

The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Perspectives on the Advancement of Arab Society in Israel

Recommendations for the Development of Effective Leadership in Arab Society in Israel

Editors

Khaled Abu-Absbah Libat Avishai

Members of the Working Group on the Development of Leadership in Arab Society in Israel:

Dr. Khaled Abu-Asbah Project Director

Mr. Hussam Abu-Baker The Abraham Initiatives Fund and High School Principal in Haifa

Mr. Amal Abu-Zidan The Center for Research on Peace Education, Haifa University

Dr. Ayman Agbaria Haifa University and Beit Berl Academic College

Dr. Khalid Arar Jaljulia School Principal and Beit Berl Academic College

Mr. Ayub Asi Head Councilman of the Bara Village

Mr. Ali Haider Co-executive director of the Sikkuy Association

Dr. Ramzi Halabi Tel Aviv University and CEO of a company that specializes in social and organizational advice

Dr. Omer Mazaal Kay College and Organizational Adviser

Mr. Mohanad Moustafa Haifa University

Ms. Amira Mussah Abu Snen Community Center and Elamar Organization

Ms. Tuffaha Saba Tel Hai Academic College

Prof. Yossi Yonah The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Ben Gurion University of the Negev

Academic Adviser

Rabbi Prof. Naftali Rothenberg

Editor

Ms. Libat Avishai

Project Coordinator

Ms. Asmahan Masry-Herzalla

The Working Group on the Development of Leadership in Arab Society in Israel

List of Position Papers:

Mr. Hussam Abu-Baker and Mr. Amal Abu-Zidan The Role of NGO's in the Development and Reinforcement of Civic Leadership in Arab Society in Israel

Dr. Ayman Agbaria The Vision Discourse within Arab Society in Israel

Dr. Khalid Arar Authentic and Transformational Leadership in the Arab Education System in Israel

Dr. Ramzi Halabi Developing Economic-Entrepreneurial Leadership in Arab Society in Israel

Mr. Mohanad Moustafa Arab Municipal Leadership in Israel

Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. Executive Summary | 6 |
| 2. Foreword | 9 |
| 3. Introduction: Leadership, Leaders and Arab Society in Israel | 10 |
| 4. The Working Group on the Development of Leadership in Arab Society in Israel: Basic Assumptions and Working Principles | 21 |
| 5. Issues and Foci for Action | 24 |
| 6. Recommendations | 43 |
| 7. Afterword | 54 |
| 8. References | 56 |

1. Executive Summary

This document summarizes the conclusions of the Working Group on the Development of Arab Leadership in Israel, which operated at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in 2007. It is the third in a series of papers that present the conclusions of a multi-year strategic project at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute on the advancement of Arab society in Israel, focusing on education, civil-society organizations, leadership, and socio-economic development.

The working group was guided by the following central assumptions and principles:

- The development of modern and effective Arab leadership in Israel requires a change in the model for the allocation of public resources to one that is based on greater substantial equality and partnership of Arab society in general and its leadership in particular. This change needs to be accompanied by an expansion of this leadership's activity space in government and decision-making mechanisms, the marketplace, and civil society.
- The Arab leadership that is needed should be anchored in a desire for more thorough integration and involvement in the life of the Israeli state and in Israeli society, as a corollary of the fact that the members of the Arab minority are full-fledged citizens of Israel. To be effective, initiatives and actions by Arab leaders must take into account the existing circumstances and constraints relating to the Israeli state and to Arab society in Israel today.
- There is a severe leadership crisis in Israeli Arab society today. But there is great human potential in Arab society from which a more effective leadership, with a capacity for initiative, could emerge, and steps must be taken to help it reach its full potential.
- There is a vital need to develop a modern, up-to-date, and effective leadership in all spheres of life and in the dynamic and changing circumstances of Arab society in Israel today. This leadership is perceived to be the human engine required to power strategic change and break through the many social barriers and problems that continue to stand in the way of the Arab minority in Israel.
- Fostering an effective Arab leadership is the joint responsibility of: public and government bodies on the countrywide level; local Arab governments; Jewish and Arab individuals and organizations in the private and business sector; and of the mechanisms of Arab civil society in particular and of Israeli civil society in general.

- The working group's activity focused on key issues in the present (diagnosis), along with a forward-looking and operational orientation (prognosis), based on a conscious choice to avoid overemphasizing historical or declarative aspects of the Jewish-Arab divide.
- A majority of the members of the group were experts and professionals from the Arab sector in Israel, individuals who have themselves played leadership roles in Arab society in fields such as education, academia, local government, and the Third Sector.
- The working group's activity focused on outlining ways to ignite a deliberate dynamic within the sector, a step in which the Arab sector itself takes responsibility, in order to promote and foster a modern Arab leadership and to avoid exclusive and passive reliance on government initiatives and activities.

The working group concentrated on identifying and evaluating those strategic areas of leadership that its members believe have a high leveraging potential, both to cultivate new generations of modern, responsible, and change-oriented leaders and to better the overall status and situation of Arab society in Israel. It focused on the following four areas:

1. The development of economic-entrepreneurial leadership.
2. The cultivation of formal public leadership at the municipal level.
3. The empowerment of informal public leadership at the civic level.
4. The development of educational leadership within the managerial echelon in the Arab education system.

The methods proposed by the group to promote Arab leadership in these areas include the following:

- Expanding and intensifying the efforts by "MATI" (Business Development Centers) in Arab localities, while providing Arab entrepreneurs with more opportunities, assistance and know-how to start small and mid-size businesses.
- Running professional training and retraining programs for Arab university graduates, especially in high-tech professions.

- Developing unique economic sectors to promote entrepreneurship among Arab women without advanced education, in traditional domestic sectors, such as: organic farming, cheese making, cooking, and ethnic crafts.
- Establishing an Arab Support Foundation to fund Arab NGOs, and a Center for Research, Training, and Developing Civil-Society Leadership in Israeli Arab Society.
- Establishing an umbrella organization of Arab civil-society organizations to work to develop a countrywide social and professional network of organizations, activists, and Arab civic leaders. This umbrella organization would enhance coordination and cooperation among the various civil-society organizations and between them and the formal representative bodies of Arab society.
- Adopting a new model for the location, training, and professional development of Arab school principals, with the accent on cultivating an authentic, transformational, and effective educational leadership.
- Encouraging the establishment of modern local representative political frameworks in Arab localities, whose involvement in local politics transcends traditional clan affiliations.
- Raising the electoral threshold for representation on Arab local councils.

2. Foreword

This document presents a comprehensive summary of the activity and output of the Working Group on the Development of Arab Leadership in Israel, which operated at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in 2007. The group was established as an integral part of the Institute's broader multi-year strategic project on the advancement of Arab society in Israel in other realms as well, including education, civil-society organizations, and economic development.

The bulk of this document is based on position papers written by the members of the group at the end of its deliberations. It synthesizes their insights, positions, and operative recommendations at the strategic and tactical levels.

It includes: an overview of the subject addressed by the working group - leadership and Arab society in Israel; a description of the group's principles and postulates and of the importance of its work; a mapping and description of the areas on which its members concentrated; and the recommendations and practical measures proposed by its members.

We would like to thank the administration of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, which provided the encouragement and resources that made it possible for the professional group to function, and the UJA-Federation of New York for its ongoing support of the project.

We are grateful to Rabbi Prof. Naftali Rothenberg for his support all along the way. We thank Ms. Sara Soreni and Ms. Yona Ratzon of the Van Leer Publications Department.

Finally, we thank Ms. Asmahan Masry-Herzalla, the project coordinator, and Ms. Danae Marx-Callaf, who provided invaluable assistance on the production side.

3. Introduction: Leadership, Leaders and Arab Society in Israel

Conceptual Preface

Leadership is one of the oldest topics in the world. The study of human history began in large measure as an inquiry about prominent leaders (Bass 1990; Tzur 2001). Because it is a timeless and universal phenomenon, found in all societies and cultures, it is a classic and complex subject for scholars, and one in which research (theoretical and empirical) continues to pursue a deeper understanding of the field.¹ Leadership is a complex phenomenon because it combines many different dimensions—contextual, psychological, behavioral, moral, interpersonal, organizational, and symbolic (Conger 1998; Tzur 2001). Because of this multi-dimensionality, the phenomenon is studied by various disciplines and from many different perspectives. For example, at least ten different categories of definitions and notions of the term “leadership” have emerged over the years (Kellerman 1984; Tzur 2001).

As a matter of principle and as a basis for a discussion of leadership in Arab society we must note that “leadership” is a broad concept that, transcending different contexts, encompasses all aspects of the phenomenon: leaders, support groups and followers, surrounding circumstances, missions, and modes of action.

From the perspective of the historical evolution of the study of leadership, the group of new approaches, which crystallized starting in the 1980s (Shamir 1999; Tzur 2001), offered a dynamic concept of situation-dependent leadership processes and gave primacy to the interactions between leaders and followers and to the way in which followers perceive and evaluate leaders’ personalities and actions (Tzur 2001). These approaches view leadership in terms of the relations that emerge from the ongoing interactions between leaders and followers (Ganz 2004). Leaders and followers/support-constituencies are involved in a process of reciprocal influence that changes both leaders and followers (Shamir 1999).

The group of new approaches also includes the dominant theory of Burns (1978) about “transformational leadership,” which he distinguishes from “transactional leadership.” His theory, which influenced and continues to have significant influence on research about leadership, draws on variables such as vision and inspiration. It encourages the development of new theories based on these and other variables.²

¹ Bass 1990; Rosenbach & Taylor 1998; Elgie 2001

² Yukl 1998; Avolio 1999; Kark & Shamir 2002

“Transformational leadership” refers to leaders who modify their followers’ expectations, raise their aspirations and moral level, and actively seek to change society and improve its norms and interactions (Popper 1994). The subcategories of transformational leaders include reformist leaders, ideological leaders, and intellectual leaders (Tzur 2001).

On the other hand, “Transactional leadership” is based on relations of exchange and on the satisfaction of needs and desires, while tuning expectations and conduct to correspond with (rather than challenge) the norms of a given society. Here the subcategories include leaders of political parties, parliamentary leaders, and executive-branch leaders (Popper 1994; Tzur 2001).

Alongside the development of the group of new approaches to the study of leadership, a distinct body of knowledge that has begun to form in the social sciences in recent years focuses on “public leadership,” that is, on the sector that, in general, is considered to be “political” and the arena in which individuals and institutions are committed to public governance and public policy³ (Kellerman & Webster 2001). In this new frame of research there is a distinction of principle between “formal public leadership” and “informal public leadership.” The former relates to government institutions and formal sociopolitical structures, including official positions of authority, which include rules and means of enforcement anchored in the law. The latter relates to social structures that have no official institutional authority and whose leaders are *a priori* dependent at all times on the consent of their followers to be attentive and cooperative. This context relates in particular to organizations and social movements in the nongovernmental civic sector (Kellerman & Webster 2001; Reich 2002).

This evolving research tradition is especially alert to the influence of the sociopolitical context that nowadays characterizes the dynamic conditions in which various types of public leadership are anchored and with which they must deal. The issues that guide inquiry in this field include the influence of information technologies and globalization on the nature and performance of public leadership and its bonds with its support groups; the impact of the weakening of traditional and official authority structures, alongside the division, decentralization, and diffusion of power, responsibility, and legitimate authority in the public space, on the ability of contemporary public leaders to plan and implement changes in policy; and how current trends of civic passivity and apathy are dealt with.⁴

 3 As distinct, for example, from the theoretical and empirical focus on organizational behavior and dynamics, or on questions of military command effectiveness.

4 Chrislip & Larson 1994; Kellerman & Webster 2001; Reich 2002

The term “leader” existed before the emergence of the term “leadership.” “Leaders” are perceived as those who belong to and are a part of the various elites in a particular society.⁵ Today the accepted conceptual and research approach to leaders is characterized by an “interactive perspective” (Greenstein 1992; Elgie 2001). It takes account not only of leaders’ qualities, characteristics, and character, but also of the unique reciprocal interactions between leaders and followers and of the importance of the circumstances in which leaders operate (Bennis 1998; Elgie 2001). That is, the study of leaders is an amalgam that includes the nature and character of leaders, the nature of followers and the leaders’ relation with them, and the nature of the circumstances, including the parameters of problems and obstacles and the context of the activity and tasks required (Ganz 2004).

There is a consensus that leaders operate in the context of constraints and opportunities that are influenced in part by their followers (Hollander 1985). In this sense, leaders are considered to be inseparable from the context in which they operate. The interaction between leaders and followers is characterized by a two-way flow of influence that includes functional, emotional, symbolic, identity, and interpretive and framing elements (Burns 1986; Shamir 1999). Leaders act in situations of dynamic competition and/or discord among the various goals, values, needs, and desires of the community of followers (Burns 1978; Tzur 2001).

Taking into account that all leadership involves a certain element of power, it is conventional to distinguish between “power over” and “power to”: “power over” refers to relations of control and domination by X over Y (dependency domination), with a focus on the control of resources; “power to” is closely linked to the nature of the power wielded by social and civic leaders and has to do with interdependency relations between the leader and followers and a focus on aspects of goal-oriented collective action (Rejai & Philips 1997; Ganz 2004). There are different types of power that derive from different sources, and these influence the nature of leaders’ authority and legitimacy. For example, “reward/coercive power” is based on the ability of the power holder to produce reward or inflict punishment; “referent power” is based on the power recipient’s emotional identification with the power holder; and “expert power” is based on the fact that the power holder has special knowledge and information (Rejai & Philips 1997).

An examination of the situation and characteristics of Arab society in Israel with regard to its current leadership exemplifies the key theoretical insights and approaches delineated above. The dynamic, unique and changing context of Arab society today mandates and motivates paradigmatic and practical change in the nature of the Arab leadership that is anchored in this context.

 ⁵ Elites based on traditional religious and/or kinship affiliation, as well as professional and performance elites: political, bureaucratic, military, educational, legal, business and economy, intellectual, media, informal civic, etc. (Gardner 1990; Marvick 1996; Rothman 2001).

Furthermore, the growing emergence in Arab civil society of a modern and informal public leadership (alongside the continued existence of the traditional and formal leadership) poses internal challenges that involve competition among values, norms, sources of authority, and power patterns.

Leadership and Arab Society in Israel

Arab society in Israel today is weak and divided (Haidar 2006a; Ghanem and Mustafa 2008). Its internal political arena is fissured along ideological, regional, religious, confessional, tribal, family, social, and class lines. This is in addition to the high level of cultural variation and heterogeneity. These circumstances weaken collective identity within Arab society, limit its capacity for internal unity, and amplify its members' individualistic orientation (Totry 2008).

