes on the Palestinian side may not come to pass for quite a while, during which a demographic and territorial reality will continue to develop within Israel which undermines its existence as a Jewish and democratic state.

Draft

The second alternative – reaching agreement with the Palestinian side – has slim chance of realization at the present time.⁹ First, the Israeli public, including supporters of the Labor Party and left-wing parties, no longer has any faith in the crumbling Palestinian leadership. This argument is sufficient to undermine any attempt to reach an agreement. One might add that the prevailing view of the international community, as expressed clearly in President Bush's speech and in the European responses to it, is that the present Palestinian leadership cannot be deemed a partner for agreement with Israel. These days the international effort is focused on the specific demand for "government reforms" in the Palestinian Authority (according to the EU and UN position), or even on a specific demand to replace the current leadership (the Bush speech). But such reform has only a weak chance of being realized, unless far-reaching personal changes in the Palestinian Authority are made in the near future. The authors believe that governmental changes in the Palestinian Authority, among them changes in personnel, together with a comprehensive reform of the security authorities and in the system of government, are necessary conditions for forming a Palestinian partner with whom it will be possible to renew permanent-status negotiations. However, fulfillment of these conditions may take quite a long time. Therefore, so long as they remain unfulfilled, it is wiser to stick to unilateral moves that aim to protect the national interests of the State of Israel. Moreover, the more powerful forces in the Palestinian territories, which reflect Palestinian public opinion,¹⁰ are not yet ripe for movement toward an agreement with Israel.

⁹ An international conference in itself has no diplomatic efficacy, and it does not constitute an alternative to a diplomatic policy plan. A regional conference may be the forum at which this Position Paper is discussed by the international community.

¹⁰ The last poll taken by Khalil Shikaki (May 2002) indicates complicated opinion trends in the Palestinian public, in which two-thirds of the public support the Saudi initiative (return to 1967 lines

The third alternative – reoccupation and imposing military rule¹¹ – also has significant drawbacks, first and foremost in the continued control over another people. The deterioration of Israel’s moral strength, together with the economic reversal emanating from international isolation, is evinced, among others, in the slowdown in economic activity, in the need to commit budgetary resources to maintaining military systems in the territories, and in frequent call-ups of military reserves. The economic recession will widen social gaps by imposing a heavier burden on those sectors that bear the burden, while other sectors are exempt from it entirely. Furthermore, this alternative does not ensure the strengthening of the personal sense of security. For the reasons indicated above, it even impairs the national security of Israel, and undermines the national interest of preserving the State of Israel as a Jewish, democratic state.

Due to the drawbacks of these three alternatives, the authors recommend a policy under which Israel will declare a proactive separation, in order to guarantee its vital national interests, with the aspiration of returning to negotiations over permanent status after stabilization of a responsible leadership on the Palestinian side.

Draft

“The Green Line”

“The Green Line” (the armistice line in effect on 4 June 1967) plays a central role in shaping the reality on the ground in the near term. “The Green Line” is recognized in the international arena as a legitimate line of demarcation between the State of Israel and the area that would constitute, under the permanent status arrangement and subject to changes and adjustments, the “State of Palestine.” Even if there is no precise and agreed-on demarcation of the Green Line, it has taken on international legitimacy as determined in Security Council Resolution 242, and as adumbrated several times since then, including in the parameters for an agreement set forth by President Clinton in December 2000, by the Saudi initiative in March 2002, and by

and establishment of an independent Palestinian state), but only 17% believe that such a thing is possible. However, despite a certain decline over the past few months, a majority of the Palestinian public (52%) still supports suicide attacks in Israel, and an absolute majority (90%) supports continuation of violent attacks on soldiers and settlers.

¹¹ Roughly one-third (29%) of the Jewish population in Israel supports the idea of transfer in this context (*Peace Index*, April 2002).

President Bush's speech in June 2002. The international community views the "Green Line" as the outer boundary of legitimate Palestinian territorial claims. As such, the "Green Line" can lend international legitimacy for the policy proposed herein.

The Permanent Status

The proposed policy constitutes the beginning of a process that will lead to shaping a permanent status between Israel and the Palestinians. Its actual adoption by the Israeli government may spur international governments and institutions, as well as pragmatic elements in the Palestinian public, to take action to bring an end to terror, to complete structural reforms in the Palestinian government, and to renew the diplomatic dialogue.

