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معهد فان لير في القدس

Collective Identities, Public Spheres
and Political Order
in Modern and Contemporary Scenes

A Research Program at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute
Under the direction of Professor S. N. Eisenstadt

Report for 1995–2002

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1. Introduction

The research program entitled "Collective Identities, Public Spheres and Political Order: Comparative Analysis of Civilizations" is a project of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in cooperation with the Max Weber Kolleg at the University of Erfurt and the Department of Sociology of the University of Heidelberg, under the directorship of Prof. W. Schluchter, and with SCASSS, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, in Uppsala, under the directorship of Prof. B. Wittrock. The program in Jerusalem, directed by Professor S. N. Eisenstadt, focuses on the cultural foundations of historical and contemporary societies, as well as their formation and transformation. The main thrust of the program has been to promote an understanding of the major transformations of collective identities, public spheres, and political order in various historical contexts in the modern age and the contemporary scene. This report presents the analytical perspectives that have evolved in the process and describe the activities that took place between 1995 and 2000. It begins with an exposition of the project's theoretical framework and assumptions. It continues with a discussion of the basic issues as they were treated by the various project groups. After that it offers a new analytical perspective as the basis for future research. The last part of the report surveys the work of the groups and ends with a complete list of the activities conducted as part of the project (research sessions, workshops, discussion groups, seminars, and conferences). A list of publications is appended. Several of them were published in cooperation with ARENA as well as with other institutions participating in the broader program.

2. Theories of Modernity: A Critical Overview

The analytical perspective of this project was based on the notion of "multiple modernities," a notion that goes against some of the strong – explicit and implicit – assumptions of the classical sociological tradition, against theories of modernization predominant in the 1950s and 1960s, and against some of the dominant themes in the contemporary discourse about modernity.

The "classical" theories of modernization identified the core characteristics of modern social structure and of the cultural premises of modernity. The most important structural dimension identified was the growing tendency to structural differentiation, manifested, inter alia, in the growing urbanization process, the marketization of the economy, and the continual development of distinctive channels of communication and agencies of education. On the institutional level, this differentiation was manifested in the development of autonomous institutional spheres – economic, religious, etc. – and in the crystallization of new formations like the modern state, modern national collectives, and new and capitalist-political economies. Concomitantly, modernity was seen as bearing a distinct cultural program and shaping a distinct type of personality characteristics. These theories, like classical sociological analysis, tended to conflate the major dimensions of modernity as it developed in the West. They assumed that even when these dimensions are analytically distinct, they come together historically and grow to be basically inseparable. Moreover, a very strong assumption of modernization studies was that the cultural dimensions of modernization – the basic cultural premises of Western modernity and the "secular" rational worldview, including the strong individualistic view of man – are inherently and necessarily interwoven with the structural dimensions.

The cultural program of modernity was rooted in the transformations of the late medieval European civilization, polities, and economies. It crystallized in Western

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Europe, especially after the French Revolutions, and gave rise to the military, economic, technological, and ideological expansion of modernity throughout the world. The scope of this expansion first embraced Eastern Europe, especially Russia, and then Islam and the great Asian axial civilizations – the Confucian, Hindu, and Buddhist. The only major non-axial civilization in which a successful non-Western modernity took shape was Japan. This expansion, which in time also came to encompass Africa, can be seen as the first wave of modern globalization, which had reached unprecedented dimensions by the end of the twentieth century. Almost from the beginning of modernity (and certainly from the second half of the twentieth century) this worldwide expansion raised the question of whether the modern world, having crystallized under the impact of expanding globalization, would become a single homogeneous and hegemonic civilization.

This was the view promulgated by many of the "classical" theories of modernization and the convergence of industrial societies of the 1950s. It was very close to the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and to a large extent even Weber – or at least in one reading of him, which assumed, even if only implicitly, that the basic institutional constellations that had come together in modern Europe, as well as the cultural program of modernity as it developed there, would ultimately be adopted, as a matter of course, by all modern and modernizing societies, which, with the expansion of modernity, would prevail throughout the world.

The reality that began to emerge at the start of the modernity age, and with greater force after World War II, has not borne out the assumptions of any of these approaches. The actual developments in modern or (as they were then designated) modernizing societies have gone far beyond the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of the original European or Western program of modernity. It is true that a general trend to structural differentiation of various institutional arenas (the economic, the political, and the familial), along with urbanization, the extension of education, modern means of communication, and tendencies to individualistic orientations, developed in most of these societies. Yet the ways in which these arenas were defined and organized varied from society to society and from period to period of their development, giving rise to

multiple institutional and ideological patterns. This institutional pattern which developed in these societies did not however constitute simple continuations, in the modern era, of the respective traditions of these societies. They were, rather, distinctively modern, even if their dynamics were strongly influenced by the society's cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences. Although the extent of structural differentiation varied between them, distinct modern dynamics and distinctive ways of interpreting modernity developed in all of them.

The original Western project indisputably constituted the crucial starting point and constant reference point for the processes that developed in the modern era in various societies throughout the world in the wake of the expansion of modernity. However, the developments in these societies have gone far beyond the homogenizing dimensions of the original cultural program of modernity, which had become hegemonic and remained so for long periods of time throughout the world, and far beyond the concrete contours and initial premises of this project and the institutional patterns that had developed in Europe.

Modernity has indeed spread to most of the world. It has produced, however, not a single institutional pattern, a single modern civilization, but several modern civilizations or rather civilizational patterns, societies that, while sharing some central characteristics, have tended to develop different (though cognate) ideological and institutional dynamics. Moreover, far-reaching changes that go beyond the original ideological premises and institutional patterns of modernity have taken place in Western societies as well.

Some scholarly approaches have claimed that the best way to understand these multiple dynamics of various modern and "modernizing" societies is to see them as continuations, in new ways, of their traditional institutional patterns and dynamics – a view revived to some extent on the contemporary scene in the theory of the "clash of civilizations." Other approaches emphasized the importance of "international systems" in shaping the features and dynamics of these societies. In fact, however, the institutional formations that developed in most societies in the world were distinctively

modern even if their dynamics were greatly influenced by distinctive cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences. Of special importance in this context is the fact that even though the dominant social and political movements in these societies, such as nationalism, often appear to be strongly anti-Western or even anti-modern, they were basically distinctively modern and promulgated distinctive ways of interpreting modernity. This was true not only of the various reformist, socialist, and nationalist movements that developed in all these societies from about the middle of the nineteenth century until after World War II, but also of the contemporary fundamentalist ones.

Alongside the growing recognition of the great complexity and variability of modernity and attempts to understand the nature of the new era or civilization, two opposing evaluations of modernity became very prominent (evidence of the inherent contradictions of modernity). One of them was also implicit in the theories of modernization and of the "convergence" of industrial societies that were prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. It saw modernity as a positive, emancipating, progressive force epitomizing the promise of a better, inclusive, emancipating world. The other, which first developed in the core of European societies and later found strong resonance in societies outside Western Europe and America, espoused a negative (or at least very ambivalent) approach to modernity, seeing it as a morally destructive force. It emphasized the undesirable effects of some of its core characteristics, including technology and the empowerment of egoistic and hedonistic goals.

The classics of sociology – Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Durkheim – were very conscious of these contradictions of modernity; their approach to it was therefore highly ambivalent. They strongly emphasized the contradictory tendencies inherent in the program of modernity and its institutionalization and the problematics it generated. Such ambivalence intensified in the 1920s and 1930s, with the rise of Fascism and Communism. After World War II, a new optimistic view of modernity, with less emphasis on its contradictions and almost no ambivalence about it, prevailed in studies of the modernization and convergence of industrial societies in both their "liberal" pluralistic and Communist versions.

As a result of the intellectual rebellions and protests in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the waning of the Cold War, and the rise of postmodernism, this optimistic view of modernity gave way to a more pessimistic one. Concern with its inherent contradictions and tensions again came to the fore in the analysis of modernity and in the discourse about modernity and the nature of the contemporary world. The criticism of and ambivalence toward modernity, which had existed from its very beginning, re-emerged forcefully, with the primary emphasis on the threatening and negative aspects of the development of technology and science, in particular the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear power and the devastation of the environment.

Moreover, it came to be increasingly recognized that the processes of modernization and the ceaseless expansion of modernity throughout the world were not necessarily benign or peaceful; that they did not constitute an ongoing process of reason; that their promises were not always delivered. It was increasingly recognized that these processes were perpetually interwoven with wars, violence, genocide, repression, and the dislocation of large sectors – sometimes of entire societies. In the optimistic view of modernity, wars, genocide, and repression were portrayed as being against its basic grain and as vestiges of premodern attitudes. Gradually, though, it became clear that these negative phenomena were being radically transformed and intensified by their interweaving with the ideological premises of modernity, its expansion, and the specific patterns of institutionalization of modern societies and regimes – thereby generating a tendency to a specifically modern barbarism.

The most important manifestation of such a transformation was the ideologization of violence, terrorism, and war – first in the French Revolution but later also in the various romantic and national movements – and the combination of this ideologization with the constitution and institutionalization of the nation-state. Such ideologization became a central component of the nation-state, which became the most important agent and arena of the constitution of citizenship and collective identity. These destructive potentialities became more apparent with the crystallization of the modern European state system and with European expansion to other continents. Imperialism and colonialism were often legitimized using the cultural program of modernity, reinforced

by modern technologies of war and communication. The traumas of modernity, which undermined its great promise, emerged clearly after World War I and became more visible in World War II and the Holocaust, subverting the naive belief in the inevitability of progress and the conflation of modernity with progress.

All these developments call for a critical re-examination of modernity. The need for such a reexamination stems also from the shift in the scholarly discourse about modernity. This shift resulted from the recognition of the great symbolic and institutional variability and the different modes of ideological and institutional dynamics associated with the spread of modern civilization. A new perspective on modernization emerged from a critical examination of various theories about its processes; whether those theories stressed the importance of traditions or of the dynamics of an "international system" for understanding variability and for the adoption of a comparative civilizational approach. The process of modernization was no longer tacitly assumed to elicit some kind of preordained evolutionary potential common to all societies in history. Instead, the new perspective assumes that modernity is a specific type of civilization. It originated in Europe and spread throughout the world, encompassing almost all of it, but exhibiting a great variety of concrete forms.

A new critical examination of modernity will provide us with a better understanding of it as a civilization, of its internal tensions, and of its processes of expansion. It should permit us to view the crystallization of the multiple, changing, often contesting modernities in a more nuanced manner, in order to analyze the central characteristics and dynamics of modern and contemporary societies. Such a critical examination constitutes the analytical framework of the research project presented here.