From the collective perspective, Arab society is beset by immediate reactions to events and incidents that take place around it and is preoccupied with "putting out fires" associated with the many political (both countrywide and local), social, and economic crises that have affected it for years. The continuing and worsening tension between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority, including the Israeli Jewish establishment, supplemented by the ineffectiveness and weakness of the social and institutional structure of the Arab minority, makes it very difficult for Arab society to extricate itself from its distress and effect the necessary changes in its civic and socioeconomic situation (Totry 2008).

The absence of an effective leadership is the overarching obstacle confronting Arab society today. The continuing inability of its political, representative, and official leadership to effect real and substantial change in the status of Arab society in Israel (Ghanem and Mustafa 2008), along with the problems faced by Arab citizens of Israel when they try to penetrate power centers and decision-making circles in the public arena and in the Israeli employment market, are symptoms of a leadership crisis that cuts across all spheres of life in Arab society today: politics, society, economy and employment, education, the media, culture, law, academia, etc.

The relative overall improvement in the condition of the Arab public in Israel, including the rise in the level of education and in the proportion of university-educated Arabs (Abu-Asbah 2005; Haidar 2005a), has not been translated into the creation of an effective, active, and change-oriented leadership (Totry 2008).

This leadership crisis derives from a complex set of factors and obstacles, which fall into two dimensions: internal and external.

The internal dimension involves structural, psychological, and social characteristics of Arab society that have negative and inhibitive implications for the development of a contemporary Arab leadership that is suited to the needs of the hour.

First of all, Arab society in Israel is still traditional, patriarchal, and conservative, with rigid patterns based on traditional authority and hierarchy (Totry 2008). It is a society that permits very little individual independence or individual expression and mobility. There is an intimate connection between individual identity and collective identity in Arab society (Sharabi 1992). The normative culture encourages obedience to and marching in step with the collective (family or clan, village, religious confession), at the expense of expressing individuality (Barakat 1993). The collective identity guides and keeps a vigilant eye on the conduct of the individual in Arab society; individual identity is disempowered. These tendencies lead in turn to an absence of individual responsibility or individual initiative and to a lack of creative thinking that would be suited to the needs of changing Arab society (Totry 2008). The leadership that grew up in this normative social structure is suited to and reproduces it; to a large extent it is based on the authority of the traditional collective⁶ and draws its power from it. Hence, we are dealing with a traditional and conservative leadership that mediates among existing and deep-rooted arrangements and actually reinforces them (Totry 2008). This leadership tends to emphasize the configurations of “power over” while focusing on the leader’s control and authority vis-à-vis his followers.

Second, in Arab society individuals are split, psychologically and existentially, between two separate and contradictory selves: The authentic inner self, with its needs, motives, desires, opinions, images, and values, is repressed and deprived of verbal and behavioral expression. The other self, structured and shaped by rigid collective norms, complies with the needs of the community, religious and social tradition, social-supervision mechanisms, norms, and customs. These two selves are in perpetual tension and conflict (Dwairy 1997). The structured, external, disciplined, and “artificial” entity has long had the upper hand in Arab society. This tension impedes the development of a contemporary leadership that is based on individual potential and morality. Furthermore, any activity and behavior that differ from the views of the traditional leadership and from traditional patterns are seen as deviating from the correct path and as influenced by negative external influences. These circumstances impair the self-confidence of young people (and especially of young women) in the Arab sector that may have leadership potential. They are deterred from following their individual course by the fear of social sanctions that may be applied against them. The social norms and structure of Arab society foster mechanisms of protection and rejection vis-à-vis new leaders who would adopt approaches and methods never employed in the past. Because of these mechanisms, public discourse in Arab society is neither purposeful nor to the point. It does not relate

 ⁶ As distinct, for example, from resting on authority derived from relevant considerations of professional and personal ability.

to the content or quality of positions or topics raised by people but rather to the class, affiliation, and personal characteristics of the person who advances them (Ghanem & Mustafa 2008). This kind of internal discourse tends to delegitimize young potential leaders for irrelevant reasons.

A third key element that gets in the way of the development and empowerment of effective modern leadership in Arab society is the fact that Arab society in Israel is a “society in transition” that has been experiencing accelerated modernization and multiple change processes in recent years (Stendel 1992). These major change processes include: an erosion of traditional sources of livelihood and traditional employment (such as farming land near to the home) and an increasing need to find work outside the home village; the consolidation of a new middle class; an increase in the number of civil-society organizations and civic activists in the Arab sector; the penetration of more modern ideas about the status of Arab women, etc.

In certain spheres Arab society has adopted semi-modern structures and patterns, including daily life centered on the nuclear family; but in many other senses it remains traditional. The accelerated change processes have created a severe crisis of identity and values for Arab society today (Abu-Asbah 2001). The alteration in its internal scale of values creates dilemmas about the extent of integration into or segregation from Israeli society, the degree of traditionalism or modernity and westernization that is appropriate, and the balance between individualism and collectivism in Arab society. The Arab sector’s intensive exposure to Israeli Jewish society has energized processes of social and cultural modernization that are not always accompanied by appropriate, deliberate, and intelligent modifications to suit the nature and needs of Arab society. For example, the rise in the level of education and especially higher education in Israeli Arab society has not led to social and economic mobility for educated Arabs throughout the country. The employment of Arab university graduates in appropriate jobs nationwide is limited. Demographic mobility in the Arab sector, in search of jobs and a place to live, is relatively inconsequential.

These trends are indicators of the immaturity of the modernization process in Arab society and of the lack of coherence between the development of the Arab individual and the development of the Arab collective.

In these circumstances, the internal polarization within Arab society itself, split amongst values and behavior patterns, is increased (Dwairy 1997; Abu-Asbah 2001; 2007). This polarized crisis situation is to some extent an obstacle to the emergence of effective, consolidated, and modern leadership in the Arab sector, because of the substantial contrasts that exist in Arab society today. This social fission and polarization also impede the possibility of mobilizing a broad and solid base of support and "followers" for new young leaders.

The external factors that impede the development of effective Arab leadership in Israel are connected to the worsening friction between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority in Israel and with the overt and tacit policy of Israeli governments over the years with regard to the Arab minority. These obstacles are related to the second-class status of the Arab citizens of Israel, both as individuals and as a collective. The long-term policy is reflected in paltry budgets and investment, an absence of long-term planning, and close official supervision (Smooha 1999; Abu-Asbah 2007). The Arab population of Israel has been shunted to the public and social sidelines; it has been excluded and subjected to socioeconomic, educational, political, and cultural discrimination. The discrimination and inequality have been translated into persistent disparities between the Jewish population and Arab population in Israel (Al-Haj 1996; Haidar 2005a).

The problematic relations between the Israeli Jewish majority and establishment, and the Arab minority (which the former perceives as inimical to the State of Israel) has made it difficult to cultivate modern and legitimate leadership mechanisms to shape the present and future of the Arab minority in Israel, both internally and with regard to the country as a whole. Historically, this problem can be traced to the collapse of the social, cultural, economic, and especially the leadership structures of Arab society at the time of Israel's creation. The leadership structure, in particular, never recovered. The harsh economic situation, including relatively high rates of unemployment and poverty in Arab society, compelled a focus on day-to-day survival rather than on planning the future in a deliberate and responsible fashion. The relatively low level of education has long impeded full exploitation of the potential of human capital in Arab society. An official, establishment policy of co-opting the formal leadership of the Arab sector, while limiting its ability to take part in government decision-making processes and in molding the political, social, economic, cultural, and symbolic order in Israel (Ghanem 1996), have chipped away at the effectiveness of the Arab leadership, restricted its field of action, and diminished its ability to organize and act. The lack of access to public resources, including insufficient employment in the Israeli labor market, has created an Arab minority society and Arab leadership that are dependent and have only limited opportunities (Jamal 2003).

The internal and external circumstances described above pose an obstacle and challenge to the development of effective Arab leadership in Israel. At the same time, however, those circumstances and obstacles create both a need and an opportunity, today more than ever, for the emergence of modern Arab leaders. The greater the awareness within Arab society in general and among the younger generation in particular, of the Arabs' problematic status in Israeli society (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2002), the greater is the internal incipient dissatisfaction with the formal and traditional leadership; and this entails a weakening of the partisan political leadership of Arab society. There has also been erosion in individual Arabs' perception of the power and centrality of the clan in daily life. The transition to households composed of nuclear families means that the role of the clan has contracted and is increasingly limited to local politics.

One recent manifestation of the attempts to yoke the described opportunity and need, to the goal of coalescing an alternative leadership in Israeli Arab society is the “vision discourse” that has been taking place, including the publication of several position papers and documents in 2006 and 2007 about the civil and national status of the Arab citizens of Israel. Published by central Arab organizations and written for the most part by academics, intellectuals, social activists and representatives of Arab civil-society organizations,⁷ these documents provoked a lively public debate, among supporters and chiefly among opponents, both inside and outside the Arab sector (Rekhess 2007; Ozacky-Lazar and Kabha 2008).

The publication of these papers constitutes a deliberate collective action by a relatively new and young Arab leadership elite, for the most part in civil society and academia. This group is engaged in a struggle to establish its leadership and entrench its authority and influence within Arab society. The drafters of these documents operate outside and beyond the traditional channels of clans and official political parties and movements in Arab society (Ghanem and Mustafa 2008).

The most central of these documents, “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel,”⁸ published in 2006, reflects the Arab public’s deep sense of frustration, estrangement, and alienation from government policy, perceived as failing to offer a solution to the yawning gulfs and problems of Arab society. But the document also reflects Arab society’s increasing awareness of the need to effect change deliberately and proactively and takes an inward critical look at the behavioral and conduct patterns of Arab society itself, which are in great need of modification and improvement (Ozacky-Lazar and Kabha 2008; Totry 2008).

Many opponents of the document saw it as a rigid political and ideological product, dramatic and radical, and excessive in its separatist demands, which could trigger a significant deterioration in the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel (Rekhess 2007).

Most of all, the publication of the document reflects the internal power struggles within Arab society today, between the traditional, veteran, representative leadership and new and informal contemporary leaders.

From the perspective of leadership change processes in Arab society, the “Future Vision” document is a tool deliberately wielded by one group of leaders that is attempting to

⁷ The documents in question are: *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*, published by the National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel; *An Equal Constitution for All?*, written by Y. Jabareen and published under the aegis of the Mossawa Center; *The Democratic Constitution*, published by Adalah; and *The Haifa Declaration*, produced by Mada al-Carmel.

⁸ Available at: <http://www.arab-lac.org/tasawor-mostaqbal-eng.pdf>

differentiate itself (as more secular, non-partisan, and with no clan affiliation) from the traditional and political leadership in the Arab sector. As part of the effort to leverage its legitimate status both within and outside Arab society and to consolidate a supporting constituency around it, it circulated a document consciously intended to set off a contemporary public debate about the status of the Arab citizens in Israel and their future in the country.

In this sense, the document is, on the one hand, a fairly common manifestation of the age of globalization, in which ethnic minorities, through new social movements, are more vocal about demanding their collective rights (Gurr 1993; 2000). On the other hand, it reflects the conscious use of the techniques of political debate by a group of leaders who want to challenge the public agenda and existing leadership structures of Arab society in Israel and to push the Arab public to social action aimed at improving its lot.

Interpreted this way, the wave of vision documents in general constitutes an attempt to move Arab society from the politics of radicalization to the politics of dispute and controversy (Jamal, 2007). The former, which involves estrangement and confrontation, is typified by hopelessness, distrust in the establishment, and a lack of confidence in the possibility of advancing one's interests vis-à-vis the establishment. It is found chiefly in situations of self segregation that express alienation from the state. By contrast, the politics of dispute and controversy is a dynamic model in which a minority group employs diverse strategies applicable to the conditions and tools available to it, including reframing, re-interpreting, and re-challenging practices, norms, and conventional definitions (Benford and Snow 2000),⁹ while exposing the negative implications and limitations of the exclusion of and discrimination against minorities.

The drafters of these documents are inclined to controversy politics. They want to challenge the traditional and political line of Arab society and depict themselves as an alternative leadership that can provide effective identity and meaning and that has a capacity for critical moral, social, and political decision-making.

The contemporary vision discourse also reflects a communitarian orientation that emphasizes the concept of responsibility to society and community (Sandel 1982). In this context, the leadership group in question seeks to influence and change priorities and behavior within Arab society today, including its basic character, the influence of its traditional organizations, the status of Arab women, etc.

As stated, the vision discourse is one example of collective and contemporary leadership activity in Arab society today. Most of its authors and initiators come from Arab civil-

⁹ This type of re-challenging is manifested, for example, by *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*, which challenges and refutes existing models and forms of government and rule in Israel and includes a proposal to redefine and reconstruct the State of Israel as a “consociational democracy.”

society organizations; in this sense it is an expression of an informal grassroots public leadership that wants to seize the reins of leadership of Arab society in Israel today. The example of the vision discourse indicates that the playing field open to young and new Arab leaders today is blocked by internal resistance and obstacles. This is demonstrated by the results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in 2007, according to which only 5.5% of the respondents within Arab society had actually read the “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel.” Even among those who had read it, many did not understand several of its key proposals (Rekhess 2007). The internal criticism and derision aimed at the vision documents, voiced by the Arab political parties and by established Arab public figures, and the relative indifference expressed by the Arab public towards the vision documents, has been recently acknowledged by Arab researchers (Ozacky-Lazar & Kabha 2008; Totry, 2008).

The lack of an open, content-oriented and fruitful internal dialogue between the traditional and representative leadership and the modern informal leadership makes it more difficult for Arab society to consolidate an effective and legitimate leadership.

In addition, the techniques of controversy and re-challenging described above are not devoid of problems or dangers. Their tendency to stress disagreements, to radicalize demands, and to boldly challenge current norms, raises serious doubts about their effectiveness in improving relations between the Arab sector (including its leaders) and the Jewish population and especially the decision-making and policy-setting mechanisms of the Israeli Jewish establishment (Totry 2008).

However, the vision discourse certainly does point to a lively and necessary need in Arab society today to develop modern leadership patterns and leaders who are oriented toward improving and propelling change in the condition of the Arab minority in Israel.

There is a clear need for a leadership that is not satisfied by mediation, rewards, and representing shortsighted sectoral needs to the state institutions. That type of leadership has turned out to perpetuate the internal obstacles and to preserve external obstacles.

What is needed, then, is a modern leadership that is drawn from diverse and nontraditional sources within Arab society today, individuals who have a profound acquaintance with the contemporary dynamics of Arab society and a transformational, effective, active, relevant, and responsible orientation.