Draft

The authors are of the opinion that a permanent arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians, to the extent it is achieved during the next few years, will to a great extent be grounded in compromises by both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides, based on the following principles:

- ¿ The agreement will establish the end of the historical conflict between the Palestinian people and the Jewish people in the land of Israel (*Eretz Yisrael*).
- ¿ What was formerly the Land of Israel (*Eretz Yisrael*) during the British Mandate will be repartitioned between a sovereign Palestinian state and the State of Israel, on the basis of the 4 June 1967 lines, with agreed-upon changes. The State of Israel will be defined as the homeland of the Jewish people, and the Palestinian state as the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people.
- ¿ The larger blocs of Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria will be transferred to Israeli sovereignty, which will also apply to the small number of Palestinians living in those areas. Israel will not reject a discussion regarding areas currently located within its sovereign territory with a view to transferring such areas to the Palestinian state.
- ¿ A right of return to Israel by refugees will not be recognized. The Palestinian refugees will be rehabilitated in their current countries of

residence, in the Palestinian state, and in additional countries that will have expressed their willingness to absorb them. An international apparatus will be established to rehabilitate the refugees and to assist those Arab countries that will absorb refugees in their territory.

- ¿ The Jerusalem region will serve as two capital cities – Jerusalem and Al-Kuds. A clearly defined border of sovereignty will divide the two.
- ¿ A special regime will apply to the “Holy Basin”, which will ensure freedom of access and worship for all religions.¹²
- ¿ A clearly-defined border regime will be established between Israel and the Palestinian state to ensure controlled passage of workers, goods and services between the two states.
- ¿ The security arrangements will be based on a demilitarized Palestinian state, on long-term international guarantees that will ensure regional stability, and on the possibility of an agreed-on international presence, in certain circumstances and under defined conditions, headed by the United States.¹³

Draft

¹² The authors do not reject the possibility that Saudi Arabia and Morocco will be partners in managing the mosques in the Holy Basin.

¹³ The recommendations regarding the character of an international presence depend to a great extent on the scope of the mandate. In the past, several possibilities were discussed, involving the participation of states such as Canada, Britain, Turkey, Russia and Morocco, and not necessarily headed by the United States.

IV. The Proposed Israeli Policy

The Five Principles

1. *Progress in stages: a declaration, followed by two implementation phases*

The Israeli government will determine the temporary boundary (as set out in the map attached as Appendix 1) and will deploy along this line in two phases, as detailed below. The temporary boundary will create a stable, secure atmosphere for an extended period, even if no negotiations are taking place, and along this boundary a territorial and demographic state of affairs will evolve in a manner that will influence the shaping of Israel's permanent borders in the future.

2. *Deployment along the temporary boundary*

At the conclusion of the second implementation phase, Israel will be deployed along a temporary boundary that is not the permanent border of the State, but which will guarantee its crucial interests, relating to security, demographics, settlement, economics and infrastructure.

Based on this temporary border, 80% and perhaps more of the settlers in Judea and Samaria, and only 36,000 Palestinian residents of those areas, will remain within Israel's borders.

3. *"Permanent communities" – Guaranteeing an absolute Jewish majority in the State of Israel*

The temporary border will be fixed on the basis of geographic, demographic, security and moral considerations. In this framework, 68 Israeli settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be relocated to a permanent location within the settlement blocs and within the State of Israel, and national efforts to encourage Jewish immigration to the State of Israel will be stepped up.

4. *Establishing an effective border regime*

A barrier will be constructed along the temporary border between Judea and Samaria and the State of Israel, which will improve security considerably on the one hand, and

Draft

on the other hand will enable control and monitoring of the transfer of infrastructure and the movement of people and goods in both directions.

5. International coordination

International support for the proposed policy will be enlisted through coordination and public information efforts that will present the plan's advantages – i.e., the fact that it is a “road-map” for the permanent status that takes into account the national aspirations of the Palestinian people alongside the national interests of the State of Israel. As part of the international coordination effort (explained below), the authors recommend that consideration be given to the possibility of forming an international force, with a clearly defined mandate, which will deploy in the areas vacated by Israel.

Draft

The Deployment Map

The map of the Israeli deployment aims at stabilizing the security, diplomatic and economic state of affairs for many years, while preserving the national and religious symbols of the State of Israel and minimally impacting the Palestinian side, and making adjustments that take account of demographic realities. The map is based on the “Green Line” for three principal reasons:

- ¿ As mentioned previously, the “Green Line” represents the legitimate boundary in the eyes of the international community since 1967. Reliance on this border will grant a legitimacy to Israel which is crucial for building international support for unilateral Israeli initiatives.
- ¿ The “Green Line”, with critical adjustments, reflects a broad internal consensus among the Israeli public.
- ¿ Israeli deployment based on the “Green Line”¹⁴ will enable the Palestinians (with international supervision) to establish a viable political entity that will not endanger its neighbors.