3. Analytical Framework of the Research Project: From Modernity to Multiple Modernities

▪ Modernity as a Civilization

The starting point for such a critical examination is to recognize modernity as a distinct civilization. The crystallization and expansion of modernity have to be viewed as the crystallization of a new type of civilization that had a deep impact on the societies to which it spread. According to this view, the core of modernity is the development of modes of interpreting the world. This view implies the possibility of transforming both the natural and the sociocultural orders, of exploring and mastering them. These interpretive modes entail distinct shifts in the conception of human agency, including its autonomy and its place in the flow of time. They lead to a conception of the future in which various possibilities – which can be realized by autonomous human agency or by the march of history – are open. The premises and legitimacy of the social, ontological, and political order are no longer taken for granted; an intensive reflexivity has developed around the basic ontological premises and the basic social and political order (authority) of society – a reflexivity shared even by the most radical critics of modernity.

The cultural and political program of modernity, as it developed in Western and Central Europe, involved distinct ideological and institutional premises as well as fundamental changes in and redefinition of some of the major aspects of social life. These aspects – collective identity, citizenship and civil society, public spheres, and patterns of political participation, which can be found in all political frameworks and are always central to social-political life and organizations – constitute the crucial foci of our analysis.

The first and "original" modernity emerged in Europe and combined several closely connected dimensions. In structural terms, these included differentiation, urbanization, industrialization, and communication. Concomitantly, they allowed for the construction

of new collective identities bound up with the nation-state but embedded different modes of structuring the major arenas of social life and as shaping a distinct type of personality. On the institutional level, the crystallization of modern civilization gave rise to the development of new formations, such as the modern state, modern national collectives, and new, capitalist-political economies. Concomitantly, modernity appeared to be bearing a distinct cultural program.

The crystallization of these distinct formations and the attempts to institutionalize them in new patterns were closely connected, historically, with the distinct structural and institutional dimensions of modern societies. Above all, it was associated with the decomposition of the older, relatively "closed" social formations and the creation of new spaces in which new institutional formations could be formed. Contrary, however, to the assumptions of many theories of modernization – "liberal" and Marxist alike – there has been no necessary correlation between any specific modern institutional form and the various components of the modern cultural program. This is so whether such forms were capitalist or "guided" (socialist) and whether the political regime was pluralistic, authoritarian, or totalitarian. Each of the dimensions or aspects of modernity – the institutional and the cultural – are analytically distinct. They come together in different ways in different historical constellations, coalescing differently in different historical contexts.

These differences were greatly influenced by the different interpretations of the modern cultural order and of its institutional implications. These implications developed in all institutional arenas – including the political one the analysis of which constitutes one central focus of our research program.

The program of modernity has also entailed a radical transformation, which developed slowly and intermittently – first in Europe and then in what later became the United States, above all in the Great Revolutions and their aftermath – a transformation of the conceptions and premises of the political order, of the constitution of the political arena, and of the characteristics of the political process.

As with the general cultural program of modernity, the core of this political program was the breakdown of the traditional legitimacy of the political order, the perception that this order was not preordained by some divine or transcendental force but could be established by human activities, and the resultant opening up of different possibilities of legitimation. This dynamic was recognized by Montesquieu and realized more fully in the *Federalist Papers,* in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, and in almost all of the political discourse that developed after the American and French revolutions. Thus the modern political program led to perpetual tension between – in the words of Claude Lefort – the loss of the "markers of certainty" caused by the breakdown of traditional legitimacy and the attempts to regain such certainty, manifested in repeated attempts to reconstitute the political order.

Such attempts could move in two sometimes complementary and sometimes opposing directions. One is reflected in the view that political action can make it possible to bridge the gap between the transcendental and mundane orders; that is, to realize utopian, eschatological visions in the mundane order and social life, transforming society through political action guided by a distinctive vision with strong utopian orientations. This view was rooted in some of the characteristics of the Great Revolutions. The Great Revolutions were the culmination of the sectarian and heterodox potentialities that developed in the axial civilizations – especially those in which the political arena was defined as one of those in which the transcendental vision predominant in them could be realized. Attempts to reconstitute the political order required inverting (in secular terms) the Augustinian vision, which promulgated the separation of the City of God from the City of Man, with an accompanying attempt to implement heterodox visions. Sectarian visions were often imbued with strong Gnostic elements that sought to bring the City of God to the City of Man. The Great Revolutions can be seen as the first attempt in the history of mankind (or at least as the most dramatic and successful) to implement utopian visions with strong Gnostic components on a macro-societal scale. It was Eric Voegelin's great insight – even if he presented it in a rather exaggerated way – to point to these roots of the modern political program in the heterodox and Gnostic traditions of medieval Europe. Since then, people have been searching for ways in which the concrete social order that took shape as a result of the

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Great Revolutions could embody an ideal order and a central component of the modern political discourse and tradition. The center was charismatized as the area in which such visions can and should be implemented, through the full and active participation of members of the society.

These visions became closely connected with the second major axis of the political program of modernity – namely, recognition of the legitimacy of multiple interests and of multiple conceptions of the common good. This recognition was at least implicit in theories of natural rights, especially those that emphasized property rights, with a consequent shift from the republican view of property, which stressed the importance of property-owning for freeing citizens to be responsible participants in the political community, to a notion of property as embodying "natural rights," with the political community as the guardian of property. The growing recognition of the legitimacy of different a priori interests slowly extended to the realm of (religious) beliefs as well.

Alongside these conceptions of the political order, in modern societies there developed a distinctive perception of their centers and peripheries and of the relations between them. The centers manifested a very strong tendency to permeate the peripheries, while the peripheries impinged on the centers – and participated in the constitution of the centers' charismatic attributes – thus blurring the distinctions between center and periphery. What is more, a strong emphasis developed on the participation of all members of a society in the political arena. Concomitantly relatively widespread autonomous public spheres, in which different peripheral sectors organized themselves to explore ways in which they could exert their influence and gain relatively autonomous access to the centers, crystallized.

Finally, the charismatization of the centers merged with the incorporation of the themes and symbols of protest, which were woven into the modern transcendental vision as basic and legitimate components of the centers' premises. Themes of protest – equality and freedom, justice and autonomy, solidarity and identity – became key components of the modern project of the emancipation of human beings. Indeed, it was the incorporation by the center of such themes of protest that heralded the radical

transformation of various sectarian utopian visions into key components of a political and cultural program that combined propensities for rebellion and intellectual antinomianism with strong orientations to center formation and institution building and giving rise to social movements (protest movements) as permanent components of the political process.

The peripheries' quest to participate in the social, political, and cultural order and the centers' incorporation of various themes of protest and concomitant possible transformation were often guided by attempts to reconstitute the markers of certainty. A political arena grounded in utopian visions – visions promulgated mainly by the major social movements that emerged – became (as we shall see later) an inherent component of the modern political process.

In the wake of the incorporation of symbols and demands of protest into the central symbolic repertoire of society and the reconfirmed legitimacy of multiple interests, the continuous restructuring of center-periphery relations has become a focus of the political process and dynamics of modern societies. In modern societies, the various structural modifications and dislocations that took place as a result of the rise of capitalism, economic changes, urbanization, changes in communication, and new political formations have led various groups to enunciate their concrete grievances and demands. These modifications have also led to a growing quest of such groups for participation, and even reconstitution, of the broader social and political order and its central arenas.

These demands for participation in the center were closely connected with the crystallization of the basic characteristics of the modern political process, whose common denominator was their openness. While these characteristics are naturally most visible in democratic or pluralistic regimes, they are also inherent in autocratic and totalitarian regimes, even when the latter attempt to regulate and control them in ways that seem to "close" them. One such characteristic has been the emergence of a new type of "political class" and of new types of political activists – a non-ascriptive class to which recruitment was open to all – in principle if not in fact. Another has been the

persistent attempts by this "class" and its members to mobilize political support through open public contests. A third characteristic is that attempts to mobilize such support are closely related to the promulgation and implementation of policies. There has also been a very strong tendency – unparalleled in any other type of regime (except, perhaps and in part, some of the city-states of antiquity) – to politicize the problems and demands of various social sectors and the conflicts among them.

Demands to redefine the boundaries of the political sphere, put forth by various political actors and social movements, are advanced primarily in periods of change. It is in such periods that protest emerges as a major component of the political arena and process. However – and this is of great importance for our discussion – social movements' demands for the reconstitution of the political realm and attempts to institutionalize them, in cooperation with political parties and other political actors, were of great importance in most situations and have been a persistent component of the modern political process.

In the "classical" periods of modernity, from the Great Revolutions until the late nineteenth century and even World War I, most such demands for reconstruction of the political realm focused on various dimensions of the nation-state and revolutionary state. The crystallization and institutionalization of these states entailed several dimensions: an emphasis on the congruence of the cultural and political identities of the territorial population; the promulgation by the center of a strong symbolic and affective commitment to the center and the collectivity by members of the society; and a close relationship between the center and the more primordial dimensions of human existence. In most modern societies – with the partial exception of Japan – such relationships did not entail a denial of the validity of the broader, civilizational orientations. Rather, the new national collectivities tended to become the repositories and regulators of these broader orientations. At the same time, though, an oscillation and tension between the national and the more broadly universal emerged. A key component in the construction of these collective identities was a society's perception of itself as "modern," as bearing a distinct cultural and political program, and its relations with other societies – whether or not those societies claimed to be (or were seen as) bearers of this program – and diverse "others."

The central characteristic of the modern model of political and social order, especially the nation-state and revolutionary state, as it first appeared in the absolutist states of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and later after the revolutions, was a strong emphasis on the cultural and political homogeneity of the population living on the territorial boundaries of the state. One focus of this homogeneity, closely related to the basic premises of the cultural program of modernity, was the image of the "civilized man." This image, as analyzed by Norbert Elias and, though in a more exaggerated way, by Michel Foucault, was presented above all in the great works of modern literature – both the great novels and more "popular" literature – all of which proclaimed the *mission civilisatrice* of modernity.

The images and attributes of modernity as crystallized in nation-state model were also promulgated – as shown by John Meyer, Ron Jepperson, and others – through a series of very strong socializing agencies. All of these agencies – notably schools, the military, and the major media – strongly emphasized the ideal of a politically and culturally homogeneous entity.