The modern leadership must work to empower the latent human and social potential of Arab society. The leaders' effectiveness will be exemplified by their ability to define and decipher the key issues and problems about which it is possible and important to act; to determine and sketch out strategic and feasible paths of action to achieve the objectives set; and to lead the Arab public to attain these objectives, within the constraints of the Israeli milieu and existing reality.

The value hierarchy of the new leaders must correspond to the changing values of Arab society in the twenty-first century.¹⁰ The leaders must provide their followers with an up-to-date interpretative and symbolic frame (Bass 1990; Ganz 2004), in addition to achieving the objectives of advancing Arab society.

These trends and needs are manifested in particular in four sectors of Arab society on which the members of the Van Leer working group focused: the business and economic sector; the public municipal sector; the nongovernmental civil sector; and the educational sector. In section 5 we shall present a snapshot of the leadership and leadership issues in each of these sectors, as viewed by the members of the group. First, however, we review the working group's assumptions and working principles.

 ¹⁰ This includes an acceptance of less hierarchical, "flatter" leadership patterns in Arab society, which in turn cultivate and empower active, collective, goal-oriented, and collaborative behavior by followers. Leadership of this sort emphasizes productive patterns of "power to" rather than "power over."

4. The Working Group on the Development of Leadership in Arab Society in Israel: Basic Assumptions and Working Principles

The Working Group on the Development of Leadership in Arab Society in Israel met at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute for about a year, during 2007, to increase the understanding and identification of the obstacles that impede the advancement and development of modern effective leadership in Arab society in Israel today, and to propose ideas and ways to foster and empower such leadership.

The group had 14 core members; academic and organizational support was provided by the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Except for one Jew, all the members were Arab citizens of Israel who come from the Arab public itself. The professional mix was diverse and included academics and scholars, senior public officials in Arab society, including school principals, a community-center director, the head of a local authority, and representatives of civil-society organizations. That is, in a certain sense the group had a dual essence: on the one hand, it was a professional group that discussed the leadership issue in depth; on the other hand, it was simultaneously a reflection and activity of contemporary, modern leadership and leaders of Israeli Arab society.

The group's work included open discussions, the writing of position papers, and a conference open to the general public to raise awareness of the issue and of the group's work.¹¹

The issue of leadership in Arab society in Israel today has not been sufficiently studied. Current studies of the topic are relatively few in number. Consequently, the working group's contribution is simultaneously research oriented and practical: The description and analysis of current empirical trends regarding leadership in Arab society, while taking into account central theoretical insights within the general field of public leadership research, constitute the group's vital contribution to the case study of leadership in Arab society. The survey of practical ways to develop effective leadership in Arab society in Israel represents the applied contribution.

¹¹ The conference was held on November 26, 2007, at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. A streaming video of the conference can be accessed at the Van Leer website: <http://www.vanleer.org.il/heb/videoShow.asp?id=402>

Seven key assumptions underpinned the working group's activities:

1. A nongovernmental professional group is an effective and essential force for animating change related to leadership in Arab society today. Such a group can spark grassroots change in a way that offers meaningful participation and involvement of diverse and contemporary professionals and incumbents of leadership positions, in Arab society itself.
2. The development of modern and effective Arab leadership in Israel requires a change in the model for the allocation of public resources to one that is based on greater equality of and more significant participation by Arab society in general and by its leadership in particular, accompanied by an expansion of this leadership's involvement and activity space in government and decision-making mechanisms, the marketplace, and civil society.
3. The Arab leadership that is needed should be anchored in a desire for more thorough integration and involvement in the life of the Israeli state and of Israeli society, as a corollary of the fact that the members of the Arab minority are full-fledged citizens of Israel. To be effective, initiatives and actions by Arab leaders must take account of the existing circumstances and constraints related to the Israeli state and to Arab society in Israel today.
4. There is a severe leadership crisis in Israeli Arab society today. But there is great human potential in Arab society from which a more effective leadership, with a capacity for initiative, could emerge, and steps must be taken to help it reach its full potential.
5. There is a vital need to develop a modern, up-to-date, and effective leadership in all spheres of life and in the dynamic and changing circumstances of Israeli Arab society today. This leadership is the human engine required to power strategic change and break through the many social barriers and problems that continue to stand in the way of the Arab minority in Israel.
6. Fostering an effective Arab leadership is the joint responsibility of public and government bodies on the countrywide level, Arab local governments, Jewish and Arab individuals and organizations in the private and business sector, and the mechanisms of Arab civil society in particular and of Israeli civil society in general.
7. The development of a modern and effective leadership in Arab society in Israel is a long-term task that will sometimes require substantial changes in entrenched leadership patterns, values, and mindsets. This means a long-term investment in human capital, which requires patience and persistence.

Based on these assumptions, the group was guided by four main working principles:

1. The working group's activity focused on key issues in the present, along with a forward-looking and operational orientation, based on a conscious choice to avoid overemphasizing historical or declarative aspects of the Jewish-Arab divide. That is, the members of the group focused as much as possible on relevant and pragmatic improvement and advancement of the current circumstances of Arab leadership.
2. A systematic survey of the factors (external and especially internal) that hold back and frustrate the cultivation and success of a modern Arab leadership today, is an essential stage in the attempt to cope with the issue of developing an effective Arab leadership.
3. The development of an effective Arab leadership depends to a large extent on the responsibility and initiative of the Arab public itself, as well as on a willingness for self-criticism, self-reckoning, and self-improvement, in a deliberate and active fashion, aimed at structures, norms, and conduct within Arab society. An internal dynamic must be triggered and the concept of initiative must be cultivated in Arab society, in order to sketch its future course in the twenty-first century.
4. There is a need for strategic attention to specific arenas of leadership that have a relatively high potential for leveraging; that is, focusing on areas in which members of the group believe that various activities can have broad and long-term implications for the entire Arab sector in Israel, including its leadership.

The members of the working group identified four spheres of strategic action related to Arab leadership today and drew up recommendations concerning them. The products of their work were formulated in position papers, which will be synthesized, reviewed, and summarized in the next two sections.

5. Issues and Foci for Action

The group focused on mapping and evaluating strategic areas of leadership that its members believe offer a great leveraging potential to foster new generations of modern, responsible, and change-oriented leaders in additional areas of life, and to improve the overall condition and status of Arab society in Israel.

The group decided to focus on four areas:

- A. Economic-entrepreneurial leadership
- B. The formal public leadership at the municipal level
- C. The informal public leadership in civil society
- D. Educational leadership within the managerial echelon in the Arab education system

Before presenting the group's recommendations in these areas, it is necessary to understand and describe the current situation within them, as assessed by its members.

A. Economic-entrepreneurial leadership

“Entrepreneurship” is related to the concept and field of leadership. In this context, “entrepreneurship” means a commitment to set up and run an economic project, organization or business. Entrepreneurs initiate the establishment of factories, commercial projects, and organizations, invest social and economic efforts in pursuit of an economic goal, and thereby serve as catalysts for local and regional change. In this sense, just as leadership is perceived as a vital human resource that must be cultivated, so too entrepreneurship in general and entrepreneurs in particular are perceived to be a key socioeconomic resource for the advancement of Arab society and the Arab economy. Effective cultivation of this resource is the basis for the creation of new socioeconomic opportunities (Bird 1989).

One can treat the term “entrepreneurship” as a subcategory of the broader term “leadership,” one that is connected to the economic and commercial sphere of society. That is, “entrepreneurship” is a character trait and style that the economic and business leadership of Arab society must have in order to propel changes and promote economic

opportunities, while mobilizing the required support. In the view of the working group, an entrepreneur is a kind of “transformational leader” in the economic sector.

The socioeconomic circumstances of Arab society in Israel are marked by hardship, frustration, under-development, inadequate infrastructure, and continuing socioeconomic inferiority (Haidar 2005a; 2005b). In Israel in 2001, the Arab civilian labor-force participation rate of those age 15 and up was only 39%, as against 57% for the Jewish population. This disparity stems in part from the relatively high unemployment rate among Arab women and among young Muslim and Druze men. The Arab labor force has a relatively low level of education and professionalism; the opportunities for Arabs with higher education to find jobs that match their qualifications are much more limited than for their Jewish counterparts. More than 53.1% of Arab urban wage-earners earn no more than the minimum wage. The vast majority of Arab households (62.2%) are in the bottom three income deciles, as measured by the index of disposable income. The incidence of poverty in 2001 was 45.3% of Arab households, as against only 14.4% of Jewish households (Haidar 2005a). As these figures show, an overall perspective on the economic sphere provides evidence of the marginal status of the Arab minority in Israel.

An important indicator of the economic backwardness of the Arab population in Israel is the situation and characteristics of Arab entrepreneurs. They are insufficiently involved in the development of economic infrastructure on a broad and/or countrywide scale; in this sense their activity is undeveloped and limited (Sofer *et al.* 1995; Haidar 2005b). The September 2007 issue of the economic magazine *The Marker* published a list of the 100 most influential persons in the Israeli economy in 2007; not a single Israeli Arab was included. Similarly, 40 of the most promising young people in the Israeli economy of the future were profiled; here too there were no Arabs.

Arab owners of small businesses generally invest in circumscribed areas: trade and services, construction subcontracting, workshops, and transportation.

In both quantitative and qualitative terms, Arab businesses in various economic sectors do not express the existing economic potential of the Israeli Arab population (Haidar 2005b).

Three major factors account for the economic under-development and entrepreneurial backwardness of Arab society in Israel:

First of all, the policies followed by the government and the Israeli Jewish economic establishment over the years excluded the Arab sector from the national development

processes (Schnell 2004; Haidar 2005b). Studies have identified persistent discrimination against Arab society in Israel, an unequal allocation of resources and development budgets, restrictive supervision and interference by the central government with regard to Arab economic-entrepreneurship, and the exclusion of representatives of the Arab minority from government agencies that make economic decisions.¹² This policy began with the vacuum of Arab economic leadership in Israel after independence. The Arab population was weak and dependent on the authorities. Over the years, the State Budget served as a key tool for implementing government policies that discriminated against Arab society (Ben Bassat and Dahan 2006); at the same time, the Arab economic leadership exerted minimum influence on the national budgeting process. Scholars have argued that certain biases can be identified, that work against Arab-populated districts with regard to the design and application of socioeconomic policy in fields such as the eradication of poverty, unemployment, and participation in the Israeli labor market (Shihadeh 2006). It has been argued that these biased mechanisms ensure close supervision of the industrial, economic, and educational development of the Arab minority in Israel.

The shortage of adequate physical infrastructure (including land and advanced educational institutions), the physical distance from the large markets of the Israeli Jewish economy, and the failure to extend conventional abatements and state incentives to Arab entrepreneurs for investments in development areas, constitute persistent obstacles to Arab entrepreneurial activity that might lead to economic progress (Haidar 2005b).

As part of this policy, Arabs in Israel (including business entrepreneurs) find it extremely difficult to navigate their way along the course in which the Israeli economy is moving ahead, and especially its reliance on high-tech industry and rapid privatization. The erosion of the economic and employment foundations of traditional sectors such as agriculture and textiles, the cutback of the welfare state, broad reductions in the budgets of local authorities, and the continued exclusion of educated Arabs from main sectors¹³ of the Israeli economy, have relegated Arab society, disempowered in any case, and potential Arab entrepreneurs to the economic margins of the country (*ibid.*).

Second, the tense and turbid relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel have long impeded the economic and entrepreneurial development of Arab society. The Arabs' notion that Israeli Jewish society views them as a strategic and security threat (Sofer & Bystrov 2006), as well as protracted periods of heightened tension between the two sectors, in the wake of political and military developments in Israel and the region, amplifies the alienation and gulf between the two sectors, including in the economic and business spheres.

¹² Sofer *et al.* 1995; Awad 2004; Haidar 2005b

¹³ For example: the hi tech sector. For further reading on this specific sector, see: Solomon 2008.

The deteriorating relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are manifested in the economic domain in several ways: There is an evident disconnection and lack of economic cooperation between the two populations in general and between Arab and Jewish entrepreneurs in particular (especially since the events of October 2000); Jewish companies, institutions, and suppliers boycott businesses in Arab localities; and Jewish consumers and vacationers stay away from Arab commercial centers, businesses, and towns (Haidar 2005b). In these circumstances, Arab manufacturers and entrepreneurs have extremely limited options for marketing their products and services to Jewish consumers. Furthermore, the Arab sector's economic dependence on the Jewish sector, especially in fields where the Jewish sector enjoys exclusivity in the supply of goods and services,¹⁴ places Arab entrepreneurs in an inferior position that is more marked in times of crisis (*ibid.*). In practice, the ability of Arab entrepreneurs to compete economically in the Israeli free market is quite limited.

The resulting economic separatism (of both consumers and entrepreneurs) of Arab society, and the reliance on small and mid-sized businesses within the Arab community, cannot support economic development and expansion, thus creating frustration amongst potential Arab entrepreneurs. The Arab market is limited in its size and consumption capacity and does not have sufficient opportunities to expand into the countrywide market.

The third factor that keeps Arab economic entrepreneurship from flourishing is internal—the characteristics of the Arab economy and society that hold back modern economic development and integration into the Israeli economic system and job market (Sofer *et al.* 1995).

The conservatism of traditional Arab society erects a fundamental obstacle to dealing successfully with the rapid changes in the structure of the Israeli and global economies. The preservation of traditional patterns, such as the inferior status of Arab women in the business, economic, and employment domain, does nothing to encourage modern Arab economic entrepreneurship (Totry 2008).

A defining trait of most businesses in Arab society is that they are family-based. This forces Arab entrepreneurs to maneuver and balance the good of the business against the needs and desires of the family. This is a particularly difficult economic equation (Weissman 2004). Arab entrepreneurs must minimize the contradictions between dynamic economic goals and objectives and family and emotional needs that sometimes resist change. The dependence of family businesses on the younger generation within the family reduces their odds to survive the transition from one generation to the next.

 ¹⁴ These areas include raw materials for the construction industry, such as cement, and food items such as milk and dairy products.

The absence of adequate professional knowledge about advanced industrial entrepreneurship and the management of large enterprises and organizations, the lack of Arab institutions that encourage entrepreneurs and help them raise development capital, and the lack of access to or awareness of possible sources of economic support on the national level, constitute further obstacles to the advancement and development of meaningful Arab entrepreneurship in Israel.

These obstacles merge in the Arab public's propensity to invest its savings in the Jewish sector rather than internally and in the fact that the Arab sector's financial resources are dispersed among too many hands, with no financial brokerage mechanisms that could fuel thoughtful strategic development (such as a developed banking system) (Haidar 2005b).