¹⁴ From here onward, the term “Green Line” in this Paper refers to the Line after modifications and adjustments as indicated in the attached map (Appendix 1).

To emphasize the temporary nature of the process, Israel shall retain control over several areas in Judea and Samaria:

- ∫ The Jordan Valley will remain under Israeli control until negotiations on the permanent status, and shall serve as a security wedge until suitable security arrangements are established that will permit transfer of sovereignty over the Jordan Valley to the Palestinian state. Israel will not encourage additional civilian settlement or extraordinary development of existing settlements.
- ∫ Settlement blocs: The purpose of Israeli control of settlement blocs (Jerusalem and its surroundings, the Etzion bloc, and the Ariel bloc) is to demarcate Israel's territorial and geographical conception of permanent borders, and to serve as land reserves for completing the resettlement process.
- ∫ Road 443 (Modi'in–Jerusalem). Israeli control over road 443 derives from the strategic need to reinforce Jerusalem as Israel's capital city. Road 443, as an access road, is part of the infrastructures that secure Jerusalem's continued development as a capital, instead of it turning into an "outpost".
- ∫ Hebron and Kiryat Arba.¹⁵ The Jewish people has historic and national interests in Hebron. In contrast to arrangements in a permanent agreement, in a unilateral arrangement it is not possible to ensure freedom of access to sites sacred to Jews, except by Israeli control of Hebron and Kiryat Arba.
- ∫ Ofra and Beit-El. As part of the aspiration to achieve broad internal consensus in Israeli society, it is proposed that Ofra and Beit-El, with all their symbolic resonances, remain within the area controlled by Israel. For this reason, any discussion about these settlements will only take place in permanent status negotiations.

¹⁵ Requires further deliberation.

Implementation in Phases

*The First Phase – “The Transitional Phase” (18 months)*¹⁶

During the first phase:

- ז The physical barrier along the deployment line will be completed, in accordance with security, geographic and demographic priorities. By the end of the first phase and the completion of the physical barrier, security responsibility for the Palestinian areas will remain in the hands of the IDF.
- ז In this context, a small number of settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be relocated into the settlement blocs, and the settlements themselves will become military outposts. This step will of course have security significance, but beyond that, it will strengthen the public impression – in Israel, the territories and in the international arena – of the seriousness of Israel’s intentions to complete the whole process.
- ז The process of locating and planning the areas designated for the Jewish “permanent communities” in the settlement blocs, in the Galilee and Negev regions, and in any other location determined to be appropriate, shall be completed.
- ז Legal preparations will be completed in anticipation of the extension of Israeli sovereignty over part of the areas in Judea and Samaria that will remain under Israeli control.
- ז Preparations for separating and relocating vital infrastructures (electricity, gas, water, and transport) will commence.

Draft

During the transition phase, the international efforts to complete reforms and build governmental institutions in the Palestinian Authority will be accelerated and broadened. As part of these efforts, an international force will begin to be formed, alongside delegations of international representatives who will come to the Palestinian areas to monitor and supervise the process of building the Palestinian institutions (elections, the judiciary, security forces, economic infrastructures). Although such

¹⁶ Eighteen months is a realistic time period for completing this phase, assuming that the initiative is given high priority on the national agenda, because preparatory work has already been done for many of its components (planning “permanent communities”, separating infrastructures).

international actions are not under Israel's control, Israel should be involved in them, and even initiate and promote them.

The aim of the first phase is to demonstrate Israel's determination to take the initiative on the basis of the principles mentioned above. During this phase Israel will examine on a continuous basis whether a reliable Palestinian leadership has emerged and stabilized, a leadership that can be a partner in concluding diplomatic arrangements that will lead to an end of the conflict. If by the end of the first phase the existence of a peace-seeking Palestinian leadership cannot be identified, Israel will proceed unilaterally to the second phase.