A central aspect of this homogeneity was the conception of citizenship, which entailed a direct relationship between the members of the collectivity and the state, unmediated by membership in any other collectivities. In these states, the centers became the regulators of the relations between the central identity and various secondary ones – primordial or "sacred" universalistic ones, whether religious, ethnic, or regional. Concomitantly, the tendency developed to relegate the identities of other collectivities – religious, ethnic, and regional – to the private sphere, leaving the unitary public sphere as the major arena in which the relations between citizens and state and national collectivity were played out.

These conceptions of citizenship differed in several important ways from those prevalent in medieval and early modern (pre-revolutionary) Europe. For one thing, they emphasized its embeddedness in diverse concrete social and cultural settings as well as the diversity of rights and privileges allotted to those entitled to citizenship. They also emphasized the

different possible links between citizenship and the construction of collective identities. Similarly, as C. McIllwain has shown, the conception of constitutionalism prevalent in the political discourse of early modern Europe entailed a recognition of the embeddedness of constitutionalism in diverse social settings rather than the much more uniform "post-revolutionary" conceptions of constitutionalism. In fact, even the practice of citizenship and the constitution of public space, as they developed in the modern nation-state, were far more diversified and variable than those promulgated by their model. They constituted, as we shall see, important foci of struggle for the reconstruction of the political realm in modern societies.

The ideal model of the nation-state evinces a strong tendency to conflate "state" and "nation." Within this model and its concrete institutionalization, however, strong tensions developed between the "state," with its emphasis on territoriality and potentially universalistic notions of citizenship, and the "nation," with its more particularistic definition of membership and strong primordial components. Thus, paradoxically, a central aspect of the constitution of modern collective identities – one closely related to the tension between "citizenship" and "membership" in the primordial community, between state and nation – was a growing tendency to sharper delineation of the boundaries separating different ethnic, regional, and even religious communities. This tendency changed the relative permeability of former semi-ethnic territorial, linguistic, or kin boundaries into more formalized ones with strong political orientations. Although, in principle, such primordial communities were to be brought together under the umbrella of the nation-state and regulated by it, in fact what emerged was a potential for a multiplicity of distinctive collectivities with strong political orientations, although those varied greatly from society to society.

The distinctive visions of the new modern collectivities, above all of the nation-state, entailed the promulgation of distinct collective memories in which the "sacred" components, rooted in both the universalistic cultural program of modernity and in the particularistic national one, emphasizing its territorial, historical, and cultural specificities, came together. These collective memories coalesced in different ways in

different societies; in all of them, however, they constituted a major focus of tensions and contests.

The combination of ideology, the premises of the political program of modernity, and the core characteristics of modern political institutions produced three central characteristics of modern political processes. One was the strong tendency of various social sectors to politicize their demands, which led to conflict between them. This struggle was related to the definition of the political realm: drawing the boundaries of the political has in itself constituted – unlike in most other political regimes in the history of mankind – one of the major foci of open political contest and struggle The third was the continuous restructuring of center-periphery relations. The various ways in which the modern political process and the constitution of collective identities developed and crystallized were mainly influenced by the tensions and antinomies of modernity.

- ### The Tensions and Antinomies of Modernity

Many internal tensions, contradictions, and antinomies emerged within the cultural, social, and political programs of this civilization of modernity and served as the starting points as well as for movements of protest. These movements of protest had strong roots in the major heterodoxies of the Axial civilizations and were closely connected to processes leading to the crystallization and transformation of key institutional formations of modern societies. The included the tensions between emotion and reason; between acceptance of multiple patterns of life and absolutization of certain dimensions of human experience and social life; between individual autonomy and extended control over cultural and social environments. In the political arena, these tensions coalesced with those between liberty and equality, between freedom and "emancipation," and between the civil and utopian elements of the cultural and political program of modernity. Above all, these tensions converged with those of the promulgation of the general will and of different conceptions of the common good, including the articulation of a common identity. Other closely related tensions were that between the principle of majoritarian decision-making and the affirmation of basic rights (which were in a way

beyond the scope of such decisions) and that between the autonomy of civil society and the characterization of state power.

Perhaps the most critical tension, in both ideological and political terms, has been that between totalizing and pluralistic visions; between the view that accepts the existence of a diversity of values and rationalities and the view that conflates such diversity in a totalistic way. This tension developed with respect to the very conception of reason and its place in the constitution of human society. As Stephen Toulmin has shown, it was manifested in the difference between the more pluralistic notions of Montaigne and Erasmus – which also entailed recognition and legitimization of other cultural characteristics of human experience – and the totalizing vision of reason promulgated by Descartes. One of the most important conflations of different rationalities – one often identified as the major message of the Enlightenment – has been that of the sovereignty of reason, which subsumed value-rationality (*Wertrationalität*) or substantive rationality under instrumental rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) in its technocratic mode or under a totalizing moralistic utopian vision. In some cases (e.g., the Communist ideology), some combination of the technocratic and the moralistic utopian visions developed under one totalistic canopy. Concomitant tension between totalizing, absolutizing, and more pluralistic tendencies developed also in the definition of other dimensions of human experience – especially the emotional ones.

Cutting across these tensions and strongly interwoven with them, persistent contradictions between the basic premises of the cultural and political programs of modernity and the major institutional manifestations of modern societies developed, albeit with varying concrete manifestations. Of special importance among these contradictions was that (strongly emphasized by Weber) between the creative dimension of the visions that led to the crystallization of modernity and the flattening of these visions, the "disenchantment" of the world inherent in the growing routinization and bureaucratization.

Another contradiction was that between an overarching vision that makes the modern world meaningful and the fragmentation of such meaning produced by the growing autonomy of the different institutional arenas – the economic, the political, and the cultural. Closely related has been the tension between the emphasis on human autonomy

and the strong restrictive dimensions inherent in the institutional realization of modern life – or, in Peter Wagner's formulation, between freedom and control.

These tensions between the different components of the cultural program of modernity were influenced by themes familiar from political theories of authoritarian, republican, and communitarian social order and by the problem of constructing a collective consciousness.

- ■ **The Expansion of Modernity and the Crystallization of Multiple Modernities**

This civilization of modernity – the distinct cultural program with its institutional implications – first took shape in Western Europe and expanded to other parts of Europe, to the Americas, and then the rest of the world. With its expansion, it gave rise to changing cultural and institutional patterns that constituted different responses to the challenges and possibilities inherent in the core characteristics of the civilizational premises of modernity.

Modernity challenged the symbolic and institutional premises of the societies to which it spread. These societies' responses had the effect, in turn, of opening up new options and possibilities. This, along with the interaction between the civilization of modernity and the historically rooted Asian, African, and Latin American civilizations, produced a great variety of modernizing societies. They may share many common problems (those arising from urbanization, industrialization, the expansion of communication, and widespread politicization), but they differ fundamentally in their institutional "solutions" to these problems. They also differ in how they define and interpret these problems and the "needs" related to them. These differences result from the highly selective incorporation of major symbolic premises and institutional formations of the original Western civilizations as well as from the traditions and historical experiences of their own civilizations.

The diverse cultural programs and institutional formations were shaped by the interaction between the cultural premises of particular societies, their institutional elites

and counter-elite formations, their specific historical experience, and their exposure to new external influences. In this interaction, new interpretations – of the cosmic and social order, of basic ontological assumptions; of the political order; of authority, hierarchy, and equality prevailing in the society – emerged. While the common starting point was indeed the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West, it sustained and gave rise to a multiplicity of cultural and social formations that went far beyond the homogenizing and hegemonizing aspects of the original Western vision of modernity.

Thus the economic, military, political, and ideological expansion of modernity produced a multiplicity of interacting and changing modern civilizations rather than a single homogeneous modern world-civilization. The differences in the institutional dynamics and discourses that have emerged in modern societies are rooted in their different and distinct cultural programs. They entail differing interpretations and a highly selective incorporation and transformation of the various premises of Western modernity and of the components of the cultural and institutional program of modernity. These differences are not purely "cultural" or "ideational." They are closely related to basic institutional processes and to relations between the utopian and the civil components of modern politics, between "revolutionary" and "normal" politics, and between civil society and the state. They also entail different conceptions of authority and of its accountability and different modes of protest and political activity.

As noted, the history of modernity has been one of the continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural and institutional programs. This was partly acknowledged in theories that emphasized the importance of an "international system" and in theories that saw the continuity of different traditions. These theories, however, did not go far enough in their analysis and interpretation of the variability and multiplicity of the modern programs – the study of which is the core of the concept of multiple modernities. The diversification of the vision and understanding of modernity and the variety of basic cultural agendas of different societies have gone far beyond the assumptions of traditional modernization theory, resulting in a re-reading of modernization processes and to the development of the notion of multiple modernities.

The variability and diversity of modernity in the contemporary age necessitates a return to Weber's analysis of the different modes of rationality, different types of relations between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and the specific historical dynamics of non-Western civilizations. What Weber wrote about the internal dynamics of the various great civilizations and their characteristic rationalities – with special emphasis on the role of heterodoxies and sectarian movements – is most relevant for an understanding of multiple modernities. Accordingly, such a reading of Weber almost naturally raises the question of how these dynamics, the specific historical experience of these civilizations, may influence (but certainly not determine) some of the distinct characteristics that developed in these modernities. This reading of Weber is reinforced by the fact that these "new" multiple modernities are "late" modernities. Weber focused his analysis on the development of the first modernity – Western European – and did not assume that later ones would necessary develop in the same conditions.

The idea of multiple modernities denotes a certain view of the contemporary world and of the history and characteristics of the modern era that runs counter to the views long prevalent in the scholarly and general discourse. It goes against the "classical" theories of modernization and convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s as well as against the classical sociological analysis, which assumed that the cultural program of modernity, as it developed in modern Europe, and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies. The reality that emerged after the so-called beginnings of modernity, and especially after World War II, failed to bear out these assumptions. Actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of this Western program of modernity.

The idea of multiple modernities assumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world is to see it as a story of the continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs. One of the most important implications of the term "multiple modernities" is that modernity and Westernization are not identical.

Western patterns of modernity are not the only "authentic" form of modernity, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic point of reference for others.

But acknowledging a multiplicity of continually evolving modernities raises the problem of what constitutes the common core of modernity. This problem is exacerbated by the contemporary deconstruction or decomposition of many of the components of "classical" models of the nation-state and revolutionary state, particularly under the impact of the contemporary process of globalization. Accordingly, contemporary discourse has raised the possibility that some forms of the modern project, at least in terms of the classical formulation that held sway for the last two centuries, have been exhausted – on the contemporary scene we witness either the "end of history" (Fukuyama) or "clash of civilizations" (Huntington).