Nothing in the thicket of external and internal obstacles described above means that there is no potential for entrepreneurship in Arab society today. On the contrary, the potential and desire exist; but they must be exploited properly. The proof is that despite all of the obstacles and difficulties, recent years have seen a growth in the number of small businesses established in Arab towns, especially in retail trade and services. A survey of the contemporary economic activity of Arab citizens in Israel reveals variegated economic and entrepreneurial activity in Arab localities, subject to the familiar limitations (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, there has been increasing awareness of this issue recently, reflected in the establishment of several organizations to promote economic development and business entrepreneurship in Arab society; one such is Kav Mashveh, founded by Dov Lautman, former head of the Israel Manufacturers' Association and Israel Prize laureate. This is a coalition of organizations to encourage the employment of university-educated Arabs in the public and private sectors. There are also plans to build industrial parks in the Arab sector, including Mavo Carmel and in the Saghur region in the Western Galilee, under the auspices of the Jewish-Arab Center for Economic Development in Herzlia.

B. The formal public leadership at the municipal level

The official local public Arab leadership consists of Arab municipal government functionaries: mayors and council heads, and members of local and regional councils. On the one hand, this local leadership plays an essential role, both by virtue of its legal authority and function of tending to the needs of the local Arab communities for which it is responsible, and as a potential future reservoir of experienced nationwide Arab leaders who are committed to improving the lot of Arab society in particular and of Israeli society in general.

On the other hand, the situation today is that the local Arab leadership does not function effectively and does not serve as a training ground for a modern countrywide leadership. Major societal barriers and patterns, reinforced by external obstacles, impede the growth and development of effective local leadership in Arab society today. These barriers include

the traditional social and political structure, which still plays a key role in local politics at the expense of modern forms of political organization; the dearth of modern managerial expertise and up-to-date professional and system-based skills; and social and community conditions that hold back growth and deter the flourishing of a local leadership, drawn from various and new sources, that is suited to the twenty-first century.

Unlike the first few decades after Israeli independence, when Arab local leaders played a crucial role in shaping Arab politics at both the local and countrywide levels, today the official local public leadership focuses on and operates chiefly in the municipal arena. This reality contradicts the position of several scholars, who maintained that Arab local government serves as an arena for developing and training Arab leaders with a system-wide perspective of the countrywide level.¹⁵

The ineffectual nature of much of Arab local leadership is manifested in diverse ways, including the absence of persistent systematic attention to community problems; the creation of irresponsible and paralyzing budget deficits; irrelevant coping with local coalition crises; no orientation toward change; and hiring people for local government positions without regard to their professional competence and abilities (Totry 2008).

The development and patterns of Arab public leadership at the local level in Israel can be divided into three main periods, as follows:

1. The period of dominance: This period lasted from independence until the early 1970s. The local leadership developed and amassed power against the backdrop of the leadership vacuum in Arab society after 1948 (Al-Haj and Rosenfeld 1990). The municipal leaders of this era emerged from the traditional clan-based and confessional social leadership in the Arab villages; as a result, the political function of the clans increased after the birth of Israel (Rekhess 1985). In these years, the Israeli government and the Jewish-Zionist parties (notably Mapai and Mapam) encouraged and cultivated the Arab local leadership that stemmed from the traditional clan-based structures of Arab society, providing it with resources and authority and establishing Arab political satellite-party-lists led by local Arab leaders. These satellite lists had a clan and confessional basis, were supported by the state and government apparatus, and served as brokers between the Arab population and government institutions. They won about half the vote in the Arab sector (Neuberger 1995) and served as an institutional means to co-opt local Arab leaders (Lustick 1985). The municipal leadership accordingly had an apolitical orientation. It did not function as a social and political movement seeking to effect change; instead, it reflected mainly the social and political situation of the Arab minority in Israel while focusing on achieving basic sustenance (Bishara 1995). The official local leaders replicated and expanded their political activity from the local level to the national level, by means of the satellite lists.¹⁶

¹⁵ Al-Haj and Rosenfeld 1990; Al-Haj 1993; Ghanem 1995

¹⁶ Cohen 1989; Landau 1993; Rekhess 1993

It was during these years that local authorities were established and the Local Authorities Law was enacted (1965). By the mid-1960s there were more than 35 Arab local authorities in Israel. After their establishment, the Arab mukhtars¹⁷ continued to dabble in the jurisdiction of the local authorities and councils and had a negative effect on their performance, while bypassing the official powers of the authority heads. The formal local governments established in this period actually reinforced the traditional leadership, which derived from the tribal structure of Arab society. Thus Arab local government perpetuated and reproduced the traditional structure of Arab society.

2. The localization period: This era lasted from the early 1970s until the end of the 1980s. It was marked by increasing political participation amongst Arab society and the politicization of the Arab population (Smooha 1990; Neuberger 1995). There was a manifest rise in political organization on a national and countrywide basis, with the establishment and strengthening of Arab movements and political parties (such as Hadash) and of Arab organizations like the National Committee of Arab Students, the Committee to Protect Arab Lands, etc. These groups challenged the traditional local leadership, which they considered to be supported by the official Israeli-Jewish establishment.

Concomitantly, the Arab local leadership began to withdraw from the countrywide political arena. The satellite lists ceased to exist by the early 1980s (Benziman and Mansour 1992), and the clan leadership retreated to local politics. On the one hand, in this period the role of the head of the local authority was bolstered after the enactment of the law for direct election of mayors and council heads in the mid 1970s. On the other hand, the law did not change the complex coalition reality of Arab local politics, dictated to a large extent by tribal and clan divisions. The political power of the local clan-based lists survived, both for council members and for council heads, who won election thanks to their support by and affiliation with a clan¹⁸.

The countrywide Arab parties and movements continued to exploit the traditional structure of Arab society to ensure their electoral survival in the municipal arena (Moustafa 2005). Thus the role of the Arab local-authority head became an interesting combination of two patterns—the modern representative apparatus and the traditional kinship-based structure. The mukhtars and clan leaders continued to hold leadership and political positions in the official municipal structure. Most local authority heads were members of the traditional leadership and were also perceived as social leaders, who had to satisfy their voters' wishes and meet their social and clan obligations as part of their formal positions.

¹⁷ The mukhtar ran the Arab village, with the backing and support of the Israeli establishment. He was a member of one of the large clans in the village and served as the intermediary between Arab citizens and the government bureaucracy. Many mukhtars saw the local councils and authorities as a brazen assault on their local power and status, and worked to preserve their own influence in local government.

¹⁸ Harari 1978; Ghanem 1995; Ghanem 1996

3. The “third generation” of Arab local leadership: This period began in the late 1980s and continues today. Its hallmark is the intensification of the contest to control formal leadership positions on the municipal level. This struggle reflects the multiplication of the players, both veterans and newcomers, who compete for municipal leadership

in Arab society and is expressed in the increasing number of candidates for mayor or council head in the Arab sector.

The power bases of the traditional clan-based actors in local politics have been revived, preserved, and strengthened. (Ghanem and Abu Sharqiyya 2003; Moustafa 2005). Here one can identify new semi-independent local groupings of members of the younger generation who are disaffected with the existing structures but still base themselves on the traditional clan affiliation (Ghanem 1995). Groups of this sort feature potential leaders whose ideological or political platform has no countrywide dimension. In this context, new elements that compete for local leadership and to some extent attempt to bypass the traditional clan structure have recently appeared on the scene. These actors come from diverse sources, including activists and leaders of Arab civil society or business-sector entrepreneurs. Even though they are attempting to position themselves as an alternative to the local clan leadership, they have no choice but to base themselves on clan affiliation in order to mobilize support and win legitimacy.

In tandem with the renewal of the traditional actors, the political lists that represent countrywide parties and movements, including their candidates, are losing power locally.

In 1993, local clan-based lists won approximately 65% of the vote in Arab local elections (Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar 1995; Ghanem 1996). In 1998, the support for such lists increased to 70%; in 2003 it reached 75% of all Arab voters. In the local elections in 2003, 42 council heads who ran with a traditional local affiliation were elected, as against only 11 who had a political-party base¹⁹ (Moustafa 2005). Except for a handful of candidates with a strong partisan political identification, most mayors and council heads (including those with overt party affiliation) depend on the traditional family and clan support; without this support their local electoral strength declines (Amara 1998).

In practice, Arab municipal leadership today falls into four main categories, distinguished by their sources and leadership patterns.²⁰

1. A regenerated traditional leadership (e.g., Tur'an): This group includes leaders who emerged from the traditional structure of the major clans in the Arab locality. In this

¹⁹ Data processed, based on: Central Bureau of Statistics 10 Nov. 1998 (No. 1112); Israel Ministry of the Interior 1998, 2003.

²⁰ This classification is based on empirical research about mayors/council heads and local councils in five test cases: Umm al-Fahm, Nazareth, Tur'an, Maghar, and Ma'ale 'Iron.

pattern there is a clear and direct link between the head of the local authority and one of the large clans. What distinguishes this type from the older traditional leadership is the fact that the clan's candidate for local-authority head is not necessarily the head of the clan or its leading dignitary. This kind of leadership perceives the clan structure as a major opportunity to run for office and to win it. Clan affiliation and clan interests remain pervasive and important both to get elected and for the day-to-day running of the authority. The local-authority head is subject to certain limitation, which stem from the need to placate clan-based coalitions.²¹

2. Partisan political leadership (e.g., Umm al-Fahm and Nazareth): This group, which accounts for only a small proportion of Arab local leadership, consists of leaders who emerged from the Arab political parties and movements. They have, relatively speaking, a countrywide political orientation and frequently lead public campaigns associated with the status of the entire Arab minority in Israel. But only a few Arab local authority heads operate on a strongly partisan basis. Most of them continue to rely on the structure and support of the traditional clan in the local context.

3. Municipal business leadership (e.g., Ma'ale 'Iron): This is a relatively new source of local public leadership, one that is still building its momentum and power today. Leaders of this type generally have no local or countrywide agenda. They wave the flag of their own business acumen and management abilities as a central part of their public image. Such leaders have no real familiarity with or understanding of the problems that confront Arab local government and consequently tend to be ineffectual in dealing with them. They are not interested in Arab politics at the countrywide level and focus on the economic aspect of running the local authority. This model is poorly suited to fulfilling the local authority's duty of promoting social and community values. It reflects the attempt by Arab capitalists (such as traders and contractors) to augment their political role in Arab society.

4. Local leaders who are academics or members of the liberal professions (e.g., Maghar): Members of this group are referred to as "independents" and are ostensibly perceived as such. On the one hand, they challenge the countrywide political leadership in the local arena and the traditional local leadership, while allying themselves with local lists that are not officially identified with a clan or political party. On the other hand, they do rely on the power of their own clan; in this sense they constitute a semi-traditional clan-based leadership. Leaders of this type do not usually have a firm agenda, focus mainly on their personalities and education, do not attempt to modify the existing social structure of their communities, and even exploit it during the election campaign. Their higher education does not necessarily constitute an advantage when it comes to changing the patterns of conduct in Arab local government, but their participation does reduce the proportion of Arab local authority heads who are poorly educated (Ghanem 1995).

²¹ For example: by distributing jobs within the local authority after the elections.

What do these contemporary leadership patterns signify?

The continuing hegemony of traditional structures and patterns in Arab local leadership, despite the processes of change and modernization experienced by Arab society, has negative implications in several dimensions. First of all, there is indication that Arab mayors and council heads are unsuccessful and ineffective when elected on the basis of a clan or semi-clan affiliation and where the council coalition consists of many clan-based lists. Three of the five test cases examined by the Van Leer working group exemplify this: two local authorities were disbanded by the Minister of the Interior—those in Ma'ale 'Iron (because of a paralyzing coalition split) and in Tur'an; a third authority (in Maghar) is in desperate economic straits.

On the other hand, the two local authorities whose heads were elected on a partisan political basis (Umm al-Fahm and Nazareth) are in somewhat better shape and their leaders are involved in countrywide Arab politics as well.

The proliferation of local clan-based lists and the intense coalition pressures have a deleterious effect both on how Arab local-authority heads are selected and on their performance. In the absence of requirements for office that are pertinent and associated with skills, education, and experience, it is difficult to guarantee that local authority heads will have the abilities required for their public role (Ben-Elia 1999). The profile of Arab elected local officials affects the conditions of local authorities and their residents. Most Arab local authorities today tend to a personalization of politics and a petrified, centralized, and conservative organizational and leadership culture based on the traditional, patriarchal and clan-based social structure (Al-Haj & Rosenfeld 1990; Khamaisi 1994). Local authority heads are forced to respond with increased vigor to narrow and unprofessional interests, while the decision-making process becomes increasingly complicated.

In the absence of an issue-driven, systematic, and countrywide orientation among candidates and incumbents, very few Arab local leaders emerge from the municipal arena to become effective leaders on the countrywide level. Authority heads elected on a traditional clan basis remain local leaders with a limited scope of activity. Most of them do not effectively advance system-wide social interests and lack the managerial and leadership skills appropriate to the present day. Clan influences divert public activity onto personal and unprofessional tracks and are conducive to long-term leadership failure (Jamal 2006).

In other words, Arab municipal leadership today does not provide a fertile field or lever for the development of a modern, professional, and effective leadership, whether local or countrywide. The blurring of the borders and division of power between the formal public leadership and the traditional social leadership in Arab society produces unsatisfactory models with regard to the origins, style, objectives, and capacities of Arab municipal leadership today.

C. The informal public leadership in civil society

The NGO revolution, the growth of social movements and grassroots social organizations, and the consolidation of the so-called Third Sector, are an important cumulative and essential change that has been accelerating in many democratic countries since the 1980s and continues today.²² In the past decade, the increasing tendency of individuals and groups in society to sidestep formal government structures and organize around various social and political issues and to work outside government in order to influence public policy has multiplied the number and diversity of the players in the public arena. There is increasing recognition that many changes and processes in the public arena occur from the bottom-up, independent of the leaders at the apex of formal government agencies.²³

There is no doubt that civil-society organizations now play a larger and invaluable role with regard to policy change, the provision of social and community services, grassroots public communication with government actors, and civic and community development and participation (Chrislip & Larson 1994). The capacity of civil-society organizations and leaders to make social and public issues meaningful and important for citizens and to mobilize them to deal with these issues gives civil-society organizations and leaders a position that cannot be ignored in the public system today. At the same time, the informal, voluntary, and extragovernmental infrastructure, with its aspiration to modify and better society, poses many unique and complex challenges, problems, and circumstances for this civic leadership.²⁴

The development and expansion of the Third Sector and of NGOs has not bypassed Israeli society in general and Israeli Arab society in particular.²⁵

Although Arab NGOs constitute an integral though relatively small part of civil society in Israel – only 5% of all registered NGOs in the country – there is persistent growth in the scope, institutionalization, and importance of Arab organizations that work to improve the lot of the Arab minority in Israel (Galnoor *et al.* 2003; Even Choref 2008). The greatest growth in recent years has been among Arab NGOs active in the field of social and civic change (Even Choref 2008).