The Second Phase – Implementation (18 months)

Draft

During the second stage:

- ¿ In accordance with the map-drafting principles mentioned above, 68 Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria not inside the settlement blocs, and all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, will be relocated to a permanent location in the settlement blocs and in the State of Israel, based on national planning of priorities.
- ¿ Separation of infrastructures will be completed, and a controlled border-crossing system will be activated on both sides of the barrier.
- ¿ With international coordination, and in accordance with the continuous situation assessment carried out by Israel regarding the extent of effective control by the authorized Palestinian leadership, an international force (as detailed below) will assume control over areas vacated by the IDF.
- ¿ Israel will assist in the effort to find solutions for the issue of Palestinian refugees, and will not oppose entry of refugees into Palestinian areas, nor their placement in settlements whose Jewish population has been relocated, based on suitable international guarantees.

By the end of the second phase, if no Palestinian leadership has arisen that can serve as a partner for an agreement with Israel, Israel will deploy along temporary, stable and defensible borders.

Emphases and Other Points

Reduction of Enclaves

The authors call for no Israeli civilian enclaves to remain in the Palestinian areas. The map presented herein leaves a minimum number of Palestinians under Israeli control (36,000); a detailed discussion is still necessary regarding their legal status. Nevertheless, these Palestinians will be granted special rights regarding entering and leaving Israel, as well as going to and from agricultural lands that they cultivate.

Resettlement

The Zionist dimension of the State of Israel will be reinforced by renewing the momentum of Jewish settlement of its homeland, and by resettling individuals and communities from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip within the boundaries of Israel or within the settlement blocs. This surge of settlement activity will entail an allotment of national resources to strengthen rural and outlying communities. The authors maintain that it is possible to convince the relevant publics in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to view some of the Jewish communities as “temporary”, and to relocate them to a permanent site within the borders of sovereign Israel, or within the settlement blocs. The basic principles of this plan were formulated in the past, and even received Halakhic backing from Jewish religious authorities. Today, implementation of this plan depends on the willingness of individuals and communities to cooperate, having faith in the Halakhic principle of preserving the intactness of the nation and the sanctity of life, and the primacy of these over other principles.

Draft

Effective Border Regime

The temporary border will allow limited movement of people and goods into and out of Israel. The border will have only a few controlled crossing points. During the transition phase, the infrastructure will be prepared for orderly crossing points which will be built during the implementation phase, as well as for one permanent safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank (Karni – Tarkumia) in accordance with the plans prepared between 1999 and 2001, during discussions regarding the permanent status (three central crossing points for goods and three additional ones for workers).

By the end of the first phase, preparations will be completed for disengaging joint Israeli-Palestinian infrastructures along the proposed deployment line. Not all joint infrastructures will be disengaged, but only those infrastructures with respect to which disengagement will serve Israel's interests better than their continued joint use – for example, electricity and water, as opposed to sewage infrastructure, which from the standpoint of both sides is better left as a common infrastructure. As stated above, the implementation will take place in the second phase.

In a parallel process of civil, economic and security deliberations, a policy will be developed for employment of Palestinians in Israel, alongside the development of broader sources of employment on the Palestinian side, which will include a plan for economic rehabilitation, infrastructure renewal, building of factories and industrial areas, and encouragement of multi-story construction.

Draft

The Nature of the Physical Barrier

During the transition period, the plans and operational suggestions currently on file in the defense establishment regarding the nature of the barrier and the deployment of forces along it, should be implemented.

Legislative Changes and Adjustments

In the transition phase, preparation of the legal groundwork necessary for extending Israeli sovereignty to those areas in Judea and Samaria remaining under Israeli control will be completed. For part of these areas, the legal groundwork will emphasize Israel's intention to shape territorial realities in accordance with its national interests,

while at the same time indicating the zones of flexibility in the event that negotiations with the Palestinians are resumed.

Draft

Jerusalem

Jerusalem is the home of 213,000 Arabs today, of whom 201,000 are Muslims and the rest Christians. In addition, many Palestinians living outside Jerusalem hold “East Jerusalem” identity cards, which grant them residency status and the many attendant social rights and benefits, as well as full freedom of movement. This fact, together with the complex demographic divisions in Jerusalem,¹⁷ makes realization of Israeli interests in Jerusalem – strengthening the capital, expanding it, and preserving its Jewish character – extremely complicated.

The proposals of the President of the United States in December 2000 addressed two central points. The first point was drawing a dividing line of sovereignty through the city according to demographic distribution of Jews and Arabs; the second point was dividing control of the Old City and the Holy Basin between Israel and the Palestinian state. Israel has expressed reservations regarding the latter issue, but the basic premise that Israeli sovereignty in a permanent arrangement will apply to those parts of Jerusalem with a solid Jewish majority is accepted today by most experts engaged in analyzing the city’s development. The special arrangements applying to the Holy Basin (the Old City, Mount Zion, David’s City, the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives) will be dealt with separately, during permanent status negotiations.