But a closer look at these contemporary developments indicates that the processes of globalization that have been taking place do not entail the "end of history," in the sense of the end of ideological confrontations between different cultural programs of modernity. Nor do they entail a "clash of civilizations," which seems to remove certain civilizations from the program of modernity. These developments do not even constitute a (basically impossible) "return" to the problematic of pre-modern "axial civilizations." Rather, all these developments and trends are aspects of the continual reinterpretation and reconstruction of the cultural program of modernity, of the construction of multiple modernities, and of attempts by various groups and movements to re-appropriate and redefine the programs of modernity in their own terms.

At the same time, they entail a shift of the major arenas of contest and of the crystallization of multiple modernities from the nation-state to new arenas in which diverse movements and societies constantly interact. This produced a need for a critical reexamination of the key concepts employed in the social sciences to analyze modernity. Such reexamination has been the project of the research project reported on here.

4. The Research Project – Major Outlines

This research project has attempted a critical examination of different approaches to modernity. Its starting point was an analysis of the conceptual basis of the ideal model of the nation-state accepted in most modern societies. Its basic concepts – political orders, collective identities, public spheres, civil society, and citizenship – crystallized in a specific way in the ideal model of the nation-state. But unlike the classical interpretation of modernity, in which the connections among these concepts seemed to be of almost universal validity, with a similar and standard content and structure, we have tried to analyze their concrete manifestations in different societies and different historical contexts. Our recognition of the specificity of the historical contexts of these basic concepts did not lead us to abandon their analytical use, but rather to enhance it by placing them in their contexts. Thus our critical examination explored different historical contexts, the variety within this model, and what has changed on the contemporary scene.

Our study was conducted in a series of workshops, seminars, and research groups that met between 1995 and 2000, which are listed below. The list is followed by a description of the activities of the seminars and workshops, structured around the above-mentioned basic concepts – political orders and citizenship, collective identities, public spheres, and civil society.

- **Political Orders and Citizenship**

The research group on "Collective Identities and Political Thought," which met in 1996 and 1997, focused on an examination of notions of political order and citizenship within various historical and cultural contexts. The group addressed major issues of political philosophy and social thought, such as the connection between political allegiance and territoriality; citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity; power-sharing; and

constitutionalism, with special emphasis on the diverse patterns of linkage between nationalism and citizenship in different societies.

The group's aim was to examine the methods employed in various countries for handling the problematic relation between nationality and citizenship. Accordingly, a number of sessions were dedicated to a study of the requirements, conditions, and entitlements defined by citizenship laws in several countries (notably Estonia, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, India, and Israel). Obviously, each of these countries has a unique dynamic for confronting questions of collective membership, definitions of social inclusion and exclusion, and its gatekeepers. The group also studied several societies (including India, Canada, and the European Community) in which there exists more than one component of collective identity and focused on the ways in which multiculturalism may serve (theoretically and practically) as a regulator of potential and existing conflicts.

"Collective Identity and Citizenship in Europe – Fields of Access and Exclusion" was a multidisciplinary workshop on collective identity. Its year of seminars aimed at establishing the field of collective identity within the framework of the ARENA-program in Oslo. The group conducted joint meetings in Jerusalem and in Oslo with the Collective Identity Research Group (CIRG) of ARENA, whose members were recruited from the wider ARENA network in Norway and Sweden.

The group examined how identities are negotiated and institutionalized in public spaces. The particular cases studied were controversial or "inappropriate" identities, such as nineteenth-century prostitutes in Stockholm and senior citizens in contemporary Sweden, and how they are contained with the help of mechanisms of access and exclusion. The general framework called for analysis of the emerging EU citizenship within a framework of already existing tensions, specifically that between the civic, primordial, and sacral components of citizenship. The group's work produced a volume of essays, published in June 1999 (ARENA/VLI Series: *Collective Identity and Citizenship in Europe: Fields of Access and Exclusion*, ed. T. Barth and M. Enzell, Report No. 3, June 1999).

The workshop on "Democracy, Nation-State and Collective Identities," which met in 1998 and 1999, also discussed political orders and citizenship. It dealt with both the theoretical definitions and the actuality of the nation-state. New and old models of the nation-state, minorities, and diasporas were examined. The discussion focused on the processes of change taking place in the public spaces of modern states – such as France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Norway, Finland, Austria, the United States, China, and Israel – via the prism of the new collective identities crystallizing in those states.

These processes were also analyzed in the context of globalization, on the one hand, and through changes in the definition and function of existing and new nation-states, on the other. The central themes examined were the various types of the classical model of the nation-state, the transformation of the public sphere in the face of cultural homogeneity, and new definitions of territoriality.

In all of these discussions, the groups' theoretical assumption was that collective identities are not naturally given but socially constructed and that this construction has always been a basic dimension of the constitution of societies and social order.

The case studies and the analytical elaboration of the relationship of citizenship to the construction of collective identities spawned a discussion of theoretical problems, particularly those related to the link between the construction of collective identity and the transformations of political frameworks. Some weaknesses in the existing analyses were recognized, especially in the model of the nation-state and citizenship. We elaborate on these in the next part of the report.

- **Collective Identities**

Over the years, several research groups have examined the constitution of collective identities manifested in various historical and cultural contexts. The discussion group on "Redefinition of Identities in Transition," which met in 1997/1998, examined collective identities in historical empires and in Latin America. The group focused on historical

empires and the consequences of their disintegration in the light of current research on local traditions, mutual inter-civilizational impacts, and processes of change. The cases studied were: Mesopotamia, Greece, early Judaism, Rome, early and medieval Christianity in Western Europe, the Spanish empire in the Americas, the Siamese kingdom and Thailand, and the French empire in North Africa.

The group explored the ways in which collective identities and public spheres are shaped when political systems are being radically transformed, in parallel to transformations in the basic criteria of territoriality, primordiality, and sacredness. Of special importance was an examination of the reconciliation of primordial criteria of collective identity during radical political transformations of empires and the multiple collective identities they encompassed. The primordial criteria were defined differently following the disintegration of ancient empires than that of modern ones. The assumption of the group was that the primordial element is not a given in the collective identity of any group but undergoes constant transformation, like the other criteria.

"Collective Identities and Public Spheres in Latin America" (1996–1998) was another research group that focused specifically on collective identity. It discussed the constitution and transformation of collective identities in Latin America, as well as external models of reference and their relationship to internal dynamics and collective identities. The focus of the discussion was the distinct discourses of modernity, closely related to these societies' cultural self-conceptions. Their orientation toward the mother country and the centers of Western culture were central to the discourse of modernity that developed in the New World from the colonial period through the period of independence, and the concomitant emergence of movements of protest and political dynamics. In the Americas, the elites' confrontation with modernity and the West was a confrontation with their own origins rather than with an alien culture imposed from the outside. This group also convened an international workshop in Jerusalem in January 1996.

The group's work was interwoven with two international workshops held at the Max Weber Kolleg in Erfurt (Germany) in June 1997 and December 1998. The first focused

on the role of sociocultural trends and historical experiences in the shaping of identities and public spheres; the second explored the various forms of modernity, collective identity, and public spheres that crystallized in the Americas. These workshops resulted in two publications:

1. *Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres. Latin American Paths.* Edited by L. Roniger and M. Sznajder. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998.

2. *The Collective and the Public in Latin America: Cultural Identities and Political Order.* Edited by L. Roniger and T. Herzog. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000.

The search for new modes of construction of collective identities brought us to look at the changing reality that emerged from the growing influence of new types of diasporas and minorities. These were the focus of the workshop on "Democracy and Collective Identity" (1998–1999). Its participants discussed the ways in which new collectivities and movements – such as ecological groups, anti-globalization movements, and diasporas – challenge the symbolic (and concrete) boundaries of the nation-state, its definitions of belonging, participation, and loyalty, and its program for cultural homogeneity.

The group focused on the changing role and conception of minorities within the nation-state and on the construction of new diasporas. Three case studies of new diaspora collectives were presented and discussed: the growing worldwide Islamic diaspora, which is becoming increasingly significant in the European and American public sphere; the Chinese diaspora, which has begun to grasp itself as a diaspora only in the last few decades; and the Russian-speaking citizens of the successor republics of the Soviet Union, who after its collapse found themselves living in newly independent non-Russian nation-states. These new collectives and their identity are being defined in a joint process by the "homeland" and its attitude toward external collectives, by the "host" nation-states and their policy regarding minorities, and by the borders defining membership and citizenship. Also important is the transnational discourse that helps

shape the collective identity of these groups. The work of the group resulted in the following publication:

Collective Identities, Public Sphere, and Political Order, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt, Ronna Brayer-Garb, and Tal Kohavi. Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2003 (in Hebrew).

- **Civil Society and Public Sphere**

A comparative discussion of civil society and the public sphere, as they crystallized in various historical and cultural contexts, was conducted by the research group on "Civil Society in a Comparative Perspective," which met in 1994–1995. The group focused on the non-Western contexts of India, China, East Asia, and Islamic countries. The "Construction of Collective Identities, Civil Society and Public Spheres in Processes of Globalization" group, active in 1999–2000, concentrated on the link between democracy and civil society in Russia, Latin America, the United States, China, the Islamic world, Africa, and Western Europe.

The group compared key themes of civil society, including the nature of the institutionalization and development of the public/private distinction and the distinction between state, society, and primordial affiliation. It also examined the historical and cultural contexts of the development of the concept of civil society. Is the concept applicable to societies outside of Western Europe, where the idea first originated? Is the concept of civil society completely dependent on the distinction between state and society? Is the development of a sort of autonomy from the state a precondition for the existence of civil-society institutions?

"The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies," a workshop that met in 1997–1998, emphasized on the role of legal institutions and schools. It attempted to disclose the mechanisms and role of the arena located between the official and private spheres in Muslim societies, which expand or contract as a function of the shifting involvement of the carrier strata that are not part of the rulership.

As noted earlier, the relations between various public spheres and the political arena have developed differently in every society and not necessarily as they did in early modern Europe. Even the definition of the public sphere seems to be culturally bound. Although we did not want to impose European patterns, we expected that a public sphere would emerge in every civilization. Our analysis of the institutionalization of public spheres and the construction of collective identities was meant to furnish clues about the applicability of Western concepts to non-Western societies.