In practice, two separate streams of civic organizations have emerged in Arab society in Israel: a modern secular stream (on which this paper focuses) and a traditional religious stream.²⁶

²² Bass 1990; Gardner 1990; Kellerman & Webster 2001

²³ Gardner 1990; Walzer 1995; Reich 2002; Ganz 2004

²⁴ Etzioni-Halevy 1993; Reich 2002; Ganz 2004

²⁵ Galnoor *et al.* 2003; Katz *et al.* 2006; Even Choref 2008

²⁶ The traditional stream developed against the background of the activity by the Islamic Movement, which sponsored and established many religious organizations and charitable associations in various Arab localities (Galnoor *et al.* 2003). This stream focuses on providing religious support services, health care, and educational services to Arab society and is inclined toward self-segregation from Israeli society as a whole.

Among the most prominent NGOs in Arab society today, are included the following:

- Civil rights and litigation: Adalah (the Legal Center for Palestinian Minority Rights in Israel), Mossawa (the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel), Karameh;
- Education and culture: The Committee to Monitor Arab Education, Mada al-Carmel (the Arab Center for Applied Social Research), the Galilee Association, the Emile Touma Institute for Palestinian and Israeli Studies, al-Tufula (the Pedagogical and Multipurpose Women's Center);
- Empowerment of Arab women: Women against Violence, Kayan, the Coalition of Organizations to Promote the Status of Arab Women in Israel;
- Advocacy and international activity: the Arab Association for Human Rights, Ittijah (the Union of Arab Community-Based Associations).

There are other important organizations that are Arab-Jewish partnerships, such as Sikkuy (the Association for the Advancement of Equal Opportunity), the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, and the Arab-Jewish Center for Economic Development.

Four main factors, both internal and external to the Arab sector in Israel, explain the growth and increasing importance of civil-society organizations in Arab society (Zeidan and Ghanem 2000; Galnoor *et al.* 2003):

The first is the younger generation's disappointment with the weak and ineffectual nature of the veteran formal organizational and leadership structure of Arab society—the Arab political parties, the local authorities, and the traditional clan-based leadership. The younger generation feels that the common Arab leadership focused too much on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the status of the Arab minority in Israel on the macro level. Meanwhile, matters associated with the daily life of Arabs in Israel²⁷ have been shunted to the sidelines and the Arab leadership has evinced a vague, unsystematic, unprofessional, and moribund approach to the problems and needs of Arab society. This disappointment has spawned a more intensive search for organizational and leadership alternatives in Arab society.

The second factor is the change in how young Arabs think about the basic method for dealing with the social circumstances of the Arab minority in Israel. They are gradually abandoning the passive, conciliatory, and conservative approach of a population (and leadership) held captive by the current situation, replacing it with an active line based on civic participation and initiative to improve and advance Arab society, taking the existing constraints into account.

 ²⁷ Including current issues such as: the moral crisis of Arab society, the erosion of internal social solidarity and unity, etc.

The third factor is the abiding economic and social distress of the Arab minority in Israel, to which state institutions have never adequately responded. This hardship has led to increased autonomous organization within Arab society and efforts to provide alternative services to those offered by the state, or to exert pressure on the state to provide better service to the Arab population. Arab Third-Sector organizations are central suppliers of welfare, education, and health-care services for the Arab population,²⁸ despite the relatively scant support they receive from the government.

Finally, the rising level of education and the growth of the stratum of young university-educated Arabs (including Arab women) have not been accompanied by a removal of the employment barriers that stand in the way of educated Arabs in the Israeli economy and labor market, and especially in the Arab market, with its limited scale. The large number of young university-educated Arabs who are unemployed has generated a search for new and alternative spaces and outlets for suitable jobs and livelihoods. Many university-educated Arabs are establishing, running, and developing civil-society organizations in Arab society, while doing an end-run around the existing traditional structures. Arab civil-society organizations in Israel employed 2,323 persons in 1998 - almost 8% of all those working for civil-society organizations. This is a large number in comparison to the small share of Arab organizations among all registered civil-society organizations in Israel (Galnoor *et al.* 2003). Civil-society organizations thus constitute an important source of livelihood and employment, an opportunity for professional fulfillment, and a lever for social change. The younger generation of university-trained Arabs is more aware of modern patterns of social organization and has a more developed social and political awareness than previous generations did.

Against this background, a new and increasingly important arena of civic organizations has been created in Arab society in recent years. Social and secular in nature, they provide a new wave of young leaders from diverse backgrounds with opportunities for growth, penetration, and action. They aim at effecting deliberate and intelligent change in the work patterns and programs of Arab leaders in particular and of Arab society in general. That is, Arab NGOs serve as a conduit through which and by which modern, energetic, and talented Arab leaders are created and empowered. In this sense, the civil-society leadership is a central and necessary pillar and has the potential to propel changes in Arab society today in ways that are not necessarily dependent on government and state initiatives.

The activity space, in which civic organizations operate, tends to develop and create modern patterns of action and leadership in Arab society. These patterns are characterized in particular by a desire and commitment to change and improve specific aspects of the

 ²⁸ The enactment of the Voluntary Associations Law in 1980 made it easier to establish voluntary organizations and NPOs in the Arab sector. It also provided them with relatively greater access to government and non-government sources of funding (Bogot & Nachmias 2000; Zeidan & Ghanem 2000).

daily life of the Arab minority in Israel. This space has the potential to cultivate models of a transformational leadership that pursues, in a systematic, specialized and professional fashion, a real betterment of the situation and quality of life of the Arab citizens of Israel. The task-oriented and issue-oriented approach of civil-society leaders is strongly linked to their qualifications and skills and less so to clan or confessional affiliation considerations. This civic leadership places issues on the public and institutional agenda, spearheads public campaigns, and bolsters the Arab public's awareness of its needs and status in diverse spheres of life.

Several characteristics of the NGOs' activity space support the creation and cultivation of a new and more effective informal public leadership:

- Their voluntary, civic, and modern nature favors post-traditional patterns of mobility and participation, which are distinct from the rigid traditional, hierarchical, and patriarchal structure represented by the veteran and official leadership and institutions of Arab society.
- These organizations are more likely to adhere to values and standards of proper management, professionalism, and transparency, as part of their aspiration to emulate similar organizations in Western countries and to satisfy the prevailing criteria for receiving philanthropic funding and grants.
- Their methods develop civil participation and awareness through the use of sophisticated tools to influence public policy (e.g., disseminating information, writing position and policy papers, lobbying, holding public conferences). As such, the civic organizations serve as a hothouse for continually cultivating and training professionals, *inter alia* in leadership skills. In other words, this is a leadership that by its very nature creates and cultivates subsequent generations of new leaders.
- The focus on issues and the grassroots activity create many more opportunities for building civic coalitions that can serve as bridges between different sectors of the population and create social networks of leaders and support groups that cooperate with one another.

The civil-society organizations of the Arab minority in Israel produce many positive changes and display major leadership potential. Nevertheless, these organizations, and the social and civic leaders who are active in them, face many problems, obstacles, and challenges that make their work more difficult. Although some of these problems may not be unique to Arab civil-society organizations, they are amplified and exacerbated by the political, economic, and social circumstances of the Arab minority in Israel.

One fundamental obstacle has to do with the small number of NGOs in Arab society. In light of the claim that these organizations are an essential hotbed and channel for the growth of modern, initiative-taking, younger leaders with higher education who employ modern and more effective methods, their contribution to leadership will be minor and insufficient as long as they remain limited and scanty.

A major obstacle to bolstering the status of civic leadership in Arab society today is that it finds itself on a collision course with the traditional and formal political Arab leadership. The clan-based, religious and political leadership circles (both local and national) play a significant social, communal, and political role and are deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Arab public. Arab civic leaders must deal with the power struggles, attempts at delegitimation, and noncooperation by the traditional and representative leadership of Arab society. These circumstances pose a twofold challenge to the informal public civic leadership as it attempts to consolidate its legitimacy and public authority within the Arab constituency.

Another problem stems from the serious financial difficulties of Arab Third-Sector organizations. On the one hand, there are limited resources within Arab society, including a paucity of private funding sources. On the other hand, government and public support for these organizations is meager (Galnoor *et al.* 2003). Government agencies view Arab NGOs as a hostile risk factor and their policies reflect this perception. The leaders of Arab organizations find it difficult to receive financial support, win contracts, obtain various certifications, and register as NPOs. Arab organizations must endure more intrusive government inspection and oversight than do Jewish organizations (*ibid.*). The economic problems also have a negative effect on the professional training of the leaders of civic organizations and increase their economic dependence on private foundations that are not always focused on the real needs of Arab society in Israel today.

Note that in a situation of limited resources, the proliferation of Arab civic organizations that address the same field (such as education and culture) is counterproductive. The lack of coordination, the competition among organizations, and the tendency to identify Arab civic organizations with their personal leaders and heads, sometimes impede intelligent and strategic use of existing financial and human resources.

These problems have operational and performance implications: as the ability of Arab civic organizations and leaders to act and wield real influence decreases, their proclivity to focus mainly on professional consulting and on defining problems and alternatives increases. Consequently, when it comes to actually improving the lot of the Arab minority in Israel the civic leadership's potential leverage becomes feeble, limited, and is apt to become merely virtual.

D. Educational leadership within the managerial echelon in the Arab education system

The scholarly and professional concept of the role played by school principals in the education system has developed significantly, especially since the 1990s (Bogler 2000). Originally principals were seen as having a distinctly administrative role. During the 1970s and 1980s there was a movement toward combining the administrative role with the development of pedagogical programs. Starting in the 1990s, there has been a clear trend towards seeing the principal as an “educational leader” engaged in “educational leadership.” As such, the principal is a proactive and dynamic shaper of an educational vision (Bass 1985) who simultaneously implements, conserves, and propels change. Principal-leaders mold shared policy and objectives, manage the implementation of policy and the learning processes in the school, and oversee the faculty and institutional resources. They must demonstrate effective skills in decision making, interpersonal communication, and time management (Brama and Friedman 2007). Consequently, the principal’s importance and centrality increases. The principal’s professional identity, performance level, and leadership abilities are perceived to have a significant impact on the pedagogical discourse, educational practices, and pupils’ achievements (Arar 2007; Goldring *et al.* 2007).

The profile of professional competence (Bandura 1977) considered to be essential, desirable, and required of a school principal who is an educational leader, has expanded and changed during the last decade.

Scholars and experts in the field assert that it must include the following four main dimensions²⁹:

- **Cognitive abilities**, including knowledge in the fields of pedagogy and organizational management; a capacity for evaluation and analysis, a focus on defined tasks, and a capacity for strategic planning; awareness of the school’s particular political, social, cultural, ethical, and economic context; and the ability to develop an educational-institutional vision that can trigger action.
- **Behavioral abilities**, including the capacity to direct, guide, and motivate the faculty; persistence in pursuing a goal; an ability to work dynamically in changing and uncertain conditions; managing relations with the world outside the school; and transparency and accountability.
- **Social abilities**, such as the ability to include all parties involved in the educational activity in the decision-making process; an inclination toward dialogue in running

²⁹ Brama and Friedman 2007; Knuth and Banks 2006; Fullan 2005; 2003; Hallinger 2003; MacBeath 2003; Louis 2003.

the school; good human relations and an ability to empathize; a heightened response to variation and diversity; and an ability to win the trust of the people surrounding him/her at school.

- **Emotional abilities**, such as patience, sensitivity, integrity, fairness, ethical conduct, and serving as a personal example.

A principal with these traits and ability-profile is an authentic, effective, and transformational pedagogical leader. A leader of this type has an ethical anchor and an educational doctrine that combine a local and community perspective with a view of the entire system and organization. This makes it possible for the principal to lead, generate and leverage the change required for pupils and the school to succeed.

The authentic component of the principal's character relates to: loyalty and a commitment to a set of educational values (an internal compass), compliance with codes of integrity, fairness, and transparency, and an ability to engage in self-criticism and self-reflection (Martin 1986; Schechter 2002). Authentic leaders are not occupied in thinking about how they can be seen by others as "in control," but rather are aware of their own abilities and limitations and act accordingly, while creating a reciprocal system of effective influence between the leader and his/her constituency. An authentic leader's values are expressed in personal ethical behavior, trust in others, high educational standards, and strong self-discipline (Fullan 2005). The internal compass that guides the authentic educational leader finds expression in the vision that he/she creates and instills in the educational institution. A transformational educational leader's vision provides clarity, guidance, drive, and meaning to the faculty's work (Arar 2007).

In the case of the Arab education system, its relatively inferior situation and status in Israel³⁰ indicate that there is a vital need for educational administrators that are leaders who can serve as appropriate agents of change within the school. On the other hand, given the relatively poor performance and achievement levels of the Arab school system in Israel, the enduring disparities between it and Jewish education, and the persistent obstacles that confront the system and its graduates,³¹ it is hard not to be skeptical about the effectiveness of the current Arab education-administration elite. There can be no doubt that when principals fail in the Arab sector, Arab pupils pay a particularly high price. Such failure has long-term social and economic implications for Arab society as a whole.

³⁰ For more on this subject see Abu-Asbah 2005; Abu-Asbah & Avishai (Eds.) 2007.

³¹ Including: the lack of correspondence between programs for training educational administrators and the specific context of Arab education; the value-crisis in Arab education; the absence of expression of the unique identity and culture of Israeli Arabs in the curricula of the Arab education system; and its graduates' restricted access to higher education in Israel.

Many current Arab principals lack the elements of professional competence that form the aforementioned profile of an authentic and effective transformational educational leader. They lack the contemporary abilities, knowledge, and skills that are essential for improvement by Arab pupils in particular and by the Arab education system in general. Arab principals today are woefully deficient in their ability: to identify and relate to the genuine needs of their pupils and of their broad community; to draft a clear, inspirational, and feasible educational strategy; to consistently and candidly project a pertinent set of professional values; to engage in internal criticism of the running of the school, including their own performance;³² to energize and implement actual change; and to set standards for cooperation, dialogue, fairness, integrity, transparency, excellence, responsiveness, and accountability.³³ An indication of this is provided in a study by Hanegbi (1999), who found that principals in the Arab sector perceived the atmosphere in their schools to be worse than that in schools in the Jewish sector. This perception impedes the introduction of changes in how the schools are run, including allowing teachers to participate in the decision-making process. The same study also found that teachers in Arab schools share the feeling and sense of dissatisfaction with the way the school is run and its overall atmosphere.

Even more important, the mentioned elements of professional competence are not kept in mind by those responsible³⁴ for selecting, appointing, and training the future educational managers and leaders of Arab education.