¹⁷ See attached demographic map of Jerusalem (Appendix 4).

In the coming years, efforts should be made to institutionalize informal arrangements that will lead to a weakening of the link between Jewish Jerusalem and its Arab population, and to building acceptable alternatives to municipal services for the Palestinian population. In addition, Israel should engage in planning initiatives to strengthen Jerusalem as a metropolitan center. These actions will be carried out according to timetables coordinated with both phases of the policy proposed herein: strengthening the city and institutionalizing informal arrangements during the transition phase, and reducing the physical links in the second, implementation phase.

In addition to the above, security deployment in Jerusalem will be completed, in two circles: The first circle will be based on control and oversight of traffic routes in the “Jerusalem envelope”¹⁸ (its external perimeter); the second circle, composed mainly of military forces and security apparati – calls for a security deployment along the city’s internal demographic dividing lines, and in the seam areas between the Arab and Jewish neighborhoods. In practice, the demographic border that will divide Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem is the line along which the reality on the ground ought to be shaped during the coming years, without relinquishing full Israeli control and sovereignty over the Holy Basin.

Draft

¹⁸ That is, the entrances from the north (Ramallah area), from the south (Bethlehem-Jerusalem axis) and from the east (Ma’aleh Adumim).

Foreign Relations between Israel and the International Community

One of the core principles of the policy proposed herein is international coordination. Israeli policy will aim to build international legitimacy for unilateral Israeli deployment along the proposed border. The process of building such international legitimacy will be executed by prior coordination with the United States, and, with the Americans, by coordination with the European Union, with the Arab states and with moderate Muslim countries (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan,¹⁹ Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria).

The purpose of the international campaign is to convert the Israeli initiative into a stabilizing regional process, which despite its unilateral nature will be viewed by the international community as taking account of national interests in the region and preventing a regional conflagration.

In brief, the recommended policy will be presented on the basis of the rationale described above, under which:

- ζ The initiatives are intended to protect Israel's most basic national interest.
- ζ This policy is the product of a difficult diplomatic and security situation forced upon Israel, and of the absence of a reliable partner for a diplomatic agreement on the Palestinian side.
- ζ Israel's deployment line, as proposed in the plan, does not draw the permanent borders of the State of Israel, and the path remains open to negotiations that will bring about a resolution to the conflict.

Draft

¹⁹ Special attention will be given to coordination with Jordan and Egypt, which are expected to express public opposition to the erection of the fence.

International Force

In view of the possibility that the governmental vacuum and systemic chaos will continue on the Palestinian side, the authors believe that preparations should be made to absorb an international stabilizing force, which will be positioned in the Palestinian areas from which Israel will have withdrawn in the second phase of implementing the policy.

Deployment of the international force will be integrated into a framework of international actions that will accompany Israel's deployment along the temporary border. The purpose of the international force will be to build and strengthen social, economic and security institutions in the Palestinian government, including the Palestinian security forces. Deployment of the international force will serve as a stabilizing and supervising factor that will prevent complete chaos in the Palestinian territories.

Draft

Furthermore, for the sake of realizing Israel's interests, the future permanent status agreement will include many components involving an international presence, from a force that will ensure demilitarization of the Palestinian state and prevent development of terrorist infrastructures, to international economic arrangements that will be necessary to rehabilitate the Palestinian infrastructure, and to an international mechanism that will ensure full implementation of agreements regarding refugees. The deployment of international forces in the Palestinian territories prior to signing a permanent status agreement is consistent with Israeli interests in the long term.

The international force will be a combined civilian-military force (known as "CivPol"), with a clear and defined mandate agreed upon by Israel, and it will be headed by the United States of America or by an international organization. Its mandate will define, among other things, all of its links to the temporary border with Israel, to border crossings between the Palestinian areas and Egypt or Jordan (the bridges and the Rafiah crossing), and the system of cooperation and coordination with Israel. The international force will have proven operational capability, and may

deploy in the Palestinian territories during the transition period for the purpose of coordinating with the IDF forces that will continue, as mentioned earlier, to assume security responsibility at this stage.

Despite the above, implementation of the second phase of the plan will not be conditional on deployment of the international force.