To evaluate the forms of interaction in the public sphere in non-Western societies, the group focused on modern formats that crystallized within Muslim societies. This was done by an analysis of the role of the *ulema* and of institutions like the *waqf*, schools of law, and Sufic orders. The group pursued two axes of research. One explored change over time, examining the changing role and function of different social forces in the definition of public order. It exposed the "external" influences that challenged the European models of public order and altered the character of the Muslim public sphere. The second axis involved a comparative study of societies that are developing a narrow or more limited territorial consciousness. The group's discussions culminated in an international conference in Jerusalem in October 1997 and later in a publication, *Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*, ed. Hoexter, Eisenstadt, and Levtzion (Albany, SUNY Press, 2002).

Research Groups, Conferences, and Workshops
- **Research Groups**
  1. "Civil Society in a Comparative Perspective" (1994–1995)
  2. "Collective Identities and Political Thought" (1996–1997)
  3. "Collective Identities and Public Spheres in Latin America" (1996–1998)
  4. "Redefinition of Identities in Transition" (1997–1998)
  5. "The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies" (1997–1998)
  6. "Democracy, Nation-State and Collective Identities" (1998–1999)
  7. "Construction of Collective Identities, Civil Society and Public Spheres in processes of Globalization" (2000–2001)

8. "Religion, Fundamentalism and Terror in processes of Globalization" (2002–2003)

- **Conferences and Workshops**

International Conference on Political Order in Early Modernity, Uppsala, Norway (summer 1996)

International Workshop on Collective Identities and Public Spheres in Latin America. Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, in cooperation with the Truman Research Institute (January 1996)

International Workshop on Collective Identities and Public Spheres in the Americas, Max Weber Kolleg, Erfurt, Germany (June 1997)

49th Congress of Americanists, Quito, Ecuador (July 1997)

Collective Identity and Citizenship in Europe – Fields of Access and Exclusion, CIRG Group of ARENA, Jerusalem and Oslo (1997)

International Conference on the Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (October 1997)

International Conference on Collective Identities and Public Spheres in the Americas, Max Weber Kolleg, Erfurt (December 1998)

Multiple Modernities, International Workshop, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (December, 1998)

Workshop on Collective Identities, Citizenship and Public Spheres, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (May 1999)

International Workshop on Collective Identities, Public Sphere and Political Order, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (January 2000)

5. Analytical Summary of the Research Project: Reconstitution of the Basic Components of Modernity in the Contemporary Scene

This long-term project was based on an analysis of the primary components of the modernist program. It showed that the specific forms of these components were unique in different cultures and diverged from the analytical model. Moreover, an examination of these components in the contemporary political-cultural scene brought us to the conclusion that the current political-cultural reality challenges the basic conceptions of the modern cultural program.

Below we present a summary of the research groups' discussions and an outline of their findings. The discussions made it necessary to examine the assumptions and frameworks of classical research. On the basis of that examination we propose some analytical findings and further lines of investigation.

- **Political Orders and Citizenship**

Historical analysis of the concept of citizenship indicates that although all modern polities form collectives whose members are distinct human individuals, the relationship between a polity and its members has been conceived of in a variety of ways. In the view that emerged from the tradition of individualist liberalism and the diverse trends of the French Revolution, the members of the polity are always individuals and their relation to the polity is one of relatively uniform legal rights and obligations. In other contexts, however, the relationship may be multi-layered. The relation of individuals to the state may be mediated by their affiliation with a family, a profession, and a regional population. Their rights may vary as a function of the sector or polity to which they belong, and different repertoires of evaluation may apply. Differences in the concept of citizen-polity relations can be also traced to variations in the rules of democratic participation and solidarity institutions. They become particularly visible in

controversies over the reshaping of rules of citizenship, such as the extension of suffrage, and the constitution of social institutions.

The "modern" form of collective national identity crystallized most fully in the model of the nation- and revolutionary states in their ideological, legal, and institutional configurations. The image of the nation-state is founded upon the perception that national identity, though a given, is nonetheless not as central as it tends to be perceived. In other words, the emphasis is shifted from national identity to civil and legal arrangements. State constitutions are founded upon national consciousness; but this consciousness does not determine how the relationship between the state and its citizens is institutionalized.

The notion of the classic modern nation-state assumed a necessary link between the state and citizenship. Citizenship was the central arena in which membership in the modern national collective was defined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the concept of citizenship is not merely an invention of the modern era. A historical and comparative analysis of the concept of citizenship in political thought offers insights into the relationship between collective identity, membership and belonging, and citizenship. It is now clear that this relationship is constructed both culturally and historically and is thus not universal. It is embodied in the definition of citizenship and in the definition of citizens' rights and obligations as individuals and as members of diverse social groups.

These components and patterns of national identity have often been symbolized or defined in gender terms: the state, with its civic components and organization of political force, was often portrayed in masculine terms; the nation, with strong primordial, nurturing, and vitalistic components, in feminine terms. Although these gendered symbols were usually brought together under the overarching canopy of the nation-state, they constituted a focus of continual tensions and potentially competing identities.

These conceptions were closely connected with the transformation of the basic characteristics of the modern political arena. The most important of these characteristics

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were the openness of this arena and of the political process; a strong emphasis on participation in the political arena by the periphery and indeed of all members of the society; the strong tendency for centers to permeate the peripheries and for the peripheries to impinge on the centers, with a resultant blurring of the distinction between center and periphery; and finally, a combination of the charismatization of the center with the themes and symbols of protest.

One example of this reality is the appearance of new diasporas and minorities in the contemporary world (Muslim, Chinese, and Korean, new Russian minorities in the Baltic and Asian successor republics of the Soviet Union). These new diasporas do not see themselves bound by the strong homogenizing cultural premises of the classical model of the nation-state and are developing new forms of collective identity within it. This process entails struggles over the definition of citizenship as well as changes in the political arenas of both the countries of origin and the host societies.

The constitution of modern collective identities is a key aspect of the modern political order and citizenship and is closely related to the tension between citizenship in the nation-state and membership in various primordial communities. This tension is associated with the growing tendency to sharpen the boundaries of different ethnic, regional, and even religious communities, thus transforming the relative permeability of earlier ethnic, territorial, linguistic, or kin boundaries into more formalized ones.

- **Collective Identities**

Contemporary theories of the conceptualization of collective, ethnic, and national identities range from the perception of collective identity as "natural" – i.e., existing from the beginning of time, as it were – to its perception as a modern notion and an imaginary entity. In the process of evaluating the concept, the group adopted the perspective that collective identity is a product of continual construction and crystallization. Although this construction is always intertwined with power relations and economics, it produces autonomous components, primarily boundaries, trust, and solidarity among members of the collective. It should be clear, however, that from a comparative standpoint, national identity is only one form of collective identity. In the

sense that it is varied, contested, contradictory, and contextual, "collective identity" is very much reminiscent of "modernity." Forms of identity are suggested and developed in order to come to terms with modernity.

The bundle of the components of collective identities is exposed to change, not least because the degree of "hybridization," overlapping, and demarcation between the various identities within it is in flux. The degree of change is often greater in periods of crisis, when old interpretive patterns become problematic and are reconsidered. In the process, categories like nation, ethos, race, religion, and class – as well as concepts like freedom, equality, solidarity, and justice – are mobilized as part of contemporary "identity politics," in order to produce meaning under demarcations into "we" and "they."

As mentioned earlier, various forms of relationships between citizens and state emerged together with new concrete definitions of the basic components of collective identities – civil, primordial, universalistic, and transcendental (sacred). One form of relationship to emerge was a strong tendency towards absolutization, in ideological terms, of the basic components of collective identity; another form was that of a growing importance of the civil components; a third one entailed a strong connection between the construction of political boundaries and the boundaries of cultural collectives; a fourth, a growing emphasis on the territorial boundaries of such collectivities.

The mode in which these different components of collective identity are interwoven varies greatly among different European societies in two major ways. One involves the difference in emphasis and ways in which these components – the sacred, civil, and primordial – came together. The second relates to their development in pluralistic (multifaceted) ways, influencing the product of the tensions between the pluralistic and totalistic tendencies of the cultural and political program of modernity that developed within them. It also is associated with the basic ways in which primordial (national), civil, and sacred (universalistic) orientations were interwoven in these societies, though historical analysis shows that none of these dimensions have ever been absolutized.

- **Civil Society and Public Sphere**

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, notions of civil society were proposed and elaborated in various European contexts, especially within the intellectual tradition of what came to be termed the Scottish Enlightenment. However, the revival of interest in this concept in contemporary social science has been largely and somewhat curiously limited to the particular notion of civil society, formulated mainly by Hegel, in a continental European setting in the period of transition from absolutist monarchies to nations and states. This notion certainly did not apply to other European societies, such as Scandinavia, the Netherlands, or even Britain, where the influence of society on state was much greater than in the German states or even in France.

The discourse on civil society was long dormant in the social science literature, revived only after the breakdown of the Soviet empire and the promulgation of the concept of civil society as a norm for the reconstruction of Central and Eastern European societies. The revival of this discourse was associated with greater attention, catalyzed by Habermas, to the concept of "public spheres" in the period after World War II. The concepts of public sphere and civil society tended to be coupled and almost conflated, often with no clear distinction between them. Moreover, it came to be assumed that the development of a public sphere and a civil society is a critical condition for the formation and continuity of constitutional and democratic regimes.

The available historical and contemporary evidence indicates that this assumption is quite problematic. First of all, the relations among civil society, the public sphere, and the political arena are much more variable than it implies. The concept of a public sphere entails at least two other spheres – the official and the private – from which the public sphere is institutionally and culturally differentiated. It is, in fact, a sphere located *between* the official and the private spheres, a sphere in which collective improvement – the common good – is at stake. This is also true of the official sphere; but in the public sphere such matters are carried out by groups that do not belong to the ruler's domain. Instead, the public sphere draws its membership from the private sphere. It expands and shrinks according to the shifting engagement of its membership. The strength of the public sphere depends on its institutional locus, whether it is dispersed or

unified, and whether it is close to the center or on the periphery. This sphere is based on oral or written communication. Its influence rests on interpretations of the common good vis-à-vis the ruler on the one hand and of the private sphere, or the spheres of different sectors of society, on the other.