In other words, the methods for training future Arab principals, and especially the way in which they are chosen and appointed, do not satisfy the parameters and standards of the profile of professional competence expected of a transformational and change-oriented educational leader today.

On the contrary, the process of selecting and appointing Arab school principals is rife with irrelevant and unprofessional political and partisan considerations that are motivated by internal Arab local politics and national institutional policy concerning Arab education.³⁵ The Education Ministry's restrictive, suspicious, and centralized policy, on the one hand,³⁶ and the excessive involvement of Arab local government and of the traditional, clan and confession-based structures, on the other, leads to a fawning school-administration culture among Arab principals. The emphasis on political sycophancy (local and state-establishment) and on satisfying narrow and individual interests, and the need to deal

 ³² Note that an empirical study conducted by Dr. Khaled Arar (unpublished) about differences in the styles of male and female principals in Arab schools found that the men are more likely to be involved in local politics outside the school, and sometimes represent large clans. By contrast, the women place greater emphasis on their pedagogical involvement within the system and concentrate on improving educational processes in the Arab school.

³³ See at length in: Hanegbi 1999.

³⁴ In the Education Ministry, and within the sector itself.

³⁵ Eddy and Chen 1995; Al-Haj 1996; Eddy and Ayalon, 2000; Abu-Asbah 2006.

³⁶ On the involvement of security concerns in the appointment process in the Arab education system see, for example, Melman 2004.

with clan representatives and local political bigwigs within the Arab schools, hampers the introduction of appropriate professional models and mechanisms to locate, evaluate, and appoint principals. They also hold back the development of an authentic transformational educational leadership in Arab education.

In these circumstances the conservative, hierarchical, change-resistant inclinations are reinforced by the behavior and performance of Arab principals. The low rate of turnover of principals in Arab education and the perception of the principal's job as a lifetime appointment³⁷ are indications of the current ineffectual stagnation.

*

To sum up, the four leadership issues described above are associated with core areas in the life of Arab society in Israel: the economy, local government, civil society, and the education system. There are reciprocal relations among these four issues and leadership-sectors, and they have a potential for cross-fertilization. For example, Arab entrepreneurial leadership could make a major contribution to strengthening the Arab civic leadership by supporting and making financial investments in Arab NGOs. A modern and effective municipal leadership could create greater economic opportunities for potential Arab entrepreneurs. School administrators with a participatory orientation could make a real contribution to strengthening the status of a modern civic leadership in Arab society, with cooperation at the community level.

But development is blocked in all four arenas of leadership. Many of the obstacles are the result of conditions, patterns, and traits that are internal to Arab society, and these must be modified and remedied.

In keeping with the principles of the Van Leer working group, these are arenas that have a strategic leveraging potential, both for fostering the next generation of a modern Arab leadership and for the overall advancement of Arab society in Israel. The local and community context and connection of these four leadership spheres amplifies their latent potential to be particularly attentive to the needs of Arab society in Israel today and to energize the essential changes in it.

The next section presents the measures recommended by the working group, for the advancement and development of the leadership spheres described above.

 ³⁷ The low turnover rate of principals in Arab schools is also a function of the persistent shortage of jobs for educated Arabs and of the relatively high status that school principals enjoy in Arab society.

6. Recommendations

The working group's recommendations sketch out paths and actions for fostering and developing leadership in each of the main areas identified. Some of them relate to required changes and steps at the level of government policy and attitudes, but most of them have to do with practices and measures within Arab society.

The members of the working group and its professional consultants attach particular importance to the fact that most of the recommendations were proposed by experts and professionals who are themselves Israeli Arabs. This is an essential step toward the crystallization of more appropriate and effective strategies for developing a modern Arab leadership.

For the reader's convenience, the recommendations are arranged in the order of the discussion in the previous section.

A. Cultivating Economic-entrepreneurial leadership

As noted, there is a need to develop and cultivate a transformational economic-entrepreneurial leadership in Arab society, as a human mechanism that can leverage improvement in the condition and economic status of Arab society in Israel. In order to fully realize the entrepreneurial and economic potential that exists within the Arab minority today and to deal more vigorously with this minority's employment and socioeconomic distress, steps must be taken to reduce and overcome the obstacles and stumbling blocks, both inside and outside the sector, that keep Arab entrepreneurship from flourishing. In this sense, we are talking about a dialectic process in which the encouragement of Arab entrepreneurship depends on lowering the obstacles but simultaneously helps overcome them.

The basic strategy for cultivating Arab entrepreneurial leadership must be based on two principles:

- Broad cooperation that cuts across sectors and involves all relevant parties in Israel, meaning: businesspersons, capitalists, and Jewish and Arab entrepreneurs; civil servants (both Jews and Arabs, especially in the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Employment, the Interior Ministry, and representatives of local government); business and financial organizations (on the countrywide level and in the Arab sector); representatives of Arab local government; Jewish and Arab civil-society organizations with an economic orientation; economists and experts in fields such as business administration and the labor market.

- Two-track development (Haidar 2006b), which means working in parallel in the Israeli marketplace and economy and within the Arab sector: that is, on the one hand, vigorously improving and encouraging the integration of Arab entrepreneurs, economists, and representatives in the institutions of government and the Israeli marketplace, and developing and creating more economic opportunities for Arab entrepreneurs and for the Arab labor force in general, with an accent on their increased integration into the civil service, the Israeli economy, and national economic projects; and on the other hand, enhancing, improving, and cultivating abilities, skills, conditions, and economic and business activity within Arab society.

Propelling the internal entrepreneurial dynamic, while raising the participation rate of Arabs in the labor force and developing internal mechanisms for economic support and professional training, will help the Arab economic leadership deal with today's market conditions and reduce dependence on the government and economic establishment.

Building on this foundation, a number of recommendations emerge, which can be divided into three categories:

1. National policy and legislation

What is needed here is action targeted at changing government policy with regard to the economic development of the Arab population in Israel. The changes should incorporate, for example: the mandatory inclusion of more representatives of Arab economic interests in decision-making forums of the relevant government ministries and national economic organizations (such as the Export Institute); government subsidies to encourage the employment of Arabs in the private and public sectors; the inclusion of more Arab entrepreneurs in national development and infrastructure projects (such as the national plans to develop localities in the periphery and to strengthen the Galilee and Negev); the drafting of a new multiyear development program for Arab society; the establishment of public and private funds and foundations to support and encourage Arab entrepreneurs; and the injection of additional resources (including land) to develop infrastructure that can jump-start economic projects and entrepreneurial activity in Arab society.

In this category, the Arab economic leadership must form itself into a professional economic lobby vis-à-vis decision-makers in the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Employment, the Prime Minister's Office, etc. This leadership should include Arab businesspersons, economists, professional media advisers, professional lobbyists, representatives of civic organizations that focus on economic development, and professionals in the fields of employment and business management.

With regard to policy, note that in early 2007 it was decided to establish the Minority Sector Economic Development Authority (to deal with the Arab sector, including the Druze and

Circassians), within the Prime Minister's Office.³⁸ This new authority is still being set up. It will include an advisory council of 25 businesspersons and public representatives, about half of them representing minorities. It will have two main missions: first, encouraging economic activity (such as encouraging and injecting investments, supporting business initiatives, bolstering the economic activity of local authorities, promoting employment, etc.); second, promoting earmarked budgets and keeping track of the share of the State Budget allotted to the Arab public.

The professional Arab economic lobby should focus on promoting and stimulating the actual start of operations by the new authority in the Prime Minister's Office. Efforts should be directed toward expanding its activities and increasing its power by augmenting its budget.

2. Local action

On the local level, the focus should be on stimulating local economic development projects and programs in Arab society.

Organizationally, a National Arab Steering Committee³⁹ should be set up to promote economic entrepreneurship in Arab society in Israel and to initiate, encourage, and track local programs to encourage Arab economic entrepreneurship. The committee, which will canvass for the support and commitment required to promote Arab entrepreneurship, will include representatives of Arab local government authorities, members of the Arab Businessmen's Club, representatives of local chambers of commerce, representatives of Arab professional associations and trade unions, university economists, and Arab educators.

As part of the focused projects, efforts should be invested in the following five directions:

1. Establishing and developing Arab industrial and commercial zones, with the initiative coming from Arab society itself, and as a collaborative effort by government agencies and the Arab private sector and Third Sector.
2. Developing large businesses and expanding existing small and midsize businesses in the Arab sector. Here stepping up the involvement of MATI (business development centers) in the Arab sector, to provide advice, assistance, and economic mentoring, would be of great help.

³⁸ <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Decisions/2007/02/des1204.htm>

³⁹ The proposed steering committee would work in collaboration with an Arab organization for economic and job development affiliated with the Supreme Monitoring Committee, as proposed by Prof. Aziz Haidar (Haidar 2006b).

3. Encouraging continued activity by the Arab Businessmen's Club, which was established several years ago. The Club should expand its economic cooperation with international business organizations and with entrepreneurs from the neighboring Arab countries.
4. Launching professional retraining programs for university-educated Arabs, with the emphasis on high tech entrepreneurship. Formal job-placement mechanisms should be established for university-educated Arabs.
5. Running programs to encourage and foster entrepreneurship in two specific groups—women and young adults. Efforts should be concentrated on Arab women without advanced education in order to encourage them to join the labor force and to help them improve their socioeconomic status. These efforts should be directed toward the creation and development of new sources of employment and income for Arab women without advanced education. Rather than being knowledge-based, they should fall into areas of small-scale private, local, and regional initiatives in traditional domestic spheres such as: ethnic cuisine, textiles, authentic local crafts, organic farming, and cheese making. At the same time, efforts should be invested in young entrepreneurs in high tech as early as high school. Advanced technological courses of study should be developed in Arab high schools, along with mechanisms for scholastic and vocational guidance that emphasize these areas.

3. Arab local authority heads

A key and essential resource for upgrading economic and entrepreneurial leadership in Arab society is associated with the nature of the leadership of the heads of Arab local authorities. Here the idea is to develop a model of "cross-leadership", that is, a combination of municipal political leadership and entrepreneurial leadership with an orientation toward economic development. The heads of Arab local authorities should serve as local public and political leaders but should also develop channels and mechanisms to encourage the business community. This implies economic and community planning, including the expansion of industrial and commercial zones within the jurisdictions of local government authorities, the establishment of economic advisory agencies, the introduction of incentives and benefits for entrepreneurs within the local authority's limits, etc. Full cooperation among the various local authority heads and between them and Arab capitalists, countrywide leaders, and civic activists is essential for the realization of such "cross-leadership".

B. Development of an effective and modern municipal public leadership

In order to upgrade the professionalism, effective performance, and abilities of elected municipal leaders in contemporary Arab society and in order to cultivate a pool of talented and experienced countrywide leaders from among the Arab local public leadership, the patterns and surrounding conditions of the traditional and local public leadership in Arab society must be modified.

The change should be effected by developing and implementing a three-part model for fostering a modern Arab municipal leadership.

The model has three elements: (1) fostering post-traditional affiliations; (2) increasing the stability of coalitions; (3) consolidating a clear vision. The basic contention is that only the implementation of these three elements can free the modern local leadership from the chains of the hegemony of the traditional social structure and from the internal obstacles that impede its local and countrywide prosperity.

Fostering the post-traditional affiliation of Arab local council and authority heads means encouraging candidates for and incumbents in municipal leadership positions to identify with modern political and social organizations that are not linked to or derived from local clans. In other words, encouraging the candidacy and incumbency of mayors and council heads associated with nontraditional representative frameworks that transcend tribal divisions, such as political parties and independent social and political movements. This means encouraging, establishing, and supporting modern social and political forms of organization in Arab localities as the basis for running for local office and for producing modern municipal leaders who do not act according to narrow clan interests.

In the operational dimension, the recommendation is to take steps to set up new representative and independent groups and organizations in the Arab local arena while bolstering the local activity and involvement of existing political frameworks, such as the local branches of the countrywide Arab political parties.

Alongside this structural activity, there is room for focused efforts and programs to foster community, sociopolitical, and civic awareness in Arab localities and augment the ability of young independent candidates to run in local elections and mobilize support from the community based on their qualifications and abilities.

The typical coalition circumstances out of which Arab municipal leadership emerges constitute a real stumbling block to focused, professional, and effective performance by the heads of Arab local authorities. Frequently they find it difficult to establish a stable coalition after the elections because of the large number of local clan-based lists that clear the electoral threshold and win seats on the council. The coalitions that are cobbled

together frequently have many partners and a complicated makeup. The need to respond to the narrow interests of and pressure exerted by members of the council impedes the development and implementation of work plans for the entire locality that would benefit the residents.

As an operational measure, raising the electoral threshold might create more favorable conditions that permit streamlining the performance and governance capacity of Arab local authority heads. A threshold of at least three seats should be set for a list to win representation on an Arab local council.

The third element in the model relates to the importance of a leadership vision as an essential element for both local politics and national politics. The idea underlying this assertion is that a social, economic and community program and vision, developed, disseminated, and implemented by the mayor or council head can enable municipal leadership to leverage its position on a countrywide basis to benefit the entire Arab society in Israel. Such a vision would include a multidimensional agenda to benefit the local community in particular and Arab society in general, as well as a long-term program for implementing the agenda. Here vision is conceived of as a tool to mobilize local support, to energize social change and action by the Arab population, to foster the next generation of Arab leaders, and to focus the activities of the local authority.

Encouraging awareness of the importance of such a vision, and its actual crystallization, would require education and training in two channels:

The first applies to local authority heads and to future candidates for local office. This group needs courses and training programs on: transformational leadership with a capacity for initiative, types of leadership, leadership tools (including devising a clear strategic vision), media and leadership, the current situation of Arab society in Israel and mechanisms for mobilizing support. Jewish and Arab civil-society organizations that specialize in cultivating leadership and civic participation can be responsible for such programs.

The second channel relates to Arab teenagers and young adults. It is important to raise the next generation's awareness of leadership issues in general and of leadership in Arab society in particular, including an understanding of the internal obstacles that impede the development of an effective Arab leadership. Leadership-education programs should be set up in Arab high schools, as a cooperative venture between the Education Ministry and relevant Arab civic organizations.

C. Development and empowerment of informal public leadership in civil society

Empowering civic leadership in Arab society in Israel can serve as a lever for the growth of the rising generation of young and committed civic leaders who come from diverse backgrounds and professions and who are characterized by initiative and an active orientation, possess contemporary skills, adhere to post-traditional patterns and standards, and adopt a modern change-directed secular orientation.