Draft

National Minorities in Israel

The discussion of the status of Israel's minorities under permanent arrangements is of central importance, and it is crucial that such deliberation take place in the context of a discussion on the future of Israel's society. The authors decided to refrain from offering recommendations on this issue during the phases of initiated separation.

The authors call for urgent steps to be taken, parallel to Israel's deployment along the temporary border, to broaden settlement in national priority areas, to accelerate development plans for Israel's weaker population groups, including national minorities, chief among them Israeli Arabs; to establish an authentic, fair and continuous dialogue between the Arab population and Israeli government authorities, and to promote the development of a non-irredentist civil society among Israel's Arab population.

V. Major Implications of the Proposed Policy

The policy position proposed herein has two main disadvantages, which are not intrinsic to the plan – that is, they relate not the policy itself or its component parts, but to its alternatives:

First, the proposed policy presents an interim solution that does not guarantee an end to the conflict, and does not provide an answer to the core problems of the conflict, especially regarding Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. If the proposed policy does not succeed in encouraging the growth of a reliable leadership on the Palestinian side, it may end up postponing any resolution of the conflict for a very long time. Having said that, it should be emphasized that the plan does not veto the possibility of negotiation; it points out the principles of a permanent status arrangement that were accepted by both sides at the end of 2000; and it suggests possible guiding principles for stabilizing the reality on the ground based on Israeli interests in the permanent status; and these advantages lessen the potency of the disadvantage mentioned above. This position paper sets out an eminently practical alternative to escape from the cycle of bloodshed in which both sides find themselves today, by operationalizing and implementing the basic policy guidelines proposed by President Bush in his June 2002 speech.

Draft

Another disadvantage of the proposed plan is that an Israeli policy initiative involving resettlement not in the context of an agreement with the Palestinian side, may be interpreted by part of the Arab street as a victory for violence, and thus may encourage additional violence. The response to this claim is complex; at its core lie arguments regarding Israel's strategic and conventional deterrence capability as perceived by the Arab side, and the possibility of taking supplementary tactical measures that will lead to security stability (seizing strategically-located territories, and deterrent activity during the completion of the deployment line, particularly in the face of an expected Palestinian reaction against the barrier itself).

Israel did not lose its deterrent capacity following the withdrawal from Lebanon, which was perceived among part of the Arabs as an "escape", and the IDF's operational capability was not significantly impaired, as evidenced by Israel's operational successes in the months preceding the publication of this Paper. The policy suggested herein is based on Israel's needs, and less on its "image." Its implementation will create a broad consensus among the Israeli population that will reinforce the Israeli society's endurance ("*sumud*"). The concern about "losing our

deterrence” does not enable a proper solution for defending the long-term interests of the State of Israel.

As mentioned above, these two drawbacks – the first voiced mainly by the left, and the second by the right, are external to the policy proposed here. That is, those who make these arguments are offering policy alternatives which, in the opinion of the authors, are either infeasible (from the left – locating, almost at any price, a Palestinian partner and signing an interim or permanent agreement), or may harm Israel’s demographic-security interest (from the right – maintaining the status quo for an undefined period or reoccupation of the territories and establishment of a military government).

Draft

Beyond that, the authors are aware of additional ramifications that require examination and preparation of a response:

- ∫ The difficulty in forming a broad national consensus (primarily from elements on the right) for a move toward relocation and resettlement of communities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. This drawback weighs mainly on the practical, political level, and represents a central obstacle in the internal political system.
- ∫ The difficulty in garnering support in the international arena. Some elements in the international community, mainly the European Union, although they are well aware of the complexity of the situation and the character of the political leadership on both sides, still believe that political dialogue can take place between the two sides. One of the central tasks that the authors of this document will place upon them is to convince international entities to support a plan which, as mentioned, may serve as an effective spur towards a return to negotiations.
- ∫ The difficulty of carrying out a disengagement in Jerusalem. The main components of the policy initiative can be realized over a period of up to three years from the time of its adoption, but its implementation in Jerusalem is a longer and more complicated process, though not an impossible one.

- ז A unilateral deployment along a temporary border will exact a toll on intelligence work. The withdrawal of IDF forces from the territories under Palestinian control will distance intelligence operatives from their information sources, and will force the defense establishment to create alternative means of information gathering and of preventing terror on the other side of the deployment line.

Despite the above disadvantages, the authors emphasize that the Position Paper offers, in the present circumstances, a more correct way to ensure the State of Israel's long-term interests. The disadvantages latent in the political status quo, let alone in escalation of the conflict or an imposed solution by the international community, are greater and more dangerous to Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic country.