Hence the term "public sphere" denotes arenas that are not only autonomous of the political order but are also public, in the sense that they are accessible to different sectors of society. Public spheres are constructed through several basic processes – framing, communicating, and institutionalizing. The first process is one of categorization, which defines a discourse that goes beyond face-to-face interaction. The second process is one of reflexivity, which gives rise to a debate about problems of the common good, criteria of inclusion and exclusion, the permeability of boundaries, and recognition of the "other." This communicative capacity of the public sphere has been crucial for the direction in which identities and modernities evolved. Institutions of social communication have promoted various patterns of polarization and conflict or of bargaining and compromise. In the public sphere, various images of identity and modernity, sameness and otherness, confronting each other, have either developed patterns of overlapping and merging or have emphasized division. The third process – institutionalization – stabilizes this sphere. Public spheres tend to develop their own dynamic, which, though closely related to that of the political arena, is neither coterminous with nor governed by it. They develop in different ways in different societies and differ in their relations not only to the rulers but also to what has been often designated as civil society.

But the public sphere and civil society should not be conflated. Civil society entails a public sphere. But not every public sphere entails a civil society, economic or political, whether as defined in the contemporary discourse or as it developed in early modern Europe through the direct participation of corporate bodies or a restricted group of citizens in the political process – a participation in which private interests play a very important role. We do expect that a public sphere, though not necessarily of the civil-society type, will emerge in every civilization of some complexity and literacy. But whatever the differences in the relations among the public sphere, civil society, and the

political arena, in all societies these relations have entailed a continual contest over power and authority, their legitimation and accountability.

Public spheres and social movements, especially heterodoxies, sectarianisms, and collective identities (e.g., those that crystallized in the Vernacular Age) constituted the most important institutional arenas in which negotiation, conflict, and confrontation – between the rulers, various elites, and various social groups; between the center and periphery – took place in all these societies over the definition of the common good, the legitimation and accountability of authorities, and challenges to the existing hegemonies.

But the concrete ways in which such negotiations or contestations develop differ greatly from civilization to civilization – testimony to the different ways in which power and culture are interwoven – and shape their particular dynamics. An analysis of such dynamics of different societies may help us meet the challenge of recognizing the specific dynamics of a particular civilization and of confronting the problem of the fruitfulness – and limits – of applying concepts that developed in the discourse of Western social science to the analysis of non-Western societies. Hence one direction taken in our comparative discussion attempted to examine the concept of civil society beyond its European context, in non-European and non-modern contexts. The idea was to identify those mechanisms in non-European societies that fulfill the function of civil society and to make the analytical concept itself – which took shape in accordance with a specific and limited historical-cultural experience – more malleable.

In this context, our discussion of civil society triggered questions that are usually taken for granted in the Western context. What is the nature of the relationship between civil society and a democratic regime? Can there be a civil society in a society that is not democratically ruled? Is civility necessary for the existence of a civil society? Is this why a civil society cannot crystallize in societies where the collectivities are based on primordial or strong religious components? Finally, what is the pattern of relations between the state and civil society (autonomy, cooperation, or competition)? What is the

relationship between state power and its access to a "strong" or "weak" version of civil society?

■ **New Types of Collectivities**

One major aspect of the weakening of the cultural and political hegemony of the nation-state has been evident in the formation of new types of social movements, diasporas, and minorities which are of great importance for the contemporary transformation of the nation-state. They entail the resurrection, as it were (though in a highly reconstructed way), of hitherto "subdued" identities – ethnic, religious, local, regional, and transnational – and their movement into the centers of their respective societies and, frequently, the international arena as well.

Accordingly, the research groups' exploration of the concepts of political order, citizenship, collective identities, public sphere, and civil society in contemporary societies resulted in the recognition of this need. A closer examination of these new patterns and types of collectivities (diasporas, minorities, social movements) that have crystallized in the contemporary world, which was undertaken in our group, indicated that although many of these collectivities existed before, they assume an entirely new significance and analytical standing in the new settings. One new type of social movement oriented toward the construction of new social and cultural spaces and identities includes women's, ecological, and peace movements. Another type is movements of a fundamentalist and communal religious nature, which promulgate a markedly confrontational attitude to the West and what they deem to be Western, while attempting to appropriate modernity and the global system for their own modern but non-Western (often anti-Western) purposes. Although these movements have developed chiefly in non-Western societies, they have also become visible in Europe and the United States.

Thus the conflation between that of citizenship and territorial boundaries has been weakened by diasporas outside their nation-states, which define themselves and are defined by others as maintaining strong ties to their nation-states of origin. This is true not only of migrants by choice but also of those whose migration is the result of military

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occupation, expulsion, or border changes. The shift in terms, from "minority" (a marginalized sector of a nation-state) to "diaspora" (living outside the nation-state of origin in some other one), reflects this institutional and cultural transformation.

The new diasporas and minorities are also part of the formation of new transnational collectives that cross political and cultural borders – which is also a characteristic of the changing relations between citizens and the state. These collectives, along with the media networks they create and work through, suggest the possibility that public spheres and civil societies could develop beyond the nation-state and its territorial borders.

The common denominator of these new movements, diasporas, and minorities is that they do not see themselves as bound by the strong homogenizing cultural premises of the classical nation-state – especially by the role allotted them in the public spheres of such states. It is not that they do not want to be "domiciled" in their new countries. Indeed, part of their struggle is to become so domiciled – but on terms other than those of classical models of assimilation. They want to be recognized in public spheres and in the constitution of civil society vis-à-vis the state as culturally distinct groups that promulgate their collective identities and must not be confined to the private sphere. Thus they make claims for the reconstruction of the symbols of collective identity of their states of origin.

Moreover, while the identities they proclaim are generally local and particularistic, they also tend be strongly transnational and are frequently connected with broader transnational or trans-state identities, often rooted in the great religions – Islam, Buddhism, and the various denominations of Christianity – that are reconstructed in modern ways. Thus, transnational or separatist, local or regional sectors develop direct links with transnational frameworks and organizations like those of the European Union. Many of these sectors claim an autonomous place in the central arenas of their respective societies and are also active on the international scene. Thus, the case of diasporas and minorities illustrates some of the far-reaching changes that have taken

place throughout the contemporary world – chiefly, though not exclusively, in association with processes of globalization.

* * *

The processes and changes analyzed above attest to the weakening, transformation, or decay of the "traditional" or "classical" nation-state and the confrontations among its basic components – citizenship, collective identity, and the construction of public spaces and modes of political participation. These processes and developments have been studied abundantly, as have been many of the challenges they present to the nation-state – especially in terms of the growth of what has been called the "politics of identity." On the whole, though, there has been no systematic and comparative exploration of their mutual interactions and institutional constellations, both in their broad historical context and in their overall impact on the public sphere and political arenas.

In the research project outlined here we have attempted to use a comparative and historical analysis to develop such an exploration, focusing on a critical analysis of the basic dimensions of the constitution of social order – the constitution of collective identity; the various modes of relations between society and state (what in the Western setting has been called civil society), and the basic conception of authority and political order. This kind of analysis, which requires us to detach these concepts from the Western or modern context, permitted a more differentiated and contextual use of these conceptions. The historic and comparative examination of key concepts contributed to an understanding of transformations in the new modern era, in light of and in comparison to other social transformations known to mankind. This examination also helped us identify and understand the distinctive characteristics that distinguish the new modern era and its public discourse.

6. The Contemporary Dynamics of Israeli Society

Throughout the research project, Israeli society was taken as a case study for a closer analysis of changing social dynamics. Here, then, we present some aspects of the Israeli scene to examine some of the contemporary changes and transformations of the nation-state, including different forms of construction of collective identities and notions of civil society and the public sphere.

- **Recent Historical Background**

It is common to point to the change in ruling party – the so-called *mahapach* – that took place in 1977, when the previously dominant Labor party lost its political hegemony and a right-wing coalition formed the government, for the first time in Israeli history, as a turning point for Israeli society. This political reversal signaled the exhaustion of the hegemonic labor Zionist institutional mold and far-reaching transformations in the social, economic, and political contours of Israeli society. Among these transformations were changes in the symbols of Israeli collective identity and its institutional boundaries, as well as shifts in the regime and its patterns of legitimization. These were accompanied by a search for new ideological and/or institutional molds. This drastic political change can be understood as a reaction to the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars, catalyzed by the long-term process of exhaustion of the ideological and institutional Labor Zionist movement.

The Six-Day War opened up most of the problems of the constitution of Israeli society, its basic premises, self-conception, and collective consciousness; the Yom Kippur War undermined the legitimacy of the Labor mold. The Six-Day War unveiled most of the parameters of Israeli collective identity as they had crystallized in the initial – above all Labor Zionist – format of Israeli society and raised problems associated with almost all the major dimensions thereof, problems that had been largely dormant in the first decades of the state.

One problem had to do with the territorial compromise rooted in the 1947 UN resolution to partition mandatory Palestine and establish two states – Jewish and Arab – in its territory. The aftermaths of the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars opened up the entire problem of the nature of political arrangements with the Arab countries and with the Palestinians and the crucial problem of Israel's acceptance and standing in the region. But the impact of these wars was not confined to what may be defined, albeit misleadingly, as Israeli society's "external" relations – those between the State of Israel and the Palestinians and the Arab states.

These ostensibly "external" problems had a far-reaching impact on the entire ambience of Israeli society. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza District propelled the Israeli economy in a quasi-colonial direction; they became dependent on cheap Palestinian labor and provided large sectors of Israeli society with many opportunities for economic advancement. At the same time, the protracted occupation and rule over the Palestinians spawned unremitting tensions and clashes with them and brutalized the conduct of some sectors of Israeli Jewish society.

The most visible changes produced by the *mahapach* and subsequent elections were of course in the political arena, manifested above all in the composition of the government coalitions and in the growth of the power and influence of the religious parties – both the older ones and Shas, the new Oriental religious party that emerged on the national scene in 1984 and became a central force on the political scene and in Israeli society in general.

Starting in the late 1980s, and with increasing force in the 1990s, political parties that emphasized the ethnic ("Oriental") or immigrant component became a key factor on the political scene. The ethnic "Oriental"/Sephardi component was the core of Shas. The flood of immigrants from the Soviet Union and its successor states – which began in 1989 and peaked in 1990/1991 – added a large "Russian" component to the population. Also noteworthy was the immigration from Ethiopia. While numerically much smaller

than the Russian influx, this group constituted a distinct new element on the Israeli scene.

The *mahapach* of 1977 also produced changes in the entire mold of the Israeli economy. The earlier economic model dissolved in growing tendencies to liberalization, privatization, and deregulation – "normalization" in a capitalistic direction, less and less tainted by socialist or labor influences. These tendencies were intensified by the growing impact of globalization on the Israeli economy. All of this produced major changes in the fabric of Israeli society.