The basic strategy for cultivating and promoting the roles and power of the civic leadership that Arab society in Israel needs, has three fundamental components:

1. Expanding and reinforcing the organizational infrastructure of Arab NGOs: these organizations and the public arena they create constitute a channel through which Arab civic leaders with effective and essential patterns of action can develop. Increasing the number of civic organizations in Arab society and bolstering their status would help multiply the opportunities available to potential civic leaders and realize their latent potential to benefit Arab society as a whole.
2. Cultivating and empowering the human capital found in the Arab NGOs: developing the abilities of those active in Arab civic and social organizations and linking them more strongly to the Arab communities in which they want to work and induce change, would help civic leaders augment their importance in Arab society. Here it should be noted that all parts of Arab society must be represented in the social and civic organizations. In particular, the opportunities for Arab women to be members of and to lead Arab NGOs must be expanded.
3. The principle of “parallel action”: the informal public leadership within Arab civil society must be positioned in parallel to the continued existence of the traditional and political leadership actors and structures of Arab society today. In order to reduce friction, action should be taken on parallel tracks, so that the civic leadership is not drawn into a dynamic of conflict and delegitimation vis-à-vis the traditional and political leadership. The civic leaders in Arab society today should not brashly present themselves as constituting a political alternative to the Arab parties, including their leaders, on collective issues related to the Arab public in Israel.

A number of steps should be taken to help implement this threefold strategy:

First of all, there is a need to develop and draw on additional sources of funding for Arab NGOs, through the establishment of an Arab Support Foundation that would focus on mobilizing and developing sources of funds within the Arab population. Such a foundation would moderate the dependence of these organizations and their leaders on outside and foreign subsidies, increase the number of organizations in Arab civil society, and expand the options for activity by their members.

The foundation would be run by a local board of trustees that would include representatives of the public, observers, and auditors. From the professional standpoint, the foundation would be run by leading Arab professionals in financial management. The executive would work to establish a formal support network of prominent businesspersons.

Second, cooperation and coordination among the NGOs, including their leaders, and between them and the formal representative bodies of Israeli Arab society, must be strengthened. An umbrella organization should be set up to coordinate activity and to draft a comprehensive conceptual and operational outline for strengthening Arab civil society in Israel, based on a broad systematic perspective on the needs of the Arab minority today. This umbrella organization would cultivate coalitions of Arab NGOs and increase coordination and cooperation among them. One of the coordinating group's missions would be the establishment of a nationwide information network for the exchange of information and ideas. The umbrella organization would have a general assembly of the member organizations, elected democratically and on a rotating basis. Formal meetings and conferences to bring together this umbrella organization of Arab NGOs and official representative bodies of Israeli Arab society, would help create a dynamic of cooperation and shared commitment.

Another recommendation is to establish a Center for Research, Training, and Developing Civil-Society Leadership in Israeli Arab Society. The Center would be a resource for education and training about civil-society leadership, with the accent on skills, management practices, and standards of transparency and accountability. It would combine knowledge of models and methods in Israel and the world with a deep familiarity with the social, political, and economic context of the Arab minority in Israel. The Center would cooperate with academic bodies in Israel and abroad in areas relevant to civil society and civic leadership, as well as with Arab civil-society organizations and representative bodies such as the Arab Citizen's Supreme Monitoring Committee.

As a first stage, a professional planning committee should be established to consolidate the Center's rationale and working methods and to set up a public steering committee. The next stage would include establishing the actual operating mechanisms of the Center.

D. Fostering an authentic and transformational education-administration leadership

As noted, the roots of the ineffectual performance of many Arab school principals lie in the recruitment and appointment processes of Arab school principals and in the methods for training potential administrators for Arab education in Israel.

An appropriate response to the roots of the problem would require the establishment and adoption of an ideal model that can serve as a guide and diagnostic tool and as a professional, focused, up-to-date compass for training, identifying, and selecting appropriate future principals for Arab schools. The adoption of such a model could mitigate the extraneous political and traditional-social influences, contaminated by unprofessional considerations that enter into the appointment of many Arab principals in Israel. The elements of the model could focus the identifying and training processes of future Arab principals on the professional metrics required today.

The proposed model consists of five expected professional elements that, taken together, aim for the desired profile of a principal who is an authentic and effective transformational educational leader.

These elements are as follows:

1. **The principal as an authentic agent of pedagogical change:** A principal's values must be manifested in: ethical conduct, integrity, and fairness toward the people surrounding him/her; confidence in the correctness of his/her educational path; a commitment to a clear educational and scholastic vision; a sincere desire to effect change and improve the system for which he or she is responsible; strong self-discipline; high standards when it comes to teaching and learning processes; and the existence of a solid and responsible moral, cultural, and identity core that is relevant to the specific nature of the Arab minority in Israel today.
In this context, it is expected that principals will be aware of and able to implement authentic strategic planning, which requires that they first identify, in collaboration with the faculty, all of the school's internal needs and capabilities. Only after these have been identified can attention be paid to the external environment of the school and its pupils. In other words, principals must emphasize administrative and pedagogical introspection and listen to the voices of the faculty and community in an organized and established fashion.
2. **A leadership style that is participatory, dynamic, and transformational:** Principals must foster a participatory-school approach, which makes it possible for many collaborators with a moral and educational common denominator to take part in planning and carrying out education in the school. As such, the principal must be able to develop a network of relations, based on support rather than control and subordination, with teachers, parents, and pupils, while investing in building an integrated learning community and removing the obstacles that confront it⁴⁰. Such relations require a “flatter” organizational structure that distances itself from the hierarchical and traditional modes of thinking in Arab society.

 ⁴⁰ Regan & Brooks 1995; Blase & Kirby 2000; Harris 2002.

In addition, principals must not stagnate in a static management style. Rather, they must adapt their administrative approach and skills to the specific circumstances and needs of the hour. That is, they must have versatile educational-administrative skills. The principal's "toolbox" should include a creative combination of leadership traits and skills, including: achievement orientation, decisiveness, caring, conviction, a capacity for monitoring and oversight, boldness, and collaborative thinking and experimentation. Principals must guarantee that the school environment and climate are safe and pleasant, demonstrate their command of education policy and legislation, show an ability to conduct negotiations, and work to satisfy the needs of the pupils and community.

3. **A mission and values orientation:** Principals who are educational leaders must be motivated by a strong sense of mission and clear and solid values, combined with trust in and moral support of the school community. By consolidating and inculcating an educational and scholastic doctrine with an ethical orientation, the principal can unite the school community around planned, focused, and worthwhile tasks that are linked to the specific cultural and identity repertoire of the Arab population in Israel.
4. **Synergistic teamwork:** This element involves a willingness to redistribute authority and power in the Arab school. Arab principals must abandon hierarchical, conservative and centralized patterns of control and management, and understand that this concession is no loss at all. They must be wise enough to know how to delegate authority to intermediate echelons in the school (grade coordinators, counselors, department heads, etc.) and to employ a decentralized management approach. Fostering effective teamwork means cementing a shared, agreed on, and focused goal, detached from political considerations and traditional outside actors (such as clans). As part of this team orientation, Arab principals must have the skills needed for problem solving, dispute resolution, negotiations, and collaborative decision-making.
5. **A guiding and enabling orientation:** The required Arab principal must emphasize his/her role as guide, initiator, and enabler of the teaching, learning, and evaluation processes, accompanied by the involvement of the broader school community (including parents) in the crystallization of the pedagogical vision. This approach requires constant sharing of knowledge and information, fostering interaction and dialogue among all those engaged in the educational process, standardization of measurable feedback and evaluation tools, and transparency in school administration.

In order to promote the adoption and implementation of the model for locating, evaluating, appointing, and training future Arab school administrators, as described above, it is hereby proposed to invest focused efforts in three directions:

1. Changing the selection method and appointments policy applied to Arab principals today by establishing a new independent agency with entrenched professional authority that will be responsible for identifying and evaluating future Arab school administrators. The new mechanism will operate in accordance with the professional standards and components of the suggested model, reducing the centralized political power and influence of representatives of the national and local education establishment. This body will consist of leading Arab educators, Arab academic experts, and representatives of the Arab public, working in cooperation with the Education Ministry.
2. Developing and running compulsory official mechanisms to guarantee the existence of processes for collaborative community policy-setting, decision-making, and oversight in Arab schools in Israel. These mechanisms will cultivate the fruitful involvement of principals, teachers, pupils, and parents in the educational making, encourage taking responsibility and joint initiative, and develop a culture of constructive and effective evaluation and feedback.
3. Ameliorating, updating, and improving training programs for the pool of future Arab school administrators in Israel, so that they more strongly express the unique elements of the Arab minority in Israel in general and of the Arab education system in particular, as well as the components of the ideal professional model of an effective, authentic, transformational, education-administration leader.

7. Afterword

The members of the Working Group on the Development of Arab Leadership in Israel, at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, believe that their insights and recommendations can serve as the basis for the further development and implementation of a comprehensive strategic plan to promote a modern and effective Arab leadership that benefits the Arab sector in particular and Israeli society in general.

The group's work produced a description and analysis of various areas, issues, and steps to be taken.

All the issues and proposals have two main common denominators:

- First, an emphasis on the vital need to cultivate and develop leadership patterns for Arab society in Israel, with a transformational, active, and change-directed orientation;
- Second, recognition of the vast responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the Arab leadership in particular and of Arab society in general to modify the internal patterns and structures that impede modern and effective development.

The recommendations presented in this paper include conceptual and system changes on the macro level, alongside more focused steps such as the establishment of new institutions and agencies and the introduction of new educational programs.

The recommendations are a scaffold for improving the performance of the Arab leadership in Israel, and there is certainly room to flesh out the operational aspects.

There are many obstacles and potential resistance along the road to the desired change and improvement. Power struggles within the sector, entrenched perceptions within the Israeli establishment, the traditional and conservative social structure, and a shortage of resources can all be expected to make it difficult to implement the various recommendations.

But it is precisely in the light of the continuing leadership crisis in the various spheres of Arab society that bold and intelligent action in the areas proposed, taken by means of the recommended steps, could make maximum use of the human capital that exists in Arab society to work for broader and more comprehensive change.

There are, no doubt, other domains of leadership that were not addressed by the Van Leer working group. The development of the legal, cultural, or media leadership of Israeli Arab society is a task that can be carried out on the foundation provided by a stronger strategic infrastructure of the business leadership, municipal leadership, civil-society leadership, and educational-administration leadership of the Arab minority.

The following steps are among the actions that would contribute to the betterment and development of an effective modern leadership in Arab society in Israel:

- Establishing an Arab professional economic lobby.
- Running programs to encourage and foster business initiatives by young Arabs and by Arab women.
- Encouraging new post-traditional organizations and representative groups at the Arab local level.
- Offering courses in "leadership education" in Arab high schools.
- Establishing an Arab Support Foundation to develop sources of funding for Arab civil-society organizations.
- Running a Center for Research, Training, and Developing Civil-Society Leadership in Israeli Arab Society.
- Establishing a new professional mechanism to identify, evaluate, and appoint Arab principals.

We hope that the group's work and recommendations can assist policy-setters and decision-makers in the Israeli establishment, as well as Arab society, including its current and future leaders, in their efforts to improve and advance the functioning of Arab leadership in Israel.

8. References

- Abu-Asbah, K., 2001. "Dilemmas and Issues in Values Education in the Arab School in Israel," in S. Scolnicov, Y. Iram, et al. (eds.), *Values and Education in Israeli Arab Society*, Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Education (Hebrew), pp. 441--479.
- . 2005. "The Arab Education System in Israel: Development and a Current Snapshot," in A. Haidar (ed.), *Arab Society in Israel. 1. Economy, Society, Population*, Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hame'uhad (Hebrew), pp. 201--221.
- . 2006. "Unresolved Issues in the Arab Education System: Before and After the Dovrat Report," in D. Inbar (ed.), *Toward Educational Revolution?* Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hame'uhad (Hebrew), pp. 248--261.
- . 2007. *Arab Education in Israel: Dilemmas of a National Minority*, Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute of Policy Studies (Hebrew).
- . and L. Avishai (eds), 2007. *Recommendations for the Improvement of the Arab Education System in Israel*, Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute.
- Adalah, 2007. *The Democratic Constitution*. http://www.adalah.org/eng/democratic_constitution-e.pdf, viewed 1 April 2008.
- Al-Haj, M., 1993. "The Changing Strategies of Mobilization among the Arabs in Israel: Parliamentary Politics, Local Politics, and National Organizations," in E. Ben Zadok (ed.), *Local Communities and the Israeli Polity: Conflict of Values and Interests*, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 67--86.
- . 1995. *Education, Empowerment and Control: The case of the Arabs in Israel*, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- . 1996. *The Arab Education System: Control and Social Change*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press (Hebrew).
- . and H. Rosenfeld, 1990. *Arab Local Government in Israel*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- . and H. Rosenfeld, 1990. *Arab Local Government in Israel*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Givat Haviva: Center for Arab Studies. (Hebrew).
- Amara, M., 1998. "The Clan in Arab Politics: Adaptation to Changing Patterns," in E. Rekhess (ed.), *The Arabs in Israeli Politics: Dilemmas of Identity*, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew).
- Arar, K., 2007. "Training Educational Leadership in the Arab Education System in Israel." in L. Mansour (ed.), *Al-Rasalah: A Pedagogic, Literary, and Scientific Journal* (Arabic).
- Avolio, B., 1999. "The Full Range of Leadership, en route to Raising the Effectiveness of the Individual, the Group, and the Organization," in I. Gonen and E. Zakay (eds.), *Leadership and Leadership Development*, Tel Aviv: MOD Publishing House (Hebrew).
- Awad, Y., 2004. *The Economic Condition of the Arab Population: Selected Issues*, Tamra: Ibn Khaldun--Arab Association for Research and Development (Hebrew).