Draft

VI. Conclusion

The current political, security, demographic, economic and social situation pose a renewed Zionist challenge for the State of Israel. The national home of the Jewish people must reexamine its fundamental assumptions. A nation that was on the brink of physical extermination succeeded over a short period of time in building a Jewish, democratic and progressive state. The moral strength that was tested then, is now being tested once again.

The historic conflict between Jews and Arabs is at a decisive crossroads. The authors are convinced that just as between 1945 and 1948 the Zionist movement took the initiative to ensure the existence of a national home in the Land of Israel – so should we act today. The consolidation and strengthening of the moral power from which the Jewish people derives its independent existence in the Land of Israel are today more crucial than ever. By relinquishing control over another people, in a controlled process that does not endanger Israel's security, and which strengthens the

components of its national security, the moral fiber of the Jewish people in the land of Israel will be strengthened.

The Policy Plan proposed here is not just another “separation plan”. The distinctiveness of the Position Paper is three-fold:

Content: In the proposed initiative, proactive separation is not an end in itself, but the means for ensuring the national aim of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Its underlying logic is primarily value-based, diplomatic, social and demographic – and also takes full account of security concerns.

Scope: Unlike other plans that focus mainly on the security aspects of unilateral disengagement, this policy initiative also includes other vital components that have not yet become part of the public debate. These include the importance of the demographic component, the issue of Jerusalem, an international force, and pointing out the need to deal expeditiously and adequately with the issue of the Arab minority living in the State of Israel.

Methodology: Unlike other plans that present a basic, closed framework for a separation process, the professional team brought in a long line of experts and professionals in all of the areas touched upon in this Paper. The preparation of the Paper involved a comprehensive learning process, integrating both practical knowledge and experience, and professional and academic insights. Most of the studies, research and suggestions that were developed in various forums, including government forums, were before the members of the team, and were closely examined on their merits.

Draft


The components of the plan are intertwined, but they are not interdependent; each one has a different “timetable” for implementation. Some of the plan’s components are at advanced stages of theoretical development, some are already being implemented in the field, and some are presented here for the first time.

We hope that presenting this plan in all its detail, at the present time, will contribute to the public discussion, and that ultimately the plan will be adopted by Israel’s political leadership.

The authors are grateful to all those who shared their thoughts and participated in the work of preparing this Paper. The contents of this document represent the unanimous opinion of the team leaders, and the majority position of the team members.

Draft

1Appendix
**The Proposed
Deployment Line**



Demographic Data

PERCENT OF JEWS AMONG TOTAL POPULATION IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE, 2000-2050, MEDIUM PROJECTIONS

| Year and projection | Israel+ Palestinian territories | Israel Without territories | Israel + 100,000 refugees | Israel + Territorial exchange |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| 2000 | 55 | 81 | 80 | 87 |
| 2010 | 51 | 79 | 78 | 86 |
| 2020 | 47 | 77 | 76 | 84 |
| 2050 | 37 | 74 | 72 | 81 |

^aIncluding non-Jewish immigrants from ex-URSS (column b in Table 2). Not including foreign workers and undocumented aliens..

Source: S. DellaPergola, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Appendix 2 (cont.)

TABLE 6. SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, ISRAELI JEWS AND MUSLIMS, PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, AND MATCHED COUNTRIES, 1995-2000

| Country | TFR | TFR ^a | Infant Mortality ^b | GNIP/PC US\$ ^c |
|--------------------------------|---------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Israel Jews | 2.6 | 2.62 | 5.0 | 17,000 ^b |
| Matched countries ^d | 2.4-2.8 | 2.62 | 26.1 | 3,164 |
| Ratio Israel Jews/Matched | | 1.00 | 0.19 | 5.37 |
| N. of countries | | 20 | 20 | 16 |
| Israel Muslims | 4.7 | 4.67 | 9.2 | 8,000 ^b |
| Matched countries ^d | 4.5-4.9 | 4.67 | 65.5 | 758 |
| Ratio Israel Muslim/Matched | | 1.00 | 0.14 | 10.43 |
| N. of countries | | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| West Bank | 5.4 | 5.44 | 25.5 | 1,618 |
| Matched countries ^d | 5.2-5.6 | 5.40 | 78.4 | 891 |
| Ratio West Bank/Matched | | 1.01 | 0.33 | 2.34 |
| N. of countries | | 12 | 12 | 11 |
| Gaza | 7.4 | 7.41 | 30.2 | 1,468 |
| Matched countries ^d | 7.0+ | 7.36 | 115.9 | 284 |
| Ratio Gaza/Matched | | 1.01 | 0.26 | 5.16 |
| N. of countries | | 6 | 6 | 5 |

a. Average of selected countries.