- **Opening up the Basic Premises of Collective Identity**

The *mahapach* of 1977, and many of the changes that have taken place since, together with the depth of the fissure in Israeli society, can be understood only in terms of their close interweaving with struggles over collective identity in Israeli society. These struggles are about the definition and self-conception of the Israeli collectivity as conceived of by its various sectors and about the scope of its territorial bases and frameworks and its symbolic and institutional boundaries. They are accompanied by far-reaching social processes, especially the efforts by many sectors to become incorporated into the Israeli mainstream. These processes have impinged on all sectors of Israeli society and public life, with a far-reaching impact on the institutional and ideological format of society.

These developments were closely connected to changes associated with the exhaustion of basic Zionist orientations inherent in the initial hegemonic model of Israeli society. In particular, they were closely linked to the dilution or weakening of the revolutionary components of Zionist ideology – which had aimed at the reconstruction of Jewish life and society – and its elitist orientations.

The contests over the reconstitution of the symbols of Israeli collective identity, which developed in tandem with the weakening of the revolutionary and pioneering components of the Zionist ideology, moved in two contrary – but also sometimes, paradoxically, mutually reinforcing – directions. Common to these two directions was

the tendency to dissolution of the combined universalistic and particularistic characteristics of Israeli identity as they took shape in the first decades of the State of Israel. This dissolution consisted of rupture between these two directions, of their disembedment from one another as well as from a common framework, and the continual questioning of such relationships. Concomitantly the attempts to reconstruct the symbols and components of Israeli collective identity entailed a reformulation of the ways in which major Jewish civilizational themes, the tensions between these themes and their institutional implications, became articulated in Israeli institutions and life.

The different, often contradictory, directions of reconstruction of the symbols and components of collective identity as they developed in the major – above all Jewish – sectors of Israeli society, crystallized around several basic foci inherent in the construction of this identity and in the conception of its major "others." The most important of these foci were the place of different aspects of Jewish history and tradition in the Israeli collective identity and consciousness; relations with Jewish communities in the Diaspora; relations with the Middle Eastern environment, the Arab countries, and above all the Arabs in Israel and the Palestinians; relations with the various modern civilizational and ideological frameworks; and the place of civil, legal, and universalistic orientations as bases of the state's legitimacy.

Developments after the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars naturally also affected the Israeli Arab population and raised the problems of their place in the overall construction of Israeli collective identity and of their impact on the collective identity of Israeli society. For the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel, Israeli Arabs escaped their almost hermetic isolation from the rest of the Arab world. Arab and Palestinian nationalisms intensified and became interconnected, leading to a growing radicalization of Israeli Arabs, their stronger identification with the Arab and Palestinian national movements, and their challenging the basic premises of the State of Israel. At the same time, however, Israeli Arabs were also searching for ways to become more fully incorporated, though in a more autonomous collective way, into the Israeli political system. This often produced ambivalent relations between Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. All these developments spawned far-reaching

changes in the place of the Arab component in the construction of an Israeli collective identity and began to pose problems of principle about the nature of the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. Israeli society and Israel as a Jewish state were faced with the problem of reconciling the Jewishness of the State of Israel with its democratic premises. This was a question not only of full political equality for non-Jews, but also of the possibility of greater autonomous collective participation, cultural as well as political, by the Israeli Arabs within the common democratic framework.

The emergence of these problems was closely interwoven with several processes that were gathering momentum in this period. Most important was the struggle by many sectors of Israeli society to become fully incorporated into its center. This was, in a sense, a battle between old and new elites for social hegemony.

- **The Struggles of New Sectors for Incorporation into the Central Frameworks of Society**

The changes that epitomized the exhaustion and dissolution of the Labor Zionist institutional and ideological mold were closely connected with the attempts by many previously secondary or marginalized sectors of Israeli society to become incorporated into its central frameworks and into the mainstream of Israeli life.

Such struggles for incorporation, which were associated with the growing democratization and opening up of the public spheres and were manifested in these sectors' growing participation in all political and public arenas, moved in several directions. Most important were demands for the incorporation of these sectors' symbols and themes into the central symbolic repertoire of Israeli society; the construction of new social and public spaces; and demands for the allocation of resources, often in terms of affirmative action. All of this moved toward growing heterogenization and pluralization of Israeli society and entailed continual challenges to the old hegemonies and ideological premises.

One of the most interesting and important developments on the Israeli scene, combining religious and ethnic elements in a distinctively new way, crystallized before the 1984

elections in the form of a new Sephardi ("Oriental") religious party, Shas. Its founders were rabbis and political entrepreneurs from various Oriental groups who rebelled against the Ashkenazi domination of the ultra-Orthodox Agudat Israel party and seceded from it. But unlike Agudat Israel, Shas was not isolated from the mainstream of Israeli life; rather it emerged from within it and had a more open orientation to Israeli society. Shas promulgated a new and distinctive ideological and cultural program, which it presented as a general, pan-Israeli alternative to the Zionist secular program as well as to the hegemony of the Ashkenazi rabbinate. Shas was strongly oriented toward active participation in the central political frameworks and public spaces of Israeli society. With its strong religio-ethnic identities and themes, at odds with the existing institutional premises, Shas posed the most radical ideological alternative to the current cultural hegemonies.

Starting in 1990, the incorporation of roughly one million new immigrants from the former Soviet Union – about one-sixth of the entire population of Israel – was highly significant. Most interesting was the emergence of a "Russian" party. Before and after the 1996 elections, many of these immigrants complained about discrimination by the older sectors of Israeli society, especially that they had not been fully accepted into their political, professional, and intellectual frameworks.

Other immigrants, especially those from the United States, who belonged to Conservative or Reform congregations, began having a strong impact on the Israeli public sphere. Their influence included the constructing of new cultural-religious spaces and the opening of their own schools. Their efforts were directed to injecting their notion of Jewish identity and tradition into the schools and public arena, challenging the monopoly of the (Orthodox) rabbinate in religious matters.

Another important change in patterns of participation in public and political life in Israel, starting in the 1980s, was manifested in the nature of the involvement of Jewish communities abroad, especially but not only those in North America. Instead of general financial and political support for Israel and it government, these communities evinced a more nuanced approach, demonstrated either in open and direct support of the different

political camps in Israel or in specific projects in Israel. These projects consisted of support for the settlements in the territories or – at the other end of the political spectrum – of programs to promote cooperation with Palestinians. Some took the form of new, more "open" economic ventures and cultural frameworks.

The trends that developed among Israeli Arabs included growing demands for autonomous access and possible incorporation into the center, closely interwoven with demands for a more equitable allocation of government funds to Arab municipalities, local councils, and school systems, in order to mitigate the discrimination from which they suffered as compared to the Jewish sector. Among intellectuals and young political activists, including members of the growing Islamist movements, a demand emerged for the development of a more active and independent Arab political posture.

While there was relatively little readiness on the part of the majority to accept the demands by some groups for modifying the Jewish symbols of the state, the problem became central to the Israeli political discourse. The very fact of the open discourse and political activity and the demands by Arab intellectuals, along with the contacts between Arab leaders from Israel and the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, was evidence of the far-reaching changes in this arena. A greater sensitivity, often combined with strong ambivalence, grew up to the attempts by some Israeli Arab sectors to combine their increasing identification with Palestinian nationalism with a redefinition of their place in Israeli society. In the 1996 elections, the strength of the Arab parties almost doubled and they started to move toward the center of the Israeli political arena. From the perspective of the incorporation of the Israeli Arabs into the central political arena, a significant change came in the 1999 elections, when Azmi Bishara, the head of a new Arab party, ran for prime minister. Although Bishara withdrew his candidacy on the eve of the elections, his campaign was an important symbolic gesture that challenged the Zionist premises of the State of Israel and its constitution as a Jewish State.

In the 1999 Knesset campaign, several Arab candidates vocally supported the idea of a multicultural secular state of all its citizens instead of a Jewish state. The idea re-emerged at the beginning of the so-called al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000. In 2001,

unlike earlier elections, there was widespread abstention by the Arabs. But this abstention did not necessarily signal a withdrawal from the Israeli political scene; rather, it signaled a growing tendency to create a more autonomous political posture not necessarily connected with the established Jewish Israeli parties.

The demands for incorporation into the central framework and mainstream of Israeli society coalesced to different degrees with economic cleavages. These demands were carried out by various activists, most of which were economically better-off. They usually found the strongest response among the more mobile groups. It was mainly among some of the "Oriental" groups, especially in the development towns, that a relatively strong correlation developed between the economically less successful sectors and the themes of protest promulgated by the activists. Throughout the eighties and early nineties, these sectors were oriented toward the Likud. During the nineties, however, many of them veered increasingly to Shas. In the 1999 elections, after their disappointment with the policies of the Netanyahu government, many of them voted for the Labor party's Barak.

- **Directions of Transformation**

Ever since the *mahapach*, the changes in the major institutional arenas, rooted in the erosion of the Zionist-Labor institutional and ideological mold, the impact of the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars, and the continual struggle by many sectors for incorporation into the central frameworks of Israeli society have given rise to processes of far-reaching transformation of Israeli society.

The major direction of these transformations was the development of more pluralistic institutional patterns of collective identity, of lifestyles and patterns, of social and cultural spaces, and of public arenas. It was not only that the original pattern and symbols of collective identity and institutional formats that had prevailed in the first three decades of the State of Israel changed, or that new components were included or integrated while others became weaker. Beyond such changes there evolved a much greater variety of new symbols, themes, values, orientations, life worlds, and

institutional formations, often contradictory and conflicting in their combinations and interpretations.

There was constant oscillation between various sectors' demands for greater autonomy and their demands for incorporation into the common frameworks and centers of Israeli society. Another contradiction was between a growing mutual openness among different sectors and their growing segregation, distancing, mutual estrangement, and even mutual demonization. Tensions were also evident between institution building and institutional decay; between cultural and institutional creativity and social disorganization; between growing – sometimes rampant – normlessness and attempts to develop and uphold new regulatory frameworks and common foci of commitment.

The major themes of protest, whether ethnic or religious, calling for greater emphasis on civility and the rule of law and promulgated by different groups that had formerly tended to be segregated in their respective arenas, began to converge in the more central public arenas. These groups claimed to constitute legitimate components of the center and were increasingly involved in struggles over the basic premises of the Israeli political system and collective identity. At the same time, the conception of "others" – be they Jews in the Diaspora, different ethnic and religious groups, new immigrants, or Arabs – that developed together with these processes of change moved from a relatively passive, marginal, and secondary status to a much more central one. These groups claimed to constitute legitimate components of the basic frameworks and centers of Israeli society – claims that were not always willingly accepted by the previously central groups of society.