- Bandura, A., 1977. "Self-Efficacy: Towards a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change," *Psychological Review* 84: 191--215.
- Barakat, K., 1993. *Research Schools in Education and Psychology*, Kuwait: Dar al-Ilm (Arabic).
- Bass, B. M., 1985. *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*, New York: The Free Press.
- . 1990. *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*, New York: The Free Press.
- Ben-Bassat, A. and M. Dahan, 2006. *The Balance of Forces in the Budgeting Process*. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute (Hebrew).
- Ben-Elia, N., 1999. *Government Finance and the Fiscal Crisis in Israeli Local Authorities*, Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies (Hebrew).
- Benford, R. D. and D. A. Snow, 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment", *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611--639.
- Bennis, W., 1998. "The End of Leadership." Paper presented at the International Leadership Association Conference 1998, <http://www.ila-net.org/Publications/Proceedings/1998/LeadersScholars.pdf>
- Benziman, U. and A. Mansour, 1992. *Subtenants: Israeli Arabs, Their Status and the Policy Towards Them*, Tel Aviv: Keter.
- Bird, B. A., 1989. *Entrepreneurial Behavior*, Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Co.
- Bishara, A., 1995. "The Crisis of Arab Leadership: Where is the New Generation?" in E. Rekhess, T. Yegnes (eds.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads*, Tel-Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew), pp. 47--52.
- Blase, J. and P. Kirby, 2000. *Bringing Out the Best in Teachers: What Effective Principals Do* (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.
- Bogler, R., (ed.), 2000. *Leadership and its Application in Education*, Tel Aviv: Open University (Hebrew).
- Bogot, A. and N. Nachmias, 2000. "The Government of Israel's Control of NGOs: Legal Dilemmas and Structural Constraints," *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 3(2): 1--15.
- Brama, R. and I. Friedman. 2007. "Professional Competence of School Principals: A Questionnaire for Self-Evaluation by Principals," Jerusalem: Henrietta Szold Institute (Hebrew).
- Burns, J. M., 1978. *Leadership*, New York: Harper & Row.
- . 1986. "Leadership," in B. Kellerman, (ed.), *Political Leadership: A Source Book*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 419--427..
- Central Bureau of Statistics, 1998. *Results of the Local Authorities Elections, 10 November 1998*. No. 1112 (Hebrew).
- . 2007. *Press Release: On the Eve of Israel's 59th Independence Day: Approximately 7,150,000 Residents of Israel*. Apr. 24, 2007 (Hebrew).

Chrislip, D. D and C. E. Larson, 1994. *Collaborative Leadership: How Citizens and Civic Leaders Can Make a Difference*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Cohen, R. 1989. "The Political Evolution of Israeli Arabs as Reflected by their Voting in Eleven Knesset Elections, 1948–1984," Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew).

Conger, J. A., 1998. "Qualitative Research as the Cornerstone Methodology for Understanding Leadership," *The Leadership Quarterly* 9(1): 107–121.

Dwairy, M., 1997. *Personality, Culture, and Arab Society*, Nazareth: Al-Nur al-haditha (Arabic).

Eddy, A. and M. Chen., 1995. "Men as Gatekeepers of Women's Jobs: The Feminization of the Educational Administration—Ethical Value or Employment Threat?" in A. Ben Amos and Y. Tamir, (eds.), *The Teacher: Between Mission and Profession*, Tel Aviv: Ramot (Hebrew), pp. 79–96.

——— . and H. Ayalon, 2000. *Gender Inequality in Hiring: A Comparison of the Three Educational Sectors*, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University School of Education (Hebrew).

Elgie, R., 2001. "Leadership: Political." in N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences*, New York: Elsevier, Vol. 13, pp. 8578–8583.

Etzioni-Halevy, E., 1993. *The Elite Connection and Democracy in Israel*, Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Hapo'alim (Hebrew).

Even Chorlev, N., 2008. *Report: Arab NGOs for Civic and Social Change in Israel: Mapping the Field*, Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute.

Fullan, M., 2003. *Change forces with a Vengeance*, London: RoutledgeFalmer Press.

——— . 2005. *Moral Imperative of School Leadership*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Galnoor, I., et al., 2003. *Committee to Study the Roles of the Third Sector in Israel and Policy toward It: Final Report*, Beersheva: Israeli Center for Third-Sector Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Hebrew).

Gandhi, L., 1998. *Post-Colonial Theory: A Critical Introduction*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Ganz, M., 2004. "Organizing as Leadership" in G. Goethals, G. Sorensen, and J. M. Burns,(eds.), *Encyclopedia of Leadership*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 1134–1144.

Gardner, J. W., 1990. *On Leadership*, New York: The Free Press.

Ghanem, A., 1995. "Municipal Leadership among the Arabs in Israel: Continuity and Change," in Y. Landau, A. Ghanem, and A. Hareven(eds.), *Arab Citizens of Israel at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*, Jerusalem: Magnes Press (Hebrew).

——— . and S. Ozacky-Lazar, 1995. *Between Peace and Equality: The Arabs in Israel in the second half of the Avoda-Meretz Government*, Givat Haviva: The Institute for Peace Research (Hebrew).

——— . 1996. "Political Participation by Israeli Arabs," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Haifa (Hebrew).

——— . and N. Abu Sharqiya, 2003. *The Politics of Local Government among the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel*, Tamra: Ibn Khaldun–Arab Association for Research and Development (Hebrew).

——— . and M. Mustafa, 2008. "The Future Vision as a Collective Political and Theoretical Platform of the Palestinians in Israel," in S. Ozacky-Lazar, M. Kabha (eds.), *Between Vision and Reality:*

The Vision Papers of the Arabs in Israel, 2006-2007, Jerusalem: The Citizens Accord Forum (Hebrew), pp. 83-96.

Gibton, D. and M. Chen, 2003. "Training School Principals as Public and Moral Leaders," in Y. Dror, D. Nevo, and R. Shapira (eds.), *Changes in Education: Lines for Israeli Education Policy in the 21st Century*, Tel Aviv: Ramot (Hebrew).

Goldring, E., E. Porter, J. Morphy, X. Cravens, and S. Elliot, 2007. *Assessing Learning-Centered Leadership*, prepared for the Wallace Foundation.

Greenstein, F. I., 1992. "Can Personality and Politics be Studied Systematically?" *Political Psychology* 13(1):105--128.

Gurr, T. R., 1993. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

——— . 2000. *People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Haidar, A. (ed.), 2005a. *Arab Society in Israel. 1. Economy, Society, Population*, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hame'uhad (Hebrew).

——— . 2005b. "The Arab Economy in Israel: Policy that Creates Dependency," in A. Haidar (ed.), *Arab Society in Israel. 1. Economy, Society, Population*, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hame'uhad (Hebrew) pp. 171--200.

——— . 2006a. "Strategy for Social Development of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel," in *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*, <http://www.arab-lac.org/tasawor-mostaqbali-eng.pdf>, viewed 24 March 2008, pp. 22--26.

——— . 2006b. "Economic Strategy for the Palestinian Arabs in Israel," in *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*, <http://www.arab-lac.org/tasawor-mostaqbali-eng.pdf>, viewed 24 March 2008, pp. 19--21.

Haj-Yahia, K., 2002. *Dream and Reality: A Study of Israeli Arab Graduates of German Universities*, Tel Aviv: Ramot (Hebrew).

Hallinger, P., 2003. "Leading Educational Change: Reflections on the Practice of Instructional and Transformational Leadership," *Cambridge Journal of Education* 33(3):329--352.

Hanegbi, R., 1999. "The School Dynamic and the School Atmosphere," Ph.D. dissertation, School of Education, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew).

Harari, Y., 1978. *The Municipal Elections in the Arab Sector*. Givat Haviva: Center for Arab Studies (Hebrew).

Harris, A., 2002. *School Improvement: What's in it for Schools?* London: Routledge.

Hollander, E. P., 1985. "Leadership and Power," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II, New York: Random House.

Israel Ministry of the Interior, 2003. *Local Elections: Results of Elections for the Council and Authority Head, 1998*, <http://www.moin.gov.il> (Hebrew).

Jabareen, Y., 2006. *An Equal Constitution for All? On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in Israel*, <http://www.mossawacenter.org/files/files/File/An%20Equal%20Constitution%20For%20All.pdf>, viewed 24 March 2008.

- Jamal, A., 2003. "Thoughts on the Dilemma of Under-representation and In-Affectivity," *Eretz Aheret*, 16: 20--24 (Hebrew).
- . 2006. "The Arab Leadership in Israel: Ascendance and Fragmentation", *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35(2): 6--22.
- . 2007. "Strategies of Minority Struggle for Equality in Ethnic States: Arab Politics in Israel", *Citizenship Studies* 11(3): 263--282.
- Kark, R. and B. Shamir, 2002. "The Dual Effect of Transformational Leadership: Priming Relational and Collective Selves and Further Effects on Followers," in B. Avolio and F. Yammarino (eds.), *Transformational/Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead* (Vol. 2), Amsterdam: JAI Press, pp. 67--91.
- Katz, H., et al., 2006. *Figures on the Third Sector in Israel, 2006*, Beersheva: Israeli Center for Third-Sector Studies, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Hebrew)
- Kellerman, B., 1984. "Introductory Remarks," in B. Kellerman, (ed.), *Leadership: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
- . and W. S. Webster, 2001. "The Recent Literature on Public Leadership Reviewed and Considered," *The Leadership Quarterly* 12(4): 485--514.
- Khamaisi, R., 1994. *Towards Strengthening Local Government In Arab Localities in Israel*, Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute (Hebrew).
- Knuth, R. and P. Banks, 2006. "The Essential Leadership Model," *NASSP Bulletin* 90(1): 4--18.
- Landau, Y., 1993. *The Arab Minority in Israel: Political Aspects*, Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hebrew).
- Louis, K. S., 2003. "School Leaders Facing Real Change: Shifting Geography, Uncertain Paths," *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 33(3): 371--382.
- Lustick, I., 1985. *Arabs in the Jewish State*, Haifa: Mifras (Hebrew).
- MacBeath, J., 2003. "Editorial," *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 33(3): 323--329.
- Mada al-Carmel, 2007. *The Haifa Declaration*, <http://www.mada-research.org/arabic/archive/haifaenglis.pdf>, viewed 1 April 2008.
- Martin, M., 1986. *Self-Deception and Morality*, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas
- Marwick, D., 1996. "Elites," in A. Kuper and J. Kuper (eds.), *The Social Science Encyclopedia*. London: Routledge, pp. 237—238.
- Melman, Y., 2004. "The General Security Service asked for Equality. So it Asked", *Ha'aretz Online*, 23.05.04 (Hebrew), <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtSR.jhtml?itemNo=430649&objN o=56313&returnParam=Y>
- Moustafa, M., 2005. "Local Elections among the Arab Minority in Israel: The Growth in the Power of the Clan and Waning of the Political Parties," in E. Rekhess and S. Ozacky-Lazar (eds.), *The Municipal Elections in Arab and Druze Localities, 2003: Clans, Confessions, and Parties*, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew)
- National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006. *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*, <http://www.arab-lac.org/tasawor-mostaqbal-eng.pdf>, viewed 24 March 2008.

- Neuberger, B., 1995. "Trends in the Political Organization of Arabs in Israel," in E. Rekhess, T. Yegnes (eds.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads*, Tel-Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew), pp. 35--45.
- Ozacky-Lazar, S., and M. Kabha, 2008. "Introduction," in S. Ozacky-Lazar, M. Kabha (eds.), *Between Vision and Reality: The Vision Papers of the Arabs in Israel, 2006-2007*, Jerusalem: The Citizens Accord Forum (Hebrew), pp. 5--11.
- Popper, M., 1994. *On Managers as Leaders*, Tel Aviv: Ramot (Hebrew).
- Rabinowitz, D., and K. Abu-Baker, 2002. *The Stand Tall Generation*, Jerusalem: Keter (Hebrew)
- Regan, H. B. and G. H. Brooks, 1995. *Out of Women's Experience: Creating Relational Leadership*, Thousand Oaks: Corwin Press.
- Reich, R., 2002. "Leading When Everyone's a Free Agent," in *Conversations on Leadership, Harvard University Leadership Roundtable 2000–2001*, KSG -- Harvard University.
- Rejai, M. and K. Philip, 1997. *Leaders and Leadership: An Appraisal of Theory and Research*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Rekhess, E., 1985. *The Arab Village in Israel – A renewed Political National Center*, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Shiloah Institute, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew).
- . 1993. *The Arab Minority in Israel: Between Communism and Arab Nationalism 1965-1991*, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew).
- . (ed.), 2007. *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel - "The Arabs in Israel" Update Series*, Special Issue, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University (Hebrew).
- Rosenbach, W. E. and R. T. Taylor, 1998. "Preface" and "Leadership in Perspective," in W. E. Rosenbach and R. T. Taylor (eds.), *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rothman, S., 2001. "Political Elites," in N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences*, New York: Elsevier, Vol. 17, pp. 11656--11661.
- Sandel, M. J., 1982. *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Schechter, C., 2002. "Authentic Leadership in the Education System," *Studies in Educational Administration and Organization* (Hebrew), 26: 69--92.
- Schnell, I., 2004. "Economic Relations between Jews and Arabs," in S. Hasson and K. Abu-Asbah (eds.), *Jews and Arabs in Israel in a Changing Reality*, Jerusalem: Floersheimer Institute (Hebrew), pp. 98--107.
- Shamir, B., 1999. "Leadership in Boundaryless Organizations: Disposable or Indispensable?" *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology* 8(1): 49--71.
- Sharabi, H., 1992. *The Patriarchal Structure and Issues in the Backwardness of Arab Society*, Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies (Arabic)
- Shihadeh. M., 2006. *Impeding Development: Israel's Economic Policies towards the Arab National Minority*, Haifa: Mada al-Carmel (Hebrew).
- Smooha, S., 1990. "Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13(3): 389--413.

——— . 1999. *Autonomy for the Arabs in Israel?* Ra'anana: Center for the Study of Arab Society in Israel (Hebrew)

Sofer, A. and Y. Bystrov, 2006. *Tel Aviv State: A Threat to Israel.* Haifa: Reuven Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa.

Sofer, M., I. Schnell, I. Drori, and A. Atrash, 1995. *Arab Entrepreneurship and Industrialization in Israel*, Ra'anana: Center for the Study of Arab Society in Israel (Hebrew).

Solomon, I., 2008. "A Friend Brings a Friend", *Ha'aretz Online*, 11.4.2008 (Hebrew), http://www.sikkuy.org.il/media/haaretz11_4_08.htm

Stendel, O., 1992. *The Arabs of Israel – Between a Hammer and a Pole*, Jerusalem: Akademon (Hebrew)

Totry, M., 2008. "The Vision Documents: Coping with an Internal Crisis," in S. Ozacky-Lazar, M. Kabha (eds.), *Between Vision and Reality: The Vision Papers of the Arabs in Israel, 2006-2007*, Jerusalem: The Citizens Accord Forum (Hebrew), pp. 120–125.

Tzur, N., 2001. "The Rhetoric of Israeli Leaders in Times of Pressure," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Hebrew).

Walzer, M., 1995. "Introduction," in M. Walzer (ed.), *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Providence: Berghahn Books.

Weissman, N., 2004. *Family-Owned Businesses*, Tel Aviv: Ziv Haft Accountants (Hebrew).

Yukl, G. A., 1998. *Leadership in Organizations*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Zeidan, E. and A. Ghanem. 2000. *Patterns of Giving and Volunteering of the Palestinian Arab Society in Israel*. Beersheva: Israel Center for Third Sector Research, Ben-Gurion University (Hebrew).