b. Author's rough estimates.

c. Albania, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, French Polynesia, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Mongolia, New Caledonia, Panama, St Lucia, Turkey, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam.

d. Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Sudan, Swaziland, Vanuatu.

e. Bhutan, Cambodia, Central Africa, Comoros, Gabon, Iraq, Laos, Namibia, Pakistan, Senegal, Solomon Isl., Tanzania.

f. Angola, Mali, Niger, Somalia, Uganda, Yemen.

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2001); Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (1997); Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (1988); United Nations (2001); Population Reference Bureau (2001).

Appendix 2 (cont.)

TABLE 5. WORLD AND DIASPORA JEWISH POPULATION, BY MAIN FACTORS OF CHANGE, ASSUMING MIGRATION AND FERTILITY RATES AS OF LATE 1990s, 2000-2050 (THOUSANDS)^a

| Region and factors of change | 2000-2010 | 2010-2020 | 2020-2030 | 2030-2050 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Total world | | | | |
| Initial Jewish population | 13,109 | 13,428 | 13,847 | 14,125 |
| Final Jewish population | 13,428 | 13,847 | 14,125 | 14,480 |
| Difference | 319 | 419 | 298 | 355 |
| Thereof: Diaspora | | | | |
| Initial Jewish population | 8,235 | 7,863 | 7,619 | 7,250 |
| Final Jewish population | 7,863 | 7,619 | 7,250 | 6,251 |
| Difference | -372 | -244 | -369 | -999 |
| Net migration balance with Israel | -105 | -49 | -28 | -34 |
| Natural and other change ^b | -267 | -195 | -341 | -965 |

a. Beginning of year estimates. Projection baseline: 1995. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.


b. Balance of births, deaths and Jewish identification change.

Source: DellaPergola, Rebhun, Troits (2000).



Demographic Map - State of Israel



Main Religion
Countrywide



Appendix 4

Demographic Map - Jerusalem Region

Deployment of Population in Jerusalem 1967 - 1997



Appendix 5

5.1 – The Team

Team Leaders

Uri Sagie

Gilead Sher

Team Members

Shimshon Zelniker, Head of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Omer Bar-Lev (joined half-way through)

Moty Cristal

Pini Meidan-Shani

David Schattner

Iftach Spector

Team Secretary

Tali Bieler

5.2 – Experts who addressed the team

Shaul Arieli

Gideon Biger

Yitzhak Brick

Sergio Della-Pergola

Shlomo Hasson

Be'eri Holzman

Maya Hoshen

Ezra Sadan

Otniel Schneller

Dan Schueftan

Moshe Shahal

Arnon Soffer

Uzi Wechsler

[Some of the experts who appeared before the team requested to remain anonymous.]

5.3 – Symposium participants

The First Symposium

Uri Agmon

Zohara Antebi

Shaul Arieli

Ami Ayalon

Omer Bar-Lev

Goni Bar-Sela

Israel Harel

Roni Inbar

Boaz Karni

Ilan Katsir

Moshe Levi

Arieh Mintkevitch

Alik Ron

Danny Rothschild

Otniel Schneller

Herzl Shafir

Bruria Sharon

Arnon Soffer

Asher Susser

Rami Tal

Matan Vilnay

Amos Yadlin

Dani Yatom

The Second Symposium

Zohara Antebi

Shaul Arieli

Dani Ashur

Goni Bar-Sela

Ruthi Beyth

Raya Biran

Yitzhak Brick

Emuna Eylon

Shay Feldman

Gabriel Goren

Israel Harel

Israel Hasson

Zippi Hecht

Yair Hirschfeld

Eli Hurvitz

Giora Inbar

Roni Inbar

Ruthi Kaplanski-Sher

Moshe Karif

Smadar Landau

Ruth Lapidot

Ned Lazarus

Eyal Meged

Adi Minz

Itta Prins-Gibson

Yehiam Prior

Dani Reshef

Alik Ron

Naftali Rothenberg

Emmanuel Sakal

Otniel Schneller

Shlomo Shoham

Sabine Sitrouk

Sammy Smoocha

Avshalom Vilan

Ehud Yaari

Igal Yossef