These developments touched the central nerves of Israeli society, impinging on all sectors of Israeli society and public life. They were interwoven with the deconstruction and attempts at reconstruction of the premises and the symbolic and institutional boundaries of Israeli society and the basic political contours of the state. As in many other societies, these processes also posed challenges to the legitimacy of the regime and the normative ambience of the society.

They have also entailed paradoxical possibilities for the Israeli democratic system. On the one hand, the ongoing democratization of political life in Israel, combined with a growing critical attitude toward political institutions and leaders and rising demands for their accountability, have reinforced the nation's democratic tendencies. On the other hand, these very processes attest to the concomitant development of strong divisive and conflictual tendencies – manifested in a growing division between major sectors of Israeli society and above all in the erosion or weakening of many of the political institutions and norms governing them and public life in general. These contradictory tendencies were most clearly evident with respect to the essence of the Israeli consociational system, which had previously ensured the continuity of the Israeli constitutional-democratic system – namely, power sharing by different sectors of society. Such power sharing continued in this period and in some ways became even more extended.

But this increase in power-sharing tendencies also contributed to the enfeebling of many aspects of the major political institutions, such as political parties and the legislature, and the erosion of many aspects of political discourse and process in the public arena. All these developments weakened public trust in many of the nation's institutions, with the exception of the Supreme Court – although it, too, did not enjoy the confidence of the more extreme religious groups. Moreover, polls indicated no more than partial acceptance of democracy by large sectors of the population and often vocal (or strong subterranean) tendencies to delegitimize the constitutional system.

The processes analyzed above can be identified in many modern societies, where they are associated with the dissolution of their previously dominant institutional patterns, growing processes of democratization, and the struggle by different social sectors to become incorporated into the central frameworks of the society.

But the concrete ways in which these tendencies develop varies from society to society as a function of their specific historical context. In Israeli society, they are rooted in the combination of the political-ecological conditions of a small society and the primordial national and historical revolutionary-ideological orientations of the Zionist movements,

and in the relations between these Zionist movements and the major themes of Jewish culture.

The developments analyzed above denote far-reaching changes or shifts from the model or models of the modern nation-state – in the Israeli case, of the first hegemonic Labor Zionist model – in fact, the weakening of the ideological hegemony of this model. These developments, paralleled by those in other societies, attest to the reconstruction of the major characteristics of the model. But they do not denote the "end of history" or the end of the modern program.

7. Perspectives for Future Analysis

The historical and comparative examination of the basic components of modernity and its different historical forms, along with the massive socio-political-economical changes and processes of globalization that are taking place in the contemporary world, requires the formulation of a new perspective on present-day transformations of collective identities, political arenas, and public spaces. This new perspective on processes of globalization and their impact on the nation-state and beyond, is bidirectional. One direction provides a new view of "historical" ("pre-modern") societies. The second direction can offer some new insights into the social and cultural transformations that are taking place in contemporary societies. It can also support a new reading of "historical" components within these societies and the processes of change occurring within them, including globalization.

(1) The first direction of research leads to the analysis both of ancient and pre-modern societies using analytical concepts, models of social organization, and social institutions that are usually associated exclusively with modernity and especially the beginnings of modern Western constitutional regimes – among which most important were those emphasized in our research, such as public sphere; civil society; or national collective. These concepts have generally either been left out of sociological and historical analysis of these societies, because of the presupposition that they crystallized only in the modern period and/or were characteristic solely of the Western context; or when they were applied to pre-modern contexts, this was done uncritically. But as the research carried out under the aegis of this project has shown, these formations were not totally absent from pre-modern societies and non-Western civilizations. Rather, they did not always find formal expression, were usually not conceptualized in the same way as in Western societies, and crystallized in a different pattern than the more familiar modern Western one.

This approach does not postulate a causal and univocal "semi-evolutionary" historic continuity, in which social patterns evolved in Europe from pre-modern to modern society and from West to East. It attempts rather to highlight – on the basis of an empirical and comparative analysis – different constellations of relationships within and among different social and cultural frameworks, i.e., formal social organization, political orders, or collective identities.

Accordingly, this orientation aims at the construction of analytical concepts that link (rather than disconnect) ancient and pre-modern societies with modern and contemporary ones in both the Western and non-Western worlds. An analysis of this kind, which was attempted, for instance, in the group's work on Muslim societies, would address the parallels and differences between Western and non-Western social concepts, sometimes as well as those between different historical periods. Although modern social-science research is inherently embedded in Western concepts, such an analysis aims at making these concepts more flexible and analytically fruitful by differentiating and contextualizing them.

(2) The second direction of research proposed here focuses on analyzing transformations in contemporary modern societies, paying special attention to the fact that these transformations are taking place hand-in-hand with the accelerating processes of globalization that are dramatically altering the institutional, symbolic, and ideological contours of modern national and revolutionary states.

Among these processes, of special importance are first, the changes and shifting hegemonies in international systems, notably the weakening of the "old" Western hegemonies and of the modernizing regimes in various non-Western societies. Second, the demise of the Soviet Union and the corresponding disappearance of the ideological confrontation between Communism and the West – a confrontation that was set within the framework of the original cultural program of modernity. Third are processes of globalization and the transformations they entail, which are manifested especially in the growing autonomy of world financial and commercial flows, or in the continual global migrations and the concomitant development of social problems on a worldwide scale.

Fourth, the intensification of processes of economic and cultural globalization since the 1980s spawned many destabilizing processes, such as growing interchange of world capitalist forces, intense movement of migration, growing gaps between cities – especially between new "global" cities – and the countryside, including smaller urban centers.

All these processes reduced the nation-state's control of its own economic and political affairs. Concurrently, processes of globalization are also evident in the cultural arena, with the hegemonic expansion, through the major media, of seemingly uniform Western, above all American, cultural programs or visions. The processes analyzed above are strongly connected with the development of new and multiple common points of reference and with the globalization of cultural networks and channels of communication far beyond what existed before.

In large parts of the literature on globalization, we assume that some types of global relations and processes are not just a recent phenomenon but have existed in many periods of human society and were always a central part of the construction and dynamics of civilizations. Hence it is important to specify the distinctive characteristics of contemporary globalization and its impact.

Accordingly, following the analysis presented in the analytical summary of the research projects it is proposed that special emphasis should be laid on three major themes for future analysis of the contemporary scene, in a comparative historical perspective: (1) historical and contemporary transformations of major components of political order and organization; (2) new collectivities and new modes of construction of collective identities (minorities, diasporas, and social movements); (3) an examination of the two dimensions inherent in the constitution of "globalization" – global/local and universalistic/particularistic systems – and the way in which the constitution of these dimensions in different places around the world influence processes of homogenization and heterogenization, creating seemingly contradictory pluralistic and totalistic tendencies.

(1) The first theme of exploration is that of historical and contemporary transformations of major components of political order and organization as they crystallized in nation-states and especially beyond them. Here attention should be paid to shifts in and of hegemonic centers and the impact of political, economic, and ideological changes on the relations between centers and peripheries within the nation-state and beyond. Taking off from the results of the researches reported above,

Contemporary transformations in political action, sovereignty, citizenship, political participation, the construction of public spheres, and civil society will be examined through legal and economic lenses. In the legal arena, the focus will be on the development of new transnational courts, new legal institutions and networks, and new modes of legal regulation and their impact on national legal systems. In the economic arena, the focus will be on the distinctive characteristics, patterns, and outcomes of contemporary economic globalization – capital flows, migration, and transnational corporations – and on the modes and regulation of economic flows at the transnational, international, and national levels, interweaving nation-states and transnational agencies.

(2) The second theme of exploration will focus on the crystallization of new collectivities and new modes of construction of collective identities, notably minorities, diasporas and new social movements and their reconstruction of notions of citizenship and of patterns of political participation. The ways in which these processes of reconstruction are affected by the struggles for new social and political forms beyond the hegemonic model of the nation-state, as well as by the need for recognition of groups and sectors within the existing hegemonic model, will be examined.

As discussed in Chapter 5, new modes of constructing collective identities have developed in the contemporary era, along with new challenges to the hegemonic notions of citizenship and political participation promulgated by the nation-state. The common core of all these developments is the growing dissociation of major social, economic, political, family, and gender roles from the hitherto broader macro formations especially

from the hegemonic class formations of nation-states and revolutionary states. (For a fuller discussion of new social movements, minorities, and Diasporas, see "New Types of Collectivities," pages: 39–41.) Further research should address changes in the ideological platform of citizenship; the challenge that social movements, minorities, and diasporas pose to notions of citizenship and political participation; and new definitions of territoriality and modifications in ideologies of collective identity and the construction of national symbols.

(3) The third theme involves an examination and comparative analysis of the transformation of two dimensions that are inherent in all processes of globalization: the relations between global and local constitution of social orders and between universalistic and particularistic relations within the constitution of these orders, and their impact on processes of homogenization and heterogenization, creating seemingly contradictory pluralistic and totalistic tendencies.

Much of contemporary theory regards globalizing tendencies as antithetical to local assertions of identity and culture. Ideas such as the global versus the local or tribal, the universal versus the particular, are widely promoted. But matters are much more complex than this, because the relations between the global and the local are moving in different and sometimes opposite directions. One direction is the growing homogenization of the social and cultural arenas. Another, which seems to be opposed to this but is in fact complementary, involves "local" reactions to this homogenization. Examining the ways in which notions of universality and particularity are constructed today, as compared to other periods, can address some key questions of these relations, such as: What is "local"? What is being constructed as "local"? Are global processes creating an institutional and cultural uniformity, or are there other processes – those of increased pluralism and heterogenization – that repeatedly challenge this uniformity?

Approaching these seemingly opposed concepts from a perspective that focuses on the continual reconstitution of relations among these dimensions and processes makes it possible to examine their interconnectedness and the new types of identities and discourses these concepts generate.

Within this context, special emphasis should be laid on the analysis of the construction of ethnic, political, and religious spaces with orientations that challenge the "traditional" (i.e., as defined according to the premises of the nation and revolutionary states) structure of public spaces. Another focus is the growing importance of "world cities" as global spaces, with great differences among them, and with a strong particularistic (local) identity. Throughout such an analysis, the role of the media and other information technologies, as a vehicle and an actor in the formation of cultural homogenization and heterogenization will be examined; as well as their role in exposing particularistic, universalistic, national, local and transnational orientations.

We hope that these proposals for analysis will be valuable for future directions for research into the basic components of modernity – collective identity, political order, the public sphere, and citizenship – in the contemporary world.